PRAMĀṆALAKṢAṆA OF MADHVA
with
JAYATĪRTHA'S COMMENTARY

(Translation and Critical Study)

A Thesis Submitted to the University of Poona

for the award of the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

(in Sanskrit)

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"PRAMĀNALAKSANA OF MADHVA WITH JAYATĪRTHA'S COMMENTARY (TRANSLATION AND CRITICAL STUDY)

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was carried out by the candidate under my supervision. Such material as has been obtained from other sources has been duly acknowledged in the thesis.

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जन्माष्टमी.
August 1987.

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A B B R E V I A T I O N S

AnaRā - AnarghaRāghavam.

AnuBh - AṇuBhāṣya.

AnuVyā- AnuVyāKhyāna.

BhāDī - BhāvaDīpiKā

Bhāg - Bhāgavata Purāṇa

BraTa - BrahmaTarKa.

BraSū - BrahmaSūtra.

BraSūBh- BrahmaSūtraBhāṣya.

DS - DVādaśa Stotra.

J - JayaTīrtha.

KaLa - KathāLaKṣaṇa.

KaNi - KarmaNirṇaya.

LaNyāA - LauKikaNyāyāñjali.

M - Madhva

MaBh - VyāKaraṇa MahāBhāṣya

Mavi - MadhvaVijaya.

MāKha - MāyāVādaKhaṇḍana

MāMe - MānaMeyodaya.

MBTN - Mahābhārata TātparyaNirṇaya

MiKha - MithyātvānumānaKhaṇḍana

MīSū - Mīmāmsā Sūtra

NyāBi - Nyāya Bindu

NyāKalpa- Nyāyakalpalatā.

NyāSā - NyāyaSāra

NyāSū - NyāyaSūtra

NyāSūBh- Nyāya-Sūtra-Bhāṣya

NyayaVar- Nyāya Vārtika.

Nyāyāmr - Nyāyāmṛta

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NS - Nyāya Sudhā.

P - Pāṇini.

Pān. - Pāṇḍurangi - Tippaṇī.

PC - Pramāṇa Candrikā.

PL - Pramāṇa Lakṣaṇa.

PP - Pramāṇa Paddhati.

PraVā - Pramāṇa Vārtika.

PS - Pramāṇa Saṅgraha.

Rāgh. - RāghaVedra's Commentary.

SaDaSam - Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha.

ŚāBh - Śābara bhāṣya.

SiKau - Siddhānta Kaumudi.

SloVā - Mīmāṁsā ŚlokaVārtika.

Śrī - Śrīnivāsa's Commentary.

Taka - Tarka Kaumudī.

TaNi - TattVa Nirṇaya.

TāRa - TārKika Rakṣā

TāSam - Tāratamya Saṅgraha.

TāṬī - Tātparya Ṭikā

Tattvo - Tattvodyota.

Upākha - Upādhi Khaṇḍana.

Vādā - VādāVali

VaiSū - VaiśeṣiKa Sūtra.

VTN - VisṇuTattva Nirṇaya

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INTRODUCTION

It is our common experience that everyone wants to be always happy and not to suffer even a little sorrow, but he does not have his wish fulfilled. What could be the reason for this situation? The simple answer to this question is: no one can do everything according to his wish; he is not able to control his affairs by himself, it is some other unknown power which controls not merely the activities, pleasure and pains etc. of every being, but also happening in the world. Consequently the question arises: What is that Supreme power, which makes us move, as it wishes?' and to find out the answer for this question, has been a task for the people of different times and places. Even Brahmdeva is not an exception to this. After he was born in the divine lotus, he also became curious to know as to where he came from, and also as to who held that lotus etc. It is said that he went back into the stem of the lotus in order to find out the origin of that lotus.[1]

Thus the curiousity to know the nature of the divine power (or the God) and so also the attempts to remove it, (i.e.curiosity) have continued from immemorable times. Maharṣi Vedavyāsa is the first among those who recognised this curiosity, and wrote the first Brahmasūtra' athāto Brahmajiṅñāsā[2]'- thereby preparing a ground for Indian philosophy. In addition to this there were already the Vedas, the Upniṣads and the Gītā as the chief source of Indian philosophy. The group of these sacred texts was known as' prasthānatrayī.

All the Indian philosophers who believed in the authority of the Vedas, tried to find out the path to permanent happiness for common people and also the real nature of the divine powe

held this group of sacred texts as the basic source of their thoughts and presented their own systems of thought, known as the schools of Vedānta.

Among those, the three Ācāryas are well known: Śaṅkarācārya, Rāmānujācārya and Madhvācārya. The three systems of these three are different on account of their basic concepts, the concept of 'dualism' and the concept of 'non dualism'.The only common feature among these three is that, all of them consider as the source of their system, the Prasthānatrayī. But this common source itself presented great difficulties for them. Because, already the upaniṣads by themselves do not appear to be saying one and the same thing, there appear in them varied views of a number of thinkers. (The Brahmasūtras which present an attempt to put into a system these varied thoughts., has recorded the contraversions So also does the Gītā. There are many statements in the Gītā which are considered as mutual contradictions).And this situation has compelled them(i.e. these Ācāryas) to show that there is no contradiction in the thoughts of the prasthānatrayī and had to attempt a proof for their own systems as originating in the prasthānatrayī.While doing this, each of them explained away what seemed as internal contradictions' in the upaniṣads and the Gītā by effecting a suitable construction (samanvaya) of the passages in them. But while they did so, they had to establish how the other exponents are wrong in reading their doctrines in these sacred texts.

This become more and more necessary, or rather, unavoidable for each subsequent Ācārya. This explains why each subsequent exponen of any system (even a later follower of each) concentrated his attention more on the refutation of other's views, than teaching his own system of thoughts.

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The story of Maṇḍanamiśra and sayings like 'विचारण्यं महारण्यं अक्षोभ्यमुनिराच्छिनत्' show us that there was an uniterrupted tradition of debates among the followers of these systems. These debates were either in writing or in public meetings. Since, these debates became unavoidable as a part of the propogation of a particular system, there arose a necessity of having a concrete idea about a well defined means of argument whereby a particular system can establish it's own views, and refute the others.

In this regard, most of these systems took the help from the Tarkaśāstra, and on the line of that Śāstra, they adopted some means for proving their doctrines. These means, adopted to examine and prove something, are technically known as pramāṇas.

As mentioned above, Madhva, who was the exponent of a totally different system (namely, dvaitavāda), based on the same source, also had to face the difficult task of defeating other systems especially that of Śaṅkara, being prominent among them; because when Madhva was born most of the intellectuals were attracted towards the philosophy of Śaṅkara. Even Madhva's own teacher, Acyutaprekṣācārya was not exception to this. It is learnt from an account of the life of Madhva that he had to fight even with his own Guru, as regards Śaṅkara's conclusion drawn from the sacred texts.[3] As a result, there was a big burden on Madhva, of refuting the views of Śaṅkara, and he had therefore to define clearly and to adopt certain such affirmative ways of arguments as could point out the defects in what appeared as Śaṅkara's invulnerable arguments. This surely points to Madhva's distinction from others; Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja who adopted the pramāṇas that were already in vogue that is to say; they did not find it important to examine even the nature of the time honoured pramāṇas,

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separately. Contrary to them, Madhva gave special significance to this aspect of a discussion and therefore wrote among his ten Prakarana granthas, two prakaranas, one dealing with the nature of the pramāṇas and the other with debate; they are the pramāṇa lakṣaṇa and the kathālakṣaṇa. In the kalhālakṣaṇa Madhve explains the basic rules of debate while in the Pramāṇalakṣaṇa he explains nature of pramāṇas, (the means for establishing his views and for refuting that of others). And thus indeed the importance of these two works of Madhva cannot be overlooked. I became aware of the importance of these two works more and more while I repeatedly read the Sarvamūlagranthas of Madhva, and I tried to find out if there were any attempts made earlier to study these two small and yet great in importance works of Madhva. Of these two again, the pramāṇalakṣaṇa Needs more attemtion because the views discussed in this play an important role in establishing Madhva's philosophy.

I noticed that this has not received sufficient attention from scholars. Only a few valuable attempts were made to focus light on the post-Madhva literature in Madhva's tradition and introduce some aspects of Madhva's logic.

1) Mādhva Logic:- Dr.S.K.Mitra-Calcutta University, 1936-(free translation of the Pramāṇacandrikā of Challari Śeṣācārya - a primer of Mādhva logic)

2) The Reign of Realism in Indian Philosophy:- R.Naga Raja Sarma; The National Press. Madras 1937. (A chapter of this work gives summary of the Pramāṇalakṣaṇa)

3) Pramāṇalakṣaṇa of Madhva :- Literal English translation (Incomplete) By Dr.Narahari; Adyar Library Bulletin (Brahmvidya) Vol.xvii Octo. 53.

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(This covers only a few lines of the text. i.e. upto 'sambhava parisesavanumā)

4) The Epistemology of Dvaita Vedānta:-Dr.Nagaraja Rao.The Adyar Library And Research Centre Adyar,Madras 1976(Based on the Pramāṇa paddhati of Jayatīrtha)

5) The Pramana Paddhati of Sri Jayatīrtha; English translation, Dr. Nagaraja Rao and Prof.K.Krisnamurthy A.M. Jain College, Institute of Management, Madras 1982

According to my knowledge, no attempt was made to examine Madhva's own work The Pramāṇalakṣaṇa. Therefore A critical study of the Pramāṇalakṣaṇa became a desideratum. It is to be remembered that Madhva writes his works in a cryptic style, and the Pramāṇalakṣaṇa is also writeen in the Sūtra style. It is not possible for one to understand the bare text of this work easily. It needs the help of some commentary. And among all the commentaries that of Jayatīrtha on Madhva's work is undoubtedly the best. For, it is rightly observed 'without Jayatīrtha Madhva's works are closed books to us. They are read always together (Mūla and Tīkā)[5]. Naturally I thought it imperative to take up the study of the Pramana-lakaṣana with the commentary of Jayatīrtha. On this commentary of Jayatīrtha, there are only a few, sub-commentaries.This is so because later followers of Madhva's school concentrated more on Jayatīrthas more complete and exhaustive work the pramānapaddhati than on this commentary already a cryptic work. Therefore the study of the commentary together with theoriginal work under comment assumes greater significance,it helps us to trace the origin and development of

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Jayatīrtha's thought on Mādhvalogic. The source of a notable work of Jayatīrtha, however small it appeared, had to be clearly and fully understood.

The critical study undertaken here is accompanied by a complete literal translation of both, the original work of Madhva and the commentary of Jayatīrtha. And this translation has a profuse annotation with the help of the sub-commetaries. For that would amplify the thoughts of Madhva which are expressed with a most briefness.

Before I proceed to the study of the text and the commentary I feel it necessary to note in brief some information about Madhva, his philosophy, his basic thought regarding pramānas, some important aspects of this work in the range of Madhva's works and also other works on pramānas, etc, and the position of this work as opposed to the thoughts of the other systems etc. .....

A) M's life and Principal Tenets of his Phiolpsophy -

M is known for his dualism. He introduced a system of Vedānta which was based on realistic view regarding the world. He presented a totally different thought, when two different schools of Vedānta name: Sānkara and Rāmānujiya were already established, and particularly the former had created deep impact on the minds of the people in all corners of India. If we look into this situation the question will come to our mind, 'What led Madhva to profound a new system of Vedānta and was there really anything new in his system? And for the answers to these questions, we have to see some of the important aspects of M's life.

It was in 1230 A.D,[6] when M was born. His father was a well known Vaidika pandita in the village Pājaka some eight miles away from

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Udipi in South Karnataka. The name of M's father was Madhyagehabhatta, and his mother's name was Vedavati. M was the son born to this couple after their long waiting for a son. M had undergone his thread ceremony in his early childhood. After his upanayana M was taken to a Pandita of the Pūnayana family for the study of the Vedas and the Śāstras. He showed his brilliance and completed the study much earlier than other boys of his time. At the time of study M was not satisfied with what was being taught. He observed that the philosophy being taught to him
7 was contrary to common experience.[7] Therefore, when his teacher taught him the Aitareyopaniṣad, he questioned his teacher about the correctness of the meaning of it, further corrected his teacher and explained
8 to him the real meaning of the upaniṣad[8], as he saw. This was the real gurudakṣiṇā given by M to his Guru.

Having completed his study M returned home, but he was not interested in following the oridinary path of grhasthāśrama, and therefore, one day he left home in search of a guru to Udipi.

According to tradition M was requested by a group of deities
9 'Make us happy by removing the influence of a māyāvāda[9] on people, and teaching them the greatness of Viṣnu." Therefore M wanted to become a Sannyāsin. This account indicates that he was not satisfied with the situation around him. He thought it necessary to take sannyāsa for being able to wander about over various regions among the people, thereby seeking the removal of māyāvāda and the propogation of the reality of the world. This led M to Acytaprekṣa, his sannyasaguru. After receiving sannyāsadīkśā from Acyutaprekṣa, M was named 'pūrṇa-
10 Prajña'[10]. At that time he was just 15 years old.

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As Madhvavijaya has recorded, M's life is full of such heroic deeds and incidents as show his super-human powers. We are not concerned with these, but what is important to us in his life is his two trips to 'Badarikāśrama' from Udipi by two different routes. In these two tours he travelled over different parts of India and found it necessary to give a new system of vedānta. The story of his life tells us that, when Acyutaprekṣācārya first started to teach
11 him the Iṣṭasiddhi of Vimuktātman, M pointed out many defects in the very first stanza of the Iṣṭasiddhi and Acyutaprekṣācārya was not able to explain them away and satisfy M. Similar incidents continue to happen in the later period of his life also. At some place in his journey, he showed people that many of the readings in the Bhāgavata
12 Purāṇa[12] known to them were wrong and also showed them the correct readings. Among the well known pandits of that time who were defeated
13 by M in debate are i)[13] Vādisimha ii) Buddhisāgara iii) Vidyāsaṅkara bhārati, the then chief of śṛngerisaṅkara maṭha. iv) Shobhan bhatta who was the administrator of Orrissa and who later on became the nearest disiple of M, and was known as Padmanābhatīrtha.

But only pointing out of the defects of other systems in debate was not sufficient, there occured certain incidents which compelled M to write new works. Thus, for instance, when he had a debate with Vidyāsaṅkara bhārati M pointed out many defects in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya of Saṅkarācārya and in answer Vidyāsaṅkarabhārati remarked, Is it not better to write a new commentary on the Brahmasūtr
14 instead of only pointing out defects in the present.'[14] M took up the challange from this sharp remark to write a bhāshya on the

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Brahmasūtras. In yet another place in a temple on the bank of the river Payasvinī when he was delivering a lecture on the Aitareyaupaniṣad he was asked by the listeners to show how his meaning is supported by the text. He then revealed how the upaniṣad has a threefold meaning to convey Thus he exhibitted an instance of the need of showing three meanings. There is many an important insidents in M's life but we are not concerne with them. Some of the events mentioned above show the background and the situation which led M to present a new system of Vedānta and to write some important works for the establishment and propogation of this syster As a result of this travel all over India, his debates with different scholars of different systems, his familiarity with and careful study of various manuscripts, his lectures, and meetings with all types of people, M has produced as many as 37 valuable works for posterity. Though these works he has favoured not only the intellecutals of the society but also ordinary people, M's speciality is that he took all the three, Śruti Smṛti, and Purāṇas as the support for his views.

M is the only philosopher in India who commented upon the Ṛgveda, the Mahābhārata and the Bhāgavata also. Besides, in the course of his discussions he has quoted a number of smṛtis and Purāṇas which are possibly last to this day. He took full support of what he stated as the 'sadāgama and composed the following works.

1) The Commentaris on the prasthānatravī- i) two commentaris on the the Bhagavad Gītā -a) the Gitabhaṣya and b) The Gītātātpuryanirṇaya ii) four works on the Brahmasūtras- a) the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya b) the Aṇubhāṣya c) Anuvyākhyāna d) the Nyāyavivaraṇa, and the ten commentris on the ten upaniṣads = total 16.

2) Daśa Prakaraṇas- The ten short monographs some elucidating the basic principles of his philosophy. They are i) The pramāṇalakṣaṇa ii) the

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Māyāvāda Khaṇḍana iii) the Upādhi khaṇḍana iv) Prapañca mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana v) the Tattvasaṅkhyāna vi) the Tattvaviveka vii) the Tattvodyota viii) the kathālakṣana ix) the kathāniṇaya and x) the Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya = total 10

3) The commentaries and notes- i) the Ṛgbhāṣya ii) the Mahābhāratatātparyanirṇaya and iii) the Bhāgavata tātparyanirṇaya = total 3, And

4) Minor works - i) the kṛṣṇāmṛtamahārṇava ii) the Tantrasāra iii) the Sadācārasmṛti iv) the Dvādas'astotra v) the Yamakabhārata vi) the Yatipraṇavakalpa vii) the Jayantinirṇaya and viii) the Nakhastuti; total 8 = in all 37

M has left these works for his devotees so that they should acquire the real knowledge of his philosophy and thereafter also of the ways of the Vedic religion. Again, before he left for Badarikāśram for ever, he established a temple of Śrikrishṇa at Udipi and made it possible for his followers to pursue the way of devotion to Viṣnu.

So having thus found the proper paths of jñāna and bhakti which are two important instruments of getting final liberation, M disappeared from the mortal world in 1318 AD.

If any one becomes familiar with any of the major events of M's life or reads carefully any one of his 37 works, he would easily understand that M, all through his life, through his speach, physical activities and intention, faught for the removal of the influence of māyāvāda.

The basis of M's philosophical system is reality of the Universe. M observed that those, who indeed experience the reality of the world but do not accept it for their philosophical convenience, have to face many difficulties and so they have to name that reality

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as vyavahārika satyatva. And because of this contradiction in their own experience and statements, they cannot guide the people properly. M observed that the intellectuals like his own guru, Acyutaprekṣa knew through their experience that they are not the masters of themselves. They cannot do every thing according to their wish and therefore they have to accept that there is some higher divine power and yet they could not frankly accept so, since they were under the influence of māyāvāda. And because of such influence alone, they were following the path of philosophy which had no answer for the actual experience contrary to their views. M firstly stood against this situation and stated his philosophy which gives importance to the actual experience, namely the reality of the world. And hence i)'Viśvam satyam'is the most important tenet of M's philosophy.

If this first important principle is accepted, there is no difficulty in accepting some other such as Viśnusarvottamatva' God Viṣṇu is the highest among all gods'. Every one experience, that the worldly activities are beyond the control of an individual being and God Viṣṇu who controls all beings[18], is to be accepted as the supreme. what the advaitins hold as Brahman is Viṣṇu to M.M is of the opinion that God Viṣṇu is full of aspicious qualities[19] and free from all the defects. All others including the Goddess Lakṣmī are dependent on Him. Therefore, all other gods are inferior to Him. Our life, pain, pleasure etc.is obtained through his desire only. For explaining this, M wrote a distinct work the Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya'and established how all the purāṇas also support Viṣṇusarvottamatva.

Because of this fact (that Viṣṇu is the highest) we cannot be indeferent to Him. There are many factors which create distinction between God Viṣṇu and any other individual soul. Thus, He is full of qualities and the souls are not so. He is defectless, but all other beings are

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affected by many defects. Also while all other beings are under the fear of death, He is completly free from fear. He is the doer par excellence — (3) 'Harihkartā' of all acts.

If such a distinction exists between God and other souls, how they can be not different from each other? On the other hand, not only God is different from the individual souls but all individual souls also are different from each other in every respect. No one is equal to another in his nature, appearance etc. due to their emotions of six types. If some one is found similar to another we wonder about it. Therefore speaking of oneness in all beings also is untenable. So M refuted the doctrine 'jīvo Brahmaivanāparah' and established the principle of eternal difference. According to him this eternal difference is of five types i) between jīva and Īsa[20] ii) between jada and jīva iii) between jada and Īsa iv) between jada and jada and v) between jīva and jīva. As this five fold difference is eternal, it never comes to an end and it continues to be, even at the state of final liberation. Accepting this principle of basic difference, M has solved all the doubts of common people as to why one cannot be like another. M taught them that, philosophy (Vedānta) is not to be considered as apart from daily life, or rather the life being experienced by one alone is philosophy! tatvato bhinnāh jīvaganāh'

M goes a step ahead and observes discrimination among the numerous souls. The souls are innumerable, the cycle of their death and birth continues endlessly. The life of every one is different, even two brothers do not get the same standard of life. what is the reason for this? The reason is the status acquired by that soul through merits and demrits in previous life or lives. This is what M names as 'gradation' 'tāratamya'. In this system of philosophy, there are 32 different[21] ranks of beings beginning with the Goddess Laksmī up to an ordinary soul. On the

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basis of this gradation only M devides all the souls into three classes i) muktiyogya 'fit for obtaining the final liberation ii) nityasaṃsārins' who would always be subjected to the cycle of transmigration (i.e. death and birth) and iii) 'tamoyogya'' ever fit to be in naraka. (nīcochha bhāvam gatāh)

And all this is unavoidable for everyone. No one can get free from sufferings without the blessings of God. This relation between the souls and God is just like the relation between a master and a servant. God Viṣnu is the master of all. I He is satisfied, only then he obliges his servants. With this intention M says that, all the souls are His servants." (Hareranucarāh").

Since no soul is independent, the master of all souls is God Viṣnu, no one can get pleasure and happyness etc. without His blessings, But what every being should do to make Him pleased and to get happiness through His blessings? The answer is 'this is possible only through 'bhakti'. Therefore M gives to bhakti the highest place in his philosophy. M clearly states that no one gets final liberation without bhakti and bhakti is full devotion towards God visnu, accompanied with the knowled that He alone is Ommipotent.

M makes the distinction between devotion and affection very clear. He gives stress on the knowledge of the greatness of Viṣnu; only when there is such knowledge, affection turns into devotion. In order to establish the importance of bhakti M has taken full support of the Purānas, especially the Bhāgavata Purāna. He explains the need of nine 22 types of bhaki ; stated in Bhāgavata purāna, and also the absence of nin 23 types of 'dvesa' with God visnu (amalābhaktisca tatsādhanam).

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From all the above discussion we see that actual experience is the main basis of M's philosophy. Whatever we see, experience, face or undergo is the basis of his philosophy. In short, the principles of his philosophy summerised are as follows:-i) the world is real ii) the God Viṣṇu is above all and the controller of all iii) every soul is distinct from God and from each other iv) and the Vedās are real and the highest proof.

(This chapter is mainly based on i) Madhva Vijaya ii) Madhvācārya ani tyānche tatvajñāna (in Marāthi) By R.B.Avadhani - Dvaitasiddhānta Prakāśana .Poona. iii) Philosophy of Sri Madhvācārya- By Dr. B.N.K. Sarma. Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan Bombay 1962)

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B) THE NEED FOR KNOWING THE SCHEME OF THE PRAMĀNAS.

As stated earlier 'a desire to know the real nature of the world and the power controlling it, is the basis of all āstika darśana of Indian philosophy and therefore while attempting to fulfil this desire, the different schools of Indian philosophy have arrived at some conclusions, which are the principal doctrines of their respective schools. The next thing all the dārśanikas had to do is to convey their ideas to common people. Again, since they had tried to find out the answers to the people's problem or doubt and not for their own benefit, they had therefore to propogate their philosophical views among them. And this was not so easy. For, every exponent of a new philosophical system had to fight with at least one earlier established system. Every one had to show, how he was correct and others were wrong. And while doing so he had to adduce some proof or had to state the means through which he arrived at his particular conclusions.

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Nobody would believe that a particular doctrine is correct or a particular doctrine is wrong, unless there is some ground to believe so. Therefore, it was necessary for each dārśanika to state that 'these are some particular means for achieving the knowledge each had-received, and these are some grounds for the views he is stating.' This aspect of philosophy is technically known as'epistemology'. And therefore, epistemology played an important role in the field of philosophy. It accquired the status of the 'Law of evidence'. Since the rules regarding evidence are not finalised or the frame of debate is not fixed,one cannot plead one's own case or defeat that of other. The exponents of the different systems of Indian philosophy considered this fact very seriously, and declared what is for them this 'Law of evidence'. In other words, what pramāṇas are acceptable to them and through which they were going to prove their conclusions in respect of Brahmajijñāsā in particul

All systems of Indian philosophy had systematically discussed this aspect of philosophy and their views are extremly divergent. There is the difference of opinion even in respect of the meaning of the word pramāṇa. Some hold it as'means of knowledge'. Others say it is the correct knowledge' or according to some others,it is both, the knowledge as well as the means of it'. Besides, there are many other points of difference in the views of different systems, such as 'the nature of the knowledge, the procedure of it's production, it's validity, the number of pramāṇas, their division, application, necessary grounds and so on.

The epistemology of any particular system deals only with these details. And therefore, it becomes necessary first to understand the epistemology of any particular system of philosophy, so that it could be properly understood. This is why it is observed'Epistemology is a portal to Metaphysics'[25].

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This is true, for example, If some one is establishing the reality of the world, or the need of merits and demerits from the passages from the Vedas or the Purāṇas; his debate with the followers of Cārvāka, or of Buddha, will never come to an end since both the systems do not accept the Vedas and the Purāṇas as authoritative

Therefore it is very much necessary to understand the epistemology of a particular system for understanding the philosophy of the same. The philosophy of M is in particular no exception to this. And hence to understand this philosophy or rather to understand his refutations of other systems one must know what are-

C) THE PRAMĀNAS ACCEPTED BY HIM ;

(PRAMĀṆAS ACCEPTED BY M.)

Since the knowledge and pramāṇas are so much connected with each other One cannot understand the view of any system regarding pramāṇas, unless he understands the concept of knowledge in that particular system. Therefore, before discussing the views of M in respect of pramāṇas we must know his concept about knowledge.

THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE: Different systems of Indian philosophy have different opinions about the nature of knowledge. The Naiyāyikas hold that, knowledge is the quality of soul. The Mīmāṁsakas say that knowledge is an action of soul. And to the Sāṅkhyas it is identical with soul. According to Śāṅkara philosophy, knowledge is akhaṇḍa 'without parts' and 'nirviṣaya' subjectless' This system accepts two types of knowledge namely svarūpajñāna and Vṛttijñāna. But only the first one, i.e. Svarūpajñāna is considered to be real. It is the cit and therefore partless and attributeless. But M's concept about the knowledge is totally different from

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above. M does not accept that knowledge is one and partless; for the simple reason that partlessness also is an attribute. Without attributing partlessness or attributelessness (which by itself is an attribute) to it, a thing cannot be said to be partless and attributeless. Knowledge is an essential attribute of Ātman. Knowledge is eternal and always associated with egoconsiciencness. Knowledge cannot be without a subject; since it is contained in the very nature of it that it should grasp an object. Anything cannot be an object unless it becomes a subject of knowledge, (unless it is not revealed by knowledge). It is our common experience that knowledge is always of something and also is restricted to a particular object; otherwise there would not be 'knowledge of anything' distinctly. Therefore it has parts. With this intention, M does not accept that the relation between the knowledge and the object is samyoga or samavāya; but according to him, the relation between the knowledge of an object and the object is to be named as 'Viṣayaviṣayībhāva' In the words of Dr.K.Narayana 'The consideration of knowledge as eternal and as an essential attribute of Atman, would go to establish that the position of knowledge in this system is more fundamental than either in Nyāya or Mīmāmsā though it does not possess such a transendental character as that of Sāṁkhya and Vedānta.'

This background of M's view in respect of knowledge will enable us to understand the concept of Pramāna accoridng to M.M first takes into consideration the function of pramānas, and thereby decides what pramāna is. What we achieve through premāna is revealling an object as it is. Now, the question will be, what is that which reveals

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an object as it is? It is knowledge only. Though usually it is said 'I grasped a pot by perception' it is not true. Because the perception is a contact (of visual faculty) with an object. The contact itself does not prove anything valid or invalid. But it is the knowledge (created through such contact) that grasps the object and not such a contact. Therefore M is of the opinion, that knowledge alone reveals an object, and hence the knowledge is the pramāṇa directly,[27] And other instruments such as perception which create such knowledge are pramāṇas indirectly.

If one understands this basic concept of M regarding the function of pramāṇas clearly he will be able to know why M has interpreted the word pramāṇa in a totally different way. The word pramāṇa is commonly translated and understood in Indian philosophy as 'means of knowledge '. But we can observe that it is sometimes, used in a very vague sense, because there are different concepts in different systems of Indian philosophy regarding what is to be known by a pramāṇa. For example, some of the systems hold that an instrument of knowledge only is pramāṇa while some others hold that an instrument as well as the knowledge obtained through such instrument also is pramāṇa. Even in a particular single system also, we see the difference of opinion regarding this. Some wanted to recognize memory as pramāṇa and others wanted to exclude it.

M had all these different views before him, and he had to give clear cut idea about this and remove the doubts of people. With this intention only, J commenting upon Anuvyā 2.i.1[29] opens this topic and answers 'yes, both, the knowledge as well as instrument of it are pramāṇas. And with a view of bringing these two under the definition of pramāṇa M interpretes the word pramāṇa in two ways following its

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two-fold etymology, and derives the meanings of the word pramāṇa as pramā eva pramāṇam (knowledge) and pramākaraṇam pramāṇam. (instrument of knowledge).And for such interpretation he takes full advantage of grammer applying the suffix lut[30] in both the senses bhave and karane and further devides pramāṇas as kevalapramāṇa and Anupramāṇa accordingly. He brings the so called pramāṇas accepted generally, under anupramāṇas and shows knowledge as kevalapramāṇa. This is what M has exactly contributed to Indian philosophy. Because, even before M, some had accepted knowledge as pramāṇa, they could not make clear the nature of knowledge as pramāṇa, and how it is distinct from other pramāṇas. This is why M is always given credit for removing the ambigmity in using the word pramāṇa.

Definition of pramāṇa:- The definition of pramāṇa in general stated by M is 'Yathāvasthita arthavisayīkāri' which cognizes (makes an object as it is, as its object) an object as it is. Knowledge does it directly (sāksāt) therefore it is Kevalam, And perception etc. do it indirectly (i.e. through the knowledge created by them- paramparayā) therefore they are Anupramāṇas.

The kevalapramāṇa is further divided into four on the basis of the knowledge of Īśa Lakṣmī, yogin and Ayogins. The details given By M in this respect, and the commentary of J on this topic furnish further details which are more philosophical than epistemological. This helps in understanding the principle of gradation between God Viṣṇu and other gods and other souls.

The anupramāṇas (which are pramāṇas to others) accepted by M are only three- i) Perception ii) Inference and iii) verbal testimony Perception is[α] contact of a defectless sense organ with a defectless object. Since M does not accept that substance etc. are totally

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different from quality etc. he does not accept six types of contacts (sannikarsa), But accepts 7 types of perception. In this division he adds one more as sāksipratyaksa the perception of the witnessself to six types based on six sense organs. This concept of sāksin[31] also is a new and valuable contribution to Indian philosophy. Because this solves so many problems, especially that of validity of knowledge. According to M Sāksin 'witness self' is in the form of knowledge only. Whatever he perceives is correct and valid only and therefore the question of validity of the cognition of the witnessself does not arise. It is self evident. It's perception can have future and part as it's object. Further, discussing the division as nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka as stated by the tārkikas M shows how the assemption of nirvikalpaka is baseless and establishes that all perception is savikalpaka 'conceptual' only.

INFERENCE:- The second anupramāna accepted by M is inference. As he defines,'inference is defectless intelligibility'. The word anumāna is mainly used in the sense of a probans, reasoning or inferential mark but in some places it also stands for syllogism; (i.e. the statement or a group of sentences which convey inferential knowledge).In order to explain the defectlessness of inference M points out the defects of inference as follows:- i) Virodha- 'contradiction' to one's own statement is a great defect. This can be through any other pramāna and through one's own statement. The contradiction through pramāna is possible through the pramānas of equal strength or more strength. Similarly the contradiction through one's own statement can be threefold, as through pratijñā, Hetu and Udāharana. Thus defect can arise on account of statement as well as of meaning.

The second important defect is inconsistency.In inconsistency the non statement of what is necessarily to be stated and acceptance of

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what is not to be accepted are covered. Therefore the probans without these defects alone is an inference, other things are immeterial. Regarding the division of inference also M's views are different. He discusses two types as sādhanānumā and dūsananumā. And the defects like self dependance, mutual dependance, circle dependance, infinite regress etc. come under dūsanānumā. Even tarka 'hypothetical argument' is also included under dūsananumā i.e. the inference presented to refute others. J discusses all other types of inference but shows disinterest in anvaya vyatireki. He also establishes that absence of having one and the same substratum or having a non existent substratum are not the defects.

In respect of avayava 'parts of a syllogistic statement'. M's views are very liberal. He is of the opinion that the aim of pararthā-anumāna- a syllogism presented for conveying something to others is to convey others that the subject possesses probandum; and if that purpose is served even with a syllogism consisting of one member it would do, and therefore there should not be any restriction regarding the numbers of it. Besides, M also shows that clinchers and futilities (jāti) along with fallacies, are to be included under the defects of inference and therefore they need not be mentioned separately.

The third pramāna is 'verbal testimony'. It is defined by M as 'defeceless word.' And the defect of an expression in this respect stands for human defects such as ignorance, erroneous knowledge, doubt misunderstanding etc. The expression is oftwo types, eternal and not eternal. The Vedas are eternal and the purānas etc. are non eternal. According to M all the syllables are eternal.

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Further in order to establish this threefoldness of pramāṇas by showing that even less number of pramāṇas, or more number than these three connot be justified, refuting the views of cārvāka and the bouddhas he shows, how it is necessary to hold inference and verbal testimony as distinct pramāṇas and while refuting the views of others who hold some more pramāṇas separately (than these three) he shows the inclusion of all other pramāṇas under these three only. Since this is discussed afterwards in a separate topic I just make note of inclusion as follows:-

1) Presumption - under inference.
2) Anology (accoridng to the mīmāmsakas) -under all the three
3) Anology (according to the naiyāyikas)- Under inference.
4) Absence (non perception) - Under perception and inference.
5) Possibility and residue - under inference
6) Upakrama 'commencement' etc- under inference
7) Samākhyā 'name' and others - under inference

As M states in Anuvyākhyāna, of these three pramāṇas, Śabda is most important pramana. Perception is upajīvya for other pramāṇas (i.e. anumā) The fact cannot be denied and therefore if any inference goes to establish contrary to whatever is percieved it is not acceptable.

While dealing with these topics, M discusses other details also, and through that establishes, 'doubt and error are real, knowledge is self evident, and so on.

What is to be achieved through the pramāṇas as well as through the study of the pramāṇas is the intituitive perception of Viṣnu and thereby final liberation.

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D) GROUNDS FOR M'S THOUGHTS ON PRAMĀṆAS -

Though M is known as 'first exponent of Dvaita philosophy' to us; He has never claimed so. On the other hand he, through all of his works has tried to show that every details of his doctrines, is based on the authority, either of vedās, or purāṇas etc, and what he states is the opinion of Vedavyāsa. But this type of giving an importance to one's own doctrine also, is found common to all the systems of philosophy. But in respect of M we can see that not only the philosophical doctrines; but the basic concepts of epistemology and ontology, M never gets credit to himself, even for presenting views regarding some subjects where he had full scope to do so. M is the first (and last also) who took the views of Vedavyāsa as a ground for his epistemology. M's two important works namely, the Pramāṇalakṣaṇa and the Kathālakṣaṇa, which deal with epistemology are the examples for this statement. In the concluding verses of both these works M states that these works are based on 'Brahmatarka'. Since this direct mention of 'Brahmatarka' is there, no other investigation is necessary to find out the source of our present work namely the Pramāṇalakṣaṇa.

Brahmatarka- Brahmatarka is the work supposed to be connected with Nyāya and Vedānta. Through out his 37 works, M has cited some 200 quotetions from Brahmatarka, stating as 'iti Brahmatarka'. Though this is not the occasion to discuss the authoritativeness of the sources of M's philosophy; one or two important points in M's life should not be ignored. They are i) M was fond of collecting manuscripts. ii) travelling through out India he experienced that people cause damage to valuable books by way of concealing, destructing or changing their readings and adding or omitting some part of it. And another important incident of a theft of his library in his life also is=

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sufficient to answer 'why the works cited by M particularly those which support his doctrines, are not available to us. Any way we are unfortunate to have Brahmatarka in full with us.

The nature of Brahmatarka - According to M, Brahmatarka is a full and complete work. It is as authoritative as the Vedās because it was given by the God Nārāyaṇa himself. Number of the ślokas in Brahmatarka is about 50 crores. It deals with all the subject of Tarka and Vedānta. Vedavyāsa did the something in respect of this work as he did in the case of vedās, namely, he collected some important of it, i.e. 5000 ślokas, and rearranged them. And the Brahmasūtras are in the form of summary of it, and with the intention of conveying this, Vedavyāsa has used the word 'atah' in the first sūtra- अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ।

Now we can examine how the statement that the Pramāṇalakṣaṇa is based on the Brahmatarka stands to reason by comparing some of the topic (or lines) of the pramāṇalakṣaṇa with the citations from the Brahmatarka quoted by M in the VisnuTattvaNirnaya -

PL.		Brahmatarka
1) यथार्थं प्रमाणम् ।	-	याथार्थ्यमेव प्रामाण्यम् ।
2) अनुप्रमाणं त्रिविधम् ।	-	अनुप्रमाणतां याति तथाक्षादित्रयं ततः ।
3) व्याप्तिरेव हि प्रयोजिका ।	-	व्याप्तिस्तु केवलापि स्यात्, (अनुमा) सा
	-	व्यर्था नोपपत्त्या हि ... ।
4) हेतुगर्भा प्रतिज्ञा केवलापि ।	-	प्रतिज्ञा हेतुगर्भैव पृथक्प्रामाण्यमेष्यति ।
5) उपपत्तिदोषो विरोधासङ्गती न्यूनाधिके वाचानिके	-	विरोधश्च तथाधिक्यं न्यूनतासङ्गतिस्तथा उपपत्तिदोषा विज्ञेया ।
6) संवादानुक्तियुता निग्रहाः	-	निग्रहा एत एव स्यु संवादानुक्तिसंयुताः ।

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PL.		Br. Tarka.
7) अभावोऽनुमा प्रत्यक्षं च	–	अभावस्य परिज्ञानं द्विविधं समुदाहृतम् एकं प्रत्यक्षरूपं स्याद्वैतीयमनुमात्मकम्"
8) निर्दोषः शब्दः आगमः ।	–	आगमोऽदुष्टवाक्यं च ।
9) केवलम्--ईश्वरज्ञानयोगयोगि-भेदेन		प्रत्यक्षं त्रिविधं ज्ञेयमैश्वरं यौगिकं तथा..... इत्यादि ब्रह्मतर्के – VTN. 19B – 20A.
10) अर्थापत्त्युपमे अनुमानिशेषः	–	अनुमैव त्वभावाख्यो ह्यर्थापत्त्युपमे तथा ।
11) (निर्दोषो)पपत्तिरनुमा	–	उपपत्तिस्तथानुमा ।

Br Āra U Bh. 5/8 P 46-47

With these examples we can see that important and basic thoughts stated in Pramāṇalakṣaṇa have Brahmatarka as their only source; and therefore, what M stated at the end of the pramāṇalakṣaṇa is justified.

Since M's original work is very small and he states the principal doctrine only, there is very less scope to quote some others. But J as a commentator in order to make it easy to understand refutation made by M (of others) first narrates the views of others and then shows how they are wrong according to M. In the commentary of the pramāṇalakṣaṇa J has fully relied upon the 'Tārkika Rakṣa' of Varadarāja for narrating the views of others. The following few illustrations will make this statement very clear.

Tārkika Rakṣā	Nyāyakalpalatā (i.e. the commentary of J on the Pramāṇalakṣaṇa)
1) प्रारिप्सितस्य ग्रन्थस्य --- श्रोतृरोमुखी-मनुकूलायेष्यन् वर्त्तिष्यमाणमेवाग्रे दर्शयति (2.1).	1) प्रारिप्सितग्रन्थाविघ्नपरिसमाप्ति--- श्रोतृरोमुखीमनुकूलायेष्यन् वर्त्तिष्यमाणमेवाग्रे दर्शयति 1.11.

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Tā Ra.	J. on the PL.
2) अनुभूतिः प्रमाणम्---- ज्ञानम् 20·1,	2) अनुभूतिरेव प्रमाणम्--- ज्ञानम् 231·25.
3) अनुमानं त्रिधा भिन्नम्--- 81·2,	3) ~~अनु~~ त्रिविधमनुमानम्--- कोचित् 35·15,
4) पक्षः साध्यान्वितो धर्मी---- 79·8	4) साध्य------ धर्मी पक्षः 35·16
5) प्रत्यक्षयोरर्थानुमापकं विशेषतो दृष्टम् 81·6.	5) प्रत्यक्ष------ दृष्टम् 35·24
6) अकृतसमयसंज्ञा ---------- उपमानम् 86·1.	6) अकृतसमय---- उपमानम् 46·5
7) साधर्म्यं धर्ममात्रं च---- भेदतः 87·2	7) साधर्म्य ------ धर्ममात्रं ~~च~~ इति 46·6
8) प्रमेयं तस्य सम्बन्धः---- फलम् 89·6	8) संज्ञासंज्ञीसंबन्ध------ फलम् 46·7
9) अनुपपद्यमान---- अर्थापत्तिः 97·3.	9) अनुपपद्यमानप्रमितिरर्थापत्तिः- 44·20.
10) तस्यावान्तरवाक्यानि ---- त्रीनुदाहरणानान् वा यद्वोदाहरणादिकान् 195·1.	10) तस्यावान्तरवाक्यान्यवयवा--- प्रतिज्ञा------ उदाहरणोपनयौ -- 66·12
11) तत्र प्रतिज्ञा पक्षोक्तिः 176·3	11) प्रतिपादनाय पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा 66·17.
12) तर्कोऽनिष्टप्रसङ्गः स्यात् 185·3	12) (अनिष्टप्रसञ्जनं तर्कः) 54·3

13) All the definitions of nigrahasthānas and Jātis stated by J follow TāRa only. Śrī. in his sub-commentary has quoted the original verses. and has stated ---- इति कारिकानुसारेण लक्षयति etc. But Śrī has not given the name of either the other or the work.

Any way, the above mentioned few illustrations are sufficient to prove that the Brahmatarka is the only source of M's thought on epistemology and while commenting upon his text, J. has taken maximum help of Tārkika Rakṣā to quote the views of others (in many respects) before they are refuted.

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E) THE DEVELOPMENT OF MĀDHVA LITERATURE ON PRAMĀṆA AFTER THE PRAMĀṆALAKSHNA - AN ACCOUNT

As we have seen earlier, M has presented a new thought on pramāṇa in his system. But has followed a cryptic style in writing his work, the PL, and hence it was impossible for an ordinary reader to understand it. Therefore, in order to help such readers J wrote an exhaustive and full commentary on it. But while writing this commentary also, J had his own restrictions as a commentator. There were many places where J could have stated something more but he did not do so, since he did not want to cross the limits of commentary, and also he had to follow the order of original text in the commentary. As a result J could explain that difficult text as simple as it would help even to an ordinary student. J felt it necessary to write an independant work in a simple language. Therefore J besides his commentary on the PL wrote a distinct independent work.

The 'Pramāṇa paddhati' which is a valuable and remarkable work in the development of pramāṇa literature after M.

The pramāṇa paddhati :-

In the beginning of this work J has stated it's purpose as to make it easy to understand the contents for the sake of the people of ordinary intellect.

First important point to be noted in respect of the PP is the topic wise arrangement of contents. J has divided the contents of PP. into three chapters as perception, inference and verbal testimony. And some topics like the examination of definitions etc are discussed in their proper place.

Though, from the contents and principal doctrines points of view, the PP. is not at all different from the PL. it makes some points more clear and helps in developing the thoughts introduced by M. Following are some of examples of it.

1) In the definition of definition, PP adds the definitions of the

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defects of a definition namely, asambhava, avyāpti and ativyāpti and discusses them with the illustrations.

2) While explaining the nature of doubt and erroneous knowledge, PP. takes an account of the views of other dārśanikas like the Vaiśeśikas the Bhāskaras, the Vijñānavādins and the māyāvādins. This surely helps in understanding the view of M regarding the acceptance of doubt and error as real. In PL this is discussed in two different places and that also in short.(P.19)

3) The examination of the definitions stated by others comes immediatel after the statement of his own definition. In the PL it comes at the end of the work.(P.23)

4) In the explanation of the derivation of the word pramāṇa PP. refutes the objection that the word pramāṇa means the substratum of valid knowledge also, on account of but having use in the sense of adhikarana. (p.34) (This is not discussed in the comm.of PL).

5) The three types of yogins and the three types of Jīvas are very clearly explained in PP.and some concepts like 'clarity of the knowledge are also discussed (See. स्पष्टत्वं चापरोक्षज्ञानगत एव विशेषः न विषयोपाधिकः P27)

6) The defects of the sense organs are discussed with illustrations(P.3

7) The three types of external sense organs as bāhyendriyam trividham daivamāsuram madhyam ceti..... etc. is the additional information in PP. (P.44)

8) Before, the view of the naiyāyikas, regarding two types of perceptio as nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka is refuted, six types of contact and eight types of Vikalpa 'concepts' are explained with illustrations.

9) PL does not directly refers to the view of the naiyāyikas regarding the result of perception, but PP does it in detail and states it's own view in clear words.

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10) In the chapter of inference PP. furnishes the details of Co-existence as -चतुष्टयी खलु धर्मिणां गतिः etc. and shows how any of these attributes, comes under inference.- तत्र व्याप्यो धर्मो व्यापकप्रमितिसाधनं भवन्ननुमानमिति सूच्यते (P.252).

11) In order to establish that 'the necessary grounds for inference are only two, i) concomitance and ii) establishment of probans in a respective place, but the subject adjunctness cannot be a necessary condition'.PP produces different types of Vyāpti in details such as- समानदेशकालयोः, भिन्नकालयोः, भिन्नदेशकालयोः, भिन्नदेशयोः कादाचित्कस्य सार्वकालीनेन, सार्वकालीनस्य कादाचित्केन, प्रदेशवर्तिनः व्याप्यवर्तिना, व्याप्यवर्तिनः प्रदेशवर्तिना etc. The PP. ,gives illustrations also for all these types.(P54)

12) The objection that 'how perception, which can cognize the object being very near only, will cognize the relation of coexistence and thereby will help 'inference'? is answered in detail by PP. under the passage- ननु व्याप्तिज्ञानं केन प्रमाणेन जायते? etc. (P56).

13) 'Why vyatirekavyāpti is not necessary?' is explained in detail(P.76

14) In the passage opening with संप्रवादे चान्येपि प्रकाराः etc.PP. quotes an illustration of a debate and shows how only one member syllogism also is sufficient.- सांव्यवहारिकशब्देन प्रकाराः सर्वेषु शास्त्रेषु इत्येवं प्रकार-मनुमानमिति (P.82)

15) How the meaning from a sentence is derived and how व्यक्तय एव वाच्याः is discussed in the light of the views of other systems in this respect.As- जातिरेव पदानां वाच्या etc. (P147).

16) In order to answer the question- 'what is अन्वयबोधकं ? PP. takes an account of the views of other systems in this respect and finally establishes the view of M, as- प्रत्येकं सामान्यतो योग्येतरान्वितस्वार्थाभिधानशक्तीनि पदानि...स्वार्थानभिदधतीत्याचार्याः।
(P150)

17) The inclusion of other pramāṇas under these three is shown after the discussion regarding thepramāṇas is over. (In the PL this comes just after the statements of the definition)(P.155)

18) The question of validity of knowledge and pramāṇas is diseussed in

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detail at the end of PP. PL does not refer to it directly.

These are, some of the important points which show how PP. makes the view of M, regarding the pramānas and other connected subjects more and more clear in a simple language and easy manner and thereby helps the development of M's thought by creating deep impressions on the minds of peeple. Thus PP of J itself is a valuable work in the development of Mādhva literature on Pramāṇa.

Pramāṇa Candrikā:-

The second important work in his respect is the Pramāṇa Candrikā of Sri.Chhallari Śeṣacārya. This handbook of M's logic is taught as a primer of Mādhva logic in the tradition of Mādhva mathas. The author of Pc.also gives the reason similar to that given by J in PP. for composing a new work on the same subject.PC states - यद्यपि जयार्येरेव पदवाक्यादौ प्रमाणलक्षणादिकं सविस्तरं प्रतिपादितम् तथापि भावगंभीरैरपि वाक्यैर्वर्णितमिति नात्यप्रसरे. सुखेन ज्ञायते बोद्धुमिति तेषां तद्बोधनार्थं प्रायेण तदुक्तमेव किंचित्प्रायेण संक्षेपेण प्रतिपादयितुमिदं प्रकरणम् (Pc. 129. 15)

In this introduction the two words तदुक्तमेव and संक्षेपेण are very important. One can find that in many places, PC. follows- either PP or , the commentary on PL, word to word. for example -

PC.	PL. or comm.on PL
1) इह खलु --- 130.21 -	1) इह खलु ---- PL. com. 1.10
2) लक्ष्यमात्र---- लक्षणम् 129.7 -	2) लक्ष्यमात्र ---- लक्षणम् PL. com. 3.10
3) सजातीय--- प्रयोजनम् 131.3 -	3) सजातीय---- लक्षणस्यानप्रयोजनम् PP. 8.1
4) युक्ता--- परीक्षा 131.20	4) युक्तायुक्तास्विना परीक्षा PL. com. 7.4.
5) आस्मिन्वटे--- भवति 133.14	5) आस्मिन्वटे---- भवति PP 16.13
6) स च प्रत्यक्षा--- जायते 134.9	6) स च ---- जायते PP. 13.3.
7) ईशैकाधीनं-ज्ञानम् 135.22	7) ईशैका--- ज्ञानम् PL. com 19.17
8) उपपत्तिर्--- पर्यायः 143.2	8) उपपत्तिर्---- पर्यायः PP. 48.3
9) ननु व्याप्तिज्ञानम्--- 145.22	9) ननु ----- PP. 56.11
10) अन्वय--- दृष्टान्तः 150.11	10) अन्वय---- दृष्टान्तः PP. 78.19
11) आगमो--- वैशेषिकादयः 162.13	11) आगमो--- वैशेषिकादयः PP. 154.17

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I have stated above only a few examples to show how the PC follows तदुक्त only. On the other hand, there are many places where PC avoids discussion, and without going into details, follows samkṣepa and states 'this should be understood from PP. for example-

1) यद्यप्यत्र बहु वक्तव्यमस्ति.... पद्धत्यैव ज्ञातुं शक्यत्वात् नेहोच्यते 131.24
2) एतयोरन्तर्भावप्रकारस्तु पद्धत्युक्तप्रकारेण ज्ञेयः 133.24
3) चतुर्विधं प्रत्यक्षम्... अत्र विशेषस्तु पद्धत्युक्तरीत्या ज्ञातव्यः 142.8
4) करणप्रामाण्यं तु पद्धत्युक्तरीत्या ज्ञातव्यम् 166.14
5) (पंचावयव) नियमस्खण्डनप्रकारस्तु पद्धत्युक्तरीत्या ज्ञेयः 151.3. OR as-
6) व्याप्यस्य पक्षधर्मत्वं नाम समुचितदेशवृत्तित्वम् etc. 143.16.

But at the same time we can observe that in some places, where it is necessary for the understanding of the beginners, PC goes a step ahead and discussed the subject matter not directly discussed by either PP. or com. on PL. for example - i) Dalakṛtya of the definition of Uddeśa ii) Four types of Upādhi (153-24)
iii) The illustrations in detail for all types of defects of expression.
iv) The definition of Vyāpti as stated by the naiyāyikas-kecit..(143.18)
v) A list of the texts accepted as authoritative in M's philosophy. तत्र आगमो द्विविधो ज्ञेयः.... दुरागमास्तदन्ये (quoted from VTN.161.7)

Some other topics like the division of perception; narration of clinchers and futilities, their inclusion etc. are fully omitted.

Thus we can observe, PC.has not added anything to Mādhva literature on Pramāṇa, nor he has tried to show his mastery over sanskrit language or M's philosophy, but he has definitely suceeded in creating interest in the students of logic, regarding M's logic. for this reason only PC has acquired an important place in the tradition of teaching M's philosophy.

Pramāṇa Sangraha:- Besides these two important works mentioned above, one more work is necessarily to be mentioned.

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Name of this work is Pramāṇa Sangraha. This is written by Sri.Vādirājācārya Agnihotrī in a later period. This is published by the author himself in 1974.

Between J's PP and C.S'PC there are many sub commentators like Rāghvendra Śrīnivāsa, Janardanabhatta etc. who wrote commentaries on PP. or sub-commentaries on the com. of PL.

The author of PS has gone through all the available commentaries and subcommentaries (especially eight common the PP) and has compiled his work in a very useful manner. Though it is an independant work, it is completely based on these texts and commentaries. The author has mentioned the citations taken from such texts, in bold type and has explained the whole subject in a very simple language and easy way. This can be considered as 'lectures on M's Pramāṇa thought' and easier than even PC. conparatively, this is a big work, full of 85 pages of big size. It is divided into three sections according to three pramāṇas, and it has 18 sub sections. It's style is very simple. For example-

तत्र लक्षणसमन्वयस्तु इत्थम् (1); दत्तकृत्यम् तु .... (1); सलक्षणं द्विविधम्
उद्देशः ..... पृथिवीति शब्दे लक्षणसमन्वयः, तत्र पृथिवीनामभाजोण पृथिवीरूप-
वस्तुप्रतिपादकत्वात् (5); किंचन्नः (उपपत्तिदोषाः) इत्यस्योत्तरं तु- ते दोषाः
द्विविधाः (49); असङ्गतिर्नाम आकाङ्क्षाविरहः; आकाङ्क्षा नाम जिज्ञासा (49) etc.

One more point to be noted in this respect is, 'the subject matter of the Abhinavāmṛta has been for the first time is systematically used and put forth for exposition.

37 In the words of Dr.Nagaraja Rao,[37] 'this magnificent Pramāṇa Saṅgraha comes into hands of students like an Encyclopaedia for their study, guidance and ready reference".

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F) AN EXAMINATION OF APPLICATION OF PRAMĀNAS IN M'S OWN WORKS:

As M himself has stated in his anuvyākhyāna' the study of the tarkaśāstra teaches the nature and application of pramāṇas, and the result of it is, an examination of the object to be known(meya)[38]. But for the achievement of such result, one must decide first, what is to be known? Therefore he states in the tattvanirnaya[39] that an object ultimately and necessarily to be known is the God Viṣnu, His greatness and independant nature etc.

So, for the purpose of establishing his doctrines, stated in earlier chapter, M introduced three pramāṇas and with the help of these three pramāṇas he established his views and also refuted the views of others. As I have stated earlier, M, through out his life tried to establish dualism with kāyā vāc and manas, and therefore obviously every of his work is full of arguments presented for advocating his system of Vedānta. Therefore an account of application of these pramāṇas will cover almost all of his work, and hence just for instance I am referring here only a few citations which show how he established his or refuted the views of others through these pramāṇas.

One more point is to be noted here that even though an incident recorded in M's life states that in a debate he presented a series of inferences and therefore he was conferred a title 'anumāna-tīrtha'[40]. and This is sufficient to show how M was fond of inference and why he has used this pramāṇa in many places, Even so, M did not depend upon inference only, because according to him inference is not as important as verbal testimony[41] and perceptions are. what is proved by perception cannot be contradicted by inference[42]. Therefore M does not give stress only on inference, but he uses the force of verbal testimony and perception equally[43].

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The followings are a few examples, where M has established some of his basic principles with the help of these pramāṇas.

जगत्सत्यत्वम्—

1) प्रत्यक्षबाधितं जगन्मिथ्यात्वम्- सदिति प्रतीयमानत्वात् Tadyo. 242 B.8. 2) प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधाच्च दुष्टः पक्षोऽयमनया Upakha. 238 B.9, 3) (प्रतिज्ञा-विरोधः, हेतुविरोधः, दृष्टान्तविरोधश्च) सर्वे एते दृश्यत्वानुमाने द्रष्टव्याः -- प्रत्यक्षागमादिभिः जगतः सत्यत्वात् PL. 196.14, मानसिद्धत्वादिति सप्रतिसाधनत्वाच्च PL. 199.1, 4) एवमक्षजमानत्वासिद्धं विश्वस्य सत्यताम् Anuvyā. 176 B.11, 5) विमतं मिथ्या दृश्यत्वात् यदित्थं तत्तथा यथा संप्रतिपन्नम् इत्युक्ते जगतोऽभावादाश्रयासिद्धः पक्षः। अनिर्वचनीयाप्रसिद्धेरप्रसिद्धविशेषणः। सदसद्वैलक्षण्ये मिथ्यात्वे सिद्धसाधनता। दृश्यत्वाभावादसिद्धो हेतुः। अनिर्वचनीयासिद्धेरेव सपक्षाभावाद्विरुद्धः। आत्मनोऽपि दृश्यत्वादनैकान्तिकः। जगतोऽभावे अनुमानस्याप्यभाव. इति तर्कबाधितत्वेन अनध्यवसितः। प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धत्वात् विश्वं सत्यमित्यादिवाक्यविरुद्धत्वाच्च कालात्ययापदिष्टः। रजतं दृष्टामिति भ्रममानत्वात्, विमतं सत्यं दृश्यत्वात् आत्मवत् इत्यपि प्रयोज्यत्वात् प्रकरणसमः। विमतं सत्यं प्रमाणदृष्टत्वात् यदित्थं तदित्थं यथात्मेति प्रयोगात् सप्रतिसाधनः। शुक्तिरजतस्याप्यनिर्वचनीयत्वात् साध्यविकलो दृष्टान्तः। उक्तप्रकारेण दृश्यत्वाभावात् साधनविकलश्च। Makha. 240 A. 1-7.

We can see that in this passage M has refuted the inference विवादपदं मिथ्या etc. showing almost all the defects of inference in it. In one syllogism he has shown the defects in the subject, the probans, the illustration, etc. He pointed out all the types of fallacies in the probans, 'perceptibility'. With the statement प्रत्यक्षादि निरुद्धत्वात् etc and विश्वं सत्यम् etc... he has shown contradiction to the same inference through perception and verbal testimony also. Besides, he has forwarded another inference as 'विश्वं सत्यं प्रमाणदृष्टत्वात् etc. This way this passage alone is a best example for showing how M has refuted the view of falsity of the world and proved it's reality through all the three pramāṇas.

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He has also established through all these three pramāṇas that why 'mithyātva' 'falsity' cannot be considered as "anirvacaniyatva" 'inexpressibility' as- i) मिथ्याशब्दोऽनिर्वचनीयं वदतीत्यत्र च (न किंचिन्मानम्) अनिर्वचनीयस्य सर्वत्राप्रसिद्धत्वात्। अनुभानस्याप्रसिद्धविशेषणता। Tattvodyo 141A. 3; न च भावाभावविलक्षणं क्वाचिदागमो वास्ति..... विश्वं सत्यं मदात्मना.. सत्यः सोऽस्य महिमा.... इत्यादि श्रुतिभ्यश्च।

Tattvodyo 242A.4 Even he refutes 'anirvacaniyatva' through presumption which is not accepted by him as a separate pramāṇa; as – ii) न चार्थापत्त्यानिर्वचनीयासिद्धेः। असतः प्रतीतिं विना असद्वैलक्षण्यज्ञानानुपपत्तेः Tattvodyo. 242A.5; iii) न चानिर्वचनीयविशेष इति भावः..... अनिर्वचनीयासिद्धेः। न हि तत्र प्रत्यक्षमास्ति मिथ्याशब्दस्तन्मात्रवाच्येव। तदन्यत्र प्रमाणाभावात् KaNi. 251B.7;

2) <u>जीवेश्वरभेदः</u>

1) न च जीवेश्वरभेद एव तात्पर्यमागमस्य। तत्र प्रमाणाभावात्। न चानुमानात् तात्सिद्धेः। विपर्ययेणाप्यनुमातुं शक्यत्वात्। विमतं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वात् इत्युक्ते विमतं विकर्तृकं कार्यत्वात् घटवत् इत्युक्ते; विमतं विकर्तृकं अस्मत्संमतकर्तृरहितत्वात् आत्मवत् इत्यनुमानात् विरोधात् VTN. 261B.9.

2) प्रत्यक्षानुमानसिद्धत्वे च भेदस्य तद्विरोधादेवाप्रामाण्यमभेदागमस्य VTN. 261B.10.

3) --- अतः सर्वागमनिरुद्धमेव जीवेश्वरैक्यम् VTN. 271B.10.

4).. तथैव सर्वयुक्तिविरुद्धं च। न ह्यनादेरेकजीवनादो युज्यते। न हि स्वाप्रोऽयमिति निश्चित्य स्वाप्तपुत्रदायार्थं यतते..... प्रकृष्टः पञ्चविधो भेदः प्रपञ्चः। VTN. 272A10; 5) एवमाद्यनन्तयुक्तिविरुद्धोऽयं पक्षः VTN. 273A1

6) अतः सर्वप्रमाणविरुद्धत्वान्नाभेदे श्रुतितात्पर्यम् VTN. 275A.8;

7) सत्यत्वादिनेन दुःखादेः प्रत्यक्षेण विरोधतः। न ह्यज्ञातं वेदैर्वेदो जीवस्य हि कथंचन Anuvya 162B.8; 8) यस्मात्क्षरमतीतोऽहम्..... इत्यादिनोक्तभेदस्यैवानुभूयमानत्वात् Tattvodyo 244B.8.

3) <u>विष्णुसर्वोत्तमत्वम्</u> – यत्तैके आहुरगुणं ब्रह्मेति, न तद्युक्तम्। श्रुतियुक्तिविरोधात्। तथाहि श्रुतिः – सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म.. एतावानस्य महिमा.. विष्णोर्नुकं वीर्याणि प्रवोचम्..। युक्तिश्च- बुद्धिपूर्वं सर्वकर्तृत्वात् सर्वज्ञत्वादयो गुणा युक्ताः KaNi. 250A.11.

ii) अविद्यमानं न भवतीत्युक्ते विद्यमानमित्येव हि सर्वलोकानुभवः

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अतोऽनंतगुणो भगवान्नारायण इति सिद्धम् KaNi. 252A.8.

(ii) न च सिद्धेऽर्थे वाक्यस्य प्रामाण्याभावादिभिराधासिद्धैः।...
विप्रतिपत्तौ चान्यमानं वक्तव्यं तदभावे। न चानुमा अप्र-
सिद्धविशेषणत्वात्। न चार्थापत्तिः, अनुपपद्यमानाभावात्।
अतः सिद्धार्थे प्रामाण्यसिद्धेश्च सिद्धं महागुणवत्वं
विष्णोः KaNi. 251B.6.

The commentary of J and sub commentaries of other Ācāryas on the above cited passages have explained each and every word of the same, and following translation of PL also shows in detail, how M has pointed out the defects of inference in the syllogism presented by the mayāvādins to establish falsity of the world. And therefore avoiding unnecessary repetition I have simply cited here some passages from all the ten prakaranas of M. But these few passages also would be sufficient to show how M has applied these pramāṇas to refute others.

Finally one can observe that, in respect of doctrines like 'reality of the world' which can be proved by perception and through actual experience M has preferred perception. And in respect of other doctrines like 'Viṣṇu sarvottamatva' he took support of verbal testimony mostly. And in addition to these two, he has used inference to make his case stronger.

Secondly, one could observe that M - uses the phrase प्रत्यक्षागमादिभिः very often, which shows that he refutes the views of others by the pramāṇas of equal and more strength, by presenting one or two or more pramāṇas.

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G) MADHVA AND OTHER DĀRSANIKAS ON PRAMĀNA.

a Comparison.

As we have already seen, when M was born all other systems of Indian philosophy were established firmly and the exponents of those systems had directly or indirectly expressed their views on Pramāṇa. But inspite of this fact, M wrote his distinct monograph on Pramāṇa. This indicates that M did not agree with any of the established systems in respect of their views on Pramānas. Therefore, it will be interesting to compare the views of M with those of other systems. And such a comparison can be done from three different points of view, viz. i)Nature of Pramāṇas ii) Number of Pramānas and iii) other details such as division etc.

I) The nature of Pramāṇa- The real nature of Pramāṇa according to any particular system is nothing but the definition stated by thet particular system. We have a good collection of thedifferent definitions of Pramāṇa given by different systems,in TāRa. It is as follows-

अविसंवादि विज्ञानं प्रमाणमिति सौगताः।
अनुभूतिः प्रमाणं सा स्मृतेरन्येति केचन॥
अज्ञातज्ञापकत्वार्थ-निश्चायकमथापरे।
प्रमेयव्याप्यमपरे प्रमाणमिति मन्वते॥
प्रमाणेयत्तासामग्रीं प्रमाणं कोचिदूचिरे॥ TaRa. 1.4-6.

Of these,the definition stated by the Bauddhas is अविसंवादिविज्ञानम् and the word अविसंवाद is explained as अर्थक्रियास्थितिः. It means 'being in accordance with'. The main objection raised against this definition is - This definition does not cover the inferences which have past and future as their objects, because they don't have any 'arthakriyā.' Since they don't exist at all. Secondly this definition has over applicability in memory and conceptual perception, which is not recognised by the Bauddhas. If one compares this definition with that of M, apparantly he would feel that there is not much difference between these two, as 'being in accordance with' is common to both. But this is not correct. For,this definition

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is restricted to knowledge only, while M's defination covers both the knowledge as well as the instrument of it. Besides, M accepts memory as Pramāṇa and perception of savikalpa; conceptual type only. Therefore M's definition seems to be more perfect in the light of his doctrines.

The second definition is stated by the Prābhākaras. It is as अनुभूतिः प्रमाणम्। and the 'anubhūti' is the experience other than memory. M himself has feffered to this defination in the PL and refuted it as 'न चानुभूतिरेव प्रमाणम्'. According to M, memory must be considered as Pramāṇa, because there is authority in that respect. It is our common experience that memory is in accordance with the object and the Vedic cition- "स्मृति. प्रत्यक्षमैतिह्यमनुमान-चतुष्टयम्। प्रमाणमिति निर्देश्यं धर्मधिर्ये बुभूक्षुभिः।' also supports it. Since the validity of memory is proved by the śruti and experience of common people it has to be accepted as Pramāṇa. And since the definition of stated by Prabhakara does not cover memory and also the Vedās, it is not perfect. On the other hand this defect cannot be shown in the definition stated by M.

The third definition cited in the above stated stanza, is by the Bhāṭṭmīmāmsakas. It is as - अनधिगततथाभूतार्थनिश्चायकं प्रमाणम्। This is also directly reffered in PL as न प्रमासाधनं प्रमाणम् and refuted as 'ज्ञानन्यानिरेक्तप्रमाया प्रमाणाभावात्।

The defects shown by the Naiyāyikas in this definition are- the word अनधिगत refereś to the knowledge obtained for the first time, and hence, there will be contingency of i) Vedās being unauthotitative (because of the possibility that they might be read previously) and ii) incidents of accidental inferential knowledge such as the knowledge of fire from the clouds of dust (i.e. knowledge only by chance or accidental validity) or inconsistent statements of a mad person, being

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authoritative just because they convey the sense previously unknown.

In refutation of this definition, M points out two defects as - i) that there is no any proof to believe that any object 'to be cognized' has something else to be known, as 'knownness' (jñātatā) as it's attribute other than knowledge. And in the statements like 'I have known 'pot'(which is in the form of 'anuvyavasāya' knowledge of knowledge) the perception has knowledge of an object only, and nothing of 'knownness'. And since it cannot be established that there is something known as pramā different from knowledge, pramāṇa cannot be said to be an instrument of such pramā. And so, there is the defect 'impossibility' in this definition ii) Secondly even if it is accepted that pramā 'knownness' is an attribute of an object in addition to knowledge there is no any proof to believe that pramā is manifestation of only what is unknown previously. The knowledge of an object known previously can be called pramā. In fact, this difficulty would not have come for the mīmāṁsakas if they had accepted memory as pramāṇa. M insisting only on common experience, accepts memory as pramāṇa and therefore, does not face this difficulty. This second objection refutes the definition stated by some of the mīmāṁsaka (Ekades'in) also (i.e. प्रमेयव्याप्यभपरे-)

"प्रमाणनियतसामग्री" is the definition stated by the naiyāyikas which is cited by M as 'न च सम्यगनुभवसाधनं प्रमाणम्।'
In this definition the importance is given to the nature of being an instrument. But at the same time the naiyāyikas accept Īśvara, and His knowledge as pramāṇa. Since it is the knowledge, it cannot be an instrument of knowledge. And the knowledge of ordinary people also is experienced as authoritative, but all these are not covered by this definition, and so it has defect and also the problem of memory is not solved by this definition; hence, this definition also cannot

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be said to be perfect one.

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Now, there remains only one definition to be discussed and that of the advaitins. M has not directly referred to the views of the advaitins because the advaitins following the principle 'व्यवहारे भाट्टनयः' accept the views of mīmāmsaka in this respect. Therefore refutation of Bhāṭṭa's definition is sufficient for refutation of the advaitins also. With this intention PL. does not take any account of the definition stated by the advaitins. But M refers to it in his Māyāvāda Khaṇḍana as अनाधिगतार्थगन्तृ प्रमाणम् इति तन्मतम्. There he discusses this in the connection of purposefulness of the advaitaśāstra. M argues as follows. 'Any śāstra is pramāṇa because it is going to prove something. Your śāstra also is going to prove the Brahman. But the Brahman, according to you only, is svaprakāśa 'self luminous'-already proved by itself. And anything going to prove it, cannot be a pramāṇa according to you, because you only accept that pramāṇa is what (proves) cognizes an object unknown'. In this way the definition of pramāṇa according to the advaitins is refuted by M, through the principles adopted by them only.

Thus, from the above discussion it is very clear that the dārśanikas other than M had to face the difficulty in stating the perfect definition, due to either i) non acceptance of memory as a pramāṇa or ii) non acceptance of knowledge as a pramāṇa. But what M exactly has done is- he did not remain adamant for any earlier views but following the practical experience, accepted knowledge and memory as pramāṇa and brought both these under Kevala pramāṇa by suitably deriving the word pramāṇa in two ways.

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This is why M occupies a distinct place among the dārśanikas.

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The second major point of comparison between M and other dārśanikas is the number of pramāṇas.

Cārvāka is the first among those who hold less than three pramāṇas.He holds only one, namely perception. In fact M does not recognize him as a dārśanika; because according to M, those who do not believe in dharma and adharma are not the dārśanikas and since cārvāka also does not believe in dharma and adharma is not a dārśanika And therefore a question of debate with him does not arise at all.

But even it is so, the commentary of the PL takes an account of cārvākas view regarding the number of pramāṇas and refutes it as follows-

Cārvāka accepts only one pramāṇa namely, perception, but one cannot survive with perception alone. Because what perception does is revealing the object which comes into contact with the sense organs; but does not create any impression on mind that, the particular object is necessary for life, or dangerous for life. In other words it does not create the knowledge known as 'Istasādhantā'.Such knowledge is created only through inference, based on the general observation. If one sees fire, we can say that the knowledge of the existence of fire is created through perception, but at the same time the knowledge that 'If I touch this, it will burn me' is created through inference as "since this has burnt someone else, it will burn me also.' In the same way a child may see mother's breast but will not have the knowledge as to it's necessity for life. This way both 'pravrtti' and 'nivrtti' will not be possible in absence of inference.

One point is to be noted here that M's philosophy has greater scope than the naiyāyikas to refute cārvāka on this ground. Because according to the naiyāyikas the result of perception is "hānopādānaupekṣā buddhih" and therefore they cannot show such difficulty. But

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to M the result of perception is 'विशेष्यनिष्ठविशेषसाक्षात्कार एव फलम्'. cognition of a particular object. So, M alone can defeat cārvāka in this respect.

The Vaiśesikas and the Bauddhas hold only two pramāṇas, namely perception and inference. For them, J's argument is as- It is our common experience that we receive meaning from a word. And therefore we use the phrase 'शब्दात् अर्थं प्रत्येमि'. When a person who has know 'cow' listens the word 'cow' (understands) takes notice of that 'object' in mind. This is neither due to perception nor due to inference. This is just because of verbal authority. But denying this fact is just impossible to believe. Thus on the ground of actual experience only J refutes this view.

This way J has established that these and these three only are the pramāṇas. In respect of other dārśanikas M had to do nothing but to show inclusion of them in either of these three. That is done very well in the text and in the commentary. Since the entire inclusion is discussed in detail in translation I avoid it's repitition here. One remark is to be done that M has not said that other pramāṇas are not the pramāṇas, even he adds memory, hypothetical arguments etc. under pramāṇa, but what he does is, he establishes that they need not be stated as distinct pramāṇas.

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Gii) Relation to other systems particularly Vedānta of Śaṅkara and Nyāya - An examination-

The basic reason behind the raise of M's philosophy was to eppose the śāṅkara vedānta. Therefore in respect of many principles M's thoughts are totally different to those of Śaṅkara. The views regarding pramāṇas also are not exception to this. According to M the purpose of stating pramāṇas itself is different. What M wants to estab-

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lish through the pramāṇas is the greatness of Viṣnu., the eternal difference between Jīva and Īśa etc, and the reality of the world. And one can easily note that M has used the PL fully to prove the same. The concept of Kevala, it's division as Īśa Lakṣmī etc and the description about their nature, dependance etc. clearly shows that M has used his pramāṇas thought also, to establish the principle of 'Viṣnusarvottamatva', and five types of difference. Secondly the definition of pramāṇa stated by M also indicates clear and eternal difference between pramātr, 'knower' prameya 'object to be cognized' and pramāṇa means of that, with each other. Further, according to M, Visayīkaraṇa 'making something as an object of it's cognition' is the necessary condition for knowledge. This clearly indicates that knowledge cannot be without an object, it cannot be pratiess etc. These views also are contrary to those in śāṅkara philosophy, because the knowledge according to śaṅkara is partless, attributeless. Śaṅkara does not hold Vṛttijñāna 'occasional knowledge' as real, and accepts only Svarūpajñāna M holds both these types real.

These and many other points such as the number of parts of syllogistic statements etc. show the difference between the basic concepts of these two very celar. Besides this, one more point is to be noted here that, M has stated three types of contradiction to inference as a defect of inference, and has given importance to illustrate all these types of defects in the syllogism stated by advaitins to establish the falsity of the world. This way the basic foundation of epistemological thought and the result to be achieved through it's application. is totally different from each other in these two systems and therefore there cannot be single point of coordination in both. In other respects, the advaitins follow the Bhātta mīmāṃsaka. The difference with

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the mīmāmsaka is described in proper place.

If we examine the relation of M's epistemology with that of the Naiyāyikas, following will be the conclusion-

M has carefully studies the epistemology of the Naiyāyikas in detail and thereby found some defects or strict restrictions etc. are to be removed. In other words M suggested further modifications in the epistomology of the naiyāyikas, and make it as simple as possible from practical use point of view. M's epistemology can be considered as revised, modified, corrected and advanced development of the epistemology of the Naiyāyikas. The followings are a few examples for it. i) Resons for doubt:- The Naiyayikas hold 3 to 5; M holds one. 2) Parts of syllogism :- The naiyāyikas hold ten to five. M holds only one.

3) Types of concomitance:- According to the naiyāyikas they are two, M holds only one.

4) Perception is of two types according to the Naiyāyikas, M holds only one, and that is सविकल्पकम्।

5) The subject adjunctness and सामानाधिकरण्य for concomitance is not necessary to M.

6) M includes memory under pramāna, states hypothetical argument as a type of inference, establishes that assumption of nigraha and jāti is not necessary etc. These points are sufficient to prove that M modified the views of the naiyāyikas according to the need of time.

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H) JAYATĪRTHA - a) HIS CONTRIBUTION TO MĀDHVA PHILOSOPHY

It is rightly observed 'whithout the commentary of J M's literature are cleared books to us'[44]. Because a story from M's life tells us that M wrote his works in maximum briefness and with a eryptic style, and even his students, sometimes were unable to understand it. Once, one of his students only experiencing difficulty in understanding and thereby being perplexed asked M, who will explain such difficult works to us? M cooly answered - this bull, carrying the burdon of books on his back and attending my lectures seriously will explain my works.[45] It is believed that the same bull was reborn as Jayatīrtha and explained almost all of the works of M. J lived for only 35 years, more than half of which he spent as a collector of Mangalavedhā, a taluka of Maharashtra. That is why people wonder how he accquired mastery over all the sātras in Sanskrit and wrote excellent commentaries on M's works in such a short period.

Any way, his commentaries are of such great standard that J is further known only by the title Ṭikācārya, the commentator, par excellance' than his feal name Jayatīrtha.

Since I am going to discuss J's importance as a commentator in the next chapter, I avoid unnecessary repetition and take just an account of his contribution here.

J has written commentaries on all of M's prakaranagranthas and vādagranthas. Total number of his commentaries goes to 18.....
The best of his commentaries is the Nyāyasudhā, on the Anuvyākhyāna a terse commentary written by M on the Brahmsūtras. The grantha Saṁkhyā of Ns goes up to 24000. Though it is a sub commentary, it's nature is just like an independant work. NS covers discussion on all [illegible] principles of M's philosophy in the light of all other dārśanikas' works available to him at that time. Therefore one cannot point out a subject of Indian philosophy not discussed in NS. Because of

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this type of nature, NS is referred as an Encyclopaedia of philosophy of that time. It is always said in respect of NS- सुधा वा पद्मनीया नसुधा वा पालनीया Which indicates tough nature of the same.

Besides NS and other commentaries J wrote five other independant works, of which, the pramānapaddhati and the vādāvalī are more important. We have examined PP in earlier chapter. The Vādā deals with famous syllogism चित्रं मिथ्या etc. It is analysed and refuted in minute detail. As the author himself indicates this work is based on khandanatraya of M. This has criticised the views of advaitins with special reference to Tattvpradīpikā of Citsukha, the vivarana and the Nyāya kandali etc. The vāda's granthasaṅkhya goes to 500.

Thus. we can say, 'J is the first desciple of M who brought all of his books into the light and put his thought in such a manner that it could receive a status of an independant system of philosophy even in the eye of ordinary people. J's place in M's philosophy is equal to that of Patañjali in Pāninī's grammer.

H (b) J AS A COMMENTATOR—

Since J has written a number of commentaries, and some of them are treated as an independant works, the evaluation of J as a commentator is not an easy task, and cannot be treated as a small topic. But as we are concerned here with his commentary on the PL we will discuss some salient features of J's commentary with only a few examples from the same. (i.e. the comm on the PL)

First, we will see, what is intended by J in writing a commentary. A commentary is an explanation (i.e. spastikarana) because what a commentator has to achieve through a commentary is explaining the work. And in the words of J himself, explanation (spastikarana) is

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स्पष्टीकरणं -चानेकानिधम्- क्वचिदनुक्तांशस्योक्तिः। क्वाप्यतिसंक्षिप्तस्य विस्तरणम्। क्वचिदतिविस्तृततया बुद्ध्यनारूढस्य संक्षेपः। क्वापि अतिसंक्षिप्तस्यैकीकरणम्। कुत्राप्युक्तस्योपपादनम्। क्वचिदपव्याख्याननिरसनेन दृढीकरणम् (NS. P8 B.1)

Thus, J has given six necessary characteristics of a good commentary and one can easily find out that all these are covered in any of J's commentary.

Our present work, the commentary on the PL also is not exception to this. Though the PL is a very small work, J's commentary on it is very much exhaustive. J discussed every line of the PL in such a manner that nothing would remain unexplained.

1) for every sūtra he has given introduction as-

1) न केवलमसङ्गतं पुनरुक्तं च ---- (176)

2) निग्रहस्थानानन्तरस्याप्यज्ञानमविवक्षितमाह ---- (177)

3) दृष्टान्तानिरोधं दर्शयति ---- (187) etc.

2) Even small words seemigly unimportant are given importance and exactness of M's statement is shown through their explanation as-

i) न हि तादृना प्रकृष्टा लक्षणोक्तिः स्यात् (प्र) (1)

ii) अतो वा प्रवक्ष्यामीत्युक्तम् (7)

iii) उक्तप्रकारसूचनार्थं इति शब्दः। (8)

iv) अनुकर्षणार्थश्चकारः (61)

v) उभयोर्नीति ग्राह्यम् (187).

3) With his typical introduction to every sūtra it has become possible to understand what is objection and what is answer to it. The objections are marked as ननु or किम् etc. with and answers इत्याह etc.

4) In each and every place, the order of the sūtras, even of the words in that sūtra is explained with reasoning; for example.

i) प्राधान्याभिप्रायेण ---- उद्दिशति (11)

ii) प्राक् ---- निग्रहात्। अतस्तेनैव क्रमेण तमुपपादयति। (108)

iii) ग्रहणम् -- अनिवक्षितक्रमं नाम्यमनुसृत्य कृतम्। (61) iv) प्रायेण -- ज्ञापनार्थं क्रमोल्लंघनम् (58)

5) The division of sentence also is explained with reasons-

i) अतो युक्तो योगविभागः (50) ii) -- ज्ञापनार्थः अयं विभागः (53)

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6) Technical words are explained with synoyms of suitable explanation –

i) उपपत्तीरिति लिङ्गमुच्यते (34)

ii) व्याप्तिरिति निश्चेयत्व निधायेयः प्रत्यक्षस्योपलक्षणम् (64)

iii) अत्र प्रथमहेतुशब्देन लिङ्गमुच्यते (186)

iv) अननुगमः अनुगत्यप्राप्तिः (187)

v) एकवत्प्रसूता गौः गृष्टिः (182)

vi) इहोपपत्तिरन्यथानुपपत्तिर्ज्ञातव्या (217).

7) The remaining part of the sūtra sentence is everywhere supplied, so that one can read the same easily for example–

i) अप्रामाण्ये प्रमाणाभावात्र .... ज्ञातस्य (इति श्लोक) (235)

ii) न एव .... लिङ्गानि .. उक्ताः (इति श्लोक) (58).

8) Since the whole text of the commentary is for the purpose of stating what is not stated, there is no necessity of giving any illustration of अनुक्ताशास्योक्तिः 'Statement of what is not stated! But a few places of such are as follows i) the definition of a definition ii) way of getting vyutpatti.

iii) Description regarding doubt and error.

iv) justification of threefold nature of pramāṇas by way of refuting the views of cārvāka Vaiśesika and Bauddha

v) Stating in detail the views of the Naiyāyikas in respect of nigraha jāti. two types of perception, six types of contacts and so on.

9) It is J's style that before refuting the view of any systems he first explains their view in detail; for example see the definitions of pramāṇa stated by others or the definitions of Jāti and nigraha etc. He discussed dalakṛtva and other possible objections on it, as if he himself has stated them.

10) EXPLAINATION IN DETAIL OF WHAT IS STATED IN SHORTEST WAY :

(i.e. ज्ञाप्यानेसंक्षिप्तस्य निस्तरणात्) i) The commentary on the definition of pramāṇa stated by M, is the best example for this. ii)for the only sentence संवादतुल्यक्रियेण निग्रहः J described all types of nigraha and Jāti.

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with showing the inclusion of each in respective defects.

iii) The only word अनिराकरणात् is interpreted four times, and used to answer four objections.

11) Putting together the subject matter discussed in different places is क्वाप्यनिर्दिष्टस्यैकीकरणम् can be observed in following -i) the definition of perception ii) the definition of verbal testimony iii) The validity of memory iv) the eternality of syllables iv) importance of kevalapramāna and many other such topics which are discussed in the commentary of PL. but not even referred in the PL directly. It is shown in the annotations of respective topics that their source is either in Anuvyā or VTN or any other original text by M. This clearly shows that J never crosses his limits as a commentator, but on the other hand, performs his duty carefully by putting the views of M in a proper place.

12) As J has discussed in स्पष्टीकरणम्, making the statement of original author firm by refuting the wrong interpretation done by others क्वचिद् दूषणव्याख्याननिरसनेन दृढीकरणम् is also necessary for a commentator. And J. does not fail to do it. The best examples of such type in the commentary on PL are i) explanation given for the word Kenacit in the Anuvyā i) अनेनैव 'न च केवलतर्केण ... केनाचित्' इत्यादि पृथगुक्तोपपत्तिरुक्ता भवति (46). ii) justification for the word चतुष्टयम् in the authoritative text 'स्मृतिः प्रत्यक्षमैतिह्यमनुमानचतुष्टयम्। प्रमाणमिति विज्ञेयं धर्मविर्यैः बुभूषुभिः॥ etc. in both these illustrations J has justified the threefoldness of pramāna by refuting the objections raised on the grounds of the words Kenacit and catustayam.

Besides this J's simple style, series of undefeated arguments, easy use of phares and maxims like- शुकशावाहिकान्याय, सिंहावलोकनन्याय, ज्ञानिनां कर्मणि केनाप्यनाधिकारः, वंध्यासुतो नत्यति, मूकोदितम् and others make deep impressions of subject matter on mind and exactly teach what is intended by the author himself. Therefore one can conclude the evaluation of J as a commentator with the remark- v.

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what is stated in the traditional verse –
चित्रैः पदैश्च गम्भीरैर्वक्ष्ये मतिरनाकुलैः। गुरुभावं व्यञ्जयन्ती भाति श्रीजयतीर्थवाक्॥
(Nyāyāmṛ. ii.4).

OTHER COMMENTATORS : RAGHVENDRA ŚRĪNIVASA AND PĀṆḌURANGĪ

While studying the text and the commentary on it, I have consulted three sub commentaries mainly. They are by Sri.Raghvendra - tīrtha Śrīnivāsatīrtha and Pt.Pāṇḍurangī. Of these, first two are printed together with text and the third one is in a manuscript form. It was made available to me by Prof.Dr.Pāṇḍurangī, for which I am very much thankful to him.

All the three commentators have followed the guidlines for commentary writing laid down by tīkācārya the commentator par excellance J. Since they have written sub commentaries (i.e commentories on J's commentary) they dealt with J's commentary alone. Becauseof their explanation only, one can understand J in some particular places. Of these three, the śrīnivāsīya is more detailed and exhaustive. Rāghavendrīya is smaller in comparison with śrī. and Pān covers 125 folios of pothi. It is not possible to take an account of all details of all these three because they have commented upon almost every word of the commentary of J. And therefore I just mention only a few examples which are sufficient to show how they are expert in all the śāstras and also in interpreting, finding out the hidden meaning in the words of J, finding out the similar quotetions from various texts etc. and making the commentary as easy as possible for understanding.

1) Explanation given for plural form used by J in opening maṅgalācarana: पूर्वबोधानपि गुरून्। Ra. सामानाधिकरण्येन। ... Śrī. to include other two gurus; Pā. following the rule युष्मादि गुरावेकेजाम्।

2) All these three subcommentaries have given good reason for whereever J has used the word Ādi.

3) The word artha in the definition of pramāṇa is explained with etymolo-

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gy and it is shown how does it stand for 'object' and not for 'going'; by all the three.

4) They have given cross references such as वक्ष्यति etc. which is commented upon by giving exact text where that particular topic is discussed(7).

5) They have given justification for some grammatical doubts, such as- आङ् Rā. (24) Compound अनुभायाः with आनिर्देशिताच Rā.(2

6) In many places they explain the same in one or other words but in a few places like the coumpound of न्यूनाधिकसंख्यान्यतमानर्थनिमाव (P31) they differ; or explaining the word परकृतिः they have got difference of opinion as to what is to be understood by परकृतिः।

7) While explaining the sentences of J, they have given source of J's statements (i.e. Anuvyā VTN etc) (See pages 8,14,15,22,etc)

8) They have not failed to explain their philosophy (See.P.18) with the authority of M इच्छारूपानित्यमेवोक्तं इच्छावत्वं न चापरम्।(P18)

9) Though these commentaries have taken PP. as their base, they have not lost their independant importance by supplying more and more information. And on the other hand, where they felt that same contrast with PP. appears to be, they have defended such places and justified. न चाऽत्र पक्षतोविरोधः .. etc.(See pages 189,192,195)

10) Where J has refered to other opponents, Śrī. has tried to supply original text from that particular book. The example for this, can be given for Jāti and nigraha. The whole relative portion of Tārkika Rakṣā is given by Śri. as it is. Or the citations like सनातनीयं कुरुपाण्डव वादाद् are supplied by all these subcommentators.

Since I have referred all such illustrations in the annotation on respective passages, I do not repeat anything more, But I am sure that these remarks alone would be able to convey the importance of all these three commentaries in order to understand J as well as

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M. It is true J makes M's writing open to us, we cannot forget that J also is not so easy to understand for an ordinary person and therefore we cannot ignore the importance and necessity of such sub-commentaries.

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GENERAL REMARKS

Before entering into the other details of the PL. I must refer to the statement made by Dr.P.Nagaraja Rao in his introduction to the epistemology of Dvaita Vedānta. The statement is as follows: "Madhva has briefly expounded the epistemology of his system in a short work called Pramānalaksana. This work appears to comprise only a few disjoined and broken sentences interspersed with a string of apparently irrelevent quotations from various books, including passages from a nonextant and untracable work on logic called Brahmatarka----"

But this is not so, because

1) M performs mangalācarana twice, in the begining and at the end of the PL.And from both these verses it is clear that this is an independant work.

2) Though at the end of this work M states that this is based on the paths stated in Brahmatarka, no sentence in this text follows his peculiar style of quoting Brahmatarka,.....इति ब्रह्मतर्के or इति हि ब्रह्मतर्के etc. In other works M has given some two hundred quotations in above style. Therefore we cannot say that he has cited passages from Brahmatarka. Secondly, total number of sūtras in the PL goes only upto 126 and hence the questionof citing 'passages' does not arise.

3) This also is not possible that he has cited quotation, from others works because if it were so, J could have referred to the original authors in his commentary, but it is not there. On the other hand, while stating the views of others also, M does not follow them word to word. For example, the definition of pramāna according to the Naiyāyikas is प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणम् But M puts in his own words as न च सम्यगनुभवसाधनं प्रमाणम्। or प्राकट्यसाधनं प्रमाणम्। is the original wording of Bhāṭṭa's definition, which is quoted by M as न प्रमासाधनं प्रमाणम्।

4) This also is not true, that some sentences of the PL are common to other works of M. Because even through the subject-matter of the Mith-

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yāthārthyānumānakhaṇḍana and that of example for the defects of inference given to the PL.(सर्वे एते दृश्यत्वानुमाने द्रष्टव्याः) is common, no sentences are the same, for example- भानासिद्धत्वादिति सप्रतिसाधनत्वाच्च (PL) and विमतं सत्यम्---- इति प्रयोगगतं सप्रतिसाधनः (MiKha.).

In some places we can observe that sentences of the PL are similar with those of VIN and AnuVyā. But that is unavoidable, because while commenting upon the tarkapāda of the BrahmSū. he had to express his views regarding his epistemology in AnuVyā and to establish Viṣṇusarvottamatva with the help of pramāṇas he had to explain what is pramāṇa, in VIN.

5) M writes in cryptic style and follows the method of sūtra. Therefore some sentences like जलमसङ्गतम्. अन्यत्र etc. cannot be understood without the aid, But only for this reason they cannot be said 'disjoined'. Or there are some instances like the topic of perception, where first, perception is defined and the division of it, is mentioned after the statement of defects of inference, but that also is according to J; a 'simhāvalokana.' In other such cases it is so, because this work follows the expository scheme adopted by the Nyāyasūtra (i.e. उद्देश लक्षण etc) And therefore the definition of pramāṇa comes first and its comparison with the definitions stated by others, comes at the end of the work

With all these, one has to believe that the PL is an independant complete work and not a mere collection.

If one studies the Pramāṇalakṣaṇa with the commentary of J on it, will believe that M has tried to make his epistemology as simple as possible. As Dr.S.K.Mitra[47] remarks, it might be a matter of dispute that whether M has contributed anything new to the Indian philosophy!, At least M deserves credit for simplifying and putting in clear form,

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the matter which was vague. For example M has never claimed that he is the only philosopher who accepts jñāna as a pramāṇa for the first time,.On the other hand J's commentary clearly states that there are two different views in this respect.[48] What M has done for the first time is, bringing these two concepts under the word pramāṇa, using this word in two different senses (namely, knowledge and its instrument) through the division as kevala and anupramāṇa, and thereby has removed the ambiguity in application of the word pramāṇa. This should be stated as the best example of M's intelligence and mastery over Sanskrit language and other Śāstras like grammer.

Further 'Validity of knowledge' also was a problem in Indian philosophy. Last chapter of the PP shows how the difference of the opinions created various difficulties in this regard. But the solution found out by M really is a great contribution to Indian philosophy. M's theory of Sākṣin 'the witness self' removes all the doubts and shows a definite end to the examination of knowledge for its validity. M holds that sākṣin is the highest authority, whatever perceived by Sākṣin is correct and always is in accordance with the object. He can perceive the objects in past as well as future etc. So, this way M has drawn a line where paratah prāmāṇya ends and when svatah prāmāṇya starts. In this respect also the remark passed by Dr.S.K.Mitra,[49] is not acceptable because though the concept of Sākṣin is not new, the nature of Sākṣin as described by M and attributes given to Sākṣin by M are definitely new ones.

In addition to this one must note that M has not disregarded any pramāṇa other than the three accepted by him, but he just included extra,under these three. And these three also are separately mentioned because they cannot be mixed in each other; on account of difference in their order of cognizing the objects. The same principle of simplicity and briefness, he applies to the numbers of syllogism and assumption of

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clincher and casuistries. He never insists on any hard and fast rule regarding the technicallity of numbers etc.

It's M who only goes into the basic concept or the result to be achieved through anything and thereafter decides its nature and division etc.

And as a result of this type basic of thinking alone, M states-

i) Knowledge only is a main pramāṇa which reveals an object as it is, because revealing an object as it is is the only purpose of pramāṇa.

ii) The restriction regarding the number of parts of syllogistic statement cannot be justified, because basic purpose of such statement is to convey the inferential knowledge to others, and if it is served even with a one-member syllogism, it would do.

iii) Contradiction to one's own statements and inconsistency of statements are only two defects of reasoning (or syllogism) and the defects like meaning less, speaking less or more, changing the statement, repetition etc. can be easily included under these two only and therefore assumption of 24 types of clinchers and 23 types of futility is not necessary.

iv) Only one type of Vyāpti (i.e. anvayavyāpti) is sufficient and subject adjunctness cannot be a necessary condition for inferential knowledge.

In this way though M has tried to make his epistemology more and mere simple and easy to accept, he has never ignored either exactness or perfectness. The definition of pramāṇa stated by him is the best example of his perfectness in statements. The definition of pramāṇa stated by him consists of only a compound word of two members, namely 'yathā' and 'artham.' But this much short definition also is more perfect than any other definitions such as- i) अनधिगतार्थगन्तृ प्रमाणम् ii) सम्यगनुभवसाधनं प्रमाणम् or iii) अज्ञातज्ञापकोतिरेक प्रमाणम् etc.

on the other hand M is not only after 'shortness of statements' but

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whereever it is necessary he goes on explaining till the removal of doubt, for example to establish that, perception does not cognize present only, he gives a long series of arguments as अत उत्तरदिवसे etc. and finally states इत्यव्यवस्था।

These are a few examples which prove that the PL of M is a short but perfect, complete and all comprehensive; appearing as simple and easy but a thought provoking monograph. Therefore to conclude we can say-

What M has given to us is-

1) Perfect and shortest definition of pramāṇa which removes ambiguity in using the word pramāṇa but covers all the different views of earlier dārśanikas.

2) Memory is a pramāṇa. Even other pramāṇas accepted by other systems are the pramāṇas, but can be included under these three only.

3) A syllogistic statement can be consisting of only one member.

4) In respect of the wordly cognitions, perception is the main pramāṇa while in respect of the divine cognitions, verbal testimony is the main pramāṇa.

5) Doubt and error are real experiences.

6) Inference is of two types, namely sādhanānumāna and dūsanānumāna and tarka 'hypothetical argument' comes under dūṣaṇānumā.

7) Assumption of nigraha and jāti is unnecessary. All these can be included under 'the two defects of inference, namely contradiction and inconsistency'.

8) The witness self is an independant entity which establishes validity of pramāṇa, and knowledge.

9) Six types of sannikarsa are not necessary.

And with all these what is to be understood is the world real. Viṣnu is the highest God and all other beings are different from Him and under His control. Such knowledge only will lead to Mukti.

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NOTES ON INTRODUCTION

1) विरमति महाकल्पे नाभीपद्मैकनिकेतनः
त्रिभुवनपुरःशिल्पी यस्य प्रतिक्षणमात्मभूः।
किमधिकरणं कोदृक्चास्य व्यवस्थितिरित्यसौ
वुदरमविशद् द्रष्टुं तस्मै जगन्निधये नमः॥ AnaRa. 1-2

2) अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा Brahm̐Sū. 1. 1. 1.

3) See. Ma.Vi. 4.45.

4) शास्त्रसिद्धान्तप्रतिपादके ग्रन्थभेदे- वाचस्पत्यम् (under प्रकरणम्).

5) The Rāmāna Paddhati of J. English translation. Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao. A.M. Jain College Madras. 1982. Intro. P. 2.

6) A History of the Dvaita School of Vedanta -- (Vol. I). Dr. B.N.K. Sarma. Bombay. 1960. Pt I. P102.

7) MaVi. - 3. 55.

8) साक्षादयोपनिषदो निभृतैरुपास्याः पाठच्छलेन विजनेऽर्थरसान् ब्रुवाणः।
अध्यापकाय वितताद निमोक्षकीर्तिं गोविंदमाकलयमुचितां गुरुदक्षिणां सः॥ MaVi. 3.5.

9) अयि स्वामिन् दुष्टान् दमय दमय व्यक्तमाचेरान्।
गुणान् गूढान् विष्णोः कथय कथय स्वान् समदयन्॥ MaVi. 3.56.

10) गुणानुरूपोन्नति पूर्णबोध इत्यमुष्य नाम द्विजवृन्दवन्दितः। MaVi. 4.33.

11) गुरोः स्वशिष्यं चतुरं चिकीर्षतः प्रचोदनाच्छ्रोतुमिहोपचक्रमे।
अशेषसिद्धेरखलजातिवासिधिर्निरादरेणापि महात्मनामुना॥
तदाद्यपद्यस्यमनद्यमण्डलं यदानदत्तोऽरकद्वयात्मकम्॥ MaVi. 4.45.

12) गुरोरुपान्ते श्रवणे रतैर्द्विजैः स पञ्चभैर्मासिते कदाचन।
बहुप्रकारे लिखिते नु वाचिते प्रकारमेकं प्रमुरभ्यधादृतम्॥ MaVi. 4.49.

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13) वेदद्विषां यः प्रथमं समायेयौ सवादिसिंहोऽत्र सबुद्धिसागरः। MaVi.5.8.

14) नन्वस्य सूत्रस्य परोऽर्थ उच्यतां यद्भाष्यमात्रं भवता निरस्यते MaVi.5.20

15) त्रयोऽर्थाः सर्ववेदेषु दृश्यार्थाः सर्वभारते।

16) i) विष्णोः सहस्रनाम्नापि निरन्तरशतार्थकम्"।...

ii)... ऊचुरर्थशतकं हरिनाम्नां वर्ण्यतामिति सहासमुरनास्ते MaVi.6.5.

(See also. "Ma. tyänche Tattvajñana" - Avadhani. 41).

17) त्रिगाथाः भारतं चैव पञ्चरात्रमयारनिलम्।
मूलं रामायणं चैव पुराणं चैतदात्मकम्॥
ये चानुयायिनस्तेषां सर्वे ते च सदागमाः। VTN.161.7
259 B.1

18) द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च।
यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया Bhāg. ii. 10.12.

19) नित्यपूर्णाखिलगुणो निर्दोषः सर्वदैव यः। VTN. 276 B. 8.

20) जीवेशयोर्भिदा चैव जडजीवाभिदा तथा।
जडेशयोर्भिदा च जीवभेदः परस्परम्।
पञ्चभेदा इमे नित्याः सर्वास्वस्थासु सर्वदा॥ Anuvyā 14B.1. (Sloka 15) (Compare)

21) See. तारतम्य स्तोत्र, तारतम्य पञ्चश्लोकी, तारतम्य संग्रह - by Umarji Krishnācārya. Belguma..

22) श्रवणं कीर्तनं विष्णोः स्मरणं पादसेवनम्।
अर्चनं वंदनं दास्यं सख्यमात्मनिवेदनम्॥ Bhāg. vii. 11. 11.

23) जीवाभेदो निर्गुणत्वम् अपूर्णगुणता तथा।
साम्याधिक्ये तदन्येषां भेदस्तद्वत एव च॥
प्रादुर्भावनिषेधस्तत्प्रलयस्तद्वद्वेष एव च
तत्प्रमाणस्य निंदा च द्वेषा एतेरविता मताः॥ See - Ava. 259.

24) विश्वं सत्यं हरिः कर्ता जीवोऽन्यः परमार्थतः।
वेदाः सत्यं प्रमाणं च इत्येवं व्यासमतास्थितिः॥ Vēd Ra. 1. 3.

25) Intro. to PP. Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao. (P. 2).

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26) 'A Critique of Madhva refutation of Vedānta'-Dr. K. Narayan - Udayana Publication. Allahabad. 1964. P. 49.

27) i) ज्ञानार्थे ज्ञेयता मुख्या शब्दार्थे तदनंतरम् Anuvyā·15B.4

ii) ज्ञानमेव हि विषयस्य ज्ञेयस्य ज्ञेयतायां साक्षादुपाधिर्भवति ..... युक्त्यादि करणानि तु विषयस्य ज्ञेयतामुपाधिभूतं ज्ञानं जनयन्तीति तद्विषयस्य ज्ञेयत्वमुरव्यम् NS.248B.9

28) कदाचित् इन्द्रियं कदाचिदिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षः कदाचित्प्रमा TaBhā·6.

29) केचिद्वादिनः विज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यमास्थिताः अपरे तु तत्करणस्य। तत् किमत्र तत्त्वमिति चेत्· उच्यतेऽयमिति ब्रूमः। NS.246B.7

30) See. Note on. प्रमाणम् under यथार्थं प्रमाणम् 1.

31) Dr. B.N.K. Sharma-'The Sākṣi. an original contribution of Śrī Madhvācārya to Indian Philosophy' siddhabhārati' Ed by. Vishvabandhu Hoshiyarapur 1950. II. 83.

32) i) आनंदतीर्थेन मुनिना ब्रह्मतर्कोक्तिमर्थतः।
मानलक्षणमित्युक्तं संक्षेपाद्ब्रह्मसिद्धये॥ PL. 247.15
ii) आनंदतीर्थमुनिना ब्रह्मतर्कानुसारतः।
कथालक्षणमित्युक्तं प्रीत्यर्थं शार्ङ्गपन्वनः॥ KaLa. 306.10

33) i) देशे देशे तथा ग्रंथान् दृष्ट्वा चैव पृथग्विधान् MBTN.2.7
ii) क्वचिद्ग्रन्थान् प्रक्षिपन्ति क्वचिदन्यानितान्यथे
कुर्युः क्वचिच्च व्यत्यासं प्रमादात्क्वचिदन्यथा... MBTN.2.3.4.

34) See. मध्वाचार्य न त्यांचे तत्त्वज्ञान. रा.वा. अवधानी, पुणे. P. 79.

35) ब्रह्मतर्कं च भगवान् स एव कृतवान्प्रभुः।
पंचाशत्कोटिनिस्तारान् नारायणतनौ कृतान्।
उद्धृत्य पंचसाहस्रं कृतवान्नारायणः॥ Anuvyā·164A·4-7.

36) अतस्तदर्थसंक्षेपादत इत्यभ्यसूचयत् Anuvyā·164A·8.

37) An appreciation— Dr. Nagaraja Rao. - 'Pramana Sangraha'. P. 10.

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38) प्रमाणन्यायसाध्वीक्षा क्रियते तर्कशास्त्रतः।
मानन्यायैस्तु तासिद्धेर्मीमांसा मेयशोधनम्॥
Anuvya. 164A.5-6.

39) स्वातंत्र्यमस्वतंत्रं च द्विविधं तत्त्वमिष्यते।
स्वतंत्रो भगवान् विष्णुः Tattva Ni. 1

40) सभास्तस्थौ जगाम नाम्नाय्यनुमानतीर्थनाम्
MaVi 5.7

41) See Note No. 27 and 29.

42) नानुमा कामचारिणी। प्रत्यक्षादि विरुद्धत्वादक्षा-
गमयोर्ग्रहिता। अनुमा कामवृत्ता हि न कुत्रावसरं-
व्रजेत् Anuvyā. 167B 2.

43) वयं तो श्रुतियुक्तिभ्यां बद्धारस्मन्शास्त्रमञ्जसा।
विचारयामः श्रुतीभिः युक्तिभिश्चैव सादरम्॥
Anuvyā 167A.9.

44) See Note No. 5.

45) A traditional belief.. See Dr. Nagaraja Rao -
Pramāna Paddhati (Intro. P. 3)

46) See The epistemology of Dvaita Vedānta. P. 4.
(Dr. P Nagaraja Rao)

47) S.K. Mitra. Mādhva Logic. - Intro. P. 22-23.

48) NS. 246 B 7.

49) See Note No. 47

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Text 1.

अशेषगुरुमीशेशं नारायणमनामयम् ।
संप्रणम्य प्रवक्ष्यामि प्रमाणानां स्वलक्षणम् ॥

Tr. 1 Having respectfully bowed down to Nārāyaṇa who is the teacher of all (people without any exception), the lord of Gods (and) who is without defects, I shall (now) expound the real nature of the Pramāṇas.

Comm. 1.0

प्रणम्यागण्यकल्याणगुणाब्धिं पुरुषोत्तमम् ।
पूर्णबोधानपि गुरून् व्याकुर्वे मानलक्षणम् ॥

Tr. 1.0 Having bowed down to Puruṣottama who is like an ocean of innumerable auspicious qualities[1], and also to Pūrṇabodha[2] (and my other) teacher(s)[3], I shall (now) explain (the work called) Mānalakṣaṇa[4].

---

1. According to the philosophy of Madh va (M) defectlessness and possession of all auspicious qualities are two important points in respect of Viṣṇu. Because 'viṣṇusarvottamatva' 'Viṣṇu is the highest (among all)' is one of the most important principles advocated by M; See. i) निर्दोषः सर्वदोषैर्यः गुणसर्वस्वभूतिभाग्..... नित्यपूर्णाखिलगुणो निर्दोषः सर्वदैव यः VTN. 276B.8, ii) श्रीमन्मध्वमते हरिः परतरः ..... आखिलाम्नायैकवेद्यो हरिः। A traditional verse containing nine principles of M's philosophy. मध्वमतीय दशप्रमेयस्तोत्र Śloka. 28.

2. Pūrṇabodha is substitute for Pūrṇaprajña, by which name also M is known. In fact M refers to himself as Pūrṇaprajña at many places in his writings. See. i) आनंदतीर्थभगवत्पादः सुपूर्णप्रज्ञाभिधो ग्रंथमिमं चकार MBTN. 32.170 ; ii) आनंदतीर्थ-सन्नाम्ना पूर्णप्रज्ञाभिधायुजा DS. 3.9. iii) maVi. 4.33.

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3. i) This is in accordance with the commentators of Jayatīrtha (J). This plural form is used for including other teachers namely Padmanābhatīrtha and Akṣobhyatīrtha; See ŚM. 3.20.

ii) Yet one could take it to mark the author's profound respect for his teacher according to the rule युष्मादे गुरावेकेषाम् Pā. 2.4.5.

4. Mānalakṣaṇa stands for Pramāṇalakṣaṇa.

Com. 2.0

इह खलु 'सुखमेव मे स्यात् दुःखं मनागपि मा भूत्' इति निखिलापेक्षितमोक्षस्येश्वरसाक्षात्कारमन्तरेणासम्भवात्, तस्य च प्रमाणानि विनाऽनुदयात्, प्रमाणानां च यथावद्विदितानामेव तद्धेतुत्वोपपत्तेः तत्स्वरूपं यथावज्ज्ञापयितुकामो भगवानाचार्यवर्यः प्रारिप्सितग्रन्थाविघ्नपरिसमाप्त्यादिप्रयोजनाविगीतशिष्टाचारपरम्पराऽऽदिप्राप्तेष्टदेवतानतिपूर्वकं श्रोतृशेमुषीमनुकूलयिष्यन् वक्ष्यमाणमेवाग्रे दर्शयति

Tr.2.0 In this world itself, since 'final liberation;' which is desired by all (who wish) let there be for me only happiness and not even a little of sorrow[2], - is not possible without intuitive perception of the Supreme Lord and since that (intuitive perception) does not arise without the use of proper pramāṇas and since pramāṇas understood in their real nature alone can be the cause of that (perception), the revered teacher, who wishes to teach the true nature of them, expresses in the beginning what he intends to discuss[3] (in the proposed work) with a view to render the minds[4] of listeners prone to it, (and) paying homage to his favourite deity (Viṣṇu) in accordance with the continued tradition[5] of the blameless conduct of respectable (persons) and has the purpose of (securing) completion of the work despite any obstacles.

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1. J puts forth the four Anubandhas, viz. viṣaya 'subject', prayojana 'necessity or (purpose) sambandha 'connection' and

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adhikārin 'who is eligible for the study of this work and explains how they are covered by the maṅgalācaraṇa verse 'benedictory stanza'.

2. According to M, mukti 'final liberation' is the experience of total and permanent happiness; See. अनन्यवद्रागाक्षैव वृद्धि-ह्रासविवर्जिताः।दुःखादिरहिता नित्यं मोदनोऽनिरतं सुखम् Anu.Bh. 27.

3. 'Vakṣyamāṇa' to be discussed and understood through these Pramāṇas is Prameya i.e. the God Nārāyaṇa.
And therefore M refers to Nārāyaṇa in the benedictory verse. For this reason, the word 'prameyam' object to be known, is to be supplied in the commentary after the word vakṣyamāṇam See. Śri. 5.3;

4. It will be interesting to compare this line with opening passage of svopajñāvṛtti of Tā.Ra. Viz- श्रोतृश्रोभुखी-मनुकूलयिष्यन् वक्ष्यिभाणमेवार्थं दर्शयति।
for comparison, see introduction.

5. This is following the tradition of Maṅgalavāda.
See. Tā Ṭi. 3.2.

Com. 1.1

नारायणस्यैव नमस्कारे को हेतुरित्यत उक्तम्॥ अशेषगुरुमिति॥ सर्वज्ञं गुरुमिति पाठे सार्वज्ञ्यं गुरुत्वस्योपपादकम्। किं च नारायणस्यैवातिसमर्थत्वेनेष्टप्रदानसंभवात् तन्नतिरिति भावेनोक्तम्॥ ईशेशमिति॥ अपि च रागाऽदिदोषरहिता हि लोके वन्द्या भवन्ति। नारायणश्चा-शेषदोषदूर इति सूचयितुं अनामयमिति॥ आमयपदं दोषान्तरोपलक्षणम्। प्रवक्ष्यामीति उद्देशविभागपरीक्षाऽऽद्युपयोगिसंग्रहायोपसर्गः। न हि तद्विना प्रकृष्टा लक्षणोक्तिः स्यात्।

Tr. 1.1. What is the reason in saluting Nārāyaṇa alone? (one might ask and) therefore (the word) 'aśeṣagurum' is stated. In (the case of varient) reading 'sarvajñam'[1] (for aśeṣa the meaning will be-

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'to the teacher who knows everything'. The statement of) His 'all knowingness' will explain why He is the teacher. (The word) śeṣam is stated with the intention of explaining that homage is paid to Him alone, because it is possible to Him (Nārāyaṇa) only to bestow on (His devotees anything) desired by them, by being the Almighty. Since only people who are free from the defects like 'desire' etc., are respected in the society and with the intention of conveying that the Nārāyaṇa is free (far away) from all the defects, (and hence He alone is to be saluted; the author uses the word) anāmayam[2]. The word āmaya is indicative of other defects. The preffix pra in (the word) pravakṣyāmi[3] is for the inclusion of uddeśa, vibhāga, parīkṣa etc.[4], Which are useful (for the statement of a definition). Because the most excellent definition would not be possible without them.

In this passage J explains the intention of the author in using almost all the words in this verse.

1. This statement shows another reading for aśeṣagurum. But available editions follow the above reading only. By stating that He is the teacher of all, the doctrine that Viṣnu is above all is supported.
2. In more popular sense the word anāmaya means ' one without disease' but J has taken it in the sense "one without defects". Śrī. justifies the interpretation as 'possibility of possessing a disease also is a defect'. And the word defect used in such a sense will also stand for other defects, following the maxim of samudāyalakṣaṇā 'one stands for a group'. By interpreting the word defect in this way, J supports the contention that Viṣnu is

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full of auspicious qualities and without any defect.

3. J.gives two explanations for this preffix: i) this is used with the intention of conveying that this work will follow the expository scheme to discuss the subject of it. According to the Nyāya Sūtra Bhāsya, the process of the science of reasoning proceeds in three ways. The inunciation, the definition and examination. The present work will follow the same order. Here J has mentioned vibhāga separately, but vātsyāyana in Nyāyasūtra bhāsya has included it in the first two, see

त्रिविधा चास्य शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिः। उद्देशो लक्षणं परीक्षा चेति
..... उद्दिष्टस्य लक्षितस्य च विभागवचनम्।

NyāsūBh.on i.1.3. ii) to indicate that the definition being stated by M.will be most superior, because pra stands for excellence.

4 etc. stands for definition.

5 The question might be asked 'how will the upasarga 'pra' will express this meaning, because it generally expresses the additional meaning attached to a root only? The answer is 'In this place 'pra' is used to indicate the Arthika meaning and not the Vācanika meaning.

com. 2. 1. (टी.) लक्ष्यमात्रव्यापको धर्मो लक्षणम्। तदुक्तिः शब्दव्यवहारार्था। सास्नाऽऽदिमान् गौः इति ज्ञातलक्षणो हि यं पिण्डं सास्नाऽऽदिमन्तं पश्यति तं गोशब्दवाच्यं प्रत्येति। यदा तु अयं गौः इत्युपदेशाऽदिना व्युत्पत्तिः तदाऽपि व्यक्तिविशेष एव न सर्वत्र। तत्रोपदेशाऽद्यभावात्। अतस्तत्र व्यक्तिविशेषे व्युत्पन्नः तदन्यत्रापि व्युत्पित्सुः तद्धर्मेषु व्यवहारानालोच्य, व्यभिचारिणोऽव्यापकांश्च परिहृत्य, लक्षणभूतमेकं गृहीत्वा, तद्वत्सु गोशब्दसम्बन्धं गृह्णाति। प्राचीनपक्षे केवल व्यतिरेकिणा अत्र अन्वयव्यतिरेकिणेति विशेषः।

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Tr. 1.1 Definition[1] is the charactreristic feature which pervades only that which is to be defined.(And) The statement of that (definition) is for the sake of usage of words (in their respective sense) He who has known the definition (of a cow as)[2] a cow is that which has dewlap and sees an object possessing the dew-lap knows that object as expressed by the word 'cow'. But when he has the knowledge (of the object) through the instruction as 'this is a cow' that knowledge (in such cases) pertains only to that individual object and not to other (cows) because of the absence of (such) instructions (in respect of other cows). And therefore,(he) who has the knowledge (of the relation of the word cow to a particular object and is desirous of having (same) knowledge of relation (of that word to other objects) proceeds in the following way- First he observes the usage of the word cow in some object possessing particular characteristics. Then he excludes the characteristics which exist in the objects other than that particular object but do not exist in some of them, and thereafter holds one common characteristic to them which has been the definition of them and understands the relation of the word cow to them (the objects), who possess that characteristic) The difference[3] (between these two views) is that in the first view (the knowledge is through negative relation and here (in the second view) it is by both, positive and negative relation.

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1 In this passage J has discussed the definition of a definition, and necessity of stating a difinition. Laksya' is any (object) which is to be named or for which a particular word is to be applied. And Laksana is an important characteristic of it. This characteristic is not to be found in others (i.e. the objects not to be defined) but necessarily found in that (to be defined). And the purpose of stating a definition is to create the knowledge of the relation between a particular word and an object expressed by that word. This knowledge is technically known as 'Vyutpatti' (what is meant by what)

2 In this example the commentator explains two ways of getting the knowledge of the relation between the word and the object expressed by it. These two views are known as i) Laksana-jñānādhīna saṁketagrahapaksa and ii) Upadesajñānādhīna-Saṁketagrahapaksa. In the first type, the pupil is taught the definition first. For example 'a cow is, what has dewlap' and then whenever he sees cow; understands that this is what is expressed by the word 'cow'; In the second case; the pupil is told that this is a cow; by showing a particular 'cow' But he is not given any instructions about important characteristics of 'cow' in general. Therefore in this case, the pupil goes on observing many cows; takes notice of some characteristics of cow as 'having horns' etc. which are common to other animals also; and characteristic like blackness which are not in all cows; then having removed them from mind, holds any one characteristics which is found in all cows; but not in objects other than

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the cows(i.e. possession of dew-lap) and thereafter uses the word 'cow' in respect of animals having dew-lap.The difference between these two ways is-in the first he cannot observe similar examples 'like.....,'but only dissimilar ones as what has no dewlap is not a cow. But in the second type he can observe in both ways a 'a cow has dew-lap and what has no dew-lap is not a cow.

Com.3.1 (टी.) नाममात्रेण वस्तुसङ्कीर्तनमुद्देशः। स च लक्षणाऽद्युक्तिसम्भावनार्थः। अनुद्दिश्य कस्य लक्षणाऽदि[2] ब्रूयात्। विधा विभागः। तदुक्तिरवान्तरोद्देशार्था। युक्तायुक्तचिन्ता परीक्षा। सोद्देशविषया न सम्भवति। फलाभावेन नाममात्रे विवादायोगात्। लक्षणपरीक्षा तस्य लिङ्गत्व निश्चयार्था। न ह्यसंभवाव्याप्त्यादिलक्षणस्वरूपासिद्धिभागासिद्धिव्यभिचारापरिहारे[3] लिङ्गता[4] निश्चीयते। विभागपरीक्षा न्यूनाधिकसङ्ख्याव्यवच्छेदमुखेन विभागसमर्थनार्था। बुद्धिदोषनिवृत्ति-पर्यन्ता परीक्षायाः परीक्षा तत्सौष्ठवसिद्ध्यर्था। द्विधा चोद्देशादयः सामान्यतो विशेषतश्चेति।

Tr. 3.1

Mentioning of a thing merely by it's name is called uddesa'enunciation'. It is for the purpose of making it possible to state a definition etc.[1] for, without having mentioned the name how can one state the definition etc.[2] Vidhā is division. The statement of that, is for the purpose of enumerating the sub-divisions. Parīksā 'examination' is considering the correctness or otherwise (incorrectness). That examination is not possible in respect of enunciation alone as there will be absence of result. because of the impropriety of debate merely on name.[3] An examination of the definition is for the purpose of deciding it's nature of being inferential mark. (i.e. probans). (But) this state of it's being the inferential mark cannot be decided until the removal (of the defects of probans) namely[4] svarūpasiddhi'

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'unestablishment in respect of itself' bhāgāsiddhi' unestablishment in a part' and vyabhicāra' being too wide' which are corresponding respectively to a definition being defective of asambhava 'impossibility ' avyāpti' partial inapplicability' etc.[5] The examinition of division (also) is(necessary) for the purpose of justifying (the division) by way of negating less or ~~excess~~ more in the number of division. The examination of examination with the purpose of establishing the perfectness of the definition has to be done till the removal of the defects in one's understanding. The inunciation etc.[6] are of two types i) in general and ii) in particular[7]

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1. etc.-- stands for examination of definition and division.
2. If one says ' I state the definition .... as ' one which has dewlap'. He will be immediatly questioned of what this definition is? for one ~~one~~ will not understand it unless the name of 'to be defined' is stated. In the same way the statement of the division of any thing will not make any sense unless the name of a thing (division of which is being stated) is -- stated.
3. The purpose of debate is to arrieve at some conclusion, but when there is no any matter at all and the debate is merely regarding name, there would not be any conclusion.
4. The purpose of the examination of definition is to see whether something is an inferential mark or not? For example, If a cow is defined as 'one having dewlap' the examination of this definition will prove whether this characteristic is a mark for inference of a cow? But

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'possession of dewlap' would be an inferential mark of a cow only when it is not-i) unestablished by it's very nature in any of cows (it will be so if the definition has defect asambhava 'impossibility of being in any one of defined. for example ekaśafatva 'having only one horn' which is not possible in any cow.
ii) Unestablished in a part of the defined. (It will be so if the definition has defect 'Avyāpti' partial inapplicability' for Black is cow' -(will not be available in other cows)
iii) being too wide (It will be so if the defination has defect 'overapplicability'. for example-having horns is cow' which will be applicable to buffalo also) These three are fallacies discussed in their proper place. what J wants to say is, if the definition has defects, it will cover not only the inferential marks but also what appear to be so. Therefore examination of definition is necessary.

5. etc. covers ativyāpti' over applicability'
6. etc. covers division and definition.
7. in general as-'yathārtham pramāṇam'. - particular as nirdoṣārthendriya sannikarṣah pratyakṣam'

Com- 4.1 प्रमाणलक्षणस्यान्यैरेवोक्तत्वात् किमपूर्वनिर्माणेनेत्यतो वा प्रवक्ष्यामीत्युक्तम्। अन्योक्तीनाम-
Ch. 4.1 प्रकृष्टतां वक्ष्यति।

Tr. 4.1 Or (the verb) pravakṣyāmi is stated (with the Upasarga pra) in order to (answer the question) 'what is the use of writing a new (work now) when the definition of pramāṇa is already stated by others?' (Pra indicates that the author)

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will show imperfectness of the statements of others(about the definition).

Com. 5.1 द्विविधं लक्षणम्, यावल्लक्ष्यभावि अयावल्लक्ष्यभावि चेति। तत्राऽऽद्यं यथा, पृथु-बुध्नोदराऽऽकारो घट इति। द्वितीयं यथा, भोगाऽयतनं शरीरमिति। तत्राऽऽद्यमेव व्युत्पाद्यम्। तस्यैव सार्वत्रिकव्यवहारोपयोगित्वादिति भावेनोक्तम् ॥ स्वलक्षणमिति ॥ तदेव हि स्वरूपभूतं लक्षणं यत् यावल्लक्ष्यभावीति।

Tr. 5.1 The definition is of two types[1] : 1) that which lasts till the object to be defined lasts and 2) that which does not last till the object to be defined lasts. The first (of them) is as - 'the pot is that which has a broad and hollow bottom'. The second is as ' the body is the substratum of enjoyments.[2] of these two, only the first is fit to be stated.[3] (as an expressive of some object)[4]. For that alone is useful for common use ,(And) with this intention the word svalaksanam[5] (instead of lakṣaṇam) is stated (in the text). for, that definition (alone) which is applicable as long as the object to be defined lasts,is said to be the definition which represents the essential nature of the thing to be defined).

(M discusses in this passage, the types of a definition and also explains what type of definition is intended by M)

1. This discussion has reference to, two types of definition discussed in Vedānta,namely- tatasthalaksana and svarūpalaksana. The 'yāvallaksyabhāvi' stands for tatasthalaksana and ayāvallaksyabhāvi stands for svarūpalaksana See i) जगज्जन्मास्थितिध्वंसाः यतः सिध्यन्ति

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कारणात् । तत्स्वरूपतटस्थाभ्यां लक्षणाभ्यां प्रदर्श्यते Panc PāVi. 204.2

ii) tatasthalaksana is यावद्दृश्यकालमनवस्थायित्वे सति यद् व्यावर्तकम् SarvaDaSam 30.

Examples of both these types are given as –

मायावादिमते ब्रह्मणः जगज्जन्मादिकारणं तटस्थलक्षणं ।
सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म इति स्वरूपलक्षणं ।

SaDaSam.30 also the discussion on BraSū i.1.2

2. Of these two examples, we can observe that the first denination (i.e. of a pot) represents the very nature of pot. If that particular type of shape is broken the object will not be called a 'Pot'(i.e upto that mo ment) Hence this definition becomes applicable as long as the object to be defined remains. But the second type of definition(i.e. of a body) ceases to be applicable (some times) even when the object to be defined remains, because a (dead) body is said to be body but not having capacity of enjoyments(or a place of enjoyments).

3. Māyāvādins need both the types of definitions for the convinience of their philosophy, since they have to differenciate the two stages of the knowledge of Brahman. i) before the removal of avidyā and after the removal of avidyā. Tatasthalaksana is applicable in first stage while the svarūpalaksana is applicable in the second stage. M being of realistic view, holding that the world is true and there is nothing as māyā does not have this difficulty and therefore he intends to state only svarūpalaksana

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4. The word vyutpādyam exactly means 'the relation of a word to it's sense is to be taught' see —

व्युत्पाद्यो [illegible]

Bhā Dī.8.19.

5. Sva stands for svarūpa.

Com 1.2 (टी.) प्रमाणानामित्युद्देशे सिद्धे प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणमाह

T. 2 यथार्थं प्रमाणम्

Com 2.2 प्रमाणमिति लक्ष्यनिर्देशः। यथार्थमिति लक्षणोक्तिः। एवमुत्तरत्रापि ज्ञातव्यम्। यथार्थं यथावस्थितार्थविषयीकारि। अर्थविषयीकारित्वमात्रस्य संशयविपर्ययसाधारण्याद्विशेषणोपादानम्। अर्थविषयीकारित्वेनैव प्रमेयाऽदिव्युदासः। अर्यत इत्यर्थो ज्ञेयमुच्यते। अतो न गम्यविषयीकारिगतावतिव्याप्तिः।

Tr.1.2 (In this way) when the statement (of the subject of the work by mere name is done with the word pramāṇānām (M) states the definition of pramāṇas in general (as)-

Tr. 2. Pramāṇa[1] is '(what cognizes) the (object) to be cognized[2] as it[3] (really) is.'

Tr. 2.2 (In this text, the word) Pramāṇa conveys what is to be defined. (And the word) 'yathārtham' is the statement of the definition. In this way should one understand (in what follows).[4] 'yathārtham' means that which has for it's object a thing as it is. (In this text there is the) mention of qualifying (word yathā 'as it is') because 'having for it's object' is common to both doubt and error.[5] (And there is) exclusion of prameya 'object to be known' (from the definition of pramāṇa) etc.[6] is done by the phrase ' being one which has a thing for

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it's object'. The derivation of the word artha is as 'aryate iti'[7] (and the meaning expressed by it is)' to be known'- (and not the object to be reached by movements) And therefore there is no overapplication of this definition in the action of going which has for it's object (a place) to be gone (to be reached by movements).

---

1. The word pramāna is generally translated as 'means of knowledge, itself as well as instrument of knowledge. The word pramāna is derived as under - Pra + √Mā (ni)

Pra-mā + y (lut) P.iii.3.15

Pra + Mā + ana P.vii.1.1-

natva - pramāna.

In this process the suffix added is lut; and this can be in both, the senses i) instrument and ii) rootsense. because of the rule of P.' Lut ca'iii.3.115. Therefore the word pramāna means pramā valid knowledge and pramīyate anena iti' 'instrument of that valid knowledge'. By drawing this twofold meaning from the word pramāna M has given full importance to the grammar and has not restricted the sense to either of it arbitrarity, and defined the word pramāna accordingly

2 artha = not only the object but whatever is to be known.

See. अर्थशब्दस्तु न विजयपर्यवसितः किंतु ज्ञेयवाची. NS. 247 A-9.

3. The indeclinable yathā has 4 meanings. But the meaning intended in this context is anatikrama.

4. This sentence states a definition. It has tow parts. The first part states a definition and second part states what is to be defined.

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In this way the relation of defining and to be defined is to be understood in the text coming hereafter. For example- tatsādhanam anupramānam. The first part is the definition of the second part, to be defined.

5. First, the word yathā is explained as yathāvasthitārthavisayīkār and then padakrtya 'purpose of stating everyword,' is discussed. Doubt and erroneous knowledge also make an object known, but not 'as it is'.

6. Ādi. stands for pramātr 'cogniser'. The importance of this definition is- 'it states the relation of visayavisayī 'subject and object' between the knowledge and object, and thereby confirms the difference between cognizer, cognition and 'to be cognized.'

7. The word artha is derived from the root √R. It's meaning is 'to go' and has the other meaning 'to know' following the rule 'sarve gatyarthāh jñānārthāh' (See. Si.Kau. Root No. 1003; and Pā. Sam. NS.244 p.12

In this context, the second meaning is intended. The derivation is as -

i) √R + 'than' - usikusigarthibhyah sthan (unādi 161)

ii) Guna = ar + tha = artha - And the meaning is 'to be known' (i.e. an object)

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Com.0.3 तद्विभागमाह

T. 3 तद्द्विविधम्

Com.1.3 प्रमाणानामानन्त्येऽपि साक्षात्पारम्पर्येण याथार्थ्यज्ञापनार्थोऽयं विभागः ।
एतदेव दर्शयन् द्वे विधे उद्दिशति

T.4 केवलमनुप्रमाणं च

Com.1.4 साक्षाद्यथावस्थितार्थविषयीकारि केवलम् । परम्परया तादृशमनुप्रमाणमिति ।

Tr.0.3 (Now) (the author) states it's division.

Tr. 3 It is twofold[1].

Tr.1.3 Though the pramāṇās are many, this division is (stated) with the intention of conveying it's being in accordance with the object as it exists, directly and indirectly. (And) showing this very (twofoldness of yāthārthya the author) states two types (as follows)

Tr. 4 (Viz) Kevala 'direct' and Anupramāna 'indirect'

Tr.1.4 Kevala (pramāna) is that which takes for it's object a thing as it is, directly (And) Anupramāna is similar to it (i.e. grasping an object as it is, but) indirectly.

---

1) This first division is based on the way pramāṇas grasp the object. As discussed in previous notes; M has taken the word pramāna for both, the valid knowledge as well as an instrument of it. According to M the function of pramāna is to reveal an object as it is. It is the knowledge only, through which one grasps an object and therefore, the knowledge is direct pramāna and other pramāṇas like perception etc., do not directly grasp an object but they create the knowledge through which one grasps an

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objects ; hence they are anupramānas. They reveal an object indirectly. for example, when one says 'I perceived presence of a pot' It is not the contact of visual faculty and the pot which itself cognizes the object, but it is the knowledge created through such contact, what cognizes the pot. With this intention, M has devided pramāṇa into two as Kevala and anu. See.

i) केचिद्बादेन विज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यमास्थेयत। अपरे तु तात्पर्यस्य तत् किमत्र तत्त्वम्। इत्यमाहुते ब्रूमः।--- ज्ञानमेव हि विजयस्य ज्ञेयस्य ज्ञेयतायां साक्षात्व्यापियते। अतस्तद्वैपयस्य ज्ञानं मुख्यं, पुरुषाधिकरणाते तु विजयस्य ज्ञेयतायामेवं ज्ञाने ज्ञानमेव विजयस्य ज्ञेयत्वमुच्यते। N.S. 246 B 7

ii) याथार्थ्यमेव ज्ञाने स्वानुरूपं ज्ञानजन्यम्। Anubhya. 178 B 7

केवलप्रमाणलक्षणम्

Com.0.5 (टी.) प्राधान्याभिप्रायेण प्रथममुद्दिष्टं केवलं लक्षयति

T. 5 यथार्थज्ञानं केवलम्

Com. 1.5 संज्ञानिरुक्त्यैव लक्षणसिद्धौ शृंगग्राहिकया तज्ज्ञापनार्थं पृथगारम्भः। यथार्थेति संशयादिव्युदासः।

Tr.0.5 (M) defines kevala(pramāṇa) which was stated first, with the intention of showing it's prime importance.

Tr. 5 Kevala(pramāṇa) is the knowledge which is in accordance with it's object (to be known).

Tr.1.5 Even though the defining characteristic can be accomplished by mere etymological explanation[1] of the name, the distinct statement of the definition is done with a view of explaining the same in the manner of Śrngagrāhikā

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'taking by the horns'[2] (i.e. in order to specify the prominent feature). There is exclusion of doubt etc.[3] (from coming under the definition of pramāṇa) by the part yāthārtha[4] (of the definition).

---

1) Nirukti is 'etymological explanation'. Such explanation in respect of the words pramāṇa and anupramāṇa will be as follows i) Pramāṇam is prakrstam mānam and pramā eva pramāṇam which mean i) main or important pramāṇa -- (valid knowledge) and ii) Anupramāṇam is 'anyat anusrtya' which, following others only, becomes pramāṇa. This explanation itself is sufficient to convey what is intended to be conveyed by the definition. Then why it is necessary to state the definition separately? One might ask. To answer this, J explains as above.

2) 'Srngagrāhikā Nyāya - 'Nyāya' is maxim, and srngagrāhikā means 'showing or pointing out a particular animal taking or holding by horns'. This maxim is applied when something is stated in general, and further the same thing is discussed or referred in particular. In this case M had already stated the name of pramāṇa. It was sufficient to convey the intention, even then M stated the definition because he wanted to make it known in particular. [See. शृङ्गस्य ग्रहणं यस्यां क्रियायां सा। Based on P. III-1-108-9 यथा गोव्रजे का त्वधीया गौरिति गोपा पृष्टः शृङ्गं गृहीत्वा गां प्रदर्शयेत् तथा बोधकम् La.Nya. Pt. 2. Jacob.]

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3. etc = includes erroneous knowledge.

4. for, doubt, and erroneous knowledge are the knowledges, but they are not 'as the object is' - Therefore they will not be called pramanas.

Com.2.5

अनवधारणज्ञानं संशयः। स द्विविधः। अनिर्दिष्टकोटिको निर्दिष्टकोटिकश्चेति। तत्र कोटीनामतिबाहुल्यादनिर्दिष्टकोटिरनध्यवसायापरनामा। यथा, 'किंसंज्ञकोऽयं वृक्ष' इति। द्वितीयोऽपि समानानेककोटिरन्यतरकोटिप्रधानश्चेति द्वेधा। तत्राद्यो यथा, 'किमयं ब्राह्मणस्तदितरो वा, इति। ऊहापरनामा द्वितीयो यथा, 'प्रायेणायं ब्राह्मण' इति।

नैयायिकैकदेशिमते संशयकारणानि

प्रत्येकं निश्चायकाभावसहकृतसमानासमानधर्मविप्रतिपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिजन्मा पञ्चधा भिद्यत इत्येके। तद्यथा, समानधर्मात् दीर्घत्वात् 'स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा' इति। असमानधर्मात् आकाशविशेषगुणत्वात् 'शब्दो नित्योऽनित्यो वा' इति। विप्रतिपत्तेः 'भौतिकानीन्द्रियाणि उत अभौतिकानि' इति। उपलब्धेः 'किं सदिदमुदकमुतासत्' इति। अनुपलब्धेः 'किमत्र यक्षोऽस्ति न वा' इति।

उदयनमते संशयकारणानि

उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्योः समानधर्म एवान्तर्भावात् त्रैविध्यमित्यपरे। समाने हि सदसतोरुपलब्धत्वानुपलब्धत्वे इति।

स्वमते कारणम्

असमानधर्मविप्रतिपत्त्योरपि समानधर्म एवान्तर्भावयितुं शक्यत्वात् ऐकविध्यमिति तत्त्वम्।

Doubt

Kr.2.5 The uncertain knowledge (indeterminate apprehention) is (called) 'doubt'. It is twofold. i) Anirdistakotika' that (statement) in which the alternatives (of doubt) are not stated, and ii) Nirdistakotika' that (statement) in which the alternatives (of doubt) are stated. Since the alternatives (can be) being too many, the anirdistakotika

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has another name 'anadhyavasāya' absence of determination' for example, 'of what name is this tree?'[1]. The second type also (i.e. nirdistakotika) is twofold as i) Samānānekakoti in which there are many equally possible alternatives, ii) Anya Itarakotipradhāna - in which, one of the alternatives is predominant. (of these two types) the example of first (type i.e. one in which all alternatives are equally possible). "Whether this one is Brahmin or other than Brahmin?[2] (The example of Second type one in which one alternative is predominant) which has the another name Uhā 'guess' is as - most probably he is Brahmin![3]

Some[4] hold that each of these (types of) doubt is (to be) subdivided in to five- arising out of i) common property ii) uncommon (property) iii) conflicting testimony iv) perception and v) non perception, (each of these) accompanied (aided) by the absence of the determinating factor[5]. The examples are as follows (The doubt)- i) is it a pillar or man?- arising from noticing the talness as common property; ii) whether sound is eternal or non-eternal? arising out of uncommon property (because sound is the specific quality of ether[6]) iii) are sense organs material or non materials?- arising out of conflicting testimony[7]. iv) is this water (now available) existent before or non-existent?[8]- arising out of perception, and v) whether there is yakṣa or not? arising out of non perception.

Others hold only threefoldness (of reasons of doubt) on account of the inclusion of perception and non perception

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in common property' Because perception and non perception are common to the existent and nonexistent.

But the truth[10] is that, there is only one reason for doubt because of the possibility of inclusion of uncommon property and conflicting testimony in 'common property'.

(To make it easy to understand the statement that doubt and erroneous knowledge are not pramāṇas J explains the nature of doubt and erroneous knowledge, and takes opportunity to express his views regarding the reasons of doubt).

1) Answers to this doubt can be 'any tree', but possibility of any one is not mentioned.

2) The person can be any one, Brahmin, Kṣatriya, or Vaisya etc. But no stress is given on his being any one. Therefore this is an example of many alternatives of equal possibility The person may or may not be Brahmin.

3) Possibility of his being Brahmin is emphasized, therefore it is an example of one alternative being predominant.

4) This 'some' refers to Gautama. Nyāsū i.1.23 gives five reasons for doubt. They are discussed here, and for all these types, absence of determining factor is important.

5) The basic reason for doubt is absence of determination. But if any determinating factor is there, the doubt would not arise. Suppose, in the example given above, if the determining factors of Brahmin such as śikhā etc. are appeared clearely, no doubt would arise.

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6) As Nyāya school discusses the sound is specific quality of eather. See [illegible] Tasam. 11·8 :
This is not found either in the things eternal or non eternal Therefore one cannot decide whether sound is eternal or non-eternal.

7) There are two different opinions regarding the nature of being material in respect of sense organs. They are material to the tārkikas But
They are not so to the Sāṅkhyas

8) This doubt arises after a well is dug. Some-times water already existing there comes out; or sometimes it is available there through the ways newly made. This doubt refers to this idea.

9) This 'others' has reference to Nyāyavārtika. See
[illegible] Tatt 256.12

10) In fact, 'common property' is the only reason for doubt. Because when something is found common in two then only the doubt arises 'what is this'. In all these examples stated above, the common properties namely 'talness', 'treeness', 'availability', 'manness' etc. are the basic reasons for doubt. fot, if they would not have been there, the doubt would not have taken place. Therefore J takes very practical view. This is an important contribution of M's philosophy, Which avoides unnecessary assumptions- In short 'the doubt is when there appear to be many different(contrary) propertie

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in only one property -

एकास्मिन् धर्मिणि भासमानाविरुद्धानेकप्रकारावगाहि ज्ञानम् ।

See śrī. 13.16.



Error

Com. 3.5 **विपरीतनिश्चयो विपर्ययः । यथा, शुक्तिकायामिदं रजतमिति ।**

Tr.3.5 Assertion[1] to the contraty (opposite to the real) (is called) error(erroneous knowledge). For example (the assertion that) this is silver, in a (conch) shell.

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1. The difference between doubt and error is, in error the contrary knowledge is taken as valid one; but in doubt it is uncertain and therefore there is scope to remove it.

Com. 4.5 **ज्ञानमित्यनुप्रमाणव्युदासः । अनुमानादेरपि स्वविषये केवलत्वान्नातिव्याप्तिः ।**

Tr. 4.5 By the use of the word jñānam (in the definition) there is an exclusion of anupramānas (from coming under the definition)[3] And also (there is no over-applicability of this definition in respect of inference etc.[2] because of their being Kevala 'direct' regarding their own objects.[3]

---

2 Because, anupramānas are the instruments of knowledge and not the knowledge itself.

2. etc. covers verbal testimony.

3. Here one might argue 'In the inference of fire, smoke is the instrument of inferential knowledge -'fire', and therefore it is anupramāna but at the same time the word 'smoke' -

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cognizes the object smoke directly, and hence it is Kevala pramāṇa of smoke. Therefore 'smoke' can be both, Kevala and anupramāṇa; so the definition of Kevala will be applicable to Anupramāṇa (i.e. inference) also. To avoid this difficulty J says 'intention of speaker is to be considered. When the word smoke is used to convey the object smoke then it is Kevala, but when it is used to infer fire, it is anu'.

x-x-x-x

DEFINITION OF ANUPRAMĀṆA -

Com. 0.6 (टी.) अनुप्रमाणलक्षणमाह

Tr.0.6 (Now) the author states the definition of anupramāṇa

T. 6 तत्साधनमनुप्रमाणम्

Com. 1.6 तदिति यथार्थज्ञानपरामर्शः। यथार्थेति संशयाऽदिसाधनदुष्टेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाऽदिव्युदासः। ज्ञानग्रहणमनुप्रमाणसाधननिवृत्त्यर्थम्। साधनमिति केवलप्रमाणव्युदासः। अनुमानाऽदेरपि लिङ्गयादि विषयेऽनुप्रमाणत्वात्। हेतुरित्युच्यमाने प्रमातृप्रमेययोरपि प्रसङ्गात् साधनग्रहणम्। सतोरपि कर्तृ-कर्मणोर्यदभावात् कार्याभावो यदनन्तरं चासति प्रतिबन्धे भवत्येव कार्यं तदुच्यते साधनमिति। यथा व्यापारवान् कुठारः। अत एव न यादृच्छिकसंवादिलिङ्गविभ्रमादावतिव्याप्तिः। यथार्थ-मित्येवोक्ते केवले अतिव्याप्तिः। ज्ञानमित्येवोक्ते तत्र संशयाऽदौ च। प्रत्यक्षे अव्याप्तिश्च। साधनमित्येवोक्ते कुठाराऽदौ। अतो विशिष्टग्रहणम्। प्रमावान् प्रमाता। प्रमाविषयः प्रमेयम्। यथार्थज्ञानं प्रमा। प्रमातुः प्रमेयत्वेऽपि विवक्षावशात् पृथगुक्तिः।

Tr. 6. Instrument of that (as it is knowledge) is anupramāṇa.

Tr.1.6 By the word tad 'that' (in the text) there is reference to the knowledge (of an object) 'as it is'[1]. By the use of the word 'yathārtha' 'as an object is' (in the definition) there is an exclusion of the contact etc.[2] of the defective sense-organs (with an object) which are means of doubt etc.[3]. Mention of the word jñāna is for the purpose of excluding an instrument of anupramāṇa.

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With the use of (the word) sādhana (there is an) exclusion of Kevala pramāna since inference etc. are of the nature of anupramāna[4] in respect of 'liṅgin' proban-dum' etc. If the word 'hetu' 'cause' (instead of sādhana 'instrument' is used) there will be cotingency (of appli-cability of this definition) in respect of pramātr 'cognizer' and prameya 'that is to be cognized' also;[5] and so the word sādhana 'instrument' is used. Something is called an instrument when because of the absence of which there is an absence of result, and because of the presence of which the result is (necessarily) to happen, if no obstacle exists; inspite of the presence of the agent and the object. For example 'an axe in function' (And) there-fore (because of such definition of instrument, and it's use in the definition) there is no over-applicability of the definition (of anupramāna) in the erroneous knowledge of probans which corresponds (with probandum) only by chance. (i.e. accidental validity)[7]

(If the definition of anupramāna is stated as) 'as it is' only, there will be 'over-applicability' (of such definition) in Kevala, (similarly) if it is said to be 'knowledge' only[8] then the same (overapplicability) will be in the case of that (i.e. Kevala) as well as in doubt etc.[9], and also (it) will not cover the perception.[10] If it is said (that) 'instrument' (only is the definition) then (there will be overapplicability) in axe etc. And hence the mention (of these words) all together (is necessary).

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"The cognizer"is one who possesses correct cognition. 'To be cognized' is the object of correct cognition and the'correct cognition'is the knowledge of an object'as it is'. Even though, the cognizer is also the object of cognition[12], it's separate mention is made (done) because of the intention (of speaker).[13]

(In this passage J has explained the necessity of every word in the definition of anupramāṇa. and also, explained what is 'instrument'; which is an important word in respect of this definition).

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1. Therefore the definition will be'यथार्थज्ञानसाधनमनुप्रमाणम्।
2. etc.covers the defects of an object also; because the word defectless in the definition of perception is applicable to both, object to be cognized and the contact.
3. etc.= stands for erroneous knowledge.
4. Without the word jñānam the definition will be 'yathārthasādhanam' and it will be applicable to senses also. Senses are the 'sadhana' 'instrument' of contact which is according to the object. After the addition of the word jñāna this difficulty would not arise, because contact is a function but not knowldege; and hence senses will be'sādhana'of function, but not of knowledge.
5. Kevalapramāna by itself is knowledge, hence it is not the instrument of knowledge. Secondly, as discussed in note No. 3 on P. 23 →

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'smoke' is both, Kevala and anupramāna. When the smoke is understood as a pro ban: it will b anupramāna only, and when it is taken to understand the object 'smoke' it is Kevala. So there is no overapplicability of these definitions in the same , namely 'smoke', because the intention of the speaker in particular context is to be taken into consideration.

6. The person who cognizes, and the object to be cognized both are one way or other, reasons of valid knowledge; But they are not 'instruments' in it's particular sense. Because even when the object pot is there; the person who wishes to cognize is present, but eyes are closed, or no contact is created with the object, the perception would not take place. It is the contact only, without which, perception cannot take place, and in the presence of which, perceptional knowledge would necessarily arise, if no obstacle is there. Therefore contact only is sādhana for knowledge. Through perception

7. This is very common example. If a person sees dust in the sky, and misunderstands it as 'smoke'. Through that, he infers fire on the mountain, and only by chance, fire is there. In this case, even erroneous knowledge of smoke, has created inferential knowledge of fire. But this should not be a proper example of inference, because there is misunderstanding in this case. And according to the definition this is not an inference. Since the dust is not

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such type of instrument in the absence of which there would not arise inference; (on the other hand, it arises, for, every place where smoke is; dust may or may not be) and in presence of which, necessarily, inference should arise (this also is not possible, because in every place, where dust is there we do not find fire). Therefore dust cannot be inference. (Anupramāna).

8. Kevala being 'knowledge' cannot be the instrument of it.
9. doubt also(may be indeterminate) is knowledge.
10. Because perception is instrument of knowledge, and not knowledge, by itself.
11. J. with a view of making it easy to understand what is stated in note. 6; defines 'pramātr' and 'prameya'.
12. In the statement 'I know myself' myself (i.e. cognizer I) is an object to be known (i.e. prameya)
So, what is prameya in that particular place, is depending upon the intention of speaker; and these definitions are to be applied in that particular context only.
13. This discussion regarding anupramāna and the relation of knowledge with knower; makes it clear (and supports the view of M that) the knowledge, the knower and the object to be known are different and there is existence of bheda 'distinction' between them.

Kevalapramāna (in detail)

अथ केवलप्रमाणनिरूपणम्

Com. 0.7 केवलप्रमाणं विभजति

T. 7 केवलं चतुर्विधम्

Com. 1.7 अयमपि महावैलक्षण्यज्ञापनार्थो विभागः । चतस्रो विधाः प्राधान्यक्रमेणोद्दिशति

T. 8 ईशलक्ष्मीयोग्ययोगिभेदेन

Com. 1.8 ज्ञानिनामेवं भेदेन निर्दिष्टेन ज्ञानमपि चातुर्विध्यम् । तत्रार्हं तु संक्षेपात् ।

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Tr.0.7 (The author) classifies Kevalapramāṇa.

Tr.7 Kevala is fourfold.

Tr.1.7 This classification also is for the purpose of conveying the difference (among the four). (first the author) enumerates the four types in their order of importance.[1]

Tr.8 On account of the distinction as Īśa : Lakṣmi yogins and ayogins.

Tr.1.8 Because of such distinction among the possessors of (Kevala) knowledge; the (Kevala) knowledge also is of four types. Or the word knowledge is to be supplied (in the text)[2].

---

1. The entire discussion regarding the division of Kevala-pramāṇa and their definitions etc. is an important part of M's philosophy. One of his doctrines namely tāratamya 'gradation' is discussed here. According to M, the God Viṣṇu is highest and above all. He knows everything about Himself as well as others. His knowledge has no beginning and no end. It is all-comprehensive, and without the efforts of thought. It is independant, but the knowledge of everyone else, is dependant on Him, in respect of its scope, existence, etc. And He is jñānamaya. Then comes Lakṣmī. Her knowledge about the God Viṣṇu is more than that of anyone else. She is dependant only on Viṣṇu. Her knowledge also is eternal. She knows more details about Viṣṇu but not fully. Next to Lakṣmī there are three types of Yogins. Their knowledge goes on decreasing downwards. After yogins there are ayogins, lower in the order. This way M has given 37 different Kakṣyās 'stages', and every

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being occupies respective place according to its capacity. See for details i) Tattva sangraha of Madhva; ii) Tāratamyasamgraha of Raghvendra, iii) Tartamyapancas'loki-Edi.by Katti. We are not concerned with philosophical details, but we must note here that M has taken full opotunity of explaining his doctrine of gradation among the souls and even the Gods, while stating the division and definitions of various kinds of Kevalapramāṇa.

2. So that, the text will be " Īśajñāna, laksmījñāna,..... bhedaen".

Com.1. (टी.) अनुप्रमाणस्य केवलप्रमाणसाधनत्वेनोक्तत्वात् चतुर्विधमपीदं तज्जन्यं, तत एवानित्यं चेति न मन्तव्यमित्याह

पूर्वद्वयमनादि नित्यम्

T. 9

ईशलक्ष्मीज्ञानम् ।

Com.1.10

द्वयोरप्यनादिनित्यत्वे को विशेषः येन पृथग्ग्रहणमित्यत आह

T.10 स्वातन्त्र्यपारतन्त्र्याभ्यां तद्विशेषः

Com.1.10 अनादिनित्यत्वसाम्येऽपि स्वसत्ताऽऽदौ स्वतन्त्रमीशज्ञानं, तदधीनं लक्ष्मीज्ञानमिति महाविशेषात् पृथग्ग्रहणमुपपद्यते । अनेन स्वतन्त्रज्ञानमाद्यं, ईशैकाधीनं द्वितीयमिति द्वयोर्लक्षणं सूचितं भवति । आद्ये स्वतन्त्रमिति लक्ष्म्यादिज्ञाननिवृत्तिः । ज्ञानमितीशव्युदासः । द्वितीये ईशाधीनमिति ईशज्ञाननिवृत्तिः । एकेति ब्रह्माऽदिज्ञाननिवृत्तिः । ज्ञानमिति लक्ष्मीव्यावृत्तिः ।

तयोर्विशेषान्तरमाह

T.11 पूर्वं स्वपरगताखिलविशेषविषयम्

Com. 1.11 लक्ष्मीज्ञानस्याप्यतिमहत्त्वेनैतत्संभवात् कथमीशज्ञानस्य विशेषः ? इत्यत आह

T. 12 द्वितीयमीशेऽन्येभ्योऽधिकम्

Com. 1.12 (टी.) लक्ष्मीज्ञानमीशविषये ब्रह्माऽदिज्ञानेभ्य एवाधिकविषयम् ।

किं चातः ? इत्यत आह

T. 13 असार्वत्रिकम्

Com. 1.13 न त्वीशे सर्वविशेषविषयम् । अतस्तयोरस्ति विशेषः ।

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Com 1.15 किम् ईशलक्ष्मीज्ञानयोरन्यत्र तर्हि साम्यमेव ? नेत्याह

T. 15 स्पष्टत्वे भेदः

Com 2.15 द्वयमपीशादन्यत्र सर्वविषयं स्पष्टं च। तत्रेशज्ञानं निरतिशयस्पष्टं। न तथा लक्ष्मीज्ञानमित्यस्त्येव विशेषः।

Com 3.15 अथ वा पूर्वमित्यनेन कात्स्न्र्येनेशविषयत्वं लक्षणान्तरमीशज्ञानस्य सूचितम्। तत्र कात्स्न्र्येनेति लक्ष्म्यादिज्ञानव्युदासः। कृत्स्नजगद्विषयं लक्ष्मीज्ञानमपि भवतीतीऽशग्रहणम्। ईशेऽन्येभ्योऽधिकमसार्वत्रिकमिति लक्ष्मीज्ञानस्य लक्षणान्तरम्। ईशग्रहणं स्वरूपकथनार्थम्। असार्वत्रिकत्वासंभवनिवृत्त्यर्थं च। अन्येभ्योऽधिकमिति ब्रह्माऽदिज्ञानव्युदासः। असार्वत्रिकमिति ईशज्ञाननिरासः। ईशेऽसार्वत्रिकमन्यत्र सर्वविषयमिति तल्लक्षणान्तरम्। ईशादन्यत्रग्रहणं व्याघातपरिहारार्थम्। ईशेऽसार्वत्रिकमिति ईशज्ञाननिवृत्तिः। अन्यत्र सर्वविषयमित्यस्मदादिज्ञानव्युदासः। ऋजुज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिपरिहारायानालोचनेऽपीति ग्राह्यम्। तस्याऽलोचने अन्यत्र सर्वविषयत्वं वक्ष्यति। स्पष्टत्व इत्यनेनापि निरतिशयस्पष्टं ईशज्ञानं, ईशज्ञानमेव यतोऽधिकस्पष्टं तत् लक्ष्मीज्ञानम् इत्यनयोर्लक्षणान्तरं सूचितं भवति।

Tr.1.9 'One should not think that, since anupramāṇa is said to be instrument of Kevalapramāṇa, this fourfold (Kevalapramāṇa) is a product of that (anupramāṇa) and hence it is not eternal'[1] To convey this, the author says ---

Tr.9 The first two are without a beginning and eternal.

tr.1.10 (first two means) the Knowledge of the Lord and of Lakṣmī. (one might ask) ' if both are beginningless and eternal, what can be uncommon between them so that they are distinctly mentioned?' for this (the author) says --

tr.10 The distinction between them is on the basis of independance (of Lord's Knowledge) and dependance (of Lakṣmī's knowledge on the Lord).[2]

tr.1.10 In spite of beginninglessness and eternality being common the distinct mention (of these two) is justified by the great distinction (between the knowledge of the Lord and of Lakṣmī) namely in respect of it's own existence etc. the

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Knowledge of the Lord is independant (of anyone else) while the knowledge of Lakṣmī is dependant on Him[3]. This distinct mention (itself) indicates the definitions of these two as - the first (the knowledge of the Lord) is independant knowledge and the other (i.e. the knowledge of Lakṣmī) is dependant on the Lord alone.[4] In the first (definition) there is the exclusion of the knowledge of Lakṣmī etc[5]. (from coming under the definition) because of the use of the word svatantram 'independant'[6]; and (by the use of the word) jñānam 'knowledge' (there is the) exclusion of the Lord.[7] In the second (i.e. the definition of the knowledge of Lakṣmī) by the use of the word Īsādhīna' dependent on the Lord' the knowldege of the Lord is excluded, and by the word Eka 'alone', there is the exclusion of the knowledge of Brahmadeva[8] etc. And by the word jñānam 'knowledge' there is exclusion of Lakṣmī[9] (from coming under the definition).

Further the author states the other points of distinction between these two (knowledges as) -

tr.11 The former has for it's object entire particulars belonging to Himself, and also of others.

tr.1.11 (One might ask) 'it is possible that this (i.e. having for it's object everything) might pertain to the knowledge of Lakṣmī (also) on account of it's vastness (and therefore) how can this be the peculiarity only of the knowledge of the Lord?' therefore (to answer this) the author states --

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tr.12 The second is more comprehensive than that of others, in respect of the Lord.

tr.1.12 The knowledge of Lakṣmī in respect of the Lord is more comprehensive than that of Brahmadeva and others only. (one might ask,'even if it is so) what comes of this? - (In order to answer, the author) states -

tr.13 Not pertaining to all details (of the Lord).

tr.1.13 But it is not pertaining to all particulars in respect of the Lord. (And) therefore there is distinction between them. (i.e. the knowledge of lakṣmī and Brahmadeva etc). (One might ask)' just as the knowledge of Lakṣmī is not all-comprehensive in respect of the Lord, is it so in respect of other (objects) also? (To answer) in negative he states -

tr.14 Elsewhere (in respect of objects) other than the Lord.it is all-comprehensive.

tr1.15 (Then there will be a question) Is there equality of the knowledge of the Lord and that of Lakṣmī in respect of other (objects)? (To answer) the author states, No.

Tr.15 There is the distinction from clarity (point of view)

tr2.15 Both these are all-comprehensive and clear in respect of the other objects other than the Lord, but of these two, the knowledge of the Lord is more clear, par excellence; and the knowledge of Lakṣmī is not so, hence there is distinction (between the two).

tr3.15 Or, the word pūrvam 'former' suggests yet another possible definition of the knowledge of the Lord as 'one having for it's object the entire nature of Himself'. The word kārtsnyena 'entirely' (in this definition) excludes

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the knowledge of Lakṣmī and others. Since the knowldege of Lakṣmī also; has for it's object the entire world, there is the addition of (the word) 'Lord'." (Similarly) there can be another definition of the knowledge of Lakṣmī as" "One not all-comprehensive, but more than that of all others, in respect of the Lord". (In this second definitior the use of the word) Īśa is for conveying His essential nature, and also for the sake of avoiding the total inapplicability (of the definition) arising out of it's not being all-comprehensive[12]. By the use of the phrase "more than that of others" there is the exclusion of the knowledge of Brahmadeva and others. (Similarly) with the phrase 'not all comprehensive' there is the exclusion of the knowledge of the Lord[13]. Yet there will be another definiti of that (i.e. the knowledge of Laksmī) as - 'what is not all-comprehensive regarding the Lord but is all-comprehensi in respect of all else than the Lord".

(In this definition) the mention (of the words)"all else than the Lord" is for the purpose of avoiding (the defect called) 'self-contradiction'[14].(And) there is the exclusion of the knowledge of the Lord with the words 'not all-comprehensive in respect of the Lord" And by the phrase 'it has everything for it's object, except in respect of the Lord" there is the exclusion of the knowledge of ourselves[15] (people like us - we and others). Supplement of the word anāyāsenaiva 'even without efforts of thought' is to be understood for the purpose of avoiding overapplicability

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(of the definition) in (the case of the) knowledge of Rju type of yogins. (Since) later on the author is going to state it's (i.e. the knowledge of Rju yogins) nature of having everything for it's object through the efforts of thought[16]. And with the word 'spastatve'in clarity' yet other definitions of the knowledges of the Lord and of Lakṣmī are suggested as i) what is excessively clear is the knowledge of the Lord and ii) that compared to which the knowledge of the Lord is clearer is the knowledge of Lakṣmī.

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1 Since, whatever is produced is not eternal, and Kevala is definid as one for which, anupramāna is instrument; so that, Kevala is produced with that instrument, Kevala is not eternal.

2 According to M, the Lord is independant in every respect, while all others are dependant on Him. Lakṣmī also, has knowledge of everything, but only through his blessings and not otherwise. See. स्वतन्त्रमस्वतंत्रं च द्विविधं तत्त्वमिष्यते। स्वतंत्रो भगवान् विष्णुः TaSam. 1.

3. See note above.

4. In the order, Lakṣmī is next to the Lord. She is higher than anyone else in respect of every thing, the knowledge its scope, existanee etc. Therefore she is not dependant on any one else.

5. etc = others, Brahmadeva, Rudra and so on.

6. Since they all are dependant on the Lord.

7. Since the Lord is defined 'svatantra' See. TaSam. 1.

8. Because the knowledge of Brahmadeva and others, is dependant

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on Lakṣmī also; and not only on the Lord.

9. for Lakṣmī is different from the knowledge

10. 'Others' stands for Brahma, Rudra & other Gods. But not as full as that of the Lord.

11. Because Lakṣmi does not understand the Lord fully; in all aspects.

12. The definition asārvatrika 'not all-comprehensive' will not cover the knowledge of Lakṣmī because it is all-comprehensive, (except in respect of the Lord) and therefore total inapplicability of this definition will arise. To avoid this difficulty ' in respect of the Lord it is not all-comprehensive' is to be supplied.

13. Because He knows everything about Himself.

14. If the words "all else than the Lord" are not mentioned, the statement will be "not all-comprehensive and in respect of the Lord, (and) all-comprehensive". And there will be contradiction between the statements.- not all-comprehensive-all-comprehensive"----- To avoid this defect of statement, namely vyāghāta, "elsewhere (all comprehensive) is to be added.

15. Because our knowledge is limited even in respect of the objects other than the Lord.

16. The author has already stated that this addition is to state the 'great distinction between the knowledges of these four- One of the points of difference is 'the Lord and Lakṣmī do not need any efforts of thinking for having any knowledge. In other words their knowledge is only of svarūpa type; and not of 'manovṛtti' type. Therefore

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it is all the time eternal. But this is not the case in respect of others. All others have both types of knowledge namely svarūpa and Vṛtti' Even the Ṛju type yogins who are in the higher place can have knowledge more than that of any one else (in respect everything else than the Lord) only when they do efforts of thoughts. The api with anālocana stands for avadhāraṇa 'only'. Therefore the definition of their knowledge will be 'not all comprehensive in respect of the Lord, but all comprehensive in respect of the other things only on the efforts of thought" see. Pā 21 A.9.

17. The different definitions of the knowledge of the Lord and of Lakṣmī discussed above can be summerised as under -

The knowledge of the Lord	The knowledge of Lakṣmī
1) स्वरूपादौ स्वतंत्रम्।	1) तदधीनम्।
2) स्वतंत्रज्ञानम्।	2) ईशैकाधीनं ज्ञानम्।
3) कार्त्स्न्येन ईशविषयम्।	3) ईशेऽन्येभ्योऽधिकम्, असार्वज्ञिकम्
4) निरतिशयस्पष्टम्।	4) ईशज्ञानमेव यत्नेऽधिकस्पष्टम्

Ṛju yogins

Com. O. 16 (टी.) योगप्रभावलब्धातिशयं योगिज्ञानम्। तत् त्रिविधम्। ऋजुतात्त्विकातात्त्विकयोगिज्ञानभेदेन।

(टी.) तत्र पूर्ववद्ऋज्ञानं नानुप्रमाणजन्यमनित्यं चेत्याह

T. 16 योगिज्ञानमृजूनामनादिनित्यम्

Com. T. 16 केषां योगिनां? ऋजूनां इति योज्यम्। योगिज्ञान इति पाठे ज्ञानमिति शेषः। असार्वज्ञित्वात् योगविभागः।

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तल्लक्षणमाह

T. 17 ईशे जीवेभ्योऽधिकम्

Com·1·17 ऋजुव्यतिरिक्तजीवज्ञानेभ्य एव। ईश इति स्वरूपकथनम्। जीवेभ्योऽधिकमित्यस्मदादिज्ञाननिरासः। अवधारणेनेशलक्ष्मीज्ञाननिवृत्तिः।

लक्षणान्तरं चाह

T. 18 अन्यत्राऽलोचने सर्वविषयम्

Com·1·18 अन्यत्र ईशादिति शेषः। अन्यत्रग्रहणमसंभवनिवृत्त्यर्थम्। आलोचन इतीशलक्ष्मीज्ञाननिरासः। सर्वग्रहणमस्मदादिज्ञाननिरासार्थम्।

ऋजुज्ञानं यद्यनादिनित्यं तर्हि कथं तत् योगिज्ञानम्? योगजं हि योगिज्ञानमित्यत आह

T·19 क्रमेण वर्धमानम्

Com·1·19 योगप्रभावेन वृद्धिसद्भावात् योगिज्ञानत्वं युक्तम्।

क्रमेण वर्धमानत्वे मुक्तावपि किं वर्धत इति? नेत्याह

T·20 आ मुक्तेः

Com·1·20 आङ् मर्यादायां।

अभिवृद्धनदीवत्पुनः किं ह्रासो भवति? नेत्याह

T· 21 ततोऽव्ययम्

tr. 16 The knowledge of [1] yogin is what has excellance obtained by the power of yoga[2]. It is threefold on account of the difference between (the knowledge of) Rju[3], Tāttvika and Atāttvika types of yogins. Among these, knowledge of Rju yogin is as before (stated), not produced by anupramāna and not non eternal[4] (And to convey this) the author states-

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tr.1.16 The knowledge of Rjuyogins is beginningless and eternal. Th·7593

Of what (type of) yogins? (Will be a question, and therefore) (the word) Rjūnām 'of Rjū yogins' is to be connected[5] (with the word yogins in the text). In the case of (variant) reading yoginjñāne (in the place of yogijñānam)[6] the word jñānam 'knowledge' (after the word Rjūnām) is (to be supplied as) remaining part. The division of sentence is (done because, the beginningless-ness and eternality of the knowledge) not being common (to all yogins)[7]. (further the author) states the definition of it (i.e. the knowledge of Rjuyogins) as ---

tr.17 In respect of the Lord it is more comprehensive (than that of (all other beings).

tr.1.17 (The word more comprehensive should be understood as more comprehensive) than the knowledge of the beings other than Rjuyogins. The word Īśe (is for the statement of) the essential nature. By the words 'more than that of (all other) beings' there is the exclusion of the knowledge (all other beings) such as 'we' (ordinary beings) with the assertion (i.e. by the word eva 'only) there is the inclusion of the knowledge of Lakṣmī[8]. The author (further) states another definition as --- Th. 7593

tr.18 Apart (elsewhere, the knowledge of Rjuyogin) has everything for it's object, on efforts of thought.

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tr.1.18 (The word) Īsāt 'from the Lord' is to be understood as a remaining part (after the word apart). The mention of the word anyatra 'apart, (elsewhere)' is for the purpose of avoiding the impossibility[9]. By the word ālocane 'on efforts of thought' there is the exclusion of the knowledge of the Lord and of Ṭakṣmī[10], (And) mention of (the word) 'all' is for the purpose of avoiding the knowledge of (beings) such as we. (One might ask 'If the knowledge of Rjuyogins is beginningless and eternal, then how can it be the knowledge of yogins? because the knowledge of yogins is produced from yoga; (and anything which is produced cannot be beginningless and eternal). (and) therefore (in order to answer, the author) states -

tr.19 Increasing gradually.

tr.1.19 Since there is possibility of increase due to the power of yoga, being the knowledge of yogin is proper (in case of the knowledge which is beginningless and eternal)" (Then there will be another question) If it is 'increasing gradually, then whether it increases even after attainment of 'final liberation'? To answer in negation he states --

tr.20 Till the final liberation (is attained)

tr.1.20 (the prefix) Ān is for (setting the upper)[12] limits. (one might ask further) will there be decrease (of the knowledge of Rjuyogins) as in overflooding river? (In answer) the author states No.

Tr.21. Thereafter it is unchanged (has not decrease).[13]

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1 J states the definition of yogijñāna in general; which is not stated in the text.

2 Yoga is defined as " भगवद्धर्मानुष्ठानादिरूपः ज्ञानोपायः। Rāgh.24.3. We can see how this definition indicates, that yoga is a way of obtaining knowledge which takes one to final liberation.

3 According to the philosophy of M all the beings are divided into two groups i) yogin and ii) ayogin. Yogins (again) are of three types i) Rju ii) Tāttvika and iii) Atāttvika. And ayogins also are of three types i) muktiyogya ii) nityasamsārins and iii) tamoyogya Rjuyogins are the yogins who are higher in the rank; and fit for getting the post of Brahmadeva. Rjus are defectless. According to M's philosophy, Vāyu alone is now highest among all the beings and fit for Brahmadeva's post see---

1) अविपरीतानचिन्तादिमान् ऋजुः Tattv Pra. 197 B.10

2) ऋजवो नाम हिरण्यगर्भपदप्राप्तियोग्याः सन्ति संसारिणो पुरुषाः NS. 542 A.5

Tāttvikayogins are the deities who preside over and control the different tattvas 'catagories'. Beginning with Brahmadeva vāyu and ending with dharā different deities occupy total 25 tattvas. In the group of atāttvika yogins all the deities, other than those occupy the tattvas, are covered.

In ayogins, some are muktiyogya, who might get final liberation at some (proper) time, other nityasamsārins will never have a change to get liberation, and of the third type, namely tamoyogya who will go to tamas only.

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and willnot be back from that position. for details see i) Tasaṁ-s'loka 1.5 ii) Tantra SāSaṅ adhyāva, -1 and iii) Prameva Saṅ of Rāgh.

4. i.e. eternal (only).

5. Infact this text is not proper; because the word yoginām is connected with the word jñāna only. So no relation of Viśesaṇa Viśesya, between yoginām and rjūnām is possible See. Pāṇ. 22 A.4 with the explanation, the text is to be read as Rjūnam yoginām jñānam.

6. According to this reading, text will be yogijñāne Rjūnām (yoginām) (jñānam) anādinityam 'I think this reading will be more proper, because it will avoid the difficulty of expectancy as stated above in N.5 and addition of the word yoginām after Rjūnām is admissible, than shifting of the word Rjūnām to yogijñānam.

7. (A question might be asked) ' if the knowledge of the lord, Laksmī, and yogins - of all three is beginningless and eternal, then for what reason two different sentences are stated ? It could have been said " Pūrvatrayam anādinityam'. The answer is in that case the knowledge of all types of yogin, would have been beginningless and eternal, which is not intended. This division indicates that, it is restricted to the knowledge of Rjuyogins only.

8. Because the knowledge of Rjuyogins is more than that of ordinary beings only, and not than that of the Lord or Laksmī.

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9. If the word 'an atra' is not there, the definition will be 'having everything for it's object on the efforts of thought' This definition will not cover the knowledge of Rjuyogins since it can not be about everything, and hence there will be impossibility of application of the definitior

10. Because their knowledge is of svarūpa type only, they do not need any efforts of even thinking to have increase in the knowledge of something.

11. Because increase in the knowledge is a production only, therefore it is yogaja and at the sametime, it is eternal also.

12. 'Ān' has two senses-limit and inclusion. In this respect it is used in the sense of 'limit' See. Ān maryādābhividhyoh P.ii.1.13;89 And since it is Karma pravacanīya the ablative case ending is justified See. I) ततश्च पंचम्यजाइ--परिभिरिति कर्मप्रवचनीयाइ·योगात्पंचम्रीति भाव: Pan. 2.3.8.10.

2) ईषदर्थे क्रियायोगे मर्यदाभिविधौ च यः। एतमातं डितं विद्यात्

See Maha Bh. on i.1.14; Kārikā on P. i.1.14.

13. In short, the knowledge of Rjuyogins is, what has gradual increaseupto the final liberation and thereafter no increase or decrease.

Com.0.21 (टी) तात्त्विकातात्त्विकयोगिज्ञानलक्षणं युगपदाह

T. 21 ततोऽर्वाक् क्रमेण ह्रसितम्

Com.1.21 ऋजुभ्योऽन्येषां योगिनां ज्ञानं ईशात् अन्यत्र क्रमेण किञ्चिन्मात्रह्रासयुक्तं भवति। नेदं लक्षणं युक्तम् अन्योन्यमृजुज्ञानाच्च अव्यावृत्तेः। इत्यत आह

T. 22. सादि च तात्त्विकेभ्योऽन्यत्र

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Com 22.1 नैतावदेव लक्षणम्। किं तु : तात्विकयोगिज्ञानमनादि अतात्विकयोगिज्ञानं सादीत्यपि गृह्यते। एतेन अनादित्वे सति ईशात् अन्यत्र आलोचनेऽपि ह्रसितं तात्विकयोगिज्ञानम्, सादित्वे सति ईशात् अन्यत्र किंचिन्मात्रह्रासयुक्तमतात्विकयोगिज्ञानमित्युभयोर्लक्षणं सूचितं भवति। तत्राद्येऽनादित्वेन अतात्विकयोगिज्ञाननिवृत्तिः। ईशादन्यत्रेति ईशविषयेऽनादित्वे सत्यालोचनेऽपि ह्रसितलक्ष्म्यादिज्ञाननिरासः। ऋजुज्ञाननिरासार्थमालोचनेऽपीति। ह्रसितमित्यनेनैव ईशज्ञानव्युदासः। द्वितीये सादित्वग्रहणमृजुतात्विकज्ञाननिवृत्त्यर्थम्। किञ्चिन्मात्रह्रासयुक्तमित्ययोगिज्ञाननिरासः। ईशादन्यत्रेति तत्सम्भवार्थम्। ह्रसितत्वादिग्रहणेनैवेशादिज्ञानेऽप्रसंगः।

अयोगिज्ञाननिरूपणम्

Com 22.2 अयोगिज्ञानं किमीश्वराऽदिज्ञानवदनादिनित्यमेव सदिन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाऽदिनाऽभिव्यज्यते। उत सादि विनाशि चेति। तत्राऽह

T. 23 **अयोगिज्ञानमुत्पत्तिविनाशवत्**

23.1 **तस्य लक्षणमाह**

T. 24 **अल्पम्**

Com.1.24 **ईशादन्यत्राल्पविषयम्।**

The knowledge of the yogins other than the Rju

tr.0.21 (Now) the author states the definitions[1] of the knowledge of the tāttvika and the atāttvika yogins together[2].

tr.21 From that, it (becomes) decreased downwards in order.

tr.21.1 The knowledge of the yogins other than the Rju decreases only to a little extent in gradual order in respect of the (object) other than the Lord. (But one might argue. 'this definition is not correct, since this does not distinguish each-other, and also from the knowledge of Rjuyogins.[3] Therefore (in answer, the author) states -

tr.22. Except in the case of the tāttvikayogins it has a beginning.

tr.22.1 Only this much is not the definition. But, this also is to be added, viz. the knowledge of tāttvikayogins is beginningless whereas the knowledge of atāttvikayogins

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has a beginning. Thereby the definitions of these two are indicated as - i) The knowledge of the tāttvikayogins is one which has a decrease even after the efforts of thought in case of (the objects) other than the Lord, while being without a beginning. And ii) the knowledge of atāttvikayogins which has a less decrease even after the efforts of thought, in case of (the objects) other than the Lord, while having a beginning. In the first (definition) with the word,'while having no beginning' there is the exclusion of the knowledge of atāttvikayogins[4]. With the words 'in respect of (the objects) other than the Lord' there is the exclusion of the knowledge of Lakṣmī[5] and others[6]. Which, while having no beginning has a decrease even after the efforts of thought, in respect of the Lord. The (mention of the word) 'ālocanebi' even after efforts of thought' is for the purpose of exclusion of the knowledge of rjuyogins[7]. with the word 'decreased' alone there is the exclusion of the knowledge of the Lord[8].

In the second definition(i.e. of atāttvikayogin) addition of the word 'sāditve 'having a beginning' is for the purpose of exclusion of the knowledges of rju and tāttvika yogins[9]. With the phrase 'Kiñcinmātrahrāsayuktam' 'which has only a little decrease'. there is the exclusion of the knowledge of rjuyogins[10] (The word) Īśādanyatra 'in respect of (the object) other than the Lord' (is added) for the purpose of making the application of the definition possible (in the defined). It is only because of

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the mention of 'hrsitatva' decreased ' that there is no contingency (of application of the definition) to the knowledge of the Lord and others.

-x-x-x-

THE KNOWLEDGE OF NON-YOGINS

tr.22.2 (one might ask) Whether the knowledge of the nonyogins (also) being beginningless and eternal like that (knowledge) of the Lord and others, is manifested by the contact of the senses organs etc. or it has beginning and end? (In answer) the author states -

tr.23 The knowledge of nonyogins has a beginning and an end.

tr.23.1 (Further M) states it's definition as -

tr.24 (It is) little (limited)

tr. (Even) in respect of (the objects) other than the Lord.

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1. In short, tāttvika yogins can have comprehensive knowledge in respect of everything except the Lord, but after the efforts of thought. The important point is, they need efforts, and even after that, they can have less than that of Lakṣmī and Rjuyogins. The difference between the two is that the former is eternal and the later is non-eternal

2. Because of the absence of much difference, but that of eternality, M states both the definition together.

3. Because, this will indicate the definition as 'not having everything even without the Lord' for it's object. And this will be common to both, tāttvika and atāttvika yogins And since no word regarding the efforts of thought is added,

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it will cover the knowledge of the Rjuyogins also, because it has everything for it's object only after the efforts of thought.

4. as it has no beginning.

5. Because this is possible in respect of the knowledge of Laksmi only when it is regarding the Lord.

6. Others Brahmadeva, Rudra and so on.

7. Because Rjuyogins can have it, after the efforts of thought.

8. Since the knowledge of the Lord is all-comprehensive and full.

9. Because it is beginningless.

10. as it is very little (i.e. not little decreased)

11. Ayogins, not having power obtained by yoga, have very little knowledge in respect of everything. And for this reason, they don't have a chance of reaching the stage, that of dieties. 'alpam' indicates that the knowledge of ayogins has ignorance more than the correct cognition. See ईश्वरादन्यत्राज्ञानप्रचुरम् PP. 32.19.

Com. 24.2 (टी.) सर्वं चोत्पत्तिमत् केवलं त्रिविधम्। प्रत्यक्षजमनुमानजमागमजमिति। प्रत्यक्षाऽदीनामवान्तरभेदेन पुनर्भिद्यत इति।

tr.24.2 All[1] Kevala which is produced, is of three types, produced from i) perception ii) inference and iii) verbal testimony. And again it is subdivided according to the internal division of perception[2] ect.[3]

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1. All covers the vrttijñāna of Rjuvogins and others in order (downward) and excludes the knowledge of the Lord and Lakṣmī (it is so because they have svarūpa knowledge only) and svarūpajñāna of Rjuvogins. The Rjuvogins have both svarūpa and vrttijñāna, of those, svarūpa is eternal. and Vrtti is non-eternal.

'Sarva' is read with 'utpattimat'. तत्र च स्वरूपज्ञानस्य व्यक्त्यपेक्षया उत्पत्तिमत्त्वम् Pain 25B·1.

2. Etc.= stands for inference and verbal testimony.

3. Pāṇ. indicates variant reading for this text by the words 'सर्व -चोत्पत्तिमत् केवलं त्रिविधमिति पाठे.' As he comments, this reading itself is variant reading. but original reading as he referes in not stated anywhere 25B.1

Com.0.25 (टी.) अनुप्रमाणविभागमाह

T. 25 अनुप्रमाणं त्रिविधम्

Com.1.25 (टी.) तिस्रो विधा उद्दिशति। न्यूनाधिकसङ्ख्यान्यतमान्तर्भावाभावज्ञापनार्थोऽयं विभागः।

T. 26 प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमागम इति

Com. 1.26 प्रायेणाऽसन्नाव्यवहितवर्तमानकतिपयार्थग्राहकं प्रत्यक्षम्, अनासन्नातीतानागतव्यवहितार्थगोचरमनुमानम्, स्वातन्त्र्येणाशेषार्थविषय आगम इति अर्थग्रहणक्रमेणोद्देशः।

प्रत्यक्षमात्रप्रामाण्यवादनिरासः

प्रत्यक्षमेकमेवेति चार्वाकः। तस्येष्टानिष्टसाधनज्ञानाभावाज्जीवनमेवानुपपन्नम्। न हि प्रत्यक्षं तज्ज्ञानोपायः।

प्रत्यक्षानुमानमात्रप्रामाण्यवादनिरासः

Com. 2.26 प्रत्यक्षानुमाने एवेति कणादः सौगताश्च। तेषां किमागमो न बोधकः। बोधकोऽपि वा न यथार्थः। यथार्थोऽपि वाऽन्यत्रान्तर्भूतः। पक्षत्रयमप्यनुभवविरुद्धमिति।

1

अर्थं प्रति स्थितमक्षं प्रत्यक्षम्। प्रमाणान्तरानुसरणेनैवार्थप्रमापकमनुमानम्। सम्यगतीन्द्रियार्थावगमक आगम इति संज्ञानिरुक्त्यैव लक्षणसिद्धौ प्रत्यक्षे तस्यैव स्फुटीकरणार्थं अनुमानाऽदौ [illegible] तज्ज्ञापनार्थं च पुनर्लक्षणाऽऽरम्भः।

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ANUPRAMĀṆAS

tr.0.25 (Now) the author states the division of anupramāṇas.

tr.25 Anupramāṇa is of three kinds as -

tr.1.25 M enumerates the three types (by name). This division is for the purpose of conveying 'the absence of inclusion (of any of these) in any one of these, (and also of) less or more number.'

tr.26 Perception, Inference (and) Verbal testimony.

tr.1.26 [1]Perception is one which cognizes a few objects which are mostly near, not intervened (by any obstacle), and are present. Inference is that which cognizes the objects which are not near, past and future, and intervened (by obstacles). Verbal testimony is one which has for it's object, everything independently. (And therefore) this enumeration (of these three in the text) is (based on the) gradual order of grasping (the objects)[2].

Cārvāka (says) that (there is only one pramāṇa namely perception[4]. (If it is so) the life itself would be impossible for him; because of the absence of knowledge of the means for (to decide) that something is desired or undesired[5]. For indeed, perception is not the means for th knowledge of that.

tr.2.26 Kaṇāda[6] and saugatas[7] 'followers of Sugata' (i.e. the Bauddhas) (hold) only two, namely) perception and inference. (If it is so, there might be a question) whether,

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Verbal testmony is not a conveyer of meaning for them? or even if it is, is it not valid one? or even it is valid, is it included in any of other pramāna? All these three views (alternatives) are contrary to the experience[7].

That which is towards (it's own) object is perception; that which brings about the knowledge of an object only by following another pramāna is inference, and that which is beyond the reach of senses is verbal testimony. This way, when the definitions are expressed by the very etymological explanations[8] of the terms, a further attempt of stating definitions, is i) in respect of perception - for making it more clear[9] ii) in respect of inference and verbal testimony to make it known more particularly, following the maxim 'holding at the horns[10]'.

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1. Pramāṇas are only three; not less or more than that, All these are to be stated separately. i) Inclusion of any one of them in any of the other two; (as in the case of āgama; which is included under inference by Vaiśeṣikas) ii) holding less - (as cārvāka holds only one) and holding more (as the naiyayikas hold four) cannot be justified. This compound word could be explained in two ways -

i) न्यूनसंख्या अधिकसंख्या च अन्यतमानामभिधः । द्वंद्व । तेषामभावः ।

or ii) न्यूना च अधिका च संख्या येषां तानि (प्रमाणानि) तेषाम् अन्यतमेषु अंतर्भवि । तस्य अभावः । - द्वंद्व. स. तत्पु. and ज. तत्पु.

(See. Rāgh. 31.17 ; Śiś. 32.12 and Pāṇ. 2.5 B.9).

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In these two compounds the connection of the word abhāva is in different ways. In the first compound it is according to the order of words. Therefore the word absence goes with three; but in the second compound it's connection is not according to order, but according to context. Hence the word absence goes with inclusion only. The second type of compound is supported by both, Śrī and Pān. But I prefer first, because only in that case the rule of grammar 'the connection of the last word of dvandva with each of the words in compound' will be observed. And also the reputation of the views of Cārvāka, the Bauddhas, the Naiyāyikas and others, will be supported.

2. As the author himself gives definitions of all these types, commentator J just explains here the nature of the object and manner of grasping the object by respected pramāṇas. This is necessary to explain the order followed in the enumeration.

3. Perception has limited scope. It cognizes the object which is before the senses i.e. first in order. So perception is stated first, inference cognizes the object which is away by time and place. Hence it cognizes the object which is second in order of distance, so inference is stated secondly And verbal testimony, cognizes the object far away from the senses therefore it is stated last. J. purposely explains the reason for this order. because he wants to convey that one should not misunderstand that these are mentioned according to their importance. For, perception and verbal testimony are more important. See. तत्रार्थे सामर्थ्ययोः Anuyā. 15B.4.

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4. See - मानं त्वक्षजमेव हि Sad DaSa. 83

5. Perception cognizes the objects which are present before the senses, but does not create any knowledge about their use or result. A child can see the breast of mother, but through this perception alone, it cannot have the knowledge that it is necessary for life. Similarly, if some one sees a bottle, full of poison, will understand it as poison but will not have the knowledge that it is undesired (dangerous) for life. Therefore one cannot manage to live with the help of perception alone. To have the knowledge that something is desired or undesired for life, one must apply inference and verbal testimony.

6. See - i) शब्दादीनामप्यनुमानेऽन्तर्भाव PraPa Bh. 213.13 (on i.III.3)
ii) तच्च प्रमाणं द्विविधम् प्रत्यक्षानुमानभेदात्.... इति वैशेषिक-मतम् Tarka Kau. 8.12.

7. See. i) प्रत्यक्षं च परोक्षं च द्विधैवार्थो व्यवस्थितः Tattv Sam. 170
ii) मानं द्विविधम् विषयद्वैविध्यात् शक्त्यशक्तितः Rama Vār. 3.1.

Because the general experience is 'one gets knowledge through the words and if there is no defect in the words, the meaning is (usually) correct and valid. For such knowledge, there is no necessity of the knowledge of concomitance; which is necessary for inference. Inference helps only in the case of the knowledge of an object previously known but verbal testimony cognizes the objects even unknown.

8 Etymological explanation is as - i) प्रत्यक्षम् - (विषयान्) प्रति स्थितं (वा) अक्षम् ii) अन्वयं अनु (सूत्रं) प्रमाणम् - अनुमानम् iii) आगमः - आ समन्तात् गमयति धर्मधर्मिणौ परं पदम् See Anuyo 211 8.1. (This is sufficient to convey meaning).
a) स्फुटीकरणं च प्रतिक्षिप्तार्थक्रियेण..... ज्ञेति ज्ञातव्यम् Pān. 278.5.

Com 0.27 (टी.) तत्र प्रत्यक्षलक्षणमाह

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अत्र तत्तदिन्द्रियविषयोऽर्थ उच्यते । तन्निर्दोषत्वग्रहणेन अतिसामीप्यादिदोषयुक्तार्थानामिन्द्रिय-सन्निकर्षनिरासः । इन्द्रियग्रहणेन अर्थानामेवान्योन्यसन्निकर्षनिरासः । तन्निर्दोषत्वग्रहणं मनोऽनधिष्ठितत्वादिदोषवदिन्द्रियाणामर्थसन्निकर्षव्याघृत्त्यर्थम् । सन्निकर्ष इतीन्द्रियादिमात्रव्युदासः । सर्वेण प्रमाणान्तरव्युदासः ।

tr.0.27 Now the author states the definition of perception.

tr.27 The close contact of the defecters sense organ with the (defectless) object is (called) perception.

tr.1.27 (In this text) 'being defectless' is an adjective for both, object and sense organ[1]. By the use of the word artha 'object' there is the exclusion of the contact of visual faculty etc. with the space etc. Here the word artha 'object' in this respect, means the object of respective sense organ.[2] And by the statement of it's defectlessness the contact of the senses with the objects possessing the defects like very close, proximity etc.[3] are excluded. And with the mention of the word indriya 'sense-organs' mutual contact of the objects is excluded. The statement of it's (i.e. of sense organs) defectlessness is for the purpose of exclusion of the contact with objects of the senses which possess the defects like 'not being backed by the mind'[4] With the word Sannikarsa 'contact' there is the exclusion of senses alone. And with all the words together[5] there is the exclusion of the other prāmāṇas (from coming under the definition)[6]

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1. See above translation.
2. Though space is an object, and there is contact of visual faculty, it can not be perception, because space is not an object to be perceived by respective sense organ, namely 'visual faculty'.

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3. being very far, being too small also are defects.

4. seeing without attention etc.- done by 'absent mind.'

See" अतिदूरत्वमतिसामीप्यं सौक्ष्म्यं व्यवधानं समानद्रव्याभिघातोऽतिमिलनत्वं... चेत्यादयः PP. 36-18

5. The word sarvena 'with all' is interpreted by some others as with all the words (excluding the word defectless) since the word defectless is common to all the definitions of all three anupramāṇas. See śrī.34.5, kān 28A.

6. The word Pratyakṣa is not an 'avyayībhāva' compound, but it is Dvitīyā tatpuruṣa.

Com. 0.28 **(टी.) अनुमानलक्षणमाह**

T 28 **निर्दोषोपपत्तिरनुमानम्**[1]

Com. 1.28 **उपपत्तिरिति लिङ्गमुच्यते। साहचर्यबलेनार्थगमकं लिङ्गम्। निर्दोषग्रहणमनुमानाऽभासव्युदासार्थम्। व्याप्त्याद्यनुमानलक्षणरहितोऽनुमानवदवभासमानोऽनुमानाभासः। उपपत्तिग्रहणं प्रत्यक्षादिव्यावृत्त्यर्थम्। उपपत्तिश्च यथार्थतो ज्ञातैवार्थं बोधयति। अन्यथाऽतिप्रसङ्गात्।**

tr.0.28 The author states the definition of inference.

tr.28 The defectless reason(ing)[1] is called inference.

tr.1.28 (The word) upapatti (in this text) signifies 'probans' (inferential mark). 'Liṅgam' 'probans' is that which conveys an object (to be inferred) with the strength (of the observation of) coexistence. Here the mention of the word 'defectless' is for the purpose of avoiding fallacious probans (which appear to be probans) (And) the fallacious probans[2] is one which appears to be probans but is devoid of the characteristics of probans such as invariable concomitance. Mention of the word 'upapatti 'reason'[4] is for the exclusion of perception etc. The reason makes known the object only when it is understood as it really is[5] otherwise there will be contingency[6]

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(of inferential Knowledge through fallacious probans)

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1. The word anumāna is used for both.i) reason, probans or what is technically known as Hetu; ii) syllegism - the group of sentences which conveys inferential knowledge. To make this known I have used 'ing' in (---). J gives synonems for this word as.

2. Fallacies are dicussed in 'the defects of inference'

3. Essential characteristic of probans is to have concomitance and concommitance is 'absence of existence without the other' (avinābhāvah) see P.P. 49.3.

4. Without the word upapatti the definition will be 'nirdosa' which is common to perception and verbal testimony. But they donot require the knowledge of concomitance, and therefore they are excluded by the word upapatti.

5. (What is essentially required) for the inferential knowledge is the knowledge of probans. (i.e. the knowledge of smoke for the knowledge of fire) But there is one more point to be noted in this respect is ' if smoke is known as 'it is smoke' alone, will not give raise to inferential knowledge, but if it has to be understood as 'one which does not exist without fire'; and when such knowledge is there then only, inferential knowldge will take place. Secondly 'smoke' only should be understood as 'smoke' and not anything else. Otherwise through the clouds of dust understood as smoke, One will infer fire, but the

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resulting knowledge would not be real. Thirdly, the presence of smoke itself does not lead to inference but the knowledge of the presence of smoke leads to it. न धूमादिकमेवानुमानं किंतु तज्ज्ञानम्।

6. 'यथार्थज्ञानम्' in this respect means one should understand the connection of probans with probandum, in it's proper place. If one does not know smoke (on the hill) as a reason for fire on the same hill, then there will be contingency of the knowledge of fire at home from smoke on the hill. पर्वते धूमज्ञानस्यानुमितिकरणत्वाभावे स्वरूपतः तस्मिन् विद्यमाने गोमयस्य तद्हेतुत्वप्रसङ्गः Pan 2935.
The word 'jñātā eva' in this text, indicates that 'It is necessary for inference that instrument must be previously known. for, if one does not know what is smoke, cannot infer fire.

Com 2-28 (टी.) त्रिविधमनुमानम्। केवलान्वयि केवलव्यतिरेकि अन्वयव्यतिरेकीति केचित्। साध्यधर्मवान् धर्मी पक्षः। साध्यसमानधर्मवान् धर्मी सपक्षः। साध्यतत्समानधर्मरहितो धर्मी विपक्षः। साध्यत्वाऽकारमन्तरेण स एव धर्मः साध्यसमानधर्मः। पक्षव्यापकं सपक्षवृत्ति अविद्यमानविपक्षं केवलान्वयि। तद्द्विविधम्। सपक्षव्यापकं तदेकदेशवृत्तीति। तद्यथा, धर्माधर्मौ कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षौ प्रमेयत्वात्, गुणत्वादिति। पक्षव्यापकमविद्यमानसपक्षं विपक्षात् व्यावृत्तं केवलव्यतिरेकि॥ तद्यथा, ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञः सर्वकर्तृत्वादिति। पक्षव्यापकं सपक्षवृत्ति विपक्षात् व्यावृत्तमन्वयव्यतिरेकि पूर्ववत् सपक्षतदेकदेशवृत्तिभेदात् द्विविधम्। तद्यथा, जीवो नित्यः नाशकारणशून्यत्वात्, चेतनत्वादिति। सर्वत्र निर्दोषत्वानुवृत्तेर्न बाधिताऽदौ प्रसङ्गः।

tr.2.28 Inference (proban) is threefold.[1] According some[2] (these three typess are as) I) Kevalānvayi[3] 'having only possitive concomitance II) Kevalavyatireki' having only negative concomitance and III) Anvayavyatireki' having both positive and negative concomitance[4]. Paksa[5] 'subject' is one, possessor of property, which possesses (the thing) 'to be proved' as it's property. Sapaksa 'smiliar subject' is one, possessor of property, which

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possesses the property similar to the property 'to be proved'. (and) Vipaksa 'counter subject' is one possesser of property; which is devoid of the property to be proved or similar to it. 'Sādhyasamānadharma' 'property similar to the property to be proved 'is the same property (to be proved) but without the character of being 'to be proved'[7].

Kevalānvayi (probans) is one which is pervading the whole of subject, exists in similar subject and has no counter subject. It is twofold. i) pervading the whole of similar subject and ii) existing in a part of it, for example - merits and demerits are perceptible to someone, because they are knowable and quality'[8]

Kevalavyatireki (proban) is (the probans) which is (all) pervading the subject, having no similar subject and not existing in a counter subject. for example' God is all-knowing because of (his being) all-creator[9].

Anvayavyatireki (proban) is the (probans) which is all pervading the subject existing in a similar subject and not existing in a counter subject. This also is twofold as previous one, on the basis of the difference by it's presence on the whole of similar subject or a part of it. The example of it is - ' the soul is eternal, because of being devoid of a cause for it's destruction and being concious.[10]' Since the word defectless is continued everywhere (in all these three definitions) there is no contingency (of application of the definition) in stultified (probans) etc.

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1. ... without mentioning the division of perception, turns to inference, because the author himself will state it later on.

2. This has reference to the Naiyāyikas see - अनुमानं त्रिधा मिलाप्- अन्वयि व्यतिरेकि च अन्वयव्यतिरेकीति TaRa. 1.19-20.

3. These are the characteristics of probans only, But, in general practice these ... terms are used in connection of syllagism also.

4. In short, where we can show i) only similar example, it is Kevalānvayi ii) only dissimilar example, it is kevalavyatireki and both iii) similar and dissimilar examples, it is anvaya vyatireki.

5. To make it easy to understand the definations of all types of probans, J explains the technical terms used therein.

6. The examples for all these terms can be shown in well known '... inference'. 'The Mountain has fire because (it has) smoke as it in the kitchen, and not in a lake." as follows- i) Subject - the mountain ii) Similar subject-the kitchen, and iii) counter subject - the lake. And fire only, when it is not intended to be proved, is said 'sādhyasamānadharma' property similar to be the property to be proved.

7. We can see that in the definition of these three namely Paksa, sapaksa and Vipaksa. The word dharmin is continued. The word dharmin is indicative of being substratum. If this is not used, the definition of Paksa will cover the probans smoke also, because smoke too, is possessing, 'sādhyadharma' (i.e. fire) by samyoga sambandha. But the

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inclusion of the word dharmin, 'which means substratum; this overapplicability is removed, for, smoke is not connected with fire as it's substratum. Then the question arises- whether the continuetion of the word dharmin is necessary in the definition of Vipaksa, because Vipaksa is devoid of property. I have checked many places the definitions of Vipaksa but all they add this word; even J in his pp Seed I) साध्यतत्सामानधर्मरहितो धर्मी विपक्षः. PP. 71-22 ; II) विपक्षस्तु साध्यधर्मनिवृत्तिमान् Ta Ra 1.19 (comm. एवं साध्यधर्मनिवृत्तिमान् इत्यत्रापि साध्यधर्मविशेषस्य तत्सजातीयधर्मस्य निवृत्तिमान् विपक्ष इति) III) साध्यव्यावृत्तधर्मा धर्मी विपक्षः। Nyā Sā. 6.8.

But Rāgh; while commenting upon this passeges suggests one varient reading, without the word dharmin, by stating- अत एव न विपक्षलक्षणे धर्म्यनुप्रवेशः See. Rāgh .36.8.

I think this reading would be more correct.

8. In this syllagism the probans 'Knowability' is an example of a probans pervading whole of the similar subject, and 'being a quality' is the example of probans existing in a part of the similar subject.

9. Since, it is not possible to show any one else than the Lord, who is allknowing and the creator (of the world) there is no similar subject for this probans.

10. Since the space is without end, everlasting, it has the nature of being devoid of the cause for destruction; thus this probans is all-pervading the similar subject- the space. While the other probans 'conciousness' is

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existing in God, but not existing in the space, therefore this probans is example of existing in a part of similar subject.

11. One might argue that definitions of these three are not correct, because they have overapplicability in the defective probans like contradicted and others. Thus :- In the syllogism 'all light is not hot because of it's being material object', Since fire is experienced as hot, this probans becomes contradicted (bādhita) by experience; even it is so, the definition of Kevalānvayi fits in it, (because the probans padārthatva exists in all tejas; and nothing else is found to show otherwise- Hence it is Kevalānvayi) In the same way the overapplicability i) of the definition of Kevalavyatireki in the probans śrāvaṇatva nature of being heard' of the syllogism -The nature of being sound and other than it, are having the absence of being named, because of their being heard' which is contradicted and ii) of the definition of anvayavyatireki in the probans himsātvāt' 'because it is killing' of the syllogism' killing sanctioned by scripture leads to demerits, because of it's being killing' which is contradicted- can be shown.

In order to answer this objection J states that the word 'defectless' is continued in all the three definitions; and therefore the definitions will not cover the defective probans like 'the contradicted'. But one more question might be asked, 'How the word defectless will be continued in these definitions, because these are the definitions stated by the Naiyāyikas and word defectless is stated in the

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definition given by M; then how can the word will shift from the text of one author to that of another?" But this is not the case. What J wants to convey with the word anuvṛtti is not the continuation from other text, but it means 'just application of the word is common to all the three'. And therefore there is no difficulty by the word anuvṛtti. See Pāṇ.33A.10.

This interpretation given by Pāṇ. Seems to be more acceptable than what is clearly stated by Śrī- निर्देशोपपत्तिरनुमेति सामान्यलक्षणस्थस्य निर्देशित्वस्याध्यक्षानुवृत्तेः ऽअ. 38.11.

The other commentator; Rāgh. does not make any comment on this sentence.

CPh. 3.28 तत्पुनर्द्विविधम् । दृष्टं सामान्यतोदृष्टं चेति । प्रत्यक्षयोग्यार्थानुमापकं दृष्टम् । यथा, धूमोऽग्नेः । प्रत्यक्षायोग्यार्थानुमापकं सामान्यतोदृष्टम् । यथा, रूपादिज्ञानं चक्षुरादेः ।

(टी.) पुनस्त्रिविधम् । कारणानुमानं कार्यानुमानं सामान्यानुमानमिति । कारणं कार्यस्यानुमानमाद्यम् । यथा, विशिष्टमेघोन्नतिर्वृष्टेः । कार्यं कारणस्यानुमानं द्वितीयम् । यथा, धूमोऽग्नेः अकार्यकारणमकारणकार्यस्यानुमानं तृतीयम् । यथा, रसो रूपस्येति । Ex

tr.3.28 It is again[1] divided into two classes (from another standpoint) as i) drstam' of perceptible and ii) sāmanyato drstam' of non-perceptibles. The inferential mark which leads to inference of an object which is fit to be perceived' is drstam-(of) perceptible; For example, smoke of fire. The inferential mark which leads to inference of an object which is 'not fit to be perceived' is sāmānyato drstam' for example the knowledge of colour (leading to inference) of visual faculty etc.

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The Inference in a different way is of three classes- i) inference from a cause ii) inference from an effect and iii) inference from a general observation. The first (type) is when the cause is an inferential mark of an effect. For example. the rise of a particular type of clouds is a mark for the inference of rain. The second (type) is where an effect is an inferential mark of the cause. for example, smoke is a mark for the inference of fire. And the third type is where a thing which is neither an effect nor a cause, is an inferential mark of what is neither a cause nor an effect. For example, taste is an inferential mark for the inference of colour.

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1. This classification also is according to the view of the Naiyāyikas See. Nyā Sū. i.i.5.

2. Sāmānyato drstam is more clearly explained in PP. as- व्याप्यव्यापकयोरन्यादृशत्वेऽपि तत्सामान्याकारानुगमेन लिङ्गलिङ्गिभावे सामान्यतो दृष्टम्। यथा कृत्तिकोदयस्य कार्त्तिकादिप्रवृत्तेर्धान्यादिफलवत्त्वदर्शनेन शकटोदयः स्वातिफलमनुमानम्. PP.

But the same is discussed in Nyā Sū. as— द्रव्यपूर्वकमन्यत्र दृष्टस्यान्यत्र दर्शनम्। तथा चादित्यस्य। तस्मादासति अप्रत्यक्षत्वादादित्यस्य द्रव्यम् Nyā Sū Bh. on i.i.5.

3. This compound is to be explained as follows - कार्यं च कारणं च अनयोः समाहारः कार्यकारणम्। न कार्यकारणम् अकार्यकारणम्। कारणं च कार्यं च अनयोः समाहारः कारणकार्यम्। न कारणकार्यम् अकारणकार्यम्।
And therefore the meaning will be a 'cause-effect' not the reason for 'effect-cause'.

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In short, there is no relation as cause and effect or effect and cause between them. The taste and colour (of a fruit) don't have any such relation.

Com.0.29 (टी.) आगमलक्षणमाह

T 29 निर्दोषः शब्द आगमः

Com.1.29 अज्ञानविपर्ययसंशयप्रमादविप्रलम्भाऽदिपुरुषदोषपूर्वकत्वाभावो निर्दोषत्वम् । शब्दो वाक्याऽत्मा । विभक्त्यन्ता वर्णाः पदम् । आकांक्षायोग्यतासन्निधिमन्ति पदानि वाक्यम् । श्रोतुराकांक्षितार्थाभिधायकत्वं पूर्वपदसंजाताऽकांक्षापूरकत्वं वा आकांक्षावत्त्वम् । तेन विरक्तं प्रति वाणिज्योपदेशस्य, गौरश्वः पुरुषो हस्तीत्यादेश्चावाक्यत्वं भवति । सन्निहितार्थाभिधायकत्वं अविलंबेनोच्चरितत्वं वा सन्निहितत्वम् । तेन चोलेषु वर्तमानं तृषितं प्रति 'सन्ति सुरसरिति शीतलानि जलानि' इत्युपदेशस्य विलंबेनोच्चरितपदानां च वाक्यत्वनिरासः । अन्योन्यान्वययोग्यतावदर्थाभिधायकत्वं योग्यतावत्त्वम् । तथा च 'अग्निना सिंचेद्' इत्यादेर्वाक्यत्वनिरासः । निर्दोष इत्यागमाऽभासनिवृत्तिः । शब्द इति प्रत्यक्षाऽदिव्युदासः । आगमश्च सम्यग्ज्ञात एव बोधकः । अन्यथाऽतिप्रसंगात् । स द्विविधः । नित्योऽनित्यश्च । नित्यो वेदः । अनित्यः पुराणाऽदिः । वर्णानां च सर्वत्र नित्यत्वेऽपि प्रबन्धविशेषस्य नित्यत्वानित्यत्वाभ्यामयं विभागः । वर्णाश्च भेदकाभावात् सर्वगता एवेति ।

VERBAL TESTIMONY

tr.0.29 (Now) the author states the definition of verbal testimony (as)-

tr.29 The defectless statement[1] is verbal testimony.

tr.1.29 The defectlessness (means) absence of being preceded by the human[2] defects such as ignorance, error, doubt, carelessness, (and) deception(etc.)[3]. A statement is in the form (of the nature) of a sentence. Pada 'word' consists of syllables having case (and verbal)[5] endings. (And) a 'sentence' is a group of words having expectancy, compitability and proximity with each others. Ākaṅkṣāvattvam'

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'having expectancy' is the nature of being either expressive of the sense expected by a listener or fulfilling the expectancy created by preceding word. (Because the expectancy born of this nature, the group of words) which are 'the instruction of trade to a person who is not interested in trade,'[6] or a 'mere collection of words as 'cow, horse, man, elephant' etc. are not sentences as such. Sannihitatvam 'proximity' is either being expressive of a sense which is proximate or being uttered without (a gap of time) delay.[7] And therefore, there is the rejection of the nature of a sentence in the case of i) the instructions 'there is cold water in the divine river' to a thirsty person present in Chola country. Or ii) the words uttered in a delayed interval.[8] Yogyatāvattvam 'having compatability' is being expressive of the meanings which have mutual connection. And therefore there is the rejection of the status of a sentence in respect of the expressings like ' one should sprinkle with fire'. By the word defectless in the definition, there is the exclusion of what appears to be verbal testimony.[9] By the word 'statement there is the exclusion of perception etc. Āgama 'verbal testimony' also is the conveyor of meaning only when it is understood properly,! as it is'; otherwise there will be contingency of over-applicability[10] (in the defective listening).

It is of two types. i) Eternal and ii) non-eternal. Eternal is Veda and non eternal is Purāṇas etc! Though the syllables are eternal in all cases, this division (as eternal and non eternal) is on account of eternality

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or non-eternality of a particular text.[12] Since there is no distinguishing factor, the syllables are omnypresent.[13]

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1. The exact meaning of śabda is 'word' but here it is stated as statement, because 'verbal testimony' is always in connection of expression or statement.

2. The syllable or words etc. cannot be defective by themselves. because they are eternal, and omnypresent. If they are defective; they may be so, only because of the defects in the person who applies them. Therefore defectlessness is explained as 'being devoid of the human defects'.

3. etc. covers many other defects. See. आदिपदेन करणपाटव-गुरुपायविवक्षानिष्प्रयोजनानपेक्षितार्थप्रतिपादकत्वादिग्रहः Ragh. 39.7 this explanation is similar to that in P.P. See.43.2

4. This definition as stated by M appears to be different from what is stated in 'Brahmatarka'. In Brahmatarka Āgama is defined as ' आगमोऽदुष्टवाक्यं च। VTN 19B 3; but M has used the word 'word' instead of 'sentence'. Therefore in order to avoid, a possible question regarding the difference between these two definitions; J explains the nature of word as above. And to indicate the absence of difference in these two definitions he states the definition of Āgama in his P.P. as निर्दोषः शब्दः आगमः. निर्दोषं वाक्यं वा।

5. By the word Vibhakti tiṅantasuppixes also are covered See विभक्तिश्च P. i.4.104.

6. The sense of 'teaching trade' is not expected by the disinterested person; hence, inspite of possession of meaning, these sentences would not be 'sentences' as such.

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7. By the use of the word Vā in each, J has given two definitions for each - 'having expectancy' and 'proximity'. And the reason for stating so is 'the statement of cold water in divine river, or instructions of trade.; but they can not be authoritative, and not regarded as 'verbal testimony' because i) not having 'expectancy and ii) not being expressive of 'proximity' are the defects of statement; . . which prevent such statements from being verbal testimony'. To indicate these defects. J has given the definitions as above and stated illustrations for them.

8. not uttered in normal manner or with such interval of time, which will prevent the listener from understanding of connection between the words.

9. Āgamābhāsa is anauthoritative statement' See Rāgh. 40.23

10. J explains this as 'आगमोऽपि सम्यक्श्रुतः समयस्मरणानुगृहीतः शाब्दन्यायानुसन्धानसहित एव स्वार्थस्य बोधकः न तु सत्तामात्रेण See PP.44.3.

Therefore it must be understood that, this is necessary for avoiding the statements which are not basically defective, but have turned 'defective' because of the defects on the listener's part. If this is not interpreted in such manner any statement heard in any manner (or not even heard) would be authoritative.

11. etc. = stands for other autnoritative statements. The same is stated in other words as 'Pauruṣeya' and 'apauruṣeya.'

12. The eternality or non-eternality of a particular work is dicided by changeability of order of letters in a particular text. The order of the words (letters) in the Vedas is not changed even in different kalpas and that is why

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they are eternal, But in purāṇas the order of the words is changed to everykalpa. Purāṇas can be composed in different order of words and so they are non-eternal.

13. According to the philosophy of P., the syllables are eternal and omnypresent, because there is no proof to say that a syllable uttered in a place is different from that uttered in a different place.

Com.0.30 (टी) ननु कथं त्रीण्येव प्रमाणानि ? अर्थाऽपत्त्युपमानयोरपि पृथक्प्रमाणत्वात् इत्यत आह

T. 30

अर्थाऽपत्त्युपमे अनुमाविशेषः

Com. 1.30 अनुपपद्यमानप्रमितिरर्थाऽपत्तिः । सा द्विविधा, श्रुतार्थाऽपत्तिर्दृष्टार्थाऽपत्तिश्चेति । तत्राऽद्या यथा, 'जीवंश्चैत्रो गृहे नास्ति' इति श्रुतवतो जीवतो गृहाभावप्रमितिः । द्वितीया यथा, जीवतो गृहाभावं दृष्टवतस्तत्प्रमितिरिति । तया बहिर्भावप्रमा भवतीति सा अनुमाने अन्तर्भवति । विमतो बहिरस्ति जीवनवत्वे सति गृहेऽसत्वात् यथाऽहम्' इति प्रयोगसम्भवात् ।

tr.0.30 How (do you state) only three pramāṇas, when there are, presumption and anology as distinct pramāṇas? (one might ask) and therefore (in order to answer, the author) states-

tr.30. Presumption (and) Anology (are the) particular types of inference.[2]

tr.1.30 Presumption is cognition of what is untenable otherwise, (through the assumption of something else). It is of two types i) (presumption based on what is) heard and ii) presumption based on what is seen. The example of first type is as - The knowledge of the absence (of Caitra who is alive) at home (to a person) who has heard 'Caitra is not at home while he is alive.' The example of the second type is as - The knowledge of that (absence) of Caitra, who is alive, (to a person) who has noticed the absence of Caitra

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at home, who is alive, (In both the cases) knowledge of his existence outside his house is infered through that (absence) and therefore it is included in inference. The syllogism as 'the person(whose presence at home is untenable) is away from (his house) because he is absent at home, while being alive, as I am.' is possible.

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1. Arthāpatti 'presunption' is a distinct pramāṇa to the Mīmāṁsakas and the Advaitins See. i) अर्थापत्तिरपि दृष्टः श्रुतो वा अर्थः अन्यथा नोपपद्यते इत्यर्थकल्पना। यथा जीवति देवदत्ते गृहाभावदर्शनेन बहिर्भावस्याद्दृष्टकल्पना ŚaBh. on i·1·5(38). अन्यथानुपपन्न्या यदुपपादक-कल्पनम् mame. 118.1

2. In this respect M agrees with the Naiyāyikas. They also include presumption under inference.See.i) शाब्दैतिह्या---- अनुमानेऽर्थापत्तिः.... अप्रतिषेधः Nyāyasū. ii·2·2. ii) वाक्यार्थ-संप्रत्ययेनाभिहितस्यार्थस्य प्रत्यनीकभावाद्ग्रहणमर्थापत्तिरनुमा-नेन Nyāyasū Bh. on ii·2 5.

com.2.30 (टी) सादृश्यप्रमासाधनमुपमानम्। तत् त्रिविधम्। गृह्यमाणे स्मर्यमाणप्रतियोगिकसादृश्य-प्रमासाधनम्। यथा, गां दृष्ट्वा वनं गतस्य गृह्यमाणगवये स्मर्यमाणगोसादृश्यप्रमाणं 'गोसदृशोऽयं गवयः' इति। गृह्यमाणप्रतियोगिकस्मर्यमाणगतसादृश्यप्रमासाधनं स्मर्यमाणप्रतियोगिकगृह्यमाणगत-सादृश्यज्ञानम्। यथा, गामनुभूय वनं गतस्य गवये गोसादृश्यज्ञानं स्मर्यमाणे गवि गृह्यमाणगवय-प्रतियोगिकसादृश्यप्रमासाधनम्। 'गोसदृशोऽयं गवयः, तस्मात् गवयसदृशोऽसौ गौः' इति। निर्दोषवाक्यं सादृश्यप्रमासाधनं यथा, 'यथा गौर्गवयस्तथा' इति। तदेतत् त्रयं क्रमेण प्रत्यक्षाऽद्य-न्तर्भूतम्। विमतो गौः गवयसदृशः गवयगतसादृश्यप्रतियोगित्वात् यो यद्गतसादृश्यप्रतियोगी स तत्सदृशः यथा यमो यमान्तरेण' इति प्रयोगसंभवात्।

Analogy-according to the Mīmāṁsakas

tr.2.30 [1]Upamana 'analogy' is the instrument of the knowledge of similarity. [1]t is of three types. (The first type is) the instrument of the knowledge of the similarity in the

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(object) being perceived -correlative of which is being remembered. For example, In the case of a person who, after seeing a cow has gone to the forest (the observation that) this gavava 'gayal' is like a cow, is the insturment of the knowledge of the similarity of cow being remembered with the gayal being perceived.

For example the knowledge of similarity of a cow with a gayala of a person who has gone to forest after seeing a cow, is an instrument for the knowledge of similarity counter correlate of the gayala being perceived- As this gayal is similar to cow and therefore this cow is similar to gayal.

iii) The defectless sentence (is) an instrument of the knowledge of similarity. for example, 'As a cow is, a gayal also is like that. All these three (types of anology) are included[2] under perception and others[3] respectively; Because of the possibility of syllagism[4] like ' the cow under question is similar to gayal because it is counter correlate of the similarity existing in gayal. One who is counter correlate of the similarity existing in (something else) is similar to that (something else)[5]. As one of a twin is similar to another (of the same).

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1. In this passage, the three types of anology, according to the mīmānisakas are explained. See i) उपमानमपि सादृश्यमस्तानीकृत्येऽर्थे बुद्धिमुत्पादयति ŚāBh. on 1.1.5(37) :दृश्यमानार्थसादृश्यात् स्मार्यमाणार्थगोचरम् । असानीकृतसादृश्यस्तानं प्रत्युपमितिर्भवति MāMe. 108.4.

2. Of these three examples, in the first, the knowledge of similarity is percived in a gayal present before, in the second .

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case, similarity observed in the object present before, conveys similarity in the object being remembered. (i.e. it is not actually perceived but inferred : and in the third example, similarity is known through a statement of fact, i.e. verbal testimony. Therefore these three types come under three pramāṇas - perception, inference and verbal testimony respectively; and hence there is no need of holding analogy as separate pramāṇa.

3. 'others' stands for inference and verbal testimony.

4. Here the inclusion of second type (i.e. in inference) only is explained with illustration, and not of other two types, because it is very clear.

5. Even though in the opinion of M it is not necessary to have one and the same substratum for both, probans and probandum, J has given the illustration of that type, simply because he wanted to indicate that this is only narration of the views of others and this is indicated by the word 'possibility'

See - अत्र हेतुसाध्ययोः सामानाधिकरण्यसंपादनं च प्रदर्शनमात्रेणैव कृतम् । न वस्तुतः । तदभावेऽपि अनुपपत्तिरूप-व्याप्तेरप्रत्यूहत्वात् Par 3 P A 7

Com 3.30 (टी.) अकृतसमयसंज्ञास्मरणसहायं तत्समभिव्याहृतवाक्यार्थप्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रत्यक्षं उपमानम् । संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धप्रमितिस्तत्फलमित्यन्ये । तच्चातिदेशवाक्यार्थस्त्रिविधः । साधर्म्यं वैधर्म्यं धर्ममात्रं चेति । तद्भेदात्तत्प्रतिसन्धानात्मकमुपमानमपि त्रिधा भिद्यते । तत्र साधर्म्योपमानं यथा, 'यथा गौर्गवयस्तथा' इति श्रुतातिदेशवाक्यस्य नागरिकस्य वनं गतस्य गोसदृशं गवयमवलोकयतोऽव्युत्पन्न-गवयपदस्मरणवतः 'अयमसौ गोसदृशः य आप्तेनोपदिष्ट' इति प्रतिसन्धानं, तेन तस्य गवयपदार्थत्व-प्रमा । वैधर्म्योपमानं यथा, 'गवादिवत् द्विशफो न भवत्यश्व' इत्यतिदेशवाक्यं श्रुतवतः अश्वं पश्यतः अश्वपदं स्मरतः 'अयमसौ गवादिविसदृश' इति प्रतिसन्धानम्, तस्य तेनाश्वपदार्थत्व-प्रमितिः । धर्ममात्रोपमानं यथा, 'दीर्घग्रीवत्वाऽदिमान् पशुरुष्ट्र' इत्यतिदेशवाक्यं श्रुतवतः क्रमेलकं पश्यत उष्ट्रपदस्मृतिमतः 'अयमसौ तद्धर्मा' इति प्रतिसन्धानम्, तेनोष्ट्रपदव्युत्पत्तिरिति ।

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तदेतत् त्रयमप्यनुमान एवान्तर्भूतम् । विमतो गवयशब्दवाच्यः अगोत्वे सति गोसदृशत्वात् व्यतिरेकेण घटवदिति प्रयोगसंभवात् । अतो न विभागानुपपत्तिः । अत्रोपमानद्वयस्यान्तर्भावानुक्तिः अतिस्फुटप्रतिभासत्वात्, आगमान्तर्भूतत्वे विवादाभावाच्चेति ।

प्रयोगप्रकारवैचित्र्यात् कथमनुमानत्वमित्यत उक्तम् ॥ अनुमादिशेष इति ॥ यथा खल्वन्वयिनो व्यतिरेकिणश्च प्रयोगप्रकारवैचित्र्येऽपि नानुमानाद्बहिर्भावः अनुमानदिशेषत्वात् अपेक्षितसाधर्म्यसद्भावाच्च तथाऽत्रापीति ।

एतेनोपमानस्यार्थविशेषनिष्ठतया पार्थक्यशंकाऽपि परास्ता । तादृशसंप्रतिपन्नानुमानवदेव तदुपपत्तेः । अनेनैव "न च केवलतर्केण" इत्यादिपृथगुक्तेर्गतिश्चोक्ता भवति ।

Analogy - according to the Naiyāyikas.

tr.3.30 Some others (hold) that 'analogy' is the perception in the form of recognition of a meaning of the statement uttered simultaneously and aided by the name, meaning of which[2] is not known; and it's result is the knowledge of relation between the name and the object named by it. In this respect the meaning of atidesavākya 'statement consisting of the transference' is of three types[4] - i) similarity ii) dissimilarity and iii) mere common characteristics. On the basis of this difference, 'analogy' which is of the nature of perception of a thing already known through the statement[5], is of three types. Among these, the example of the analogy based on similarity - is as - In respect of a citizen who has heard a sentence 'gayal is like the cow', which consists of the transferred statement, and going to the forest, perceiving the cow like 'gayal' and remembering the word gayal the meaning of which was not known, then the recognition that this is that very thing which is taught by a trustworthy person, is similar to the cow and thus he has the

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knowledge of the sense of the word 'gayal'.

The example of the 'anology' based on dissimilarity is as - in respect of a person who has heard the sentence 'a horse has no cleft- hoof like that of a cow etc! which consists of the transferred statement, and perceiving a horse, remembering the word 'horse' the meaning ofwhich was not known, then the recognition that, this isthat very thing which is dissimilar to the gayal etc. and thus he has the knowledge of the sense of the word 'horse'.

The example of the 'anology' based on mere characteristics is (in respect of a person) who has heard the sentence 'an animal possessing a long neck etc. is a camel, which consists of transferred statement, perceiving the camel and remembering the word 'camel' (meaning of which was not known), then the regognition that this is that very thing possessing that characteristic, and thus he has the knowledge of the sense of the word 'camel'.

All these three types also, are included in 'inference' because the syllogism[6] as-the animal under question, is fit to be expressed by the word gayal, because of not being a cow but being similar to it like a pot by negation'. is possibe and therefore there is no impropriety of the division.[7] Here the statement regarding the inclusion of (other) two types of anology (i.e. first and third type) is not made, because it is very clear (that the first one goes under perception) and there is no debate regarding the inclusion (of third type) in verbal testimony .

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(One might ask) how can this be an inference, since there is distinction in the form of syllogism? (Therefore, in order to answer) it is stated (in the text) -anumāvisé sa- 'particular type of inference'. As in the case of probans having only positive or only negative concomitance there is distinct- form of syllogism with no exclusion from being inference, here too (upamāna) it is special type of inference due to the existence of similarity (of concomitance etc) as required (in[9] inference).

By this (argument only) the objection that, 'analogy' is a separate (pramāna) because of it's being based on a specific meaning,'[10] is refuted since it stands to reason exactly as any other inference which is similarly accepted. With this (explanation) the distinct mention[11] (na kenacit' in the verse) 'na ca Kevalatarkena' is justified[12].

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1. This has reference to the Naiyāyikas see i) प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनमुपमानम् Nyāyasū. i.1.5; ii) अव्युत्पन्नपदोपेतवाक्यार्थस्य च संज्ञिनि। प्रत्यक्षप्रत्यभिज्ञानमुपमानमिहोच्यते TaRa 1.22.

2. Samaya means the relation of a name and an object expressed by it.

3. See. अव्युत्पन्नेन अगृहीतसंज्ञिना उपेतं यद्वाक्यमतिदेशवाक्यमिति यावत् TaRa 85.4

4. See. तज्जातिदेशवाक्यार्थासन्निधिः परिगृह्यते। साधर्म्यं धर्मिमात्रं च वैधर्म्यं चेति भेदतः TaRa. 2.24

5. As- साधर्म्योपमानं, वैधर्म्योपमानं, धर्मिमात्रोपमानं च।

6. Here the syllogism to show the inclusion in fnference, in

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respect of first type of 'anology' (i.e. based on similarity) is shown. And the inclusion of other two types is as follows - i) For the inclusion of anology based on dissimilarity the syllogism is-the animal under question is to be expressed by the word 'horse' because of being devoid of calft hoof like a cow by negation'.And ii) for the anology based on mere characteristic is - ' the animal under question is fit to be expressed by the word camel like a pot, by negation'.

7. of Pramāna as stated before.

8. This has reference to the text'arthāpattyupame anumā-viśesah. In the previous passage, three types of anology according to the mimāmsakas are discussed; and it is stated that they are included under perception etc. respectively. But M mentions only anumā, therefore it seems that he does not refer to the first and third type.

9. What is important in inference is coneomitance. And it is there, any syllogism irrespective of it's form, will be called 'inference'.

10. See- ननूपमानं पृथक्प्रमाणमिति वक्तव्यम्। सादृश्यरूपार्थविशेषानिष्टत्वात् ŚM 49.

11. In VTN M says - न च केवलतर्केण लक्षनेन न केनचित्।
केवलागमनेयो ऽर्थो नरेको न चान्यथा॥

In this verse the word na kenacit is in addition to tarka, which may indicate that M has any other, may be anology, as separate pramāna.

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in his mind. Therefore it is said,'this objection is not correct, because with the word kevalatarkena he intends to state inference in general, while by the word na kenacit he refers to special type of inference (i.e. analogy). Therefore the statement that analogy is a particular type of inference is not contrary to M's own statement.

12. The syllogism stated for inclusion of analogy is based on the concomitance in general; and hence it comes under inference of 'samanyato dṛstam' type (i.e. without showing both, negative and positive concomitance). J is of the opinion that assumption of Kevalānvayi is not necessary. Even without that, one can have the knowledge of vyutpatti. And with this intention only, J has stated two types of obtaining the knowledge of relation between the word and meaning expressed by it. See page 69.

Com. 0-31 तथाऽपि अभावाऽख्यं पृथक्प्रमाणमस्तीत्यत आह

tr.0. 31 (One might object)[1] yet there is a distinct pramāṇa (called) absence (And therefore, in order to answer) the author states.

T. 31 अभावोऽनुमा प्रत्यक्षं च

tr. .31 'absence'(comes under) inference and perception.

Com. 31 अभावविषयं प्रमाणमभावः । तत् त्रिविधम् । प्रत्यक्षार्थप्रतियोगिकाभावविषयं प्रमाणं यथा 'नास्त्यत्र घट' इति । आनुमानिकार्थप्रतियोगिकाभावविषयं प्रमाणं यथा, रूपज्ञानरहितस्य 'नास्ति चक्षुः' इति । आगमिकार्थप्रतियोगिकाभावविषयं प्रमाणं यथा 'वैधहिंसा न पापसाधनम्' तत्र प्रथमं प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोरन्तर्भवति । द्वितीयमनुमाने । विमतः चक्षूरहितः रूपाज्ञत्वात् घटवदिति प्रयोगसंभवात् । तृतीयमागमे । अतो युक्तो विभाग इति । अत्राभावद्वयस्यान्तर्भावानुक्तिस्तत्र वादिनामविवादात् । उभयत्रान्तर्भावात् योगविभागः । प्रायेणानुमानेऽन्तर्भावज्ञापनाय क्रमोल्लंघनम् ।

[1] कथमेकप्रमाणस्योभयत्रान्तर्भाव इत्यत आह

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T-32

परामर्शापरामर्शविशेषात्

com.1-32 यदा "अत्र घटोऽस्ति न वा" इति परामर्शपूर्वकं योग्यानुपलब्धिरूपं घटाभावप्रमाणं प्रवर्तते तदाऽनुमाने। 'घटोऽत्र नास्ति योग्यत्वे सत्यनुपलभ्यमानत्वात् गजवत्' इति प्रयोगसंभवात्। यदा

(टी.) पुनरेवमपरामृश्य झडिति "नास्ति घटः" इति प्रवर्तते तदा प्रत्यक्ष इति न विरोधः। अयं च बहिरेव विभागो न तु सुखाऽद्यभावप्रमाणे। साक्षिणः सुखाऽदिस्वरूपे निश्चयरूपत्वेन परामर्शाभावात्।

tr.1.31. Abhāva 'absence' means the pramāṇa, which has absence for it's object. (i.e. which cognizes the absence).It is threefold.[2] Of these (the first type is) the pramāṇa which has for it's object the absence counter correlate of which is an object fit to be perceived, for example,'Here, no pot is there.' The second type is the pramāṇa which has for it's object an absence, counter correlate of which is an object fit to be known by inference. For example, he has no vision in respect of a person who cannot cognize colour. And the third type is the pramāṇa which has for it's object the absence counter correlate of which, is an object fit to be known through verbal testimony, for example. The killing sanctioned by the scripture is not a cause for sin.

(of these three) the first is included under perception and inference. The second is (included under) inference, because the syllogism as the person under question is devoid of vision on account of his being ignorant of colour like a pot (is) is possible. The third (type) is included in verbal testimony. And therefore the division (of pramāṇa) i.e. three types) is justified.

Here (in the text) there is nonmention of the two types of absence[3] (i.e.second and third) as there is no

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dispute (in this regard) among the disputants[4]. The 'yogavibhāga''making two sentences which usually could be one'. is owing to the inclusion in both[5]. And the violation of (usual) order is for conveying the inclusion (of absence) mostly in inference.

(One might ask, further) how can ~~only~~ one pramāna will be included in both?[6] (i.e. perception and inference). (In order to answer) he states -

tr. 32. Because of it's differentiation due to reflection and non-reflection.

tr. 1.32. When the means for knowledge with respect to the absence of a pot, comes into operation following a reflection as 'whether there is or not a pot here' then it is included in inference, because the syllogysm as "here there is no pot. Since it is not perceived even though it is an object fit to be perceived like an elephant." is possible. But when there is a sudden knowledge of absence as 'there is no pot' without following a refelction as above, then it is included under perception; and therefore there is no contradiction (i.e. no difficulty in including one pramāna under two pramānas) And this division also is in respect (of outside objects only) and not 'in respect of the knowledge of) pleasure etc. Because there cannot be a reflection since there is determination due to the witness self, being (himself) of the nature of pleasure etc.

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1. This has reference to the mīmāsakas who hold that absence is a distinct pramāṇa see-
वस्तुसत्तावबोधार्थं तत्राभावप्रमाणता ślo Vā. 5(8).1.

2. M has accepted only three pramāṇas. Therefore he shows inclusion of (only type of) absence in these types only. To make it possible he divides absence into three types only, on the basis of the pramāṇas through which the objects (which are the counter correlates for respective absence) are known.

3. Because the text is as' abhāvah anumā pratyksam ca' which indicates that M refers to that type of absence only, which is included under inference and perception.(i.e. first out of three types discussed above), and nothing is stated about other two types of absence.

4. The other two, (i.e. second and third) types of absence as discussed by M are not considered as absence even by the mīmānsakas and the naiyāyikas. But the first, i.e. the absence of perceptible objects, is a distinct pramāṇa for the mīmānsakas while the same is perception to the naiyāyikas therefore the author says' absence of debate'.

5. There could have been only one sentence as-
अर्थापत्युपमाभावा अनुमानेऽवबोधतः।
but it is not done. The reason is, M wanted to indicate that absence is included under both perception and inferenc

6. Since, the nature of perception and inference is different because perception needs contact of sense organs, while inference needs probans and the knowledge of concomitance.

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7. Pleasure and pains etc. are experienced by the witness self. And it is a type perception see- प्रत्यक्षं सप्तानिधम्, साक्षिजाडि-न्द्रियभेदेन- pt. Hence there is no question of reflection.

Com.0.33 सम्भवपरिशेषावपि पृथक्प्रमाणे विद्येते। अतः कथं त्रित्वम्? इत्यत आह

T.33 संभवपरिशेषावनुमा

Com. 1.33 अल्पप्रमासाधनं बहुलज्ञानं सम्भवः। यथा 'शतमस्यास्ति' इति ज्ञाने पंचाशज्ज्ञानम्। प्रसक्त-व्यावृत्तिप्रतीतिः परिशिष्यमाणप्रमासाधनं परिशेषः। स द्विविधः। विधिमुखो निषेधमुखश्च। तत्राऽद्यो यथा 'चैत्रमैत्रयोरयं चैत्रः' इत्युक्तेऽन्यस्मिन् मैत्रप्रमा। द्वितीयो यथा 'नायं चैत्र' इत्युक्ते तस्मिन् मैत्रप्रमा इति। सम्भवपरिशेषयोरनुमानेऽन्तर्भावः। 'विप्रतिपन्नः पंचाशद्वान् शतवत्त्वात् संप्रतिपन्नवत्, विमतो मैत्रः चैत्रमैत्रयोरन्यतरत्वे सत्यचैत्रत्वात् व्यतिरेकेण चैत्रवत्' इति प्रयोगसम्भवात्। तस्मादुपपन्नं प्रमाणानां त्रित्वमिति। वादिविवादभावाभावज्ञापनार्थोऽयं विभागः।

POSSIBILITY AND DEDUCTION

tr.0.33 (One might argue)[1] How can be three pramāṇas only (when) there are (two other) distinct pramāṇas namely Sambhava 'Possibility' and parisesa deduction? Therefore (in order to answer) the author states-

tr.33 Sambhava 'possibility' and parisesa deduction are (included under) inference.

tr.1.33 Sambhava possibility is the knowledge of much or more, which is the means for the knowledge of less. For example, there can be the knowledge that someone has fifty when there is the knowledge that he has a hundred (And) Parisesa deduction (Knowledge through exclusion) of what are necessarily contigents(as possible) is a means for the knowledge of what remains. That is twofold i) by way of affirmation and ii) by way of negation. Of these, the first type is the knowledge that the other one is Maitra, when someone says 'of caitra and maitra this one is caitra'. The example of

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second type is- the knowledge that the other one is Maitra when it is said (of someone) this is not Caitra'. 'Possibility and deduction' (knowledge through deduction) are included under inference, because the syllogisms like- i) the person under question has fifty because he has a hundred like a person about whom there is no dispute'. and ii) 'the person under question is Maitra because when he is either of Caitra or Maitra and is not Caitra, as in the case of Caitra by dissimilarity'- are possible. (And therefore) the division of pramānas into only three is justified. This division (of sentence)[2] is for the purpose of conveying the absence of (the existence of) dispute among the disputants.[3]

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1. This has reference to the pauranikas, who hold sambhava and parisesa as distinct pramānas

2. This is stated by separate sentence, when there could be only one sentence as अर्थापत्त्युपमाभावसंभवपरिशेषाः अनुमा।

3. Separate statement for inclusion of sambhava and parisesa is made because; Abhāva as separate pramāna is accepted by the mimāmsakas (and also by the advaitins) but it is disputed by the naiyāyikas, whereas about sambhava and parisesa there is no such dispute among the mimānsakas nauyāyikas and advaitins. All they, do not accept these two as separate pramānas. One more point indicated through this sentense is - M does not hold pauranikas as his opponents. See - पौराणिकानामभावादिनाम्नैव इति हृदयम् ऽभ. 53.19.

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, , ननु तर्कः प्रमाणं न वा । प्रमाणमिति ब्रूमः । कथं तर्हि त्रित्वम्? इत्यतस्तत्स्वरूपं विवृण्वन्नाह ।

आत्मान्योन्याऽश्रयचक्रकानवस्थाकल्पनागौरव-
श्रुतदृष्टहानाऽदयो दूषणानुमा

) आदिपदेनाश्रुतकल्पनमदृष्टकल्पनं च संगृह्यते । एतत्प्रसंजनमिहोपलक्ष्यते । व्याप्यांगीकारे-ऽनिष्टव्यापकप्रसंजनं तर्कः । द्विविधमनिष्टम् । प्रामाणिकहानमप्रामाणिककल्पनं च । तत्पुनः पंचविधम् । आत्माऽश्रयान्योन्याऽश्रयचक्रकानवस्थानिष्टभेदात् । सर्वस्यानिष्टत्वेऽपि गोबलीवर्दन्यायेन पृथगुक्तिः । तत्राद्यचतुष्टयमप्रामाणिककल्पनाऽत्मकम् । न हि कुत्राप्यात्माऽश्रयाऽदिकं प्रमाण-सिद्धम् । पंचममुभयात्मकम् । तत्राप्याद्यं द्विविधम् । श्रुतदृष्टहानभेदात् । द्वितीयमपि तथा । अश्रुताद्दष्टकल्पनभेदात् । तदेव कल्प्यानेकत्वे कल्पनागौरवम् । एतत्प्रसंजनाऽत्मकस्तर्कोऽपि पंचधा भिद्यते । तस्य पंचांगानि । प्रसंजकस्य प्रसंजनीयेन व्याप्तिः प्रतितर्कैरप्रतिघातः प्रसंजनीयस्य विपर्यये पर्यवसानं प्रसंजनीयस्यानिष्टत्वं प्रतिपक्षासाधकत्वं चेति । तस्यैवोत्पत्तिज्ञप्त्यर्थं तदुत्पत्ति-ज्ञप्त्यपेक्षायामात्माऽश्रयत्वप्रसंगः । यदुत्पत्त्याद्यधीनं यदुत्पत्त्यादि तदुत्पत्त्याद्यर्थं तदुत्पत्त्याद्यपेक्षाया-मन्योन्याऽश्रयत्वप्रसंगः । यदुत्पत्त्याद्यधीनं यदुत्पत्त्यादि तदुत्पत्त्यादौ परंपरया तदुत्पत्त्याद्यपेक्षायां चक्रकप्रसंगः । उत्पत्त्यादावन्योत्पत्त्याद्यपेक्षाया अपर्यवसानेऽनवस्थाप्रसंगः । अत्र यद्येवमभ्युपगमः तदाऽऽत्माऽश्रयाऽदिप्रसंगः । यत्रैवमभ्युपगमः तत्र तत्प्रसंगः यथाऽमुत्र । यदि नाऽत्माऽश्रयाऽदिः तर्हि नैतदपीति प्रवृत्तिप्रकारः । सामान्यत एव व्याप्तिर्वाच्या । श्रुतहानं यथा 'यदीऽश्वरो न सर्वज्ञः तर्हि न जगत्कर्ता स्यात्' इति । दृष्टहानं यथा 'यदि पर्वतोऽनग्निमान् तर्हि निर्धूमः स्यात्' इति । अश्रुतकल्पनं यथा 'यदीश्वरो जीवाभिन्नः तर्हि दुःखी स्यात्' इति । अदृष्टकल्पनं यथा 'यदि पीतमुदकमन्तरधक्ष्यत् तर्हि मामपि दहेत् अविशेषात्' इति । यत्राऽप्याद्याऽपादकयोर्न साक्षा-त्सामानाधिकरण्यं तत्र तथैवानुपपत्तौ प्रकारान्तरेणैकाधिकरणतामापाद्य व्याप्तिरभिधातव्या । यथा 'यदि देवदत्तः सर्वज्ञस्तर्हि यज्ञदत्तोऽपि तथा स्यात्' इत्यत्र 'यत्र यो धर्मो वर्तते स तदविशिष्टेऽपि वर्तत' इत्यादि । सोयं तर्कोऽनुमान एवान्तर्भूतोऽतो न प्रमाणत्रित्वभंगः ।

Tarka 'Hypothetical argument'

tr.0.34 (One might ...) whether 'hypothetical argument'[1] is a pramāṇa or not? (in answer he states) yes, we say it is a pramāṇa. How can then there be threefoldness (of pramāṇa)? will be a further question And)

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therefore while explaining it's nature the author states-

tr.34 Ātmā(śraya) self dependance 'Anyonāśraya' mutual dependance' Cakraka 'circular dependance' Anavasthā 'infinite regress' Kalpanā-gaurava 'burden of assumption, Śruta(hāna)' abondoning of what is proved by verbal testimony' and Dṛṣta(hāna) abondoning of what is proved by perception' etc. are (the types of) dūsanānumā. refuting inference'.

tr.1.34 By the word etc. there is the inclusion[2] of aśrutakalpana' assumption of what is not proved by verbal testmony' and adrstakalpana 'assumption of what is not proved by perception'. (with the words self dependance etc) their nature of resulting in unwarranted contingency is indicated.[3] Tarka 'hypothetical argument' consist in posing the undesired (contigency) as the pervador by the acceptance of the pervaded. The undesired (contigency) is of two types i) abondoning of what is proved by the pramānas, and ii) assumptic of what is not proved by the pramānas. That[4] is again of five typ because of the difference based on the defects as self dependance ii) mutual dependance iii) circle dependance iv) infinite regress and v) undesired. Though all these five are undesired (results) (the mention of first four distinct from that of fifth) is in accordance with the maxim 'gobalivarda' cattle and bull: Of these, first four are of the nature of assumption of what is not proved by the pramānas, because (the defects like self dependance etc) are nowhere proved by the pramānas; And the fifth (i.e. anista) is of the nature of both. Of them, the first one is again twofold -

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based on the i) abondonment of what is proved by verbal testimony and ii) abondonment of what is proved by perception. The second also is likewise (i.e. twofold) on the basis of the difference due to the assumption of what is not proved by verbal testimony and assumption of what is not proved by perception. And the same (i. anista of second type) is said to be burdon of assumption when the assumptions are many[6]. The hypothetical argument which is in the form of undesired contingency of these (defects) is also divided into five (types). It has five(parts) ingrediants, namely i) pervasion of the deducor with the deduced ii) not liable to be refuted by a counter hypothetical argument iii) resulting in a conclusion contrary to what is to be deduced iv) unacceptable nature of the deduced and v) non establisher of the opponents vi i) The contingency of self dependance arises[8] when for the originition and knowledge of something there is the need of the origination and knowledge of the same thing. ii) The contingency of mutual dependence arises when the origination etc. of some thi is depending upon the origination of some other thing for the origination of the former iii) The contingency of circular dependance arises when the origination etc. of something is dependant upon the origination etc. of some other thing (and at the same time) for the origination etc. of what, there is the need for the origination etc. of the former indirectly. (i.e in a circular manner)[10] iv) The contingency of infinite regress arises when the origination etc. of something is in need of something else (and this need for some other) is endless.[11]

Here (in presenting the unwarranted contingency in the form of hypothetical argument) the manner of argument is thus- If this

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is (i.e. the statement made by the opponent) is accepted then there willbe contingency of self dependance etc. Whereever there is the acceptance of this type of statement there is the contingency of that particular type of defect (such as 'self dependance),' as in the present case. (On the other hand) i) if (the opponent) does not accept the defects (like) self dependance etc. (then the first statement of the opponent also) would not be acceptable. (And in order to impose such type of unwarranted contingency on the opponent) Concomitance is to be stated in a general manner only.[12] (The example of) abondonment of what is prove by verbal testimony is -'If God is not all knowing one, then He can not be the creator of the world'. (The example of) abondonment of what is proved by perception is-'if you say that the mountain is without fire, then it should be without smoke also. (The example of the) assumption of what is not proved by verbal testimony is-if God is not different from a soul, he should be unhappy. (Similarly the) assumption of what is not proved by perception is- if water drunk would scold my internal part it would burn me also (completely)- since there is no difference between me and my internal part. In the case where the deduced and deduced do not have one and the same substratum, concomitance is to be stated by way of presentation of one common substration in a different manner. For example, in the argument 'if Devadatta is all knowing. Yajñadatta also will be like him',[13] the presentation of one common substration will be thus- a property existing in one also exists in another who is not different from the first one. And hence this hypothetical argument (as discussed above) is included under inference only; and therefore,[14] there is no breach

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of (the statement of) threefoldness of pramāṇas

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1. This statement of objection has reference to the naiyāyikas. M does not agree with the opinion of the naiyāyikas that hypothetical argument is not a distinct pramāṇa but it is प्रमाणानुग्राहकः See. प्रत्यक्षादेः प्रमाणस्य तर्कोऽनुग्राहको भवेत् Ta Ra. 1-74

2. In fact, the text is to be read as आत्माश्रय.... अनवस्था (श्रुत हान-दृष्ट हान- अश्रुतकल्पन-अदृष्टकल्पनरूप) कल्पनागौरवभेदात् ।

3. The defect self-dependance, (and others) by itself is not known as tarka, but the unwarranted contingency of such defect is known as Tarka.

4. 'Tad' stands for anista. And hence, this division is form another standpoint.

5. 'गोबलिवर्द' This maxim is translated as 'cattle and bull'. This maxim is applied when something is specifically mentioned differently, with a view to show it's special characteristic- see- An expression when pleonasm is uttered (M.W) गामानय बलिवर्दं चानय इत्यत्र च गोपदेनैव बलिवर्दबोधासिद्धौ बलिवर्दपदं दुर्मेधान्नज्ञापनपरत्वेन सफलमिति LaNyaA. Pt. II.

6. The division of anista is as follows- i) A) The abondonment of what is proved by pramāṇa and b) the assumption of what is not proved by the pramāṇas. In the second type-

Anista

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1. self dependance ii) mutual dependance iii) circular dependance iv) infinite regres

(all these four are in the form of assumption of what is not proved by the pramāṇas) .

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V) Anista(of a specific type)

i) in the form of abondonment of what is proved by the pramāṇas

i) abondonment of what is proved by verbal testimony

ii) abondonment of what is proved by perception

ii) in the form of assumption of what is not proved

by verbal testimony

by perception

and only this type of anista is called burdon of assumption when the assumptions are many

In order to convey these details, and also the nature of 'burdon of assumption' J has used the word anista instead of Kalpanāgaurava. in the commentary of the text and thereby explained the connection of the word śrutadṛṣṭahānādi.

The often quoted example of 'burdon of assumptions is - शृङ्गाग्रे शशकस्य भाने गगनस्यन्धोह्वे वन्ध्यासुत: - i.e. Chain of assumption

7. These five, are the necessary conditions of the hypothetical argument. Any statement devoid of these requirements will loose it's nature of being 'tarka'.

8. When to understand what is 'A', the knowledge of 'A' is necessary, or for the production of 'A', 'A' itself is necessary then it is called Ātmāśraya.

9. 'A' is produced from 'B' -But 'B' also is not produced without (the help of) 'A'.

10. B is produced from 'A'. 'C' is produced from 'B'. 'D' from 'C' and so on; But except 'B' any other, namely C, D, E, or F, is necessary for the production of 'A', then it is circular dependance. The difference between mutual and circular depen-

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dance is-in mutual dependance only two things are dependant on each others whereas in circular dependance, they are many and not dependant on each other directly, but in the manner mentioned above. But the result in both the cases is same, (i.e. absence of end and thereby absence of the knowledge)

11. The stock example of anavasthā is as acceptance of Jāti in Jāti As- There is potness in a pot; again the potnessness in the potness. and further potness-ness-ness in the potness-ness etc. This assumption will have no end.

12. Usually the concomitance is shown by both, through negative and positive examples. i.e. following the practice.

तत्सत्वे तत्सत्वम् तदभावे तदभावः।

And for explaining this, the example of smoke and fire is given and as an illustration the kitchen is referred. This way, when the concomitance of some specific object is shown then it is called as 'Viseṣa vyāpti'. But in the case of Ātmaśraya etc. the concomitance is to be stated without referring to any specific object, (i.e. If you state-'For the production of a pot, the presence (production) of a pot is necessary'- Then we will show the defect ātmāśraya in your statement. But if you don't accept this defect, then we would not accept your statement also. So in this concomitance no specific object is referred not there is any example for negative or positive concomitance,

13. In this example there is no concrete reason to accept, why yajñadatta also is all knowing. But to bring in trouble the other party; anyhow, this is to be managed. But what can be the common property in both? man ness' with that much simi-

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larity, it should be stated as yajñadatta and Devadatta are not different, because both they are men. and therefore the property existing in yajñadatta, should be found is Devadatta also.

14. The entire discussion shows us that, to impose unwarrented contingency in opponents statement; one has to follow concomitance alone, namely. 'If you don't accept smoke, don't accept fire also.' And since it is based on concomitance it is a type of inference only. At the same time one should forget that all other characteristics of a (real) probans will not be found in such syllogism because it is applied only to refute, and not to prove any fact.

Com.2.34 (टी.) स्यादेतत् । न तर्कोऽनुमानम् । तर्के हि प्रामाणिकहानाऽदि आपाद्यते । न च तत् साध्यं भवति अपसिद्धान्तात् प्रमाणविरोधाच्च, आरोपितलिङ्गत्वेनासिद्धेश्चेति । अत उक्तम् ॥ दूषणेति ॥ द्विविधं ह्यनुमानम् । स्वपक्षसाधनं परपक्षदूषणं च । तत्राऽद्यं यथा 'पर्वतोऽग्निमान् धूमवत्वात्' इति । द्वितीयमपि द्वेधा प्रवर्तते 'नायं निरग्निकः अनिर्धूमत्वात्' इति वा 'निरग्निकत्वांगीकारे निर्धूमत्वाभ्युपगमः' इत्यनिष्टप्रसंगरूपेण वा 'तत्र दूषणानुमाने तर्कस्यान्तर्भावः । प्रसंगरूपानुमाने च न साध्यवत् आपाद्यस्य प्रमाणविरोधाऽदि असिद्धिश्च दूषणमिति वक्ष्यतीति न कश्चिद्विरोध इति । एतदर्थ एव योगविभागः ।

tr.2.34 (further the objection will be) 'All right, it may be so, but a hypothetical argument cannot be 'inference' because in a hypothetical argument the abondonment of what is proved by pramāṇas is posed. But that cannot be a probandum[1]; because of it's being i) contrary to a view conclusively held by someone ii) contrary to (valid) pramāṇas, and unestablishment through a probans of assumed characteristics[2].' And therefore (in answer to this objection) it is stated (in the text) dūṣaṇānumāṇeti' is a refuting inference'.

Inference is of two types i) establishing one's own view and ii) refuting the view of others. Of these, (the example of) the first type is-'The mountain has fire because of the

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possession of smoke. The second type also, operates in two ways-Either i) this is not without fire because of not being without smoke, or ii) in the form of unwarranted contingency of acceptance of 'being without smoke; on acceptance of being without fire'. (And) in that case, tarka 'hypothetical argument' is included under-'refuting inference'. And since the author is going to state[3] in the case of inference (stated) for refuting the views of others, i) deducer being contradicted by pramāṇas and ii) the (deduced) probans being unestablished by it's nature, are not (said to be) the defect as they are held in the inference stated to establish one's own view.[4] and therefore there is nothing contrary to what is stated. And the text is divided into two sentences[5] for this only purpose.

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1. In proper inference the probandum 'what is to be proved' is a fact (or an object) which is already known, or it's existence could have been perceived, But compelling somebody to loose or accept contrary to pramāṇas cannot be a probandum' (i.e. something to be proved)
2. The inference in it's real sense is- what is proved through a probans. But in 'hypothetical argument, an unwarranted contingency is imposed through something which is not really probans, because the syllogism presented in tarka will be: the mountain is without smoke, because of being without fire'. and the probans will be 'being without fire'-which is not true, but āropita imposed.
3. Compare the text - स्वसिद्धैः साधनं परसिद्धैश्च दूषणम् PL. 243.11.
4. Here the text of the commentary is to be interpreted as - साध्यवत् = साधनानुमानवत् !
5. Otherwise the text could have been - अर्थापत्त्युपमाभाव..... तर्काश्च अनुमाविशेषाः।

Com. 0 35 (टी.) तथाऽपि वाक्यतात्पर्यज्ञापकान्युपक्रमादीनि पृथक्प्रमाणानि सन्तीत्यत आह

T. 35 उपक्रमोपसंहारतदैकरूप्याभ्यासापूर्वताफलार्थवादाश्च

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Com. 35 चोऽनुमेत्यस्यानुकर्षणार्थः । प्रकरणाऽदिरुपक्रमः । तदन्त उपसंहारः । तयारुपक्रमोपसंहारयोरेकार्थत्वं तदैकरूप्यम् । एकप्रकारासकृदुक्तिरभ्यासः । प्राचुर्येण[1] प्रमाणान्तराप्राप्तता अपूर्वता । फलवत्त्वं फलम् । स्तुतिर्निन्दा परकृतिः पुराकल्पोऽर्थवादः । एतेषां वाक्यतात्पर्ये अनुमात्वान्नोक्तविरोधः ।

यद्येतेऽनुमानेऽन्तर्भूतास्तर्हि कथं तेषां

उपक्रमोपसंहारावभ्यासोऽपूर्वता फलम् ।
अर्थवादोपपत्ती च लिंगं तात्पर्यनिर्णये ॥

इति उपपत्तितः पृथगुक्तिरित्यत आह

T. 36 **उपपत्तिविशेषाः**

Com. 1.36 (टी.) यथा खलु पाण्डवानां कौरवान्तर्भावेऽपि कौरवेभ्यः पृथगुक्तिः कौरवविशेषत्वेन साक्षादेकत्वाभावेन कौरवपदेन तदतिरिक्तग्रहणात्, तथा प्रकृतेऽपीति ।

नन्वेवं पृथगुक्तिमन्यथा व्याख्यायैषामनुमानान्तर्भावांगीकारे को हेतुः ? इत्यत आह

T. 37 **त एव सोपपत्तयो लिङ्गानि**

Com. 1.37 उक्ता इति शेषः । यथा 'उपक्रमोपसंहारौ' इत्यत्रोपपत्तेर्लिङ्गत्वमुच्यते तथा उपक्रमाऽदीनामपि। अतो युक्तमुक्तम् ।

किं च यथोपपत्तिर्लिङ्गम् व्याप्तिबलेनार्थधीहेतुः तथोपक्रमाऽदयोऽपि 'यत्र यत् उपक्रम्यते तत्रापवादाभावे तत् तात्पर्यगोचरः' इत्यादिव्याप्तिबलेनैवार्थबोधकाः । अतः कथं नानुमानेऽन्तर्भावः ? इत्याह ॥ त एवेति ॥ एतेनागमान्तर्भावोऽपि परास्तः । न ह्यागमवत् व्याप्तिमनपेक्ष्य बोधका एते अनुभूयन्ते । तेषामागमार्थविषयत्वज्ञापनार्थो[1] योगविभागः ।

UPAKRAMA AND OTHER PRAMĀNAS UNDER INFERENCE

tr.035 (One might argue)[1] yet there are distinct pramāṇas such as upakrama 'commencement' which convey the purport of a sentence. (in answer) the author says-

tr.35 Upakrama 'commencement' upasaṃhāra 'conclusion' (end of a topic) tadaikarūpya 'agreement between them,' abhyāsa 'repitition' apūrvatā 'novelty' Phala 'result' arthavāda' explanatory passages' also are inference.

tr.1.35 The word ca 'also' (in the text) is for the purpose of bringing in the word anumā 'inference' from the earlier sentence. 'Commencement is a beginning of a topic, 'conclusion' (end of a topic) is an end of it.

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(i.e)topic) Their oneness or agreement between them' is their nature of having one purport.'Reptition'consists in repeated mention (of the statements) of the same form. 'Novelty (is the purport) not being known (cognized) by any other pramānas.Result is being purposeful. (And) explanatory Passage consists in stuti'praise' nindā 'censure', para-kruti[2] statements made by one and the same person and purā-kalpa' statements made by different persons.' Since all these are the probans[3] (inferential marks only) in respect of purport of the sentence (they are included in inference) and therefore there is contradiction to what is stated.
(Here, the objection might be raised as)- If all these are inferential marks and therefore come under inference then how they are mentioned distinctly from upapatti 'reasoning (which is synonym. for inferential marks[4]) in the well known verse-

'Upakramopasamhāravabhyāsopūrvatā tathā
Arthavādopapatti ca linġam tātparyanirnaye[5]-

tr.36 (They are) particular types of reasoning (inference).

tr.1.36 As in the case of Pāndavas; inspite of their inclusion in kauravas there is their mention as distinct from kauravas[6] since, they are a particular type of kauravas[7] but there is no direct oneness[8](in them) and therefore the word kaurava stands for other than those (i.e. Pāndavas) So it is in this case also-
(One might ask) But what is the reason for interpreting the separate mention of theword upapatti (in the verse) in a different manner and thereby justifying (accepting) the incl-

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usion (of upakrams etc.) under inference? Therefore (in answer) he states-

tr.37 Those very (when they are)[9] together with upapatti (reasoning) (are said to be) lingas 'inference'.

tr.1.37 The words-are said to be-are a .. remaining part (of the text). As in the verse upakram etc(commencement etc) reasoning is said to be inference so also commencement etc(are inferences)and therefore what is said is correct.[10]

Moreover, as reasoning which is an inferential mark, is a cause for the knowledge of an object on the strength of concomitance so also commencement etc.(are conveyors of meaning on the strength of concomitance) as- 'whatever is begun at a place is with reference to the purport, in the absence of any exception. How then (there will not be inclusion in inference? With this (intention) the author states-'Those very- '

By this very argument, possibility of the inclusion in verbal testimony is set aside. Indeed, they do not convey (not conveyors) a sense like verbal testimony (which conveys a sense) without depending on concomitance. And this division of the sentence(as above) is for the purpose of explaining their nature of having scripture as their object.[12]

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1 This has reference to Vedāntins See Vedāsā.28.3

2. It seems that there is difference of opinion among the commentators regarding the concepts of parakrti and purākalpa. See - i) कर्तृकोपाख्यानम् परकृतिः बहुकर्तृकोपाख्यानम् पुराकल्पः Rogh. 59.1 ii) कर्तृनाम निर्देशपूर्वकाप्रसिद्धेतिहासकथनम् परकृतिः, सामान्यतः कथाकथनम् पुराकल्पः Sm. 60.13.

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3. The illustration is stated in the following passage

4. As I have stated earlier the words upapattih, linoam, yuktih and Vyāpya etc. are the synonyms for the probans. All these stand for what conveys inferential meaning. Though their chief sense is the probans, they are used even in the sense of syllogism.

5. Untraceable verse, quoted in Vedāntasāra and Vācāspatya. According to it is from बृहत्सोमित्र.

6. The Citation quoted for this purpose is" सनातनत्वीयं कुरुपाण्डवानाम् Bhag.

7. Because they are sons of Pāndu.

8. As in the case of the words ghata and Kalasa there is total absence of difference, because they are just synonyms for a 'pot'. But that is not the case at present because there is a little difference in meaning of the words Kaurava and Pāndava, for whenever the word Kaurava is used, Pāndavas are not included.

9. i.e. when there is no exception for being so.

10. i.e. inclusion under inference.

11. explained earlier.

12. Presumption and anology etc are inference in respect of the sense not connected with the scriptures, but commencement etc. are inference in respect of the scriptures only, And to indicate this difference the text is divided into two sentences.

Com. 0·38 तथाऽपि समाऽख्याऽदीनि पृथक्प्रमाणानि सन्तीत्यत आह

T. 38 समाऽख्यावाक्यप्रकरणस्थानानि च

Com. 1-38 अनुमेत्यस्यानुकर्षणार्थश्चकारः । निर्णीतस्थले समानोक्तिः समाख्या । सा द्विविधा । अर्थतः शब्दतोऽपीति । वाक्यमुक्तम् । कयाचिद्विवक्षयैकार्थावच्छिन्नं वाक्यजातं प्रकरणम् । तादृशं प्रकरणजातं स्थानम् । एतेषामनुमानेऽन्तर्भावादुक्तमुपपन्नम् । समाख्याया वाक्याऽदेरवरत्वेऽपि तदादित्वेन ग्रहणं

'श्रुतिर्लिङ्गम् समाऽख्या च वाक्यं प्रकरणं तथा'

इति अविवक्षितक्रमं वाक्यमनुसृत्य कृतम् । उपक्रमाऽदीनां तात्पर्यलिङ्गत्वं, एतेषामर्थ एवेति विशेषज्ञापनार्थो योगविभागः । उपक्रमाऽदीनां स्वार्थे आगमत्वेऽपि तात्पर्य एव लिङ्गत्वात् नोक्तविरोधः ।

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Com 0·39 तर्हि श्रुतिर्लिङ्गमिति समाख्याऽऽदीनां लिङ्गात् पृथगुक्तिः कथम् ? इत्यत आह

T 39 **लिङ्गविशेषाः**

Com·1·39 पूर्ववत्परिहारः । अत्राप्यनुमानान्तर्भावे पूर्वोक्ता युक्तिरनुसन्धेयेति ।

tr.038 (One might say) Even so, there are distinct pramāṇas, namely, Samākhyā 'name' etc. (Therefore inorder to repute it) the author states-

tr.38 Samākhyā 'name' Vākya 'sentence' Prakarana 'topic' and Sthāna 'place (position) also are (inferences).

tr.1.38 The word ca 'and' in this text is for the purpose of bringing in the word anumā. (in this sentence). 'Name' consists in a statement similar tc one in determined context.[1] That is two fold. By sense and by words. 'Sentence' is already explained.[2] 'Topic' is a group of sentences distinguished by unitory sense with a specific intention of the speaker. And a group of such topics is called 'place'[3]. Because of their inclusion in inference what is said is justified. Inspite of least validity[4] of 'Name' with regard to 'sentence' etc it's (i.e. of 'name') mention as the first (in this text) is made in accordance with the statement[5] 'Śrutir liṅgam Samākhyā ca vākyam prakaranam tathā.' Where no specific order is intended. The sentence of above text is made spearate from the previous one, (because the author wanted) to convey that the commencement etc. are the inferential marks for the purport (of a sentence) only in respect of the sense of these[6] only. (And) since the 'commencement' etc are of the nature of verbal testimony in respect of their own sence only; they are of the nature of probans in respect of 'purpurt' only. and therefore nothing is contray to what is said.

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tr.0.39 (One might ask further) How then there is the distinct mention of 'Name' etc from inferential mark as- Śrutir liṅgam (in the citation quoted above)? Therefore the author states-

tr.39. (They are) particular types of probans.

tr.1.39 Here too the removal of the objection is to be done as in the earlier (case)[7] And for showing the inclusion under inference, the argument stated in the previous case is to be applied.[8]

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1. 'Nirūḍha Sthala' is a textual context where there is no difference of opinion in respect of its meaning among the disputants. for example- Puruṣasūkta. All the disputants agree that the diety of Puruṣasūkta is Viṣnu-

2. See page- 124.

3. Examble of this, is stated as- Vedic passage from इं नो मित्र to सुवर्यन्तो भवेम etc.

4. See - श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां समवाये परदौर्बल्यमर्थविप्रकर्षात् mīmā Sū. [ii-3-14. See. Rāgh. 62-7

5. In this texte Vākya is stated after समाख्या.

6. i.e the scriptures only.

7. As in the case of the phrase'kurupāṇḍava'.

8. i.e. they convey the meaning only on the strength of concomitance.

-x-x-x-x-

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Com.0.37 यदुक्तं निर्दोषं प्रमितं लिंगमनुमानमिति। तदयुक्तम्। नारिकेलद्वीपवासिनो धूमदर्शनेऽपि वह्निप्रमाऽनुदयादित्यत आह

T. 37 व्याप्तिरुपपत्तिमूलम्

Com. 1.37 व्याप्तिरिति विषयेण विषयिणः प्रत्ययस्योऽपलक्षणम्।

न केवलं प्रमितं लिङ्गमात्रमनुमितिजनकमंगीक्रियते। किं नाम? निर्दोषत्वान्तर्गतव्याप्ति-प्रमितिपूर्वकमेव। न च तादृशं नानुमितिजनकम्। अविनाभावो व्याप्तिः। सा द्विविधा अन्वय-व्याप्तिर्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिश्चेति। तत्र साध्येन साधनस्य व्याप्तिरन्वयव्याप्तिः। यथा 'यो धूमवानसावग्नि-मान्' इति। साधनाभावेन साध्याभावस्य व्याप्तिर्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः। यथा, 'योऽग्निमान्न भवति स धूमवान्न भवति' इति। भूयो भूयो हि धूमं पश्यन् तत्राग्निं पश्यति, अग्न्यभावं पश्यंश्च धूमाभावं। ततो निश्चिनोति धूमाग्न्योः साहचर्यात् अस्त्यविनाभाव इति। गृहीतव्याप्तिश्च पर्वते धूमं पश्यंस्तामनु-स्मरति 'यत्सन्निधौ यो दृष्टः स तस्य स्मारकः' इति न्यायात्। स्मृतव्याप्तिश्च व्याप्तं धूमं पर्वते प्रत्यभिजानाति। तेनाग्न्यनुमितिरिति युक्तं लक्षणमिति।

CONCOMITANCE

tr.0.37 (One might argue) 'What is said' the defectless inferential mark understood properly (as it really is) is inference is not correct, since there does not arise the knowledge of fire to a resident of Nārikela island even on observation of smoke.' (In answer) the author states-

tr.37 Concomitance is the basis for reasoning (for holding something as an inferential mark).

tr.1.37 The word concomitance[2] is indicative of the knowledge of pervaded (an object) through pervading (the subject). We do not say (lit. accept) that mere inferential mark as such understood correctly is a producer of inferential knowledge What then? only that- which is preceded by the knowledge of concomitance which is understood by the 'defectlessness.'[3] And what is not so, is not [illegible] a producer of (inferenti knowledge. Concomitance is 'presence (of one) not without (the other). It is twofold, -i) Positive concomitance and ii) negative concomitance- through similar example and through dissimilar examples.

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Of these the positive concomitance consists in pervasion of probans over a probandum.(existence of a probans over the area than that of a probandum). For example what is possessing smoke is possessing fire. The negative concomitance is the pervasion of the absence of probandum over the area more than that of the probans. For example what is not possessing fire does not passess smoke. When a person seeing smoke often[4] sees fire (in the same place) and in the same way seeing the absence of fire(often) sees the absence of smoke(with it) and thereafter decides that, because of the co-existence of smoke and fire, there is (no) existence of (fire) without the other (i.e. smoke). And having understood this relation of invariable existence, when one sees smoke on the mountain, remembers that (concomitance), following the maxim a thing is reminder of that other thing in the presence of what, it was seen. And in this way having remembered the concomitance recognizes smok on the mountain as pervading one and thereby[5] he has the inference of fire. Therefore the definition is perfect.[6]

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1. This is quoted in many nyāyatexts (Nyāyvār i.1.5 TāpaTi 103.16 Nyāyaka 183.5) It is believed that there is an island named nārikel resident of which do not need any efforts to get their food etc. what ever they need, is in their hands, just immediately they think to have it. And since they don't need to have any use of fire, they don't know smoke and its relation with fire. The well known mountair 'Maināka' and others, are on the same island. The description about Narikaladvipa is available in Kathāsasā - यत्नारिकेलद्वीपाख्यं ख्यातं जगति सुन्दरम्... न. सिद्धियुक्ताश्च संपदः Katha Sasa. IX.4.14.

Inference is defined as defectless probans see page 115.

And the defects referred by the word, cover 'the absence of the

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knowledge of concomitance' also. Therefore the word defectless itself will remove the contingency of this type; arising out of mere knowledge of probans 'as smoke' but not coupled with the knowledge that it is invariably connected with fire.

3. This sentence is to be read as - व्याप्तिरिति विषयेण: विशेषण: = प्रत्ययस्य उपलक्षणम्। And therefore the meaning will be-the mere coexistence or invariable coexistence by itself does not give raise to inference. But the knowledge of invariable concomitance produced through the observation is only base for upapatti.
4. For the knowledge of concomitance observation of co-existence in so many times is necessary, so that, it should not be just by a chance but it should be there, as a rule.
5. The word avinābhāva can be explained in two ways- i) भाव: existance अ- not (possible); विना = without (i.e. the existence of one is not possible without the other) ii) विना अभाव: = in this case nay is to transferred with भाव: , Which will mean absence of (upapatti) something without something. But this second interpretition will cover only negative concomitance. This is not intended. Therefore J. explains concomitance as साहचर्यनियम इति यावत् See. PP.49-3
6. Tena 'thereby' stands for third cognition of inferential mark. In this process the inferential mark is observed thrice. see- अथ तत्पूर्वकमनुमानम् त्रिविधम् - तत्पूर्वकामित्यत्रेन ।) लिङ्गलिङ्गिनोः संबंधदर्शनम् लिङ्गदर्शनं चाभिसंबध्यते । लिङ्गलिङ्गिनो: संबंधयोर्दर्शनेन लिङ्गस्मृतिरभिसंबध्यते NyāySūBh. on. i.1.5.

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द्विविधमनुमानम्। स्वार्थं परार्थं चेति। परोपदेशानपेक्षं स्वार्थम्। तदपेक्षं परार्थम्। व्याप्तिमल्लिङ्गबोधकं वाक्यं परोपदेशः।

अवयवनियमनिराकरणम्

तस्यावान्तरवाक्यान्यवयवाः। ते च जिज्ञासासंशयशक्यप्राप्तिप्रयोजनसंशयव्युदासप्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनातीति दशेति जरन्नैयायिकाः। प्रतिज्ञाऽऽदयः पंचैवेति नवीनाः। प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणानि उदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि त्रय एवेति मीमांसकाः। उदाहरणोपनयौ द्वावेवेति बौद्धाः। तत्र तृतीयपक्षव्यतिरिक्तनियमपक्षास्तावन्नोपपन्ना इत्याह

सा प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदृष्टान्तरूपा

सेत्युपपत्तिप्रतिपादकं वाक्यमुपलक्ष्यते। दृष्टान्तेऽस्ति तत्प्रतिपादकमुदाहरणम्। प्रतिपादनाय पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा। यथा 'पर्वतोऽग्निमान्' इति। साधनत्वाभिव्यंजकविभक्त्यन्तं लिङ्गवचनं हेतुः। यथा 'धूमवत्वात्' इति। व्याप्तिदर्शनपुरस्सरं सम्यग्दृष्टान्ताभिधानमुदाहरणम्। व्याप्तिग्रहणस्थलं दृष्टान्तः। स द्विविधः। साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तश्चेत्येके। अन्वयव्याप्तिग्रहणस्थलं साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः। व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिग्रहणस्थलं वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः। अत एवोदाहरणमप्येवं द्विविधम्। तत्र साधर्म्योदाहरणं यथा 'यो धूमवानसावग्निमान् यथा महानस' इति। वैधर्म्योदाहरणं यथा 'योऽग्निमान्न भवति स धूमवान्न भवति यथा ह्रद' इति। एतैस्त्रिभिरेवावयवैरुपपत्तेर्बोधयितुं शक्यत्वान्न तदशावयवत्वाऽदिनियमो युक्तः।

अथ वा दृष्टान्तपदेन तद्वचनमात्रोपलक्षणेनेदं पक्षान्तरम्। उपलक्षणं चैतत्। उदाहरणोपनयनिगमनैरुदाहरणोपनयाभ्यां वा शक्यते बोधयितुम्। दृष्टान्तोपमानेन लिङ्गस्य पक्षे उपसंहारः उपनयः। सोऽप्युदाहरणानुसारेण द्विविध इति। 'तथा चायं धूमवान् पर्वतः' इति साधर्म्योपनयः। 'न तथाऽयं निर्धूमः पर्वतः' इति वैधर्म्योपनयः। हेतुपुरस्सरं पक्षे साध्योपसंहारो निगमनम्। यथा 'तस्मात् पर्वतोऽग्निमानेव' इति। किं च जिज्ञासाऽऽदयः शब्दा एव न भवन्ति। कुतो वाक्यावयवाः। कुतस्तरां तन्नियमः। उपनयनिगमनयोः प्रतिज्ञाहेतुभ्यां गतार्थत्वाच्चेति।

See on next page →

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AVAYAVA-PARTS OF A SYLLOGISM

tr.C.38 Inference is of two types i) Svārtham 'for one's own understanding' and ii) Parārtham 'for the purpose of conveying others'. Inference of Svārtha type is that which is not with the intention of instructing others and inference of parārtha type is one which is (stated) with the intention of that (i.e. instructing others). Paropadeśa 'teaching others' consists in a statement conveying that the probans is possessing concomitance.

Avavava 'members' subsentences of that (statement made for conveying that the probans possessed concomitance i.e. syllogism) are called avavava. According to the old naiyāyikas they are ten namely, i) Jijñāsā 'desire to know ii) samśaya 'doubt' iii) śakya prāpti 'obtainment of what is possible iv) Prayojana 'purpose' v) Samśayavyudāsa 'removal of doubts' vi) Pratijñā (thesis) 'proposition' vii) Hetu (Probans) viii) Udāharana 'illustration' ix) Upanaya 'reaffirmation' and x) Nigamana 'final conclusion.

The neo naiyāyikas[2] hold that they are only five, beginning with pratijñā 'proposition'. The mimāmsakas[3] hold any three either propostion, probans and illustration or illustration, reaffirmation and final conclusion. The bauddhas[4] hold only two-illustration and reaffirmation. In this respect, the author with the intention of conveying that, views other than the third one[5], regarding the restruction of about the number of members of syllogism do not stand to reason - states-

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tr.38 That (statement conveying others that the probans possesses concomitance)is in the form of proposition, probans and illustration.

tr.1.38 The word *tā*[6] (that in this text) indicates the statement which conveys reasoning. (And) the word *dṛṣṭānta*[7] example (indicates) the illustration which conveys it (i.e. example).The proposition is a statement for the sake of others which is containing subject, for example, the statement the mountain has fire. The Probans is the statement of inferential mark, which has a case suffix indicative of it's being a mean of inference.[9] for example.because of being possessed of smoke.' The illustration is a statement of an example preceded by the observation of the concomitance. And the example is a place where the concomitance is noticed. According to some,it is two fold as -i) example based on similarity and ii) example based on dissimilarity. The place where positive concomitance is noticed is the example based on similarity. And the place where negative concomitance is noticed is the example based on dissimilarity. And for this reason (i.e. the example is of two types) the illustration also is twofold in the same way. Of these, the illustration based on similarity is as '-That which has smoke has fire like the kitchen.' The illustration based on dissimilarity. is as - 'that which is not having fire, is not having smoke like a lake. (And) since it is possible to convey the argument (reasoning) with the help of (a syllogism of these) three members only, the restriction as having ten numbers is not proper.

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Or the word drstanta which is indicative of mere statement of it, the other view is suggested. The indication is as follows- it is possible to convey (other person) through the illustration, reaffirmation, and final conclusion or the illustration, and reaffirmation- Upanaya 'reaffirmation' is the conclusion of a probans in the subject through the similarity of example. This is also twofold, according to the illustration. The reaffirmation through similar illustration is as- 'And therefore like that, this mountain has smoke! And the reaffirmation of dissimilar illustration is as- (and therefore) this mountain is not without smoke, (on it) like that'. The final conclusion is the statement of conclusion of a probandum in the subject preceded by a probans. As- " Therefore the mountain does have fire! Moreover, if the desire to know etc.[10] are not even of the nature of statements, how can they be members (parts) of a sentence and how can there be any restriction? And also because, the purpose of reaffirmation and final conclusion is served by proposition and probans respectively'.

---

1. These ten members are not directly mentioned. But in the Bhāṣya on Nyāyasū i.1.32 Bhāṣyakāra refers to this view as - दृष्टावयवानेके नैयायिका वाक्ये संचक्षते | जिज्ञासासंशयः शास्त्रप्राप्तिः, प्रयोजनं संशयव्युदासो इति | See NyāSū Bh. on i.1.32.

2. See. प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवाः Nyāsū. 1-1-32

3. See i) शाबरस्वामी इन्द्रियकाम्यादिकरणे उदाहरणत्रयं प्रदर्शयति ŚāBh. P.544
ii) तदेवं त्र्यवयवं साधनम्, तत्र हेतूपनयोरत्यन्तप्रयोगेणापि साध्यसिद्धेरुभयोरुपादानमनर्थकमिति मीमांसकाः Prakaraṇ. iii) कुमारिलः .... इति वदन् प्रतिज्ञादित्रयं प्रदर्शयति Vā 3. Ślo. 366 तथा प्रतिज्ञादिरूपेण पञ्चेति नैयायिकास्त्रीनुदाहरणान्तान् वा यद्वोदाहरणादिकान् Tā Ra. 2. 64-65.

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4. Compare-सौगतास्तु सोपनयमेवानुमाहुरिति Tāra. 2.65. Dharmakīrti in his Nyāyabindu has not directly discussed the number of members, but presents the syllogism of two members only. See. यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निर्यथा महानसादौ (उदाहरणम्) आस्ति चेदं धूमः (उपनयः) Nyayabi. 3.22

5. i.e. of mimāmsakas.

6. Sā refers to anumā in the text तिदेवंजोपपत्तिरनुमान a syllogism or what is known as provoga.

7. J has used the words drstānta and udāharana with clear cut distinction. By the word drstānta, he means the place where similarity is noticed. i.e. the 'kitchen', and by the word udāharana he means the statement of that place.(in a syllogism) with this understanding I have translated these two words as drstānta-example and udāharana-illustration.

8. And with distinction stated above, J has interpreted the word drstānta (in the text) two ways- i) = the statement of it, i.e. illustration along with proposition and probans ii) the statemen of that alone- with exclusion of proposition and probans . In other words-remaining part of syllogism. (i.e. udāharana, upnaya, nigamana or udāharana and upanaya.

9. This case is 'pañcamī' and the syffixes are ङसि भ्याम् भ्यस्. These suffixes are applied when the nature of being reason is to be expressed See विभाजा गुणेऽस्त्रियाम् P ii.3.25 (विभाजा इति योग-विभागात् अगुणे स्त्रियां च क्वचित् धूमादग्निमान् - Sikau. on it)

10. etc. includes other four which are in addition to those five stated by the neonaiyāyikas. The desire etc. are the internal activities. All they come under 'thoughts'.

11. Because the statement that 'therefore' and 'therefore the mountain has fire', is a just repitition of the statement of proposition and probans-'the mountain has fire because it has smoke.'

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हेतुगर्भा प्रतिज्ञा केवलाऽपि

1.39 उपपत्तिज्ञापिकेति शेषः। 'धूमवान् पर्वतोऽग्निमान्' इति हेतुगर्भा प्रतिज्ञा अवयवान्तरं विहायोपपत्तिज्ञापिका भवतीति न कोऽपि नियमपक्षो युज्यते। तावन्मात्रेणोपपत्तेर्बोधे जातेऽप्यवयवान्तरं वदत आधिक्यप्रसंगात्। न चैवं त्र्यवयवाभ्युपगमे व्याघातः। यस्यैतावता न बोधस्तं प्रति तदभिधानस्येष्टत्वात्। विचित्रबुद्धयो हि पुरुषा इति।

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Com. 1.41 अत्र दृष्टान्त इति तद्वचनोपलक्षणम्। 'धूमवन्महानसवत् पर्वतोऽग्निमान्' इति हेतुगर्भेण सप्रतिज्ञेन दृष्टान्तवचनमात्रेणोपपत्तिज्ञानसंभवात्। श्रोत्राकांक्षानुसारेणैवावयवकल्पना युक्ता न तु तन्नियतिरिति।

tr.0.39 With the intention even the restriction of three members etc also is not justified the author states-

tr.39 A statement of the proposition containing the probans also(is)-

tr.1.39 A portion to be supplied in the text is-'upapattijñāpikā' sufficient to convey reasoning;[2] Since a proposition containing the probans-, namely the mountain possessing smoke possesses fire- without any other members, is sufficient to convey the reasoning, it is not proper to adopt any view regarding the number of members of a syllogism (And) when the knowledge of reasoning arises with that much only (i.e. the proposition containing the probans) there will be the contingency of (defect called)'excess' in respect (of the statement of a person stating other members. Even it is so, there will not be a contradiction[3] to one's own (statement) accepting three members;

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because it is desired to state those (other members) for one who has not (acquired) the knowledge (of reasoning) with this much (statement). This is so, because people are of varied intelect.[4]

tr.0.40 With the intention 'for some other reasons also this view of restriction about the number is not correct' the author states-

tr.40 When the statement of proposition is clearly understood (accomplished, then the statement of) mere probans also (is sufficient)

tr.1.40 When someone asked' bring fire from the mountain' answers 'the mountain has no fire' and at the same time, the other one else says- ' no, the mountain has hire', the statement of proposition is already made (through the question and answers). And further when he is asked 'why (it) has fire? he answers' because it has smoke,' (then through this question and answer too, the knowledge of reasoning necessarily takes place. And hence any rule regarding the number of members of a syllogism is not proper.

tr.0.41 With the intention for some other reason also this is not correct the author states-

tr.41 The example alongwith the proposition and containing the probans-

tr.1.41 Here the word drstānta stands for it's statement.[5] Through the statement of mere example ! the mountain has fire like the kitchen having smoke ' which is along with the proposition and containing the probans in it,- the knowledge of reasoning is possible. (Hence, we can see that) Since the notion (necessity of) application of the members of a syllogism is proper only according to the expectancy of a listener the fixed rule regarding it, is not (Proper).

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1. Then the text will be' The proposition containing the probans in it alone, is sufficient to convey reasoning.'

2. Upapatti in this context is-which conveys that the probans is concomitant with the probandum.

3. In the previous text M has accepted the view of the mīmāmsakas (i.e. three members) by refuting the view of others. But in this text he establishes that one member syllogism also will do. Hence these two statements appear to be contradictory with each other.

4. In short, M is ofthe opinion that the very purpose of a syllogism is to convey others that the probans possesses the concomitance; and the same is fulfilled with one member only, then other members are unnecessary, So, the number of members will be applied according to the requirement on the listener's part, which is depending upon the grasping capacity of the listener.

5. i.e. Like the kitchen' but not the kitchen itself. The distinction between drstānta and udāharana becomes clear in this place. In the drstanta only Kitchen is mentioned whereas in the illustration it is stated with the reference of concomitance, as 'whatever possesses smoke possesses fire like the kitchen'.

Com·0·42 (टी.) निर्दोषोपपत्तिरनुमेत्युक्तम्। को दोष उपपत्तेः संभवति ?। द्विविध उपपत्तिदोषः। साक्षात् वाचनिकश्चेति। यस्तत्रोपपत्तेरेव साधनदूषणाक्षमत्वाऽपादकः स साक्षादुपपत्तिदोषः। तं विभज्य दर्शयति।

T. 42 उपपत्तिदोषौ विरोधासङ्गती

Com.1.42 उपपत्तिदोषो द्विविधः। विरोधोऽसंगतिश्चेति। अन्वययोग्यताविरहो विरोधः। आकांक्षाऽभावोऽसंगतिः। इमौ चार्थवचनयोरपि संभवतः। अर्थासाधुत्वे वचनस्यापि तथात्वादिति।

Com·0·43 वचनस्यैवासाधुत्वाऽपादको वाचनिकदोषः। तं विभज्य दर्शयति

T. 43 न्यूनाधिके वाचनिके

Com. 1.43 द्विविधो वाचनिकदोषः। न्यूनमधिकं चेति। अपेक्षितासंपूर्तिर्न्यूनम्। अपेक्षिताधिकमधिकम्। न्यूनाधिके च परार्थप्रयोग एव संभवतः। वचनद्वारेणैवोपपत्तेरपि दूषिके स्यातामिति।

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tr.0.42 It is said that defectless reasoning is inference.[1] (But) what could be the defect in reasoning? (The answer is) The defect in reasoning is twofold. i) what is obvious and ii) what arises out of (syllogistic) statement. Of them, the direct defect (obvious) in the reasoning consists in what causes incapacity in the reason (probans) itself, in proving one's own view, or in refuting the view of others[2]. Now he shows this (defect) by dividing it (in to two)-

tr.42 The defects of reasoning are-Virodha contradiction and asangati inconsistency.

tr.1.42 The defect in reasoning istwofold. viz. the contradiction and the inconsistency. The contradiction is the absence of suitability of positive relation (between what is accepted as a probans and as a probandum) And inconsistency is the absence ofexpectancy (between the statements). Both these defects are possible in the case of meaning (sense) as well as expression, because when the meaning is not correct the expression also (will be) likewise.

tr.0.43 The defect in syllogistic statement is what causes incorrectness in the expression alone. Now the author explains it by diving (into two).

tr.43 Deficient (statement) and excessive (statement) are the defects of a (syllogistic) statement.

tr.1.43 The defect in expression is twofold. i) It is deficient or ii) it is excessive. It is deficient when there does not follow the fulfilment of what is desired (as to be stated) And it is excessive when there is more (of expression) than what is desired (as to be stated). (Both these) deficient and excess are possible only in a syllogism (stated for the understanding of) others.

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and therefore these (defects)will be causing the defects to the probans (or reasoning) only through the actual statements[3]

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1. See. निर्दोषेऽप्यागमोऽनुमा PL.
2. The very purpose of inference is to establish one's own view, or to refute the view of others. If the probans is incapable of doing it, then it is the defect of a probans itself. Therefore the defects which show it's incapacity are the direct defects.
3. One might ask, how the defects in expression will be the defects of reasoning because being 'reasoning' is decided by meaning only? And in answer J explains.no probans by itself will be defective (i.e. no smoke is defective) but is is said to be defective only when some statement is made in respect of it. And since any statement alone, makes probans or reasoning defective, hence the defects of expression can be the defects of reasoning.

(टी.) न केवलमुपपत्तिदोषाणामेव विरोधाऽदिभिः संग्रहः। किं नाम ? परनिरूपिताशेष-निग्रहस्थानान्यपि विरोधाऽदिष्वेवान्तर्भवन्तीत्याह

संवादानुक्तियुता निग्रहाः

निग्रहाः निग्रहस्थानानि। कथायां अखण्डिताहंकारेण परेण परस्याहंकारखण्डनं पराजयो निग्रहस्तन्निमित्तं तत्त्वाप्रतिपत्तिलिङ्गम् वा निग्रहस्थानम्। सा द्विविधा अप्रतिपत्तिर्विप्रतिपत्तिश्चेति। परोक्तस्ववक्तव्ययोरज्ञानम् अप्रतिपत्तिः। तयोरेव विपरीतज्ञानम् विप्रतिपत्तिः। तानि च प्रतिज्ञाहानिः (१) प्रतिज्ञान्तरम् (२) प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः (३) प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासः (४) हेत्वन्तरम् (५) अर्थान्तरम् (६) निरर्थकम् (७) अविज्ञातार्थकम् (८) अपार्थकम् (९) अप्राप्तकालम् (१०) न्यूनम् (११) अधिकम् (१२) पुनरुक्तम् (१३) अननुभाषणम् (१४) अज्ञानम् (१५) अप्रतिभा (१६) विक्षेपः (१७) मतानुज्ञा (१८) पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम् (१९) निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः (२०) अपसिद्धान्तः (२१) हेत्वाभासाः (२२) उदाहरणाऽभासाः (२३) तर्कपराहति (२४) श्चेति। एतानि च कथाबाह्यानि कथायामपसारोन्मादाऽदिदशाऽपन्नानि झटिति संवरणेन तिरोहितोद्भावनावसराणि पुरःस्फूर्तिकानधिकृतोद्भावितानि न निग्रहस्थानानि। तात्कालिकातत्त्वज्ञानलिङ्गत्वेऽपि प्रतियोग्यपेक्षया तदभावात् इति।

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CLINCHERS

tr.0.44 Contradiction etc. include (cover) not only the defects of reasoning. What then ; But also all the places of clinchers stated by others - are indluded under contradiction etc.'

with this intention the author states-

tr.44 These (defects) together with samvāda acceptanee of disputed points' and anukti[1] 'non-statement of what is to be stated' are clinchers (i.e. clinchers come under these four defects)

tr.1.44 The word nigraha stands for an occasion of pointing out the nigraha 'clinchers'. The[2] defeat in the debate in the form of quelling the pride of one of the debators, by the other debator whose pride is not quelled is called nigraha and a cause of it or a mark which indicates non-understanding of the truth (of what is tried to be established) is called a nigrahasthāna place or occasion of pointing out the defect. It is twofold.[3] i) apratipatti absence of understanding or ii) vipratipatti understanding otherwise (erroneous understanding). Apratipatti is ignorance of what is said by the other party and what is to be stated by oneslef. And vipratipatti is erroneous understandi: in respect of these two alone. They are i) pratijñāhāni 'abondonment of the proposition' ii) Pratijñāntaram- 'shifting the proposition' iii) Pratijñāvirodha 'opposition to the proposition iv) Pratijñāsannyāsa 'renouncing the proposition' v) Hetvantaram 'changing or shifting the probans 'vi) Arthāntaram 'the irrelavant meaning' vii) Nirarthakam 'the meaningless 'viii) Avijñātārthakam 'one meaning of which is unknown' ix) Apārthakam 'the incoherent' x) Aprāptakālam 'the inopportune 'xi) Nyūnam 'the less 'xii) Adhikam 'the more 'xiii) Punaruktam 'the repition'

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xiv) Ananubhāsana 'the non repitition' xv) Ajñānam 'the igmorance' xvi) Apratibhā 'the non ingenuity' xvii) Vikṣepa 'the evasion' xviii) Matānujñā 'the admission of an opinion' xix) Paryanuyojyopekṣaṇam 'neglecting the censurable' xx) Niranuyojyanunupekṣana 'repremanding the non censurable' xxi) Apasiddhānta 'deviation from the tenet' xxii) Hetvābhāsa 'fallacies of reason' xxiii) udāharaṇābhaṣa 'fallacious illustrations' xxiv) Tarkaparāhati 'refutation of hypothetical argument.'[1]

(All) these cannot be (said to be the) clinchers when they are i) outside debate,[5] or ii) are in debate but turned[6] into (appearing as) diseases like epilapsy, madness etc. and are hidden at the time of their pointing out, or iii) pointed out by one not authorised as purasphūrtika[7] 'the prompter'. Because though they are the marks of ignorance at that particular time, they are not so according to the other debators.[8]

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1. Samvāda and anukti are explained on Pt.121.

2. This definition of nigrahasthāna is according to tā. Ra See. अखण्डिताहंकृतिना पराहंकाररभनम्। निग्रहस्तान्योभिमतस्य निग्रहस्थानतोऽन्यते। TaRa 3.1.

3. This is according to Gautama See. विप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिपत्तिश्च निग्रहस्थानम् Nyasū. 1.2.29.

We can see that J has used two definitions of nigrahasthāna suitably and explained the nature of nigrahas. Usually when one definition is sufficient J will not state two definitions discussed in the same school without any reason. Here also J wants to indicate that the definition given by TāRa is not so perfect, because even when one is defeated his pride may or may not be quelled. And therefore परस्याहंकाररभंजनम् may not be possible . And to indicate this, J has stated another definition of nigrahasthana. as stated by Gautama.

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4. According to the Nyāyasū 5.2.1 the clinchers are 22 only, but according to J the word Ca in the sūtra is for inclusion of two more namely, Udāharanābhāsa and Tarkaparāhati and therefore J states 24 clinchers in this text. See -
प्रतिज्ञाहानिः प्रतिज्ञान्तरम् ..... हेत्वाभासाश्च Nyāsū. V.2.1.

5. Kathā - 'Debate' is described by M as तत्त्वनिर्णयमुद्दिश्य केवलं गुरुशिष्ययोः।
कथान्येषामपि सतां वादः Kala. .2

6. This is the case when one of the debators states anything which will amount to nigrahasthana but he immediately understands that it should not have been stated. he gets changed, and shows, that whatever he said is due to somedisease. (through his acting)

7. Purasphūrtika is a person authorised to prompt when one of the debators for whome he is appointed, does not remember what he stated. If the original debator does not point out any defect in the statement of the other, the prompter is allowed to do so See-
वादिप्रतिवादिनोर्दैवादन्यतरे सति तयोः पुरःस्फूर्तिकर्तारौ द्वौ कथायां क्रियेते Jn.76

8. The defect which is covered up by one of the debators himself before it is known by theother debator cannot be the defect in the eye of the latter.

M is of the opinion that clinchers need not be mentioned distinctly, because one way or the other they are the defects of the statements made by one of the debators. Therefore with the addition of samvāda and anuktī in the 22 defects of reasoning stated previously; all the clinchers will be covered. But before explaining this view and showing the inclusion of them under these defects, J explains all the clinchers in detail following the words of TāRa. I have dropped this particular part of the

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commentary (i.e. which is common to TāRa. and J's commentary) to avoid unnecessary length of the thesis. Though fallacies also come under this part, they are neceasary for understanding M's view regarding inference. Hence I have continued the translation of the commentary from 22nd clincher, 23. and 24 are being additions to clinchers according to J are discussed.

com22.42(i) हेतोरुक्तरूपेषु पक्षव्यापकत्वादिषु कैश्चिदुक्ताः केनचिद्रहिता हेत्वाभासाः। ते चासिद्ध-विरुद्धानैकान्तिकानध्यवसितकालात्ययापदिष्टप्रकरणसमसत्प्रतिपक्षाः।

तत्र व्याप्तस्य पक्षधर्मत्वप्रतीतिः सिद्धिः। तद्रहितोऽसिद्धः। स चतुर्विधः। व्याप्तपक्षतद्धर्म-त्वैतत्प्रतीतिराहित्यभेदात्।

तत्र व्याप्यत्वासिद्धो द्वेधा। स्वरूपतो वैयर्थ्येन चेति। तत्राद्यो यथा 'यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकं यथा घटः' इति। व्यर्थविशेषणासिद्धो यथा 'शब्दोऽनित्यः सामान्यवत्वे सति कृतकत्वात्' इति। व्यर्थविशेष्यासिद्धो यथा 'कृतकत्वे सति सामान्यवत्वात्' इति। आश्रयासिद्धो द्वेधा। धर्मिणः साध्यत्वस्य चाभावात्। तत्राऽद्यो यथा 'प्रधानं नित्यं अकार्यत्वात्' इति। आश्रयैकदेशासिद्धो यथा 'प्रधानपुरुषौ नित्यौ अकार्यत्वात्' इति। द्वितीयो यथा 'परमाणवो नित्याः अकार्यत्वात्' इति। पक्षधर्मत्वासिद्धः पञ्चविधः। तत्र स्वरूपासिद्धो यथा 'शब्दोऽनित्यश्चाक्षुषत्वात्' इति। व्यधिकरणासिद्धो यथा 'घटस्य कृतकत्वात्' इति। विशेषणासिद्धो यथा 'चाक्षुषत्वे सति सामा-न्यवत्वात्' इति। विशेष्यासिद्धो यथा 'सामान्यवत्वे सति चाक्षुषत्वात्' इति। भागासिद्धो यथा 'प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वात्' इति।

सन्दिग्धव्याप्यत्वासिद्धो यथा 'स श्यामो मित्रातनयत्वात्'। सोपाधिकत्वेन व्याप्यत्व-सन्देहात्। सन्दिग्धाश्रयासिद्धो यथा। 'भविष्यद्देवदत्तपुत्रो ब्राह्मणः ब्राह्मणपुत्रत्वात्' इति। सन्दिग्धाश्रयैकदेशासिद्धो यथा 'देवदत्तः तद्भविष्यत्पुत्रश्च वेदयोग्यौ ब्राह्मणपुत्रत्वात्' इति। सन्दि-ग्धासिद्धो यथा, धूमबाष्पाविवेके 'पर्वतोऽग्निमान् धूमवत्वात्' इति। सदिग्धविशेषणासिद्धो यथा 'विमतो रागादियुक्तः सर्वदा तत्वज्ञानरहितत्वे सति पुरुषत्वात्' इति। सन्दिग्धविशेष्यासिद्धो यथा 'पुरुषत्वे सति सर्वदा तत्वज्ञानरहितत्वात्' इति। सन्दिग्धभागासिद्धो यथा। एकत्र धूम-निश्चये अन्यत्रानिश्चये 'पर्वतावग्निमन्तौ धूमवत्वात्' इति। विशेषणवैयर्थ्यादौ सन्देहो न सम्भवति ॥ २२-१ ॥

tr.22.42(i) Hetvābhāsāh 'Fallacies'

The fallacies are the probans possessing some but not possessing other of the aforeside qualities of the probans[1] such as-

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perveding the subject etc.[2] They are asiddha, viruddha, anaikāntika, anadhyavasita, Kālātyayāpadista prakaraṇasama, satpratipakṣa.

Asiddha 'unestablished'

In this respect, Siddhi 'establishment' is the apprehension of the pervaded as the property of (i.e. existing in) the subject and the probans without that (devoid of such siddhi) is called asiddha 'unestablished'. It is of four types because of the difference based on the absence of i) concomitance (pervasion) ii) the subject iii) the probans and iv) apprehension.

Of these, the vyāpyatvāsiddha 'unestablished in respect of it's concomitance is twofold i) by it's very nature and ii) by (the objective etc.) being unnecessary. The example of the first type is - 'whatever exists is momentary like a pot'. The unestablished by the adjective being unnecessary is as- 'sound is not eternal because it is produced, and is universal.' The unestablished by the substantive (word) being unnecessary is as - (the sound is not eternal) because of it's being universal when it is a product. The unestablished in respect of it's abode is of two types i) because of the absence of dharma (possessor of property i.e. a subject) and ii) because of the absence of the nature of being to be proved (of these two, the example of) first (type) is as the premordial matter is eternal because it is not an effect. The unestablished in respect of a part of it's abode is as premordial matter and purusa are eternal because they are not effect'. The example of the second type is- the atoms are eternal because they are not an effect. The unestablished because of the absence of being property of subject is of five types. Of them, unestab-

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lished by it's very nature sound is not eternal because (it belongs to) visual. The example of the unestablished in a different substratum is as-(sound is not eternal) because a pot is an effect. The example of not established in respect of the attribute is as (sound is not eternal) because it is universal, when it is perceptible.

The example of the unstablished in respect of the subjective is as - (sound is not eternal) because it is perceptible when it is possessed of universal. The example of the unestablished in respect of a part is as-sound is not eternal because it is produced after effort.

The example of the unestablished because of the doubtful probandum is as (the child in womb) is black because he is the son of Mitrā, here the pervadedness is doubtful because the probans possesses an upādhi (The extraneous condition). The example of the unestablished in respect of a doubtful abode is as- the would-be son of Devadatta is a brahmin because he is the son of a brahmin. The example of the unestablished in respect of a part of the uncertain abode is as - Devadatta and his would-be son, both are fit for studying the vedas because of their being the sons of a brahmin. The example of the unestablished doubtfully is as-when there is doubt as to smoke or fog, to say that the mountain possesses fire because of possession of smoke. The example of the unestablished because of doubtful adjective is as- the man in question possesses desire etc. because he is a man when he is all the time devoid of the knowledge of the reality. The example of the unestablished in respect of the doubtful subjective is as- the person in question possesses the

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desire etc. because he is devoid of the knowledge of reality even though he is a man. The example of the unestablished in respect of a doubtful part is as - (to state) the two mountains possess fire because they possess smoke, when there is definite cognition of smoke on one out of the two mountains, and doubt of smoke on the other mountain. There is no possibility of doubt in cases where the attributes, etc. are useless.

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1. based on हेतोः केनापि रूपेण रहितः कोऽप्यदान्नितः हित्वाभासः TaRa. 1.79.
2. etc. includes existence in a similar subject, not existing in a counter subject, having uncontradicted object as it's object, and not having another probans.

Com.22.42(ii) पक्षविपक्षयोरेव वर्तमानो हेतुर्विरुद्धः। स द्विविधः। विद्यमानसपक्षोऽविद्यमानसपक्षश्चेति। प्रत्येकं चतुर्विधः। तत्र सति पक्षे पक्षविपक्षव्यापको यथा 'नित्यः शब्दः कार्यत्वात्' इति। पक्षव्यापको विपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा 'सामान्यवत्वे सति असदादिबाह्यैकेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात्' इति। पक्षविपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा 'प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वात्' इति। पक्षैकदेशवृत्तिविपक्षव्यापको यथा 'पृथिवी नित्या कृतकत्वात्' इति।

असति सपक्षे प्रथमो यथा 'शब्द आकाशविशेषगुणः प्रमेयत्वात्' इति। द्वितीयो यथा 'प्रत्यक्षत्वात्' इति। तृतीयो यथा 'प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वात्' इति। चतुर्थो यथा 'अपदात्मत्वात्' इति ॥ २२-२ ॥

VIRUDDHA

tr.22.42(ii) The viruddha 'adverse' probans is the probans which exists in the subject and the counter subject only (and not in the similar subject). It is twofold i) having the similar subject and ii) not having the similar subject. Each one of the above two types is again of four types, Of them, the example of one

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i) pervading ~~full of the~~ both subject and the counter subject when it has similar subject[1] is as-'Sound is eternal because of being produced.ii) The example of the probans pervading full of the subject and a part of the counter subject is as-sound is eternal because of being perceived by only one of our external senses,[4] when it is possessed of universal.iii) The example of the probans existing in a part of both, the subject and the counter subject is as -sound is eternal because of being produced after effort.[5] iv) The example of the probans existing in a part of the subject but full of the counter subject is as-the earth is eternal because of being produced.[6]

In the same way, when there is no similar subject(as above) the example of the first type[7] is as- sound is the specific qualit of space because of its being an object of cognition.. The (example of) the second (type[8]) is as-sound is the specific quality of space because of it's perceptibility. The (example of the) third[9] type is as-sound is the specific quality of space because of it's being produced after effort. And the (example of th fourth[10] type is as - sound is the specific quality of space becau of it's being a pada 'word&.

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1. as-i) pervading the full of both ii) not pervading a part of the counter subject iii) not pervading a part of subject and iv)pervading only a part of both.
2. In fact the text should be sati sapakse and not satipakse because i) without the subject the proposition itself will be impossible, and ii) while explaining the other type, the commentator states asati sapakse (and not asati pakse).And therefore showing 'sati sapakse as V.L. and accepting the reading sati pakse is not correct

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3. In all these four examples of viruddha when it has similar subject the similar subject is the sky, because it is eternal. And because it is so, the probans 'being produced' is not there.(i.e. it is not found in the similar subject but found in all the counter subjects because all that not eternal is produced).

4. This is possible in a part of the counter subject,namely form or colour,which is percieved by visual faculty; but not possible in others like pot, which can be perceived by both visual faculty and touch. All these are vipaksa because they are produced.

5. Since the letters are produced,this probans is existing there (i.e. a part of the subject) but sound isnot produced after effort,this is not found in sound (i.e. other part of subject) And in the case of the counter subject, it exists in a pot (a part of the counter subject) but not existing in desire etc.(i.e. the other part of the counter subject)

6. A part of the subject is atom, and the probans does not exist in the therefore it is existing only in a part of the subject.

7. existing in full of both, ie. the subject and the counter subject. In all these four examples the probandum is 'the specific quality of space'. Since sound only is a specific quality of space one cannot show any other example of that nature, so there cannot be similar subject in these examples. In this first example knowability is common to all namely, sound and other than that,what is counter subject.

8. Pervading all of the subject and a part of the counter subject.

9. Pervading a part of both, the subject and the counter subject.

10. Existing in a part of the subject but full of the counter subject.

does not exist in sound,in the form of 'dhwani', because if it is not pada, but exists in Varna 'letters'.

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Gr. 22.42(iii) पक्षत्रयवृत्तिरनैकान्तिकः । सोऽपि बहुविधः । तत्र पक्षत्रयव्यापको यथा । शब्दोऽनित्यः प्रमेयत्वात् ' इति । पक्षव्यापकः सपक्षविपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा ' प्रत्यक्षत्वात् ' इति । पक्षसपक्षव्यापको विपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा 'अयं गौर्विषाणित्वात् ' इति । पक्षविपक्षव्यापकः सपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा ' नायं गौर्विषाणित्वात् ' इति । पक्षत्रयैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा ' पृथिवी नित्या प्रत्यक्षत्वात् ' इति । पक्षसपक्षैकदेशवत्तिर्विपक्षव्यापको यथा ' आत्ममनसी द्रव्ये अमूर्तत्वात् ' इति । पक्षविपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः सपक्षव्यापको यथा ' आत्ममनसी न द्रव्ये अमूर्तत्वात् ' इति । सपक्षविपक्षव्यापकः पक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा ' आकाशात्ममनांसि[1] द्रव्याणिं क्षणिकविशेषगुणरहितत्वात् ' इति ॥ २२-३ ॥

ANAIKĀNTIKA 'UNSTEADY'

tr.22.42(iii) The Anaikāntika 'unsteady' probans is the probans existing in all three (types) of the subject[1]. This is[is] also of many kinds. (out of them) pervading in full of the three subjects is as-sound is not eternal because of being 'the object of cognition(knowable). All pervading the subject and existing in some parts of the counter and the similar subjects is as-(the sound is not eternal) because of its perceptibility. All pervading (full in) the subject and the similar subject but existing in a part of the counter subject is: a This is a cow because of horns.[3] All pervading the subject and the counter subject and existing in a part of the similar subject is as- this is not a cow because of horns.[4] Existing in a part of all three types of the subject is as-the earth is eternal because of perceptibility.[5] Existing in a part of both, the subject and the similar subject but all pervading in the counter subject is as- Soul and mind are all the substances because of not being amūrta[6]. Existing in a part of the subject and the counter subject and all pervading the similar subject, is as-soul and mind are not the[7] substances because they are not formless.(And) All pervading the similar subject and the counter subject, and existing in a part of the subject is as- 'space, soul and mind' are the substances, because of their state of being devoid of momentary specific.

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particular quality.

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1. i.e. the subject, the similar subject and the counter subject.
2. Knowability is common to all the things, hence it is all pervading.
3. The counter subject, a buffalo has horns but a horse does not have.
4. Here probandum is the absence of cowness i.e. a buffalo etc, is the subject, it has horns and the counter subject cow also has; but a part of the simil subject (i.e. horse) does not have horns.
5. Perceptibility is not common to all the eternals and non eternals
6. This exists in Ātman but not in mind= i.e. existing in a part of the subject. It exists in space but not in a pot= existing in a part of the similar subject and so on.

Com. 22-42(iv) ; साध्यासाधकः पक्ष एव वर्तमानो हेतुरनध्यवसितः । स चानेकप्रकारः । तत्राविद्यमानसपक्षविपक्षः पक्षव्यापको यथा 'सर्वमनित्यं प्रमेयत्वात्' इति । पक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा 'कार्यत्वात्' इति । विद्यमानसपक्षविपक्षः पक्षव्यापको यथा 'शब्दो नित्यः आकाशविशेषगुणत्वात्' इति । तदेकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा 'सर्वं द्रव्यमनित्यम् क्रियावत्वात्' इति । विद्यमानविपक्षोऽविद्यमानसपक्षः पक्षव्यापको यथा 'सर्वं कार्यमनित्यं उत्पत्तिमत्वात्' इति । पक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा 'सावयवत्वात् इति ।

एते चासिद्ध्यादयः उभयान्यतरसम्मत्या द्वेधा भवन्ति । विरुद्धादित्रयस्यासिद्धसाङ्कर्येऽपि उभयव्यवहारविषयत्वादविरोधः ॥ २२ ४ ॥

anadhyavasita 'non-determinate'

tr. 22-42(iv). The anadhyavasita 'non determinate' probans is the probans which does not prove the probandum and exists in the subject only. It is of many types of them. (the example of one) not having the similar and the counter subjects, and pervading the subject fully is as- Everything is non eternal because of it's being knowable.[1] (The example of one) existing in a part of the subject is as (every thing is non eternal) because of it's being an effect. (The example of one having the similar and counter subjects and pervading the subject

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fully is as- all that is effect, is not eternal because of it's having an origin. (And the example of one) existing in a part of the subject is as -(all that is effect, is not eternal) because of having parts.

All these(four) beginning with asiddha 'unestablished'. are of two types on account aceptance by both the parties[2] (of dispute) or any one of it. Even though the three beginning with viruddha are mixed with asiddha (and they need not be stated separately there is no difficulty (contradiction to one's own statement in stating so) because there is usage of stating both[3](separately).

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1. Already explained as, the knowability is common to all and therefore there is nothing to be shown as the similar or the counter subject. Other examples also are very common).

2. The nature of being asiddha etc in respect of a probans depends upon the philosophy or principles accepted by the parties to debate for example, in the statement 'sound is non eternal, because it is a object of visual faculty' the probans 'cāksusatva' fit for perception' is unestablished in the subject sound according to both the disputants, who accept either eternality or non eternality of sound. But this will not be the case in respect of the probans 'being a quality'. Because being a quality is the probans established to them who accept that sound is a quality; but at the same time it is not established to the other party who holds that sound is not a quality but is a substance(dravya). In this way, all the four types of fallacies will be divided into two, on the basis, whether they are fallacies to both the parties of debate, or they are real probans to any of the party.

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3. If we observe carefully we will find that any of the examples of viruddha anaikāntika and anadhyavasita, can be the example of asiddha (i.e. the first type) because i) the probans 'being an effect' which is an example of viruddha in the statement 'the earth is eternal because it is effect.' ii) the probans amūrtatva which is unsteady with reference to the statement 'soul and mind are not substances; and iii) the probans possessing action which is non eternal-are existing in a part of respective subjects and therefore they can be the examples of bhāgāsiddha 'unestablished in a part.'

And the answer to this objection is- this division is according to the possibility of application. If both the fallacies occur in any example, one which comes to notice first, is to be pointed out first and secondly though the example is common to two or three fallacie the fallacies by their nature are totally different, hence nothing is wrong. 'उपाधेयसाकर्येऽपि तन्नदुपाधिसाकर्याददोषः।See Regd. 117.10

Anadhyavasita is named as asādhāraṇānaikāntika also.

(टी.) प्रमाणबाधितविषयः कालात्ययापदिष्टः। सोऽप्यनेकविधः। तत्र प्रत्यक्षबाधितो यथा 'अग्निरनुष्णः पदार्थत्वात्' इति। प्रत्यक्षबाधितैकदेशो यथा 'जलानलौ पदार्थत्वात्' इति। अनुमानबाधितो यथा 'देवदत्तश्चक्षूरहितः पुरुषत्वात्' इति। अनुमानबाधितैकदेशो यथा 'देवदत्तश्चक्षुर्विषाणरहितः पुरुषत्वात्' इति। आगमबाधितो यथा 'सुरा ब्राह्मणेन पेया द्रवद्रव्यत्वात् इति। तबाधितैकदेशो यथा 'सुरासोमौ ब्राह्मणेन पेयौ द्रवद्रव्यत्वात्' इति ॥ २२-५ ॥

tr.22.42(v) Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa 'invalidated by the lapse of time' or 'adduced 'out of time'

The kālātyayāpadiṣṭa 'invalidated by the lapse of time' is the probans which has the probandum as it's subject, which is contradicted by pramāṇas. This also is of many types. Of them, the example of one the probandum for which, is contradicted by perception is as-fire is not hot because of it's being a substance. The example of one having the probandum for it, a part of which is contradicted by perception is as-

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Water and fire are (not hot) cold[7] because they are substances. The example of one, the probandum ofwhich is contradicted by inference is as-Devadatta is devoid of eyes[4] and horns because he is a man. The example of one the probandum of which is contradicted by verbal testimony is as.Wine is fit to be drunk by a brahmin because it is a liquid substance.[5] (And) the example of one having the probandum for it, a part of which is contradicted by verbal testimony is as - wine and soma are fit to be drunk by a brahmin because they are liquid substences.

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1. The probandum in each of these examples is now beyond establishment. All these are established long back, by different pramānas :
2. Hotness of fire is experienced by perception.
3. A part of probandum (i.e. fire) not cold, and therefore it is pramānabādhitaikadesa.
4. Since we can note that Devadatta has knowledge of colour etc. We can infer that he has eyes. And therefore this part of the probandum is contradicted by inference.
5. Because drinking wine is prohibited by the seriptures as न सुरां पिबेत्

Com.22.42(VI) स्वपरपक्षसिद्धावपि त्रिरूपो हेतुः प्रकरणसमः। यथा 'विमतं मिथ्या दृश्यत्वात्' इति। सत्यत्वेऽप्यस्य प्रयोक्तुं शक्यत्वात्। उभयत्र त्रैरूप्यञ्च वादिप्रतिवादिनोराभिमानिकमिति नासम्भवः॥ २२-६॥

Prakaranasama 'similar to the context'

r.22.42(VI) The prakaranasama'common to the context' is the probans which has it's all three forms[1] when it is establishing one's own side as well as the opponent's side. for example- The thing (a view) under question is false because it is perceived. The same probans (i.e perceptinility) can be applied for (establishing) trueness[2](of the world)also.

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(And one can not state) the impassibility[3] of threefold ness of this probans in both the views, because both the disputants insist on threefoldness of the probans.

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1. i.e. Being a property of the subject, existence in the similar subjec and non existence in dissimilar or counter subject.
2. The syllogism according to the advaitin is 'the world is false because of perceptibility.' The probans perceptibility exists in the subject- the 'world', in the similar subject- shell and silver and does not exist in the counter subject- The Brahman. On the other han the same probans namely,- perceptibility is applied by the dvaitins also, in the syllogism 'the thing under question (i.e. the world) is real because of perceptibility.' And probans perceptibility, according to them exists in the subject 'world' in the similar subject Brahman, but does not exist in 'shell and silver'- the counte subject.
3. One might object, 'how can only one and the same thing . . be tru and false?' Therefore he answers- both the parties insist on it's being so.

Com 22.42 (vii) (...) समबलतयाऽभिमतप्रमाणविरुद्धः सत्प्रतिपक्षः । तत्र प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धो यथा 'विमतः शङ्खः शुक्लः शङ्खत्वात्' इत्यत्र प्रत्यक्षात् 'पीतः किं न स्यात्'? इति । अनुमानविरुद्धो यथा 'आकाशं नित्यं अमूर्तद्रव्यत्वात्' इत्यत्र 'आकाशमनित्यं अस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यगुणाश्रयत्वात्' इत्यनुमानात् अनित्यमपि किं न स्यात् ? इति । आगमविरुद्धो यथा 'प्रधानं न स्वतन्त्रं जडत्वात्' इत्यत्र कापिलागमात् 'स्वतन्त्रमपि किं न स्यात्?' इति ॥ २२·७ ॥

Satpratipaksa 'the counter probans'

tr.22.42(vii)

The satpratipaksa 'the counter probans' is the probans which is (prov. ed to be contrary) by equal strength of pramana accepted in one's own system. The example of contrary through perception is as- The

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counter statement' why (is it) not yellow?' on the strength of perception only, when it is stated that 'the conchshell is white because it is a conch shell'. The example of the possibility of a counter probans on the strength of inference is as- a statement of a counter syllogism.' Space is not eternal because it is a substratum for the quality fit to be perceived by our external sense organs.' to the statement of the syllogism-space is eternal because it is a formless substance, (to argue) why it is not non-eternal because of such inference? The example of contradiction to a probans through verbal testimony is as- a counter argument 'why it is not independant, on the strength of statements of Kapila' to the syllogism-the premordial matter is not independant because it is jada.Unconsious.[1]

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[1] The probans of these three examples is contrary to what is proved by the three accepted pramanas namely, perception, inference and verbal testimony respectively.

Com. 23.42 उदाहरणरूपेषु कैश्चिदुक्ताः कैश्चिद्रहिता उदाहरणाभासाः। ते चानेकंप्रकाराः। तत्र साधर्म्योदाहरणे तावत् साध्यवैकल्यम् यथा, मनोऽनित्यं मूर्तत्वात् 'यन्मूर्तं तदनित्यं यथा परमाणुः' इति। साधनवैकल्यम् यथा 'यथा कर्म' इति। उभयवैकल्यम् यथा 'यथाऽऽकाशम्' इति। आश्रयहीनम् यथा 'यथा शशविषाणम्' इति। अव्याप्त्यभिधानम् यथा 'मूर्तत्वात् घटवत्' इति। विपरीतव्याप्त्यभिधानम् यथा 'यदनित्यं तन्मूर्तम् यथा घटः' इति। वैधर्म्योदाहरणे साध्याव्यावृत्तिर्यथा 'यदनित्यं न भवति तत् मूर्तं न भवति यथा कर्म' इति। साधनाव्यावृत्तिर्यथा 'यथा परमाणुः' इति। उभयाव्यावृत्तिर्यथा 'यथा घटः' इति। आश्रयहीनत्वम् पूर्ववत्। अव्याप्त्यभिधानम् यथा 'मूर्तत्वात् आकाशवत्' इति। विपरीतव्याप्त्यभिधानम् यथा 'यन्मूर्तं न भवति तदनित्यं न भवति यथाऽऽकाशम्' इति।

सन्दिग्धसाध्यो यथा 'अयं महाराज्यं करिष्यति सोमवंशोद्भूतत्वात् राजपुत्रान्तरवत्' इति। सन्दिग्धसाधनो यथा 'अयं न सर्वज्ञः रागादिमत्वात् रथ्यापुरुषवत्' इति। सन्दिग्धोभयो यथा 'देवदत्तपुत्रः स्वर्गं गमिष्यति धर्मवत्वात् देवतान्तरवत्' इति। सन्दिग्धाश्रयो यथा 'यथा भविष्यद्देवदत्तपुत्रः' इति। एतेष्वेवं प्रयोगेषु सन्दिग्धसाध्याव्यावृत्तो यथा 'यथा अन्यो राजपुत्रः' इति। सन्दिग्धसाधनाव्यावृत्तो यथा 'यथा समस्तशास्त्राभिज्ञः' इति। सन्दिग्धोभयाव्यावृत्तो यथा 'यथा रथ्यापुरुषः' इति। सन्दिग्धाश्रयः पूर्ववदिति ॥ २३ ॥

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UDĀHARAṆĀBHĀSA 'PSEUDO ILLUSTRATIONS'

tr.23.42 The udāharaṇābhāsa 'pseudo illustrations' are the illustrations which possess some of, but do not possess the other characteristics of an illustration.[1] They are of many types. Of them, (the examples of various types in the illustrations based on similarity are as follows) i) being devoid of the probandum-'mind is non-eternal because of it's corporiality, whatever is corporeal is non-eternal as an atom.[2] ii) Not having probans-(mind is not eternal because of its corporiality) as action[3] iii) being devoid of both (i.e sadhama and sādhya) as space.[4] iv) being devoid of a substratum- as the horns of a hare.[5] v) without the statement of concomitance because of corporiality, as a pot.[6] vi) alongwith the statement of negative concomitance-whatever is not eternal is corporial like a pot.

The examples of same (defects in the illustrations based on dissimilarity)[7] are as follows. i) Non exclusion of the probandum-whatever is not non eternal is not corporeal like action, ii) non exclusion of the probans as an atom. iii) non exclusion of both(i.e. probandum and probans) like a pot. iv) devoid of substratum as stated earlier.[8] v) non statement of concomitance-because of corporiality, like space.vi) statement of negative concomitance-whatever is not corporeal is not non eternal like space.

(The examples of the pseudo illustrations based on similarity where the necessary characteristics like probans etc. are of doubtful nature, are as follows) i) having the doubtful probandum-this one will rule the big country because he is born in somavamśa 'lunar race,' like other princes[10] ii) having doubtful probans-this one is not all knowing, because he possesses desire etc. like a man on the

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street(iii) having both doubtful-(this) son of Devadatta will get a place in(go to) heaven because he possesses merits, like other son of Devadatta.[12] iv) having doubtful abode- like a would be son of Devadatta. In these very syllogisms, (the examples of) (i) non-exclusion of doubtful probandum (is as) like other prince. ii) non exclusion of doubtful probans (is as) like one who is expert in all scinces. iii) non exclusion of doubtful (both(i.e. the probans and the probandum) (is as) like a man on the street. And having doubtful abode is as one stated earlier.

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1. The characteristics of an illustration are, i) probans ii)probandum iii) a statement of concomitance etc. Any illustration not possessing any of these is not an illustration.
2. Atoms are eternal, therefore this illustration is devoid of probandum (i.e. non eternality).
3. Action does not possess corporeality.
4. Space is neither corporeal nor non eternal hence it does not possess both, probandum and probans.
5. Hare's horn is an impossibility.
6. In this illustration only 'pot' is mentioned but there is no statement of concomitance as 'whatever is not corporeal is not eternal'.
7. The necessary conditions for an illustration based on similarity (i.e. probandum probans etc) become the defects of an illustration based on dissimilarity. Therefore these examples are of non-exclusion
8. i.e. hare's horn.
9. Certainty of probans probandum etc is necessarily required in a proper illustration. And if it is not so; (i.e. if there is doubt about their existance) the illustration becomes 'pseudo illustration.'
10. It is very vague, because it is not certain who is the other prince,

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and whether he is going to rule definitely?

11. One cannot be sure about the possession of desire etc. in respect of person not known (i.e. on the street)

12. Here, though the text is Devatāntaravat I have translated according to the Varient reading 'devadattaputrāntaravat.' because the reading devatāntaravat means like other goddess, but since there is no any reference to any of goddess statement 'the other goddess' becomes useless. Even devatāvat alone would have been sufficient.

com 24.42 (टी.) तर्कपराहतिश्च प्रागुदिताऽऽत्माश्रयाऽऽदिप्रसङ्गदुष्टत्वमिति ॥ २४ ॥

tr.24.42 Tarkaparāhati[1] 'refutation through hypothetical argument is being defective with the contingency of (the defects) self dependance etc. which are already discussed.[2]

' अनुकूलतर्काभावे तु उपाधिव्यभिचारशङ्कया व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिर्भवति ।

यद्यप्युदाहरणाभासादयो हेत्वाभासेष्वन्तर्भवन्ति । तथापि तद्रूपेणोद्भाव्यत्वात् पृथगुपादानमिति ।

एतेषु यानि निग्रहस्थानानि तत्वतस्तानि विरोधादिष्वेवान्तर्भूतानि । वक्तृदोषाणां प्रतिज्ञाहान्यादीनां कथमुपपत्तिवचनदोषेषु विरोधादिष्वन्तर्भावः? इत्यत उक्तम् ॥ संवादानुक्तियुता इति ॥ शक्तिवैकल्यात् विप्रतिपन्नप्रमेयाङ्गीकारः संवादः । वक्तव्ये प्राप्ते शक्तिवैकल्यादेव तूष्णीम्भावोऽनुक्तिरिति ।

tr. On the absence of favourable hypothetical argument it will be case of[3] Vyāpyatvāsiddhi' unestablishment in respect of pervadingness'. because of the doubt of extraneous condition, and over applicability (arising out of it).

Through these 'pseudo illustrations' etc. come under fallacies of reason, their separate mention is on account of their nature of being 'pointed out in that particular form.[4]'

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Of these, which are the clinchers in their technical sense,[5] they are included under contradiction etc. only (But one might say) how the abandonment of a proposition etc, which are the defects of a speaker, are included under contradiction etc. which are the defects of a statement containing reasoning (i.e. syllogism)? (Therefore he says) alongwith samvāda and anukti'. Samvāda is acceptance of doctrin which is contrary and disputed with one's own view on account of inability. And anukti[8] is being silent on account of inability (only) when it is necessary to say (something).

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1. Tarkaparāhati is not a distinct clincher but it caomes underthe defec 'self dependance' etc.
2. See page no. 142
3. This is in answer to the question why the absence of favourable hypothetical argument is not mentioned as a distinct clincher? If the probans is along with the favourable hypothetical argument, it cannc have extraneous condition, but if such hypothetical argument is not possible in respect of that probans, then there is possibility of deviation of probans, which will lead to fallacy called Vyāpyatvā-siddha'. Therefore, absence of favourable hypothetical argument is nothing but fallacy vyāpyatvāsiddha and hence it is not mentioned separately.
4. These defect are to be pointed out as the defects of illustrations and that is why they are mentioned distinctly from fallacy of reason
5. According to śrī. they are excepting pratijñāntara hetvantara, aprāptakāla Āśrayāsiddhi (and other fallacies).
6. etc. cover inconsistency.

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7. M. adds two more defects of reasoning, namely Samvāda and anukti. So the total number of defects is six. and the defects which do not appear to be the defects of syllogistic statement, but come under clinchers, they will be included in these two.

8. J has explained the two here and the inclusion of all clinchers

Com. 0. 43 यदुक्तम् त्रीण्येव प्रमाणानीति तदयुक्तम्। साक्षिणः पृथक्प्रमाणत्वात् इत्यतस्तस्य प्रत्यक्षान्तर्भावज्ञापनार्थम् सिंहावलोकनन्यायेन तद्विभागमाह

प्रत्यक्षकरणविभागः

T. 43. प्रत्यक्षं सप्तविधम्

Com. 0. 44 सप्तविध्यं कथम्? इत्यत आह

T. 44. साक्षिषडिन्द्रियभेदेन

साक्षिप्रामाण्यम्

Com. 0. 44 द्विविधमिन्द्रियम्। प्रमातृस्वरूपं तदतिरिक्तञ्चेति। तत्र स्वरूपेन्द्रियं साक्षीऽत्युच्यते। स च ज्ञानरूपः। तस्य आत्मस्वरूपत्वम् तद्धर्माश्च सुखाऽदयो बहिश्चाकाशकालाऽदयोऽपि विषयाः। सुखाऽदीनां भिन्नेन्द्रियविषयत्वे कदाचिदपरोक्षभ्रमविषयताऽपातात्। अनन्यथात्वनियमः साक्षिण एव हि धर्मैः न त्वन्यस्य। न च कालाऽदेरसाक्षिविषयत्वम्। रूपाऽद्यभावेन चक्षुराद्यविषयत्वात्। मनसो बहिरस्वातन्त्र्याभ्युपगमात्। अननुसंहितव्याप्तीनामपि प्रतीतेः नानुमानात् तज्ज्ञानम्। जातिबधिराणामप्युपलम्भेन नाऽगमविषयताऽपीति।

अस्वरूपं च षड्विधम्। श्रोत्रत्वक्चक्षुर्जिह्वाघ्राणमनोभेदात्। एवमिन्द्रियाणां भेदेन तत्संनिकर्षाऽत्मकं प्रत्यक्षमपि सप्तविधमिति।

इदं च न सार्वत्रिकमिति। चतुर्विधं हि प्रत्यक्षम्। ईशलक्ष्मीयोग्ययोगिप्रत्यक्षभेदेन। तत्रेशलक्ष्मीप्रत्यक्षं सर्वदा स्वरूपेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाऽत्मकमेव। स्वातन्त्र्यपारतन्त्र्याभ्यां तद्विशेषः। योगिनामयोगिनां च आ मुक्तेः उभयविधेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाऽत्मकम्। तत्र योगिनां देशकालवस्तुस्वभावव्यवहितार्थमपि विषयीकरोति। अयोगिनां तु देशकालाऽद्यव्यवहितमेवेति।

Tr. 0. 43 As to 'what is said' Pramāṇas are only three, is not correct because Sāk ṣin 'witness self' is a distinct pramāṇa'-the author states the division of that (perception) in order to convey the inclusion of sāksin 'witness self' in accordance with the maxim 'Simhāvalokana 'lions' looking back' as under-

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tr. 43 Perception is of seven types (as)

tr.44 (One might ask) How can it be ofseven types? (Therefore in order to answer) the author states-

tr.44 On the basis of the difference due to the witness self and six sense organs.

tr.44 The sense organ is of two types- i) being in the form of a cognizer self and ii) other than that. Of them, the sense organ which is in the form ofthe cognizer himself is called sāksin 'witness self'[1]. And he is in the form of cognition itself.

It is very nature of the Ātman It's attributes are pleasure etc.[2] and it has for it's object, space and time etc.[3] outside. If pleasure etc. are the objects of the sense organ other than (the Sāksin) (there wil be contingency of their being the object of error in perception sometimes)[4] The rule 'Not being otherwise' (i.e. being as it is in respe of any object) is as attrubute of Sāksin alone and not of any one els This also should not (be said) that time etc. cannot be the objects of Sāksin. Because [1] i) of the absence of form etc(in them) they cannot be the object of visual faculty etc.[5] and also, ii) because it is accepted that mind is not independant(in respect of the cognition of objects) outside. (And) the knowledge of that (i.e. time etc) does no arise through inference because it is cognized by those who have not even the knowledge of concomitance (in that respect) (And) since it i known by (people who are) born dumbs, it cannot be the object to be cognized by verbal testimony.[6]

The sense organ not being in the form of cognizer himself is of six types. On the basis of the difference between the different sense organs, namely-i) auditory ii) tactile iii) visual iv) gestatory

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v) olfactory and vi) mental faculties. And following this difference between these sense organs, perception which is of the nature of cantact with them, also is of seven types.

(But) this (division also) is not common to all, because perception (in other way) is of four types, on the basis of the difference between the perceptions of the Lord, of Laksmī, of Yogins and of avogins. Of them, the perception of the Lord and Laksmī is always, in the form of contact of svarūpendriya (i.e. witness self).

The difference between them is from independance and dependance[8]

(And) the perception of yogins and ayogins is in the form of contact of both types (of sense organs) up to the obtaiment of the stage of final liberation[9]. Of that also, the perception of yogin cognizes the object which is interviened even by the place, time, thing, and its very nature. But (the perception) of ayogins cogniz the only . . object which is not intervened by place, time etc.

And this (perception of ayogins) is of two types. i) which has for it's object what is delimited by pastness and presentness, for example, the knowledge 'this is the same pot' which is aided by the impression which is the cause of recognition. (The second is that) which has for it's object (the thing) present. for example, a (The perception) what is the cause for the knowledge "this is a pot

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1. The concept of sākṣin is a valuable contribution of M to indian philosophy. With the assumption of Sākṣin 'witness self' and it's independant nature M has solved the problem of the validity of knowledge. for other details see intro.
2. etc. covers pain, desire, efforts, knowledge and other.
3. etc = dvyanuka, paramānuprakriti and others.

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4. According to M, the witness self is the only defectless sense organ. Therefore whatever is perceived by the witness self is valid, and anything invalid is not cognized by the sākṣin. See.
साक्षी निर्दोष एवैक: सदाङ्गीकार्य एव न: Anuvyā.30A.6

This is being so, illusion or error is possible in respect of the perception through sense organs other than the sākṣin. If we accept that pleasure etc are experienced by the external sense orga this is also possible that there will be error or illusion in respect of pleasure, since these sense organs may be defective, but our experienc is not so. Therefore we have to accept that pleasure etc. are all th time real and that is why they are perceived by sākṣin alone.

5. etc. other faculties.

6. And therefore, the time etc. are cognised through sākṣin alone.

7. Because this will be possible in respect of ordinary people only.

8. See स्वातन्त्र्यपारतन्त्र्याभ्यां तद्विद्वीज: PL.19.15.

9. and after that, they have only svarūpajñāna.

(टी.) निर्विकल्पकसविकल्पकभेदात् द्विविधं प्रत्यक्षमित्येके । यत् द्रव्यगुणाऽदिस्वरूप-मात्रावगाहि न तु तद्विशेषणविशेष्यभावविषयं तत् निर्विकल्पकम् । यथा 'यत्किञ्चिदेतत्' इति, ज्ञानसाधनम्, प्राथमिकम् । सञ्ज्ञागुणकर्मजातिविशिष्टार्थविषयं सविकल्पकम् । यथा 'शुक्लो ब्राह्मणो गच्छति' इति । द्वितीयम् इति ।

निर्विकल्पकमेव प्रत्यक्षमित्यपरे ।

तदेतदयुक्तम् । गुणाऽदेर्द्रव्येणात्यन्तभेदस्य निर्विशेषाभेदस्य चाभावेन विशिष्टबोधस्यैव साक्षिसिद्धत्वात् ।

tr.2.44 Some (hold) that the perception is of two types, namely, i) non-conceptual (or indeterminate) and ii) conceptual (determinate) Nirvikalpaka non-conceptiual perception is that perception which grasps merely the substance, quality etc only as such (itself; but it does not have for it's object) the relation between them as

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qualifier and qualified. for example, the perception which is an instrument for the knowledge 'this is something'. This is of first type (i.e. non conceptual) and savikalpaka 'conceptual' is the perception which has for it's object; some object which is qualified by name, quality, action and class. For example, that fair brahmin is walking. This is second.[2]

Some other state that the perception is of only one type namely, non conceptual.

But (both these views) are not correct,[4] since there is neither absolute difference, nor unqualified oneness of quality etc. with substance. (what is) supported by the witness self (is) only concept (qualified) knowledge-

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1. This has reference to the tarkikas see. TaRa. I.11.
2. Nirvikalpaka perception grasps mere object as such. But it's details regarding shape, class, quality etc. are grasped by savi Kalpaka perception. Of these two examples, the first shows how perception grasps any object without any details of it; but in the second example the knowledge, contains everything, namely, i) name this one ii) quality- fair iii) brahmin- class iv) is walking.action.
3. This is according to the Bauddhas see. TaRa on I.11;
4. In addition to this (namely Sañjña Guna Karma, Jāti), four other Vikalpas are discussed by J in PP. They are dravya, samavāyi, abhāva, Viśesa. And finally it is shown how they are not real. According to J two out of these vikalpas 'details' are not known through perception. Because a name of an object is remembered after an objec is perceived; and the absense of an object is known after the object (absense of which is perceived) is known.

. Therefore these two details namely,

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name and absence (of any object) are not perceived and therefore there cannot be savikalpaka perception. In respect of other detail he is of the opinion that there is no difficulty in holding that guna kriyā etc. are perceived in first instance, or the moment of first perception. Since there is no proof to say that substance and quality are totally different from each other, we cannot say, they are perceived one after the other. On the other hand our experience is, the witness self cognises both together. Hence, assumpt. of non conceptual perception is meaningless.

Com. 3.44 (टी.) एतेनैतदपि निरस्तम्। यदाहुः 'सन्निकर्षः षोढा भिद्यते। संयोगः संयुक्तसमवायः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः समवायः समवेतसमवायः विशेषणविशेष्यभावश्चेति । तत्र चक्षुःस्पर्शनाभ्यां संयोगेन घटादिज्ञानं, मनसा आत्मज्ञानम् । तैः संयुक्तसमवायेन स्वविषयद्रव्यसमवेतगुणकर्मसामान्यज्ञानं, घ्राणेन गन्धज्ञानं, रसनेन रसज्ञानम् । तैरेव संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायेन गुणकर्मसमवेतसामान्यज्ञानम् । श्रोत्रेण समवायेन शब्दज्ञानम् । तेनैव समवेतसमवायेन शब्दसमवेतसामान्यज्ञानम् । तत्तदिन्द्रियैर्विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन स्वस्वविषयवृत्तिसमवायाभावज्ञानम् । सोप्युक्तपञ्चविधसम्बन्धसम्बद्धविशेषणविशेष्यभावत्वेन पञ्चविधः। यथा 'घटे रूपसमवायः' इत्यादि। यथा च 'इह भूतले घटाभावः' इत्यादि न हि द्रव्यात् गुणाऽदिकमन्यत् । येन तत्सम्बन्धः समवायः सम्भवति ।

tr.3.44 By this very argument this also is reputed as to what they say the contact is distinguished in six types as- i) conjunction ii) inherence in the conjoined, iii) inherance in that is inherent in the conjoined iv) inherence v) inherence in the inherent and iv) relation of the qualifying and qualified. Among these, the knowledge of a pot is through the (contact) injunction with visual and tactular faculties of a pot, the knowledge of Ātman is through the conjunction with mind. The knowledge of quality, action and generic character which are inherent with the substance their object, is through what are inherent in the cojoined. The knowledge of smell is through the olifactory faculty; and the knowledge of taste is through gestatory faculty; the knowledge of the generic character inherent with the quality and action is through them only by the relation inherent conjoined. Similarly the Knowledge of sound is also through auditory faculty which is inherent. By that sense organ only the knowledge of generic character

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which is inherent in the sound is by (the relation) inherent in the inherent, and the knowledge of the absence inherent in their own respective object is through the relation, as qualifier and qualified by those senee organs. That relation as qualifier and qualified also is of five types as being the relation of qualifier and qualified between those connected with that five types of connection. For example, there is the inherence of colour in a pot etc. or as here there is the absence of a pot on the ground etc.

(But) this is not (the case that) quality etc. is different from substance, and therefrom the relation as inherence between them will be established.

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1. Here the six types of contact, accepted by the Naiyayikas are discusse
2. As already stated M is of the opinion that substance are not totally different from quality, and therefore the relation of inherence is not possible, because the relation of inherence is based on differenc only. But before stating the view of the author the commentator has explained in this passage, what are the types of sanni arsa according to the Naiyayikas. See for M's view Anuvy. कार्यकारणयोश्चैव गुणादेः पञ्चकस्य तु । भिन्नस्यैव तु संबन्धः समवायोऽत्र इष्यते ।Anuvy 2.A.13.

Com 0.45 (टी.) ननु स्मृतिः केवलप्रमाणम् न वा। आद्ये केवलस्योत्पत्तिमतोऽनुप्रमाणजन्यत्वं वाच्यम्। अतः तद्धेतोः संस्कारस्य प्रामाण्यमङ्गीकार्यम्। ततश्च नोक्तविभागो युक्तः। न हि संस्कारो यादृच्छिकसंवादी। येनाप्रमाणमपि केवलस्य हेतुः स्यात्। चक्षुरादिसाम्यात्। न चासावुक्तेऽन्तर्भवति। अनिन्द्रियसन्निकर्षरूपत्वात्। अज्ञातस्यैव करणत्वात् नानुमानागमयोः। द्वितीये केवलप्रमाणलक्षणस्यातिव्याप्तिः। स्मृतेरपि यथार्थज्ञानत्वात् इत्यत आह

T 45

मानसप्रत्यक्षजा स्मृतिः

तार्किकोक्ताक्षेपनिरसनम्

Com 1.45 भवत्येव स्मृतिः केवलप्रमाणम्। न चैवं संस्कारस्य पृथक्प्रामाण्याभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गः। स्मृतेर्मानसप्रत्यक्षत्वाभ्युपगमात्। द्विविधं हि ज्ञानं मनो जनयति। तत्तदिन्द्रियाधिष्ठातृत्वेन तत्तदिन्द्रियविषयम्, स्वातन्त्र्येण स्मरणञ्चेति। संस्कारस्तु प्रत्यासत्तिमात्रम्। न तावता प्रत्यक्षजन्यत्वाभावः प्रत्यभिज्ञावदेवेति।

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tr.0.45 (one might argue) is memory a kevala pramāṇa or not? In the first option, it has to be stated (or accepted) that kevala which has beginning (has it's origin and is) to be produced by anupramāṇa. And for that reason one has to accept the validity (nature of being a pramāṇa) of saṃskāra 'traces of past experiences'(i.e. impressions). As such the said division(of the pramāṇas) will not be possible. This also is not the case that saṃskāra 'impressions' correspond to what occures only accidently, so that, any invalid (not proved by pramāṇa) will be a cause for kevala on account of it's similarity with visual faculty.[2] This cannot be included even in what is stated (i.e. three anupramāṇas) Since it is not of the nature of contact with sense organ it is not perception. This is not even included under inference and verbal testimony because the instrument (for memory is what is) unknown only.[3] In the second option[4], the definition of kevalapramāṇa will have overapplicability because memory also is 'the knowledge (of an object) as it is.' Therefore in order to answer this objection[5] the author states-

tr. 45 Momory is produced through mental perception.

tr.1.45 Memory is(no doubt) a kevalapramāṇa. And in that case there is not even a contingency of accepting the impressions as separate pramāṇa because (we) accept that memory is the mental perception. Mind produces the knowledge in two ways-i) the knowledge which is an object of respective sense organ, by being the controller of that respective sense organ. ii) memory ~~as~~ independantly[6]. The impressio is mere pratyāsatti 'recognition'. And only because of this (fact) (we should not say that there is the) absence of being produced through perception, like pratyabhijñā 'recognition'. This also should not be said that, since the contact with mind which is

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atīndriya 'what can not be seen; is not possible, memory cannot be produced through perception. Because the same contingency will occur in respect of the valid knowledge of yogin, which has past as it's object[7].

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1. All kevalapramāna 'i.e. as it is knowledge' is created through anupramāṇas. If memory is accepted as kevala, this also should be accepted that memory is produced by anupramāna; what produces memory is 'impression'. But impression is not covered by the three already stated anupramāṇas, hence it should be accepted as distinct one. If it is so, anupramāṇas will be four and not three.
2. Impression is a valid means of knowledge like visual faculty, therefore one cannot say that, it creates valid knowledge only sometimes or by chance like the clouds of dust giving the knowledge of fire.
3. Inference is drawn through what is already known, but memory is created through inpression which is unknown, so memory cannot be included under inference. Similarly for verbal testimony also, the words which are already known, are only instruments.
4. i.e. if it is accepted that memory is not a kevalapramāṇa.
5. This objection is according to the naiyāyikas
6. Of these two, the first is dependant on external sense organs while the second is not dependant.
7. If we hold that no perception will take place without the contact of sense organ with the object; memory will not be a perception because in that case there will not be any contact with the past. But this is not true. Contact with past is possible, because yogins can perceive past and future, and that type if yogipratyakṣa is accepted by all.

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Com 0.46 स्मृतिः केवलप्रमाणमेव न भवति । गृहीतमात्रग्राहित्वात् । अनुवादवत् । अतः कथं प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणजन्यत्वम् ? इत्यत आह

T. 46 स्मृत्यनुवादयोर्नाप्रामाण्यम्

Com 1.46 न हि गृहीतग्राहित्वेन स्मृतेरनुवादस्य चाप्रामाण्यं वाच्यम् । तथा सति प्रत्यक्षाऽदिसिद्धार्थानुवादकस्य 'अग्निर्हिमस्य भेषजम्' इत्यादेरप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गात् । अतो गृहीतग्राहित्वेऽपि स्मृतेरनुवादवत् प्रामाण्यमेव यथार्थत्वात् इति ।

tr.0.46 'Memory cannot (at all) be kevalapramāna, because it grasps what was already grasped; just like a repitative statement; and therefore how can it be said to have been originated through perceptior (one might ask). And in order to answer the author states-

tr.46 Memory and repitative statement are not unuthoritative. (invalid as pramāna but they are pramānas).

tr.1.46 Indeed, one should not hold unauthoritativeness of memory and repititive statement, just because they grasp the only objects which are already grasped. For, that being so, there would be contingency of unauthoritativeness in respect of the statements like 'fire is a medicine for cold' which is simply repititive of the matter already established by perception. And for this reason memory is indeed a valid pramāna because it grasps the object as it is, even though it is already grasped.

In this passage, the view of prābhākara(mīmāmsaka) regarding memory being a pramāna is criticised. M is of the opinion that, though it is true that memory does not grasp any unknown thing, but only for this reason it should not be said that memory is not a pramāna, because the very definition of pramāna is 'what stands according to object', and memory comes under it. This shows that M's view about the number of pramāṇas is not rigid but his idea about the concept of pramāna is very clear. For Prabhākara's view on memory see- TāRa page 44-45

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Com 0.47 (टी.) अन्यस्त्वाह। न स्मृतिः प्रमाणम् अयथार्थत्वात्। न हि यदा याहशोऽर्थः स्मर्यते तदाऽसौ तादृशः पूर्वावस्थाया निवृत्तत्वात्। अतो नानुप्रमाणजन्यत्वमिति। तत्राऽह

T 47 यथार्थत्वानुभवात्

Com 1.47 स्मृतेर्नाप्रामाण्यमित्यनुवर्तते। न हि यदा यादृशोऽर्थो विषयीक्रियते तदा तस्य तादृशत्वे प्रमाणस्य याथार्थ्यम्। तथा सति अतीताऽदिविषयानुमानादेः अयथार्थत्वाऽपातात्। किं नाम? यद्देशकालतया योऽर्थो यादृशो विषयीक्रियते तस्य तद्देशकालयोस्तादृशत्वे। तादृशं च याथार्थ्यं स्मृतेः साक्षिसिद्धम्। 'तत्र तदा असौ तादृशः' इति स्मृतिरर्थं विषयीकरोति। न हि 'तत्र तदाऽसौ न तादृशः' इति।

tr.0.47 (some) other says.'memory is (cannot be) not a pramāṇa (even according to your difinition of pramāṇa) because of it's not bein according to the object'[1] When (we) remember any object,it is not exactly (like) the same (as it was seen before) because the previous condition is (already) crossed (disappeared).And therefore memory is not produced through anupramāṇa- To this objection the author answers-

tr.47 (The words) Because of the experience as'being according to the object'.

com1.47 (the words) Memory is not unauthoritative' are continued from (previous text). (When we say 'pramāṇas is that which is according to the object we do not intend to say that) 'being according to the object means, according to the object as it was at a particular time (and condition) only when it was being perceived'. If it were so, there would be contingency of unauthoritativeness in respect of inferenc etc. which have past as their object.what is then? Being accordin to the object means,- the object which is grasped in a particular manner, because of respective place and time, is so(or of that particular nature) only in that particular place and time. And 'being according to the object'(in such a restricted sense) in respe of memory is established by witness self. The way, Memory cognizes

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the object is as 'at that time, this (particular object) was like that, and not as 'this particular object, at that time, was not like that.'[2]

Com.2.47 न च वाच्यम् न निवृत्तपूर्वावस्थतया स्मृतिरर्थं विषयीकर्तुमीष्टे। तथाऽननुभवात्। अननुभूतविषयत्वे अतिप्रसङ्गात् इति। अननुभूतैतावन्मात्रविषयत्वस्य साक्षिसिद्धत्वेनातिप्रसङ्गायोगात्। तदिदमुक्तम् ॥ यथार्थत्वानुभवादिति ॥

tr.2.47 This also should not be said that, memory has for it's object (anything) on account of it's state of not having previous state passed (over) for, such has not been the experience. There would be contingency (of over applicability) if it were to be 'having fot it's object the thing unexperienced before'. (But) this contingency would not arise[3] (in case, the acceptance of witness self) because having for it's object this much, not experienced before' is established by witness self. And with this (intention) it is stated-yathārthatvānubhavāt' 'because of experience as being according to the object.

Com.0.48 किञ्च स्मृतिप्रामाण्याङ्गीकारे अनिष्टाभावात् तदङ्गीकारो युक्त इत्याह

T. 48 अहानेश्च

Com.1.48 हानिपदमनिष्टमात्रोपलक्षणम्।

tr.0.48 Moreover with the intention of conveying 'since there would be nothing undesired if memory is accepted as a pramāṇa, acceptance of that (i.e. memory as a pramāṇa) is proper' the author states-

tr.48 And because of the absence of any loss.

tr.1.48 The word 'loss' in this context stands for (is indicative of) mere undesired.

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1. The contention behind this objection is- when one remembers any object, it is not in that particular condition in which it was actually perceived, because that particular time and place is changed.

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And hence, memory is not according to the object, or it does not grasp the object as it was previously. From the time and place point of view, the same thing is different in memory from that, at the tim of actual perception.

2. In order to answer the above objection J has discussed here what is meant by yāthārthya. Any pramāna is according to the object mea pramāna grasps the object as it is at the time of grasping. And when we say memory is pramāna; it is understood, that memory is authority for something being real when it was grasped first.

3. If one does not accept that memory is authoritative for an object, th previous stage of which is crossed, then there will be contingency of acceptance that memory grasps the object even not seen before, because there will not be any distinction between the objects seen and unseen. But, on acceptance of the doctrine of the witness self this difficulty is removed because the witness self distinguishes a thing previously experienced from the thing unexperienced one, and restricts the later from coming under the scope of memory.

Com 2.48 एतेनैव 'तर्को न प्रमाणम् किं तु ? प्रमाणानामनुग्राहकः । प्रमाणविषयविपर्ययशङ्काव्यवच्छेदस्तदनुग्रहः' इत्येतदपास्तम् । तस्याप्यनुमानवत् यथार्थत्वानुभवात् अहानेश्च इति ।

tr.2.48 By this (very argument) this also is refuted[1] that, 'the hypothe - tical argument by itself is not a pramāna, what is it then? It is a supporting factor of the pramānas. And it's supporting nature consists in removal of the doubt[2] regarding the contraryness of the object of a pramāna'. Since there is the experience of being according to the object like (any) inference,[3] in respect of that (i.e. hypothetical argument), and also there is the absence of any loss (in acceptance of it's validity) a hypothetical argument also should be accepte as pramāna by itself[4])

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1. J has refuted the view of the Naiyāyikas see-
प्रत्यक्षादेः प्रमाणस्य तर्कोऽनुग्राहको भवेत्। पक्षे विपक्षनिशासावच्छेदस्यानुग्रहः TaRa 1.74

2. The object of pramāna is presence of fire, it's contraryness is absence of fire and doubt of it is 'why the mountain should not be without fire'. By putting a hypothetical argument 'If it is wihtout fire, let it be without smoke too' this doubt is removed. And this a hypothetical argument supports inference.

3. The conclusion drawn after an application of a hypothetical argument is 'therefore the mountain is not without fire'. This knowledge also is 'as it is knowledge' and therefore hypothetical argument is a pramāna.

4. Even though J states in PP. सोऽयं कदाचित् विपरीतशंकानिरसनद्वारेण प्रमाणान्तरानुग्राहकोऽपि भवति PP.69-22 and indicates agreement with the view of the Naiyāyikas, there is no contradiction in his statement, because J has used the word api to indicate that hypothetical argument is both, pramāna, and the suppoting factor of a pramāna. As in the case of perception, we agree that perception by itself is a pramāna and in respect of inference it is the supporting factor al so also is the case of a hypothetical argument.

On this explanation one will object- then how J states in the abo text 'that the view of the Naiyāyikas is set aside when he himself agrees with anugrāhaka mature of hypothetical argument?' And the answer is- what is indicated through the statement of the Naiyayika is A hypothetical argument by itself is not a pramāna. And this much part of the Naiyāyikas contention is set aside by proving that hypothetical argument by itself also is a pramāna.

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Com.0.49 (टी.) विरोधाऽदिषु सर्वनिग्रहस्थानानामन्तर्भाव इत्युक्तम्। तत्प्रदर्शनार्थं विरोधे तावद्विषयं विवेचयति।

T. 49 विरोधो मानस्ववाक्याभ्याम्

Com.1.49 द्विविध इति शेषः। विरोधो द्विविधः। समयबन्धाऽदिरूपवत्यां कथायां सर्वरूपसाधारणोऽसाधारणश्चेति। तत्रासाधारणः प्रमाणेन स्ववाक्येन चेति द्विविधो भवति।

अपसिद्धान्तजात्योः स्ववाक्यविरोधेऽन्तर्भावः

Com.0.50 स्ववाक्यविरोधं विभज्य दर्शयति

T. 50 स्ववाक्यविरोधोऽपसिद्धान्तजातिरूपेण

Com.1.50 द्विविध इति शेषः। पूर्वाचार्यवचनस्यापि स्वाभ्युपगतत्वेन स्ववाक्यत्वात् अपसिद्धान्तः स्ववाक्यविरोधो भवति।

tr.0.49 It has already been stated that all the clincherss are included under contradiction[1] etc. Now, in order to show it (i.e. the inclusion); the author discusses the subject matter in the contradiction (in the beginning) as follows-

tr. 49 (The) contradiction is through a pramāṇa and through one's own statement.

tr.1.49 'Is of two types' is a remaining part[2] of the sentence. The Contradiction is of two types i) common to all forms of a debate which has it's forms like stipulation of the conditions of an arguments etc. and ii) umcommon. Of these, the uncommon becomes of two types by i) being through the means of knowledge and by being through one's own statement.

tr.0.50 Further the author states the contradiction to one's own statement by dividing it (into two) as-

tr. 50 The contradiction to one's own statement (is) in the form of i)Apasiddhānta' deviation from the tenet' and ii) Jāti 'futility.'

tr.1.50 'Is of two types' is the remaining part (of the text). Since the

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statements of earlier teachers also are one's own statements because they are accepted by one as his own, the deviation from the tenet' also becomes a contradiction to one's own statement.[4]

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1. See. उपपत्तिदोषो विरोधासङ्गतीः ... संवादानुक्तियुता निग्रहाः PL. 72.10
2. So the text should be विरोधो मानस्वताकथाभ्यां द्विविधः।
3. A debate consists in'question, answer, establishment of one's own view, refutation of that of others, etc. The contradiction to (one's own) statement (containing these) is called a contradiction in common. And the contradiction to (one's own) statement containi syllogism alone, is called uncommon contradiction.
4. Siddhānta is a doctrine or a basic thought presented by the exponents of a particular system in old times, and how can a contradiction with it shown by a follower of that system in a later time, be the contradiction to his own (i.e. the followers) statement? In answer J says when one adopts any doctrine as his own he naturally adopts the statements also made by the exponent of that doctrine, as his own. And therefore 'deviation from the tenet' also, in other words is- the contradiction to one's own statement.

Com. 0.51 (टी.) स्वव्याहतिर्जातिः। एकवाक्यविषयत्वान्नापसिद्धान्तेऽतिप्रसङ्गः। त्रिविधा स्वव्याहतिः एकवाक्यगतपदाऽदेरन्योन्यप्रतिस्पर्धित्वं स्वक्रियाविरोधः तद्वाक्यन्यायेन तद्वाक्यविरोधश्चेति।

तत्र समयबन्धाऽदौ प्रमाणविरोधाऽदिप्रपञ्चः स्वयमेवोदाहर्तव्य इति सूचयन् आद्यजातिं तावत् प्रतिज्ञायामुदाहरति

T. 51 जातिः ' न मेये मानापेक्षा ' इत्यादिका

Com. 1.51 मानसापेक्षं हि ज्ञेयं मेयमुच्यते। तस्य प्रमाणनिरपेक्षत्वप्रतिज्ञा 'मे माता वन्ध्या' इतिवत् व्याहता भवति। आदिपदेन समयबन्धादावपि इयमेवोदाहर्तव्येति सूचयति।

द्वितीयजातेरपीदमेवोदाहरणम्॥ जातिरिति॥ मेयं मानानपेक्षम् इति वदति। तज्ज्ञापनाय प्रमाणं चाभिधत्ते। अतो 'मूकोऽहम्' इतिवत् स्वक्रियाविरोध इति।

Com. C.52 (टी.) तृतीयाया अप्येतदेवोदाहरणम्॥ जातिरिति॥ तत्कथम्? इत्यत आह

T. 52 मेये [illegible]

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1.52 तेनैव न्यायेन सिद्धत्वात् । यथा 'मेये मानापेक्षा नास्ति' इत्येतन्मेयं मानापेक्षम्। अन्यथा तत्प्रतिज्ञावैयर्थ्यात् । तन्न्यायेनैव 'विप्रतिपन्नमेयेऽपि मानापेक्षाऽस्ति' इत्यस्यार्थस्य साधयितुं शक्यत्वात् इयमेव प्रतिज्ञा तृतीयजात्युदाहरणं भवति ।

0.53 (टी.) न केवलमियं जातिः स्ववाक्यविरोधान्तर्गता । किं तु ? मानविरोधेऽपि इत्याह

53 मानविरोधश्च

1.53 'विप्रतिपन्नं प्रमेयं प्रमाणसापेक्षं प्रमेयत्वात् मेये मानापेक्षा नास्तीतित्येतन्मेयवत्' इत्यनुमानसम्भवात् प्रमाणविरोधे चेयं जातिरन्तर्भवतीति पूर्ववृत्त्या योजनीयम् ।

FULILITY

tr.0.51 Jati 'fulility' is self contradiction in one's own statement. Since it(i.e. fulility) has only one sentence as it's subject, there is no over applicability (of the definition) in 'deviation from the tenet'[1]. Self contradiction in one's own statement is of three types-i) mutual contradiction between the words in one's own statement.ii) the contradiction with one's own activity and iii) a contradiction in one's own statements on the basis of the maxim established in his own statement.

(Now) indicating that;- the particulars about the contradiction with the pramāṇas etc.[3] in debate where there is the stipulation of conditions etc.[2] is to be illustrated by himself[4]- the author illustrates the example of the first type of fulility namely, mutual contradiction of words in one's own statement', in proposition as-

tr.51 (The example of) fulility (is) there is no (expectancy) need of (any) pramāṇa in (proving) a 'meya' an object to be (proved by pramāṇas) known'.

tr.1.51 The object to be known which requires pramāṇa (for it's proof) is called a meya' object to be proved'. And the statement of 'proposition regarding it's non-dependance on pramāṇa becomes contradicted

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like the statement 'my mother is a barren woman'. With the word etc. M indicates that the same (statement) is to be illustrated in the case of (debate) where there is the stipulation of condition etc.

This very statement is the example of the second (type of) futility also. Futility etc. (because) one states that meya (object to be known through pramāna' is not depending on (any) pramāna, and (at the same time) gives pramāna to prove it. And therefore this is (an example of) contradiction to one's own activity like (the utterence) 'I am dumb' etc.

tr.0.52 This very statement is the example of third type of futility.

Futility etc. How is it? (one might ask; and) therefore he states-

tr. 52 And also in respect of the statement 'there is the necessity (expectancy of means (pramāna) for an object to be cognized.'

tr.1.52 Since it is already established by that very maxim. Since (the principle statement) 'there is no need of pramāna in respect of any object to be known.' (jñeya is an object to be known which) needs pramāna; otherwise the proposition will be meaningless. And since the explanation 'there is the need of pramāna also in respect of object to be known, which is under question,' is possible to establish with the same maxim this very proposition can be an example of the third type of futility.

tr.0.53 (With the intention of conveying that) this (third) type of futility is included not only under' contradiction in one's own statement' (what is then?) but also under the contradiction through valid means of knowledge.

tr.53 And also the contradiction to (accepted) pramānas (means of knowledge)

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tr.1.53 This should be explained with the repitition of the previous[6] (sentence) in the following manner- Since the syllogism as + the object to be known which is under qusetion requires a pramāna (for it's proof) because it is a prameya (an object to be known,) like the statement (object to be known) there is no need of pramāna for meya 'which is to be known.'- is possible and hence this type of fulility is included under the contradiction through pramāna also.

Com. 2.53 (टी.) तदनेन प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासविरोधापसिद्धान्तानां निरनुयोज्यानुयोगे च जातेः विरोध एवान्तर्भावः सूचितो भवति। संन्यासस्य मानसिद्धापलापरूपत्वात्। प्रतिज्ञाविरोधस्य एकवाक्यगतपदाऽदिविरोधरूपत्वात्। अपसिद्धान्तस्य साक्षात् ग्रहणात्। परोक्तजातेः प्रतिषेधाऽत्मकतृतीयजातिरूपत्वादिति।

tr.2.53 And with this (statement of division of contradiction) the inclusion of abondonment of the propesition, contradiction to the proposition, deviation from the tenet and the futility-which comes[7] under niranuyojyānuyoga (asserting the presence of a particular vulnerable point which has not arisen) under the contradiction is indicated. (Because) the abondonment of the proposition is of the nature of (statement of) denial contrary to the doctrine which is established by pramāṇas.[8] The contradiction to the proposition is of the nature of the mutual contradiction of words in one (and the same) sentence. The deviation from the tenet' is directly mentioned (by the author) and all the forms of futility discussed by others, are of the nature of third type of futility which is in the form of refutation[10] (of what is stated by the other party).

(This explanation of futility is according to M's view which is based on [illegible] TaRa 3.2)

1. One may think that Acceptance to a contrary view also is a contradiction [illegible] hence

there will not be any difference between deviation from tenet and futility. Therefore J makes it clear that deviation from tenet takes place when one states a group of sentences which are different from his previous statement, while futility is pointed out when there is a contradiction between the words of a single sente

2. etc. covers other characteristics of a debate see. note on previous passage.

3. etc. stands for contradiction with one's own statement.

4. M has given illustration for all types of the contradiction with respect of a syllogism only, but not in respect of any debate. Therefore J states that the illustrations of the contradiction in respect of a debate are to be found by the person himself who is going to show them.

5. 'Mānādhīnā meyasiddhih' is the commonly accepted maxim by all systems. It means, one needs proof to establish anything. M has taken the same maxim and has shown that all three types of futility can be illustrated from the same.

6. And therefore the sentence will be - मेये मानापेक्षासिद्धेति च (उद्- वाक्यं जातिः) मानानिरोधश्च!

7. Niranuyojyāyoga' is a type of - clinchers discussed before. (See PL 106.5) when an occasion of a clincher is not there, but it is pointed out, it becomes a case of niranuyojyāyoga. It is of four types- i) chala ii) Jāti iii) hānyādyābhāsa and iv) aprāptakālegrahaṇam So, jāti 'futility' is one of the types of niranuyojyāyoga. Since, all the clinchers are included under the defects of reasoning, and Jāti is a sub-type of one of the clinchers, Jāti also comes under the defects of reasonin This is being so, M does not hold that futilities are to be mentioned separately.

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8. And therefore, this also is a type of contradiction.

9. As- स्ववाक्याविरोधोऽपासिद्धान्तज्ञातिरपेण See.T.50 .

10. In the previous passage the commentator has discussed three types of Jāti according to the author. The order of statements is thus

(A) first party- There is no need of pramāna for 'meya'.

(B) Second party- this is contradictory to your proposition because the word meya itself means what is to be proved by a pramāna and if you don't give any pramāna for your own statement, why should we accept it? (Then the first party changes his mind and says)

(C) First party- no,no! for this proposition we will supply pramāna

In this way the third statement is contrary to what is stated in the first. And this is made in order to refute what is stated in the second (B). According to N, all the futilites discussed by others namely, the Naiyāyikas; [illegible] are of the nature of (C) type of statement, which is made in order to refute what is stated in (B).

Com 3.53). सिद्धमपि दूषणासमर्थमुत्तरम् जातिः। असामर्थ्यं च द्विविधम्। साधारणमसाधारणञ्च। तत्र साधारणं स्वव्याहतिः। असाधारणं तु युक्ताङ्गहीनत्वं अयुक्ताङ्गाधिकत्वं अविषयवृत्तित्वञ्चेति। द्वयं च क्वचित् प्रत्येकं क्वचित् अङ्गाङ्गिभावेन। ताश्च प्रतिधर्मोत्कर्षापकर्षवर्ण्यावर्ण्यविकल्पसाध्यप्राप्त्यप्राप्तिप्रसङ्गप्रतिदृष्टान्तानुत्पत्तिसंशयप्रकरणहेत्वर्थापत्त्यविशेषोपपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिनित्यानित्यकार्यसमाः। सर्वत्र प्रमादः प्रतिभाक्षयो वा अवसरः। आरोप्यमाणदोषभ्रान्तिः फलम्।

tr.3.53 The futility[1] is the answer which is established[2] (fit in it's technically) but unable to refute (the statement of other party) The inability is of two types- i) general[3] and ii) particular[4] Of these, the general futility is the answer contradicting one's own statement in general. And ii) the futility of a particular type consists in- i) being devoid of necessary parts[5] ii) being possessed of unnecessary parts and iii) being existent in what is not it's

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object.(The inability of both these types) appears in some example of futility independantly, and in some examples of fulility (it appears in the) relation with each other, as a main or chief and sub ordinate. The futilities are- i) Pratidharma sama ii) utkarsa-sama iii) Apakarsasama iv) Varnyasama v) Avarnyasama vi)vikalpasama vii) sādhyasama viii) Prāptisama wix) Aprāptisama x) Prasaṅgasama xi) Pratidrstāntasama xii) Anutpattisams xiii) Samśayasama xiv) Prakaranasama xv) Ahetusama xvi) Arthāpattisama xvii)Aviśesasama xviii) Upapattisama xix)upalabdhisama xx) Anupalabdhisama xxi) Nityasama xxii) Anityasama and xxiii)Kāryasama. In all these cases the ignorance or loss of intelligence (or presence of mind) is an occasion to point out. And the result is . misunderstanding that a particular (contingency) being imposed (as a defect) is a (real) defect.

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1. Before showing the inclusion of Jāti under a contradiction J explai what is Jāti according to others. For this explanation J has followed TāRa 3.I to 3.33
2. Possessing the characteristic-paksadharmatā 'subject adjunctness'
3. Which is common to all types.
4. Related to particular type of Jāti.
5. The necessary characteristics of an inference are concomitance etc. and unnecessary characteristics are over applicability etc.
6. 7 different characteristics of a Jāti are discussed in Nyaya schools. They are as laksya, laksana, utthāna, bīja, pratana, avasara and phala. Here J discussess only two namely, time when to point out a jāti and result of a jāti' futile objection.

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(Since the whole discussion regarding every type of Jāti it's example and time of it's pointing out etc. is unneccessary for understanding the view of M in respect of pramāṇa and all this is a part of the commentary alone, I have omitted this part to avoid unnecessar length)

x-x-x-x

Com 0.54 अथ निरनुयोज्यानुयोगांशस्य छलस्यापि उक्तान्तर्भावमाह

T. 54 छलमसङ्गतम्

Com 1.54 परोक्तस्यार्थान्तरं परिकल्प्य तद्दूषणेन परोक्तभङ्गः छलम् । परोक्तदूषणस्यैव सङ्गतत्वेन अनुक्तारोपितदूषणं छलं असङ्गते अन्तर्भवति ।

tr.0.54 Now[1] the author states the inclusion of chala which is a type (lit-part) of miranuyojyānuyoga' repredemanding the non censurable' under what is already stated (as the defects of reasoning)

tr.54 Chala 'casuistry' (is included under) in consistency.

1.54 The casuistry[1] is the refutation of what is said by the other (party) by way of showing defects in that (through) having assumed the meanin other than what is intended by the other (party) in respect of his statement. (But) since the refutation of the statement made by other (party) being consistent one, the chala 'casuistry' which is in the form of refutation of what is not at all stated (intended to mean), becomes include under inconsistency.[3]

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1. After the discussion on jāti as described by others.
2. This definition is based on –
   कंचिदर्थमभिप्रेत्य प्रयुक्तो वचने पुनः। अनिष्टमर्थमारोप्य तन्निषेधश्छलं मतम्
   Tā Ra. 2.94
3. Inconsistency in this respect means absence of expectancy.

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Com.0.55 (टी.) न केवलमसङ्गतं छलम्। किं तर्हि? इत्यत आह

T. 55 अन्यच्च

Com.1.55 असङ्गतात् अन्योऽर्थदोषो विरोधः। तत्राप्यन्तर्भवति छलम्। छलवाक्यस्याप्यर्थान्तरं परिकल्प्य दूषणसम्भवेन स्ववचनन्यायेन स्वविरोधेऽन्तर्भावात्।

प्रतिज्ञाहान्याद्याभासाप्राप्तकालग्रोः असङ्गतान्तर्भावः

Com.0.56 निरनुयोज्यानुयोगांशान्तरद्वयस्याप्यसङ्गतान्तर्भावमाह

T. 56 अन्यच्च

Com.1.56 उक्तात् छलात् जातेश्च अन्यत् निरनुयोज्यानुयोगांशद्वयं च असङ्गतमेव। प्राप्तस्यैव हान्यादेरुद्भावनप्राप्तकाल एव ग्रहणस्य च सङ्गतत्वात्।

tr.0.55 The casuistry is . . included under not only inconsistency, what is then? In this respect . he states-

tr.55 Moreover (in the other also)

tr.1.55 The 'defect of meaning' other than inconsistency is the contradiction. And casuistry is included under that also.[1] Since there is possibility of showing defects in the statement containing casuistry also, by way of assumption of another meaning of it; casuistry (can be) included under the contradiction with one's own view through the view stated in his own statement.

tr.0.56 Further the author shows the inclusion of other two (parts) kinds[2] of niranuyojyānuyoga also under inconsistency as-

tr. 56 And the other also.

1.56 The other two kinds (parts) of niranuyojyānuyoga, other than futility and casuistry which are already stated, are included under inconsistency alone. Because pointing out of the abandonment of propcsition and pointing out of a clincher is proper only when occasion for it occurs.

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1. This is third type of futility as discussed by M. In this way

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casuistry, according to M comes under both the defects of inference namely, virodha and asangati.

2. Niranuyojyānuyoga is said to be of four kinds. i) chala ii) jati iii) hānyādyābhāsa iv) aprāptakāle grahaṇam.

(टी.) निग्रहस्थानान्तरस्यापि असङ्गतान्तर्भावमाह

अन्यच्च

उक्तात् अन्यदपि निग्रहस्थानं किञ्चित् असङ्गतमेव। यथा अर्थान्तरम्। प्रकृतोपयोगिन एव सङ्गतत्वात्। परबोधनार्थं प्रवृत्तस्य तदङ्गपदप्रयोग एव सङ्गत इति निरर्थकमपि। अत एव अविज्ञातार्थम्। अपार्थकस्य स्फुटस्तत्रान्तर्भावः। अप्राप्तकाले तु अवयवविपर्यासादि निग्रहस्थानमेव न भवति अर्थाविरोधात् छन्दोभङ्गादिवत्। अर्थविरोधि असङ्गतमेव। विवक्षितक्रमानुल्लङ्घने हि सङ्गतिः स्यात्। अन्यथानुभाषणं च, उक्तानुवादस्यैव सङ्गतत्वात्। प्राप्तदूषणोद्भावनस्यैव सङ्गतत्वेन पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणमपि 'असङ्गतिरेवेति।

tr.0.57 Further he shows the inclusion of other clinchers under inconsistency (as)-

tr.57 And the others (also).

tr.1.57 Some of the clinchers other than those already mentioned,[1] are (included under) inconsistency only. For example 'the other meaning What is useful in that particular context is only said to be prpper (consistent) (and the other meaning not being so comes under inconsistency).[2] (Moreover) the application (or use) of the word which will be a part of that (i.e statement conveying something to other only is proper in the case of (a person) who has started (stating something) with the purpose of conveying (something) to others, and therefore the 'meaningless' (lit. unnecessary) also is (included under inconsistency)[3]. And for this very reason, Avijñātārtham' meaning of which is unknown also is (included in the same)[4] And the

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inclusion of Apārthakam 'the meaningless' in that (i.e. inconsistency) is very clear.[5] And in respect of aprāptakāla 'not in proper time' the change of order of syllogistic sentences etc. cannot be a clinch at all, because there is nothing which prevents (understanding or) conveying of sense; as in the case of violation of rule of metre.[6] (But) what is contrary to (or prevents conveying of) meaning is (included under) inconsistency only, because on non violation of intended order only, consistency will be observed. Anyathānubhāsana 'otherwise repitition (of a statement)' is alo (included) under inconsistency, because the repition of what is said only is consistent. And since, pointing out of such a defect, only which is occured, is (said to be consistent); paryanuyojyopeksana[7] 'failure to point out at a proper time' also is inconsistency alone.

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1. Which means Other than niranuyojyānuyoga. Because The author has already shown the inclusion of all four types of niranuyojyānuyoga under contradiction and incondistency before this, by stating mahavirodhascha etc.

2. Arthāntaram is explained in PP as 'unnecessary explanation' And example of it is as- the word prameyatva is hetu' probans (in a particular syllogism) which is derived from the root 'hi' and the suffix 'fun' is added etc. here this explanation is unnecessary. And therefore it is inconsistency only.

3. If one is wishing to convey something to others he should use words which will be fit for that. Otherwise the use of the words like kacatatapa etc. would not make any sense. And therefore application of the words not expressive of any sense comes under inconsistency.

4. Avijñatārthakam is a statement the meaning of which is not understood by either of the members of assembly or the opposite party even after the reutterance of the same for three times. And since it is proper to state such words meaning of which could be understood easily, the statements of above type come under inconsistency.

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5. Though I have used the word meaningless for both nirarthakam and apārthakam, there is slight difference between these two types When the words or letters which are devoid of any meaning, like ka, ca, ṭa etc. are used it is nirarthakam; But sometimes some ... words are applied which have meaning, for example, Kuṇḍa, ajina, sadapūpa etc, but they don't have any connection in that particular context; it is the case of apārthakam. The use of the both these types of words is, one way or other is unnecessary and therefore meaningless, Accordingly to M, the use of proper words in proper place only is called 'consistency'. And whatever is otherwise come under 'inconsistency'. Hence, the statement of this only defect under different heads is unnecessary.

6. M is of the opinion - that, what is intended through the syllogist statement is conveying that the subject possesses the probandum. And if it is done, there is no necessity of following a particular order of sentences in a syllogism for example, If the statement, 'because of the possession of smoke, the mountain has fire,' (in which the usual order 'the mountain has fire etc.' is changed) is sufficient to convey the probandum, strict observation of any order is not necessary; as in the case of any s'loka, where rule of metre is not strictly observed, say one or two mātrās are more, the meaning is conveyed and the purpose is served, Therefore, the change of order in syllogistic statement is not a defect. But if the same change is giving the undesired sense then it is a defect, which will be covered by 'inconsistency'.

7. Paryanuyojyopekṣana' is non mentioning or neglecting a defect Which is to be pointed out necessarily. This also is 'inconsistency in one's own statement.

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(टी.) एवमुक्तादन्यच्च यथासम्भवमुक्तान्तर्भूतं द्रष्टव्यमित्याह

अन्यच्च

यथा, प्रतिज्ञाहानिः संवादे, अन्तर्भवति । अर्थतो हानिरसङ्गतावपि । प्रकृतदोषपरिहारे प्राप्ते 'अन्यथास्तु' इत्यस्य सङ्गत्यदर्शनात् । एवं प्रतिज्ञान्तरमपि । अविशिष्टदूषणाभ्युपगमात् तद्दूषणपरिहारस्यैव सङ्गतत्वात् । हेत्वन्तरमप्यनेनोक्तम् । न्यूनाधिके न्यूनाधिकयोः । तत्र अवयवन्यूनमदूषणमित्युक्तम् । एवं आभासानुद्धारः अनुकूलतर्कानुक्तिश्च । अबुभुत्सितोक्तेरेव दोषत्वात् । तर्कस्य पृथक्प्रमाणत्वात् । पुनरुक्तमधिकम् । उक्तात्

(टी.) अन्यत् अननुभाषणं न्यूनम् । तूष्णीम्भावः अनुक्तौ । अज्ञानं अप्रतिभा विक्षेपश्च, यत्किञ्चिदुक्तावपि प्रकृतोपयोगाभिमानाद्यभावात् । न ह्यनुक्तिरप्यात्यन्तिकी । किं तु? प्रकृतोपयोगाभिमानादिना अनुक्तिः । मतानुज्ञायाः प्रयोजनविशेषात् पृथगन्तर्भावं वक्ष्यतीति । न चानेन त्रिविधो विरोधः इत्यादेर्गतार्थता । अनुमानविरोधविवेकाभावे हेत्वाभासादेरुक्तान्तर्भावाप्रतीतेः इति ।

tr.0.58 Further with the intention of conveying "(the clinchers) other than what are discussed are to be observed as included under ... what is said in respective occasions" the author states-

tr.58 ...nd the others (also) (are included under what are stated as the defects of reasoning).

1.58 For example, the abondonment of the proposition is included under sa:vāda:[1] ...nd the abondonment of the proposition (not by direct statement of it, but) by implication is included under inconsistency also, because one can not observe any consistency in the statement 'let it be otherwise' when the occasion of removal of a particular refutati has taken place;[3] So, also 'another proposition'[4], because of the accepta of defect (pointed out by the other party' in respect of a statement of the proposition) without any qualifying word, Since the removal of that defect (which was pointed out in a statement of the proposition without a qualifying word.[5] Only is consistent. With this very stateme 'changing the probans' also is discussed[6], the less and the more are included under 'less and 'more' respectively. It is already stated that 'Less number' in syllogistic statement is not a defect[7]. So also, non-

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pointing out of a fallacy and non statement of favourable hypothetical argument; (because)[8] the statement of what is not expected (at all) only is of the nature of a defect. A hypothetical argument is a distinct pramāna. The repitition of the same statement (comes under) 'more'. The non repitition of the types other than what are previously discussed[9] comes under 'Less'. 'Keeping silence' (is included under) 'non statement'. Ignorance, absence of pratibhā. and Viksepa also; (are included under non statement) because even though something is said (in all these cases), there is the absence of understanding (or stress of the o) that it is (necessary or) useful for the present.[10] Non-statement also does not mean 'total silence', what is then? It is the absence of statement with the intention that the same is useful for the present.' Since there is distinct purpose for it, the author will himself state the inclusion of matānujñā separately.[12] One should not think that by this argument, (the statement) trividho virodha' etc, has become meaningless because in the absence of understanding the contradiction to reasoning, the inclusion of fallacies etc. under what is already stated cannot be clear.

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1. In this passage J has shown the inclusion of almost all of the clinches and casuistry in the defects of reasoning.

2. Samvāda is explained as विप्रतिपन्नप्रमेयाङ्गीकारः If one gives up his proposition, it is as good as acceptance of, or approval for the view of other party. For example, A says 'sound is eternal'. B shows some defect in it. Then A, instead of removing it answers- all right I will give up this proposition. This is a way of accepting the view of others, because in this way A accepts 'sound is non eternal'.

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3. In this case the proposition is already given up, and inconsistency in one's own statement is shown through implication, therefore this comes under both- Samvāda and Asangati.

4. Is included under both, namely- samvāda and asangati.

5. For example, one states 'sound is non eternal.' The other party raises the objection as- there is siddhasādhanatā in this inference. To answer this objection the first party amends the proposition as '(sound-in the form of) syllables.' Though this answer is correct, it is not consistent, because in the first statement, when the objection was raised, it was without the qualifying words namely, 'in the form of syllables.' This means the removal of defect is to be done in respect of original statement, and not with respect of any amended statement.

6. Since it is equal to change of or abondonment of the propositions, char of the probans also is included under samvāda, and asangati.

7. See the previous passage.

8. 'Abhāsānuddhāra' is absence of pointing out of a fallacy.' This may make one's own case weak, but it would not amount to defeat. Therefore M is of the opinion that ābhāsānuddhāra etc. are not the defects.

9. While refuting others, it is necessary in debate that one has to repea some sentences which are first uttered by vādin and the meaning of which is understood by other members. And non-repitition of the same becomes a clincher. This clincher is of five types. One of these five namely, anyathānuvāda is already included under inconsistency. Other three namely i) yat tadityādyanuvāda ii) dūsyaikadesānuvāda and iii) Kevaladūsanokti are according to J, included under 'nyūnam' simply because necessary statement is not done in full in all these cases. The fifth type of ananuvāda is tūsnīmbhāva 'keeping silence' and it is included under nonstatement.'

10. In the case of ignorance etc, one speaks something without knowing that it is necessary or useful for his own arguments and that is why

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it is called 'ignorance'.Therefore it is equal to non statement.

11. Keeping silence and stating some words without the intention of using them with proper connection is equal.

12. See PL.246.11

Com.0.39 (टी.) अभिप्रायान्तरकल्पनया तद्दूषणं सामान्यच्छलम्। अमुख्यार्थाभिप्रायेण प्रयुक्तस्य मुख्यार्थकल्पनया दूषणमुपचारच्छलम्।

तत्र वाक्छलादेरसङ्गताधन्तर्भावस्फुरणायोपलक्षणतया वाक्छलमुदाहरति

T. 39 गृष्टिविवक्षया 'गां आनय' इत्युक्ते पृथिवीविवक्षया 'गवानयनमशक्यम्' इतिवत्

Com.1.39. एकवारप्रसूता गौः गृष्टिः। द्वितीयं यथा 'अनूचानोऽयं ब्राह्मणः' इत्युक्ते 'युक्त मेव हि ब्राह्मणे अनूचानत्वम्' इति सम्भावनाभिप्रायेण परेणाभिहिते ब्राह्मणत्वस्य हेतुत्वाभिप्रायकल्पनया 'नैवं, व्रात्ये व्यभिचारात्' इति प्रतिषेधः। तृतीयं यथा 'सिंहो देवदत्तः' इत्युक्ते 'नैवं, सटाद्यभावात्' इति। अत्र 'गवानयनं न विधेयं अशक्यत्वात्' इत्यादिच्छलवाक्ये 'गवा नयनम्' इत्येतदयुक्तं अनन्वितत्वात्' इत्यादेश्छलस्य प्रवृत्तेर्विरोधत्वं ज्ञातव्यम्।

tr.0.59 The casuirtry is threefold[1] as i) casuistry in respect of a statement (i.e. verbal casuirtry) ii) casuistry in general (i.e. in respect of the sense or purport in general) and iii) casuistry in respect of a word used metaphorically. Of these, the casuistry in respe of a statement is[2] a refutation of statement-through the assumption of the meaning other than the principle one- which was used with the intention of stating the principle meaning. The casuistry in general is a refutation (of a statement of others) through the assumption of another purpurt (of the same) And the casuistry in respect of a word used metaphorically is- a refutation (of the statement of others through the assumption of the principle meaning-which was used with the intention of conveying the sense, not being the principle. (Now the author) in order to make (the readers) under stand the inclusion of verbal casuistry etc.[3] under inconsistency etc.[4] states

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the illustration of the verbal casuistry, indicatively[5], as-

tr.59 Like (the answer) "bringing of a go (taking in the sense of the earth) is impossible" in reject of statement 'bring a go' which was stated with the intention of conveying the sense ' a cow, which has delivered once[6].

1.59 (The word) gṛsti means a cow which has delivered once. The example of the second type is as- when someone (the other party) with the intention (of conveying that) 'it is proper for a brahmin to be well behaved' states- 'This brahmin is anūcāna well behaved'. refuting (the same statment) as 'this is not correct, because of it's extension in vrātya 'out caste' with the assumption that the word brahmin is used as a probans[7]. The example of the third type is as, when it is said 'Devadatta is a lion'; refuting it as-'no (this is not possible) because he has no mane etc'.[8] Since there is the possibility of showing contradiction (through another casuistry) as - the statement 'eye through a cow' is not proper because there is no any connection between these words'. in the statement containing verbal casuistry as- 'bringing of the earth cannot be done, because it is impossible';-One should understand that the casuistry is included under contradiction' also.[10]

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1. J discusses three types of casuistry according to the Naiyāyikas See- तत्र त्रेधा वाक्छलादिविभेदतः- - - इतीरितम्। TaRa.2.95

2. Of these, In the first type, the respective word has two different meanings. Both are the principle meanings, but the speaker intends one and the opponent purpusly understands the other. In the second, the meaning understood by both the parties is same, but the nature of the word is understood differently. And in the third place, the cognate meaning intended by the speaker is ignored, and principle or literary meaning is taken.

3. etc. stands for other two times

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4. etc.includes'contradiction'.

5. J gives explanation for 'why the text gives exam le of only one type?

6. The word arsti has two meanings i) a cow which has had only one calf. And ii) the earth. The first party uses the word in the first sense while the second party plays a trick by taking it in the second sense.

7. In this example the meaning of the word brahmin understood by both the parties is the same. But the first party uses it as a general stat ment while the other one takes the statement as a syllogistic stateme and therefore gives the status of probans to the word 'brahmin'. This way the difference is in respect of the purport.

8. In this refutation the figurative meaning 'Devadatta is like a lion' is ignored.

9. In this place J has played another trick and twisted the sentences as 'gavā nayanam'.The word nayanam'means an eye with this interpretit J shows that the sentence already twisted by the opponent is devoid o connection between the words, therefore it is contradictory,and hence casuistry comes under 'contradiction' also.

10. See the text.' अलभसङ्गतम्. अन्यच्च। PL.176.10 This ca stand for 'contradiction'.

Com.2.59 (टी.) रूढ्या योगेन वा प्रतिपाद्योऽर्थो मुख्यः। बहुलप्रयोगमात्रसिद्धा रूढिः प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तविवक्षया प्रवृत्तिर्योगः। अखण्डवृत्ती रूढिः अवयववृत्तिर्योग इति वा। गौण्या लक्षणया वा वृत्त्या शब्दबोध्योऽर्थः अमुख्यः। मुख्यार्थगुणयुक्तार्थान्तरवृत्तिर्गौणी। मुख्यार्थसम्बन्धिन्यर्थान्तरे वृत्तिर्लक्षणेति।

tr.2.59 Primary[1] (principle) meaning of a word is the meaning which what is to be conveyed by the convention (usage) or by the etymology. A convention is established through mere repeated usage, and etymology is an employment of (some word) with the desire to explain the reason behind such employment. Or in other words the meaning through a convention

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consists in a continued function[2] and the meaning through etymology consists inseveral etymological components of a word. The sence to be conveyed from a word through a metaphorical or indicative function is said to be a secondary meaning. The gauṇi type of vṛtti is the function which results in the other meaning (of a word) which possesses the quality equal to that of primary meaning (And). Lokṣaṇā type of v is the function which results in the other meaning connected with th primary meaning[3].

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1. All the three types of casuistry are based on the different types of functions applied in getting meaning from a word. Therefore J explai here, such necessary different functions.
2. In rūdhi the meaning is obtained from a word as a whole while throug yoga the meaning of a word is obtained from every part of it.
3. The difference between these two is- i) in the first type both the meanings are equal and applicable but in latter the first meaning becomes inapplicable and therefore the second meaning is used.

Com.0.60 (टी.) हेत्वाभासादेः कान्तर्भावः इत्यतस्तं वक्तुमनुमानविरोधविभागमाह

T. | 60 त्रिविधो विरोधः

Com. 1. | 60 अनुमानस्य साधारणोऽसाधारणश्च सम्भवित इति शेषः ।

Com. 0. 61 (टी.) कथं त्रैविध्यम् ? इत्यत आह

T. 61 प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदृष्टान्तभेदेन

Com. 1. 61 अत्र प्रतिज्ञापदेन पक्षोऽप्युपलक्ष्यते । हेतुपदेन लिङ्गञ्च । तथा दृष्टान्तपदेनोदाहरणम् । विरोधस्योभ्यदूषणत्वात् । प्रतिज्ञादिभेदेन साधनांशानां त्रैविध्यात् तद्विरोधस्त्रिविधः । विरोधपदं संयोज्य वा योज्यम् । तत्र प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः साधारणः । अन्यावसाधारणौ ।

tr.0.60 Where can fallacies etc be included? In order to answer (this questi the author explains the division of 'a contradiction to inference' as follows-

tr.60 Contradiction to (inference is) in three ways -

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1.60 'In respect of an inference it is conceived to be as common and general' is to be understood as a remaining part of the text.

0.61 How (to explain this) threefoldness?(one might ask ,and therefore the author states-

61 Corresponding to the differences among 'proposition,reason and example'.

1.61 In this connection, with the word'proposition' a subject also is understood and(with the word) 'reason,' an inferential mark (or proba (is understood).Similarly with the word 'example,'an illustration (is indicated)[1]Because the contradiction being a defect of both.Since the parts of an inference (i.e. syllogism) are threefold owing to the difference as proposition etc, the contradiction in respect of it,also is threefold. Or the word'contradiction' is to be read (applied) as 'having connected with'(every word in the text)[2]. Of these, the contradiction with the proposition is in general, and other two are specific.[3]

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1. This is to indicate that this contradiction is through both, meanin as well as the statement of it. In other words the contradiction to inference is a defect of artha and vacana. Pratijñā hetu,and dṛṣtāṅ are the statements of pakṣa, liṅga and udāharaṇa respectively.

2. In that case the text will be as प्रतिज्ञा विरोध हेतु विरोध दृष्टान्त विरोध-भेदेन।

3. Pratijñā is a statement of proposition done by a party to debate. When he does any other statement contrary to the same,it becomes a contradiction to one's own statement. And such contradiction is possible not only in a syllogism but in general statements also. But the contradiction to a probans or to an illustration is possible in respect of a syllogistic statement only, because they occure there

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only. Therefore this division is stated.

Com 0.62 (टी.) प्रतिज्ञाविरोधं लक्षयति ।

T. 62 प्रमाणविरुद्धार्थप्रतिज्ञा प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः

Com 1.62 अत्र प्रमाणविरोध एव हेत्वाभासानामन्तर्भावात् तस्य ग्रहणं, न स्ववाक्यविरोधस्य ।

tr.0.62 (Now the author) defines 'the contradiction to a proposition'

tr.62 The contradiction to a proposition is a proposition (Contradictory Proposition) the sense conveyed by which is contrary to what is established by valid means of knowledge.

1.62 Since the fallacies are included under 'contradiction to what is established by pramāṇas' only and not under a 'contradiction to one's own statement) there is the mention of that alone (i.e. of pramāṇa virddha) and not of a contradiction to one's own statement[1].

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1. As explained above, the contradiction to a proposition is also a contradiction to one's own statement. So one might ask 'why svavacana-virodha also is not added in this text? In answer J says 'it is true, but in this place we are concerned with the fallacies only and a contradiction in respect of the fallacies is to be shown through pramāṇa only, and therefore 'svavacana virodha' is not added in the text.

Com 0.63 (टी.) हेतुविरोधं दर्शयति

T. 63 हेतुस्वरूपासिद्धिरव्याप्तिश्चेति हेतुविरोधः

Com 1.63 अत्र प्रथमहेतुशब्देन लिङ्गमुच्यते । यत् यत्र वादिना विवक्षितं तत्र तस्याप्रमितिः स्वरूपासिद्धिः ।

tr.0.63 (Now the author) explains the contradiction to a reason, as-

tr.63 The contradiction to a statement of reason consists in unestablishment of a probans by it's very nature and (it's) partial pervasion.

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1.63 In this text by the word hetu in the first place, a probans (or inferential mark) is indicated. (And) unestablishment by it's very nature is non cognition of what is intended (as to be cognised) in a particular place[1] by a proponent.

---

1. M is of the opinion that sāmānādhikaranya 'having one and the same substratum' cannot be a necessary condition for hetu. (i.e it may or may not be present in the subject, therefore paksadharmatā 'subject adjunctness' is not required) with the intention of conveying this idea J makes it clear with the words' in an intended place'. Hence, even though a probans is not present at the subject of it, but exists in a particular intended place there is no defect called 'asiddhi'. But if the probans does not exist in a particular place where it's existence is desired by the proponent,' then it is a case of 'contradiction to the probans'.

Com.0.64 (टी.) दृष्टान्तविरोधं दर्शयति

J. 64 साध्यस्य साधनस्य वा अननुगमो दृष्टान्तविरोधः

Com.1.64 [1]उभयोर्वेति ग्राह्यम् । अननुगमो अनुगत्यप्रमितिः । साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तस्यायं विरोधः । साध्यस्य साधनस्य उभयोर्वा व्यावृत्त्यप्रमितिर्वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तविरोधोऽपि द्रष्टव्यः । अनेन पक्षसाधनदृष्टान्तलक्षणराहित्यं प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वादिविरोधलक्षणं सूचितं भवति । [2]तल्लक्षणविभागादि संग्रहेणैव ज्ञापयितुमियमुक्तिः ।

tr.0.64 (Now the author) explains 'the contradiction to an example' as.

tr.64 The contradiction to an example consists in the absence of agreement (following) either by the probandum or the probans.

1.64 'Or of both' is to be supplied[1]. The word 'ananugama' absence of following' means the absence of the cognition of following (or existence of the probandum or the probans in the illustration). This

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contradiction is (possible) in respect of the illustration based on similarity (i.e. positive concomitance). Similarly one should observe an illustration, as an example of 'the contradiction with the illustration' (in an inference) based on dissimilarity where there is the absence of cognition of non agreement (absence) of either of the probans the probandum or both. And with this[2] (explanation only) the definition of 'the contradiction with the proposition' and 'the probans' etc is indicated[3] as 'being devoid of the definition of a subject, reason and example (respectively)'. And this statement is made only for the purpose of conveying it's definition and division etc. in a nutshell.

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1. It is to be understood as- absence of agreement (existence) of the probandum or of the probans or of both in the illustration is called a contradiction to an illustration. for example, i) Mind is not eternal because it is a corporeal substance like an atom. Here the illustration 'an atom' is devoid of the probandum non eternality ii) Mind is------ 'like an action'. This illustration is devoid of the probans, because an action is not corporeal substance. iii) Mind is ----- like 'space' is the illustration which is devoid of both, the probandum and the probans, because space is not non eternal (i.e. it is eternal) and it is not a corporeal substance.

2. 'With this' means through these three sentences-'the contradiction with a proposition' etc.

3. One might argue that these three sentences do not express directly the definitions of these contradictions, but they indicate only division of them, therefore J answers that these sentences are stated with a view of giving definitions as well as division of them. And the definitions indicated through the text are as follows-

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i) Prati[j]ñāvirodha: one being devoid of the definition of a 'subject' i.e. which is not a real subject. (The definition of a subject is साध्यधर्मवान् धर्मी (i.e. साध्यधर्मविशिष्टत्वम्)

ii) Hetuvirodha is one being devoid of the definition of a probans i.e. which is not a real probans. The definition of a probans is साधनत्वाभिप्रेतसाध्याविनाभावित्वम्।

iii) Drstāntavirodha is one being devoid of the definition of an exam i.e. which is not a real example. The definition of an example is व्याप्तिप्रदर्शनपुरस्सरं साध्यदृष्टान्तामिधानम्।
(for these definitions see page 35 and 66 of PL)

Com.0.65 (टी.) बाध एव प्रमाणविरोध इति मन्वान आह। सप्रतिसाधनोऽप्यन्योऽनुमानविरोधोऽस्ति। अतः कथमेवं त्रैविध्यं? इति। तत्राह

T. 65 प्रतिज्ञायाः समबलविरोध एव सप्रतिसाधनः

Com.1.65 द्विविधो हि प्रतिज्ञायाः प्रमाणविरोधः प्रबलप्रमाणेन समबलेन चेति। आद्यो बाधकत्वेन। द्वितीयः प्रतिबन्धकत्वेन। तत्र योऽयं प्रतिज्ञायाः समबलेन प्रमाणेन विरोधः स सप्रतिसाधनसञ्ज्ञो भवति। अतो युक्तमुक्तमिति।

बाधसप्रतिसाधनयोः हेतुविरोधत्वनिरासः

एवकारेणास्य हेतुविरोधत्वं व्यवच्छिनत्ति। प्रतिज्ञामात्र एवास्य स्फुरणात्। व्याप्त्यादिहेत्वङ्गस्यानेनाखण्डितत्वाच्च। एतेन प्रबलप्रमाणविरोधस्यापि हेतुविरोधत्वं प्रत्युक्तम्।

tr.0.65 One who thinks that (the fallacy called) bādha alone comes under 'the contradiction to what is established by valid means of knowledge' raises an objection as- How the threefoldness of the contradiction to inference in this way(is justified) when there is a distinct contradiction to inference' namely, sapratisādhana?[1] (And therefore) in that respect (the author) states-

tr.65 Contradiction to the proposition through the pramāṇas of equal strength alone is called a sapratisādhana.

tr.1.65 The contradiction with a proposition through pramāṇa is intwo ways_

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i)through the pramāṇa of more strength and ii)through the pramāṇa of equal strength. The first (of these two) is by being a contradic tion[2]. And the second is by being a 'preventing[3] (or counter questi ning).Of these, the contradiction to the proposition which is thro the pramāṇa of equal strength is called 'sapratisādhana'.

and therefore, what is said is correct.

With the word eva 'only' the author sets aside it's[4] nature of bei a 'contradiction with the probans[5]' because i) it comes to mind (is noticed) at the time of mere statement of a proposition (alone)[6] an ii)the concomitance etc, which is a part of a probans is not refut by this. With this (very argument) the nature of being 'a contradi tion to a probans in respect of a contradiction through a pramāṇa more strength also, is set aside.[7]

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1. For the definitions of bādha and sapratisādhana see- PL 118-119.
2. What is resulted In the case of a contradiction through the pramāṇ of more strength is the cognition of the absence of a probandum. And thereby bādha becomes contradictory to a proposition.
3. What is resulted in the case of a contradiction through the pramāṇ of equal strength is 'the nature of being a counter correlative of absence which is a cause for the contradiction to a proposition.' In this way, both bādha and sapratisādhana come under 'the contradict to a proposition' alone.
4. It's = of sapratisādhana.
5. According to the Naiyayikas 'not having another probans' is a char cteristic of a probans; but M does not agree with them.
6. The stock example of sapratisādhana is 'sSpace is non eternal ----- ---- etc." In this syllogism, the counter thought 'why it cannot be eternal too?'

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comes to the mind at the very beginning stage, (i.e. when the state-
is being done.
ment of the proposition) Therefore M is of the opinion that sapratipak
should be included under 'the contradiction to a proposition'.
Since the contradiction through the pramāna of more strength also, con
to notice at an early stage, it is included under the contradiction t
a proposition as above.

Com.O.66 (टी.) उपाधिविरोधोऽप्यन्योऽस्तीत्याह

T. 66 स एवोपाधिदोषोऽपि

Com. 1.66. नोपाधिः स्वयमेव दोषः। किं तु दोषोद्भावक एव। स चोपाधिना उद्भेयो दोषः उपाधिदोषः प्रतिज्ञायाः समबलविरोध एवान्तर्भवतीति नोक्तविरोधः। प्रकृतसाध्यव्यापकः प्रकृत-साधनाव्यापकः उपाधिः। स हि पक्षात् व्यावर्तमानः साध्यं व्यावर्तयन् प्रतिपक्षोद्भावको भवति। उपाध्यभावस्य साध्याभावे लिङ्गत्वात्। उपाधेर्हि पक्षात् व्यावृत्तिः स्वव्यावृत्त्या साध्यव्यावर्तने शक्तिश्चापेक्षिता। तत्र साध्यव्यापक इत्येवोक्ते साधनव्यापकस्य साधनस्येव पक्षे वर्तमानत्वात् साध्यव्यापकोऽप्युपाधिर्न पक्षात् साध्यं व्यावर्तयेदिति साधनाव्यापकत्वं ग्राह्यम्। तावत्येवोच्यपाने साध्याव्यापकस्य पक्षात् व्यावृत्तावपि साध्यव्यावर्तनसामर्थ्याभावात् वैयर्थ्यं स्यादिति साध्यव्यापकत्वमपि ग्राह्यम्। तथा च साधनाव्यापकत्वात् पक्षात् व्यावृत्त उपाधिः साध्यव्यापकत्वात् व्यापकनिवृत्त्या व्याप्यनिवृत्तिरिति साध्यं व्यावर्तयतीति।

tr.0.66 (One might say) 'a contradiction through upādhi 'extraneous adjunct' also is yet another contradiction to inference' (And in the answer to it, the author) states-

tr.66 And the same[1] is a defect given rise by upādhi 'extraneous adjunct' al

1.66 (And) upādhi 'extraneous adjunct' by itself is not a defect but it is on which gives rise to (imference of) the defect. (The word upādhidosa means a defect which is to be manifested through extraneous adjunct. Since the same comes under the contradiction to a proposition throug the pramāna of equal strength there is nothing contrary to what is stated[2]. The extraneous adjunct is defined as what is all pervading the present probandum but is not all pervading the present probans.

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The extraneous adjunct getting excluded (itself) from the subject, causes the exclusion of the probandum and thereby gives rise to a counter view, because the absence of an extraneous adjunct is (an infe ntial mark or) a reason for the absence of the probandum. In respect of an extraneous adjunct, it is necessarily required that it should not be present in the subject and should have capacity to exclude the probandum also from the subject through it's own exclusion. (If this definition of upādhi is stated as) 'all pervading the probandum' only, then the upādhi existing in the subject like the probans and even being all pervading the probandum will not exclude the probandum from the subject, and hence the phrase 'not all pervadi the probans' is (necessary) to be added. But if only that much (part is being stated as the definition, then the upādhi which is absent fr the subject, and is not all pervading the probandum will not have capacity to exclude the probandum and therefore there will be useles ness, hence the nature of all pervading the probandum is to be added in the definition. In this way, the extraneous adjunct which is abse from the subject because of it's not being all pervading the probans will exclude the probandum because of it's being all pervading the probandum, following the maxim, 'exclusion of the pervaded because of the exclusion of pervading one'.

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1. Same = sapratisādhana.
2. i.e. threefoldness of the defects of inference.
3. J with the intention of making it possible to know how an upādhi by itself is not a defect but it's existence gives rise to the defect sapratisādhana, explains here what upādhi is by stating the definiti and discussing the importance of every word in it.

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Com. 2.66 उपाधिगतव्याप्यत्वोपजीवनात् सोपाधिको हेतुर्व्याप्यत्वासिद्धो भवतीत्येके।

साध्यरहितस्य पक्षस्यैव विपक्षत्वात् तत्र वर्तमानो हेतुः व्यभिचारी स्यादित्यपरे।

तत् एवकारेण व्यवच्छिद्यते। यदा उपाधिव्यावृत्त्या पक्षे साध्याभावः सिद्धः तदैव परानुमानं दुष्टं स्यादिति पश्चाद्धाविना दोषेण पिष्टं पिष्टं स्यादिति। साध्याभावाविनाभाव्यभावत्वस्य अवश्याभ्युपगमनीयत्वात् प्रथमप्राप्तपरित्यागेन दोषान्तरान्वेषणे गौरवं च स्यात्। विषमव्याप्तौ व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध्यनुपपत्तिश्चेति।

tr.2.66 Some(are of the opinion that) the probans having extraneous adjunc becomes vyāpyatvāsiddha' unestablished in respect of it's concomitance' due to it's dependance on pervadeness existing in the extraneous adjunct. But some others hold that, since the subject which is devoid of the probandum by itself is a counter subject an the probans existing in such (counter) subject will be vyabhicārin 'too wide' (i.e. existing outside the limit)[1].

(Either of) that is refuted by the word 'only'. At the very moment, when the absence of a probandum in the subject is established thro gh the exclusion of extraneous adjunct, the syllogism presented by the other party will become defective and therefore, pointing out the defect(s)(like vyāpyatvāsiddhi or vyabhicāritva) which are going to take place in a later stage, will be a mere repitition Since the nature of being an absence which does not exist without the absence of the probandum only, is to be necessarily accepted; there will b gaurava(unnecessary heavyness of assumptions) in searching of another defect on giving up of one which occured first. And also there will be impossibility (non availability) of vyāpyatvāsiddhi in respect of a visamavyāpti' unequal concomitance[2]'.

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1. In short, M has made it clear that fallacies are not be

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mentioned separately but they are included under the contradiction to inference (which is of three types). Similarily an extraneous adjunct also is not a defect by itself, but it's existence gives rise to defect. Secondly just because it has extraneous adjunct, probans will not vyapyatvāsiddha or vyabhicārin, (as accepted by the vaisesikas) because these defects occur later on, while the defect a contradiction to proposition' comes first.

2. A place of visamavyāpti is where a probans of normal inference is made a probandum, and the stock example of it is the mountain is possessed of Smoke because of fire.

Com. 0.67 प्रतिज्ञाविरोधादेरुदाहरणमाह

T. 67 सर्वे एते दृश्यत्वानुमाने द्रष्टव्याः

Com. 1.67 विवादपदं मिथ्या दृश्यत्वात् यत् दृश्यं तत् मिथ्या यथा शुक्तिरजतं, तथा चेदं दृश्यं तस्मान्मिथ्या' इत्येतदनुमानं प्रतिज्ञाविरोधादीनामुदाहरणं ज्ञातव्यमिति।

विश्वमिथ्यात्वप्रतिज्ञायाः प्रबलप्रमाणविरोधः

Com. 0.68 तत्कथम्? इत्यतः प्रतिज्ञायाः प्रबलप्रमाणविरोधं तावदुपपादयति

T. 68 प्रत्यक्षागमादिभिर्जगतः सत्यत्वात्

Com. 1.68 सन् घटः इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षेण, विश्वं सत्यमित्याद्यागमेन, विवादपदं सत्यं अर्थक्रियाकारित्वात् इत्याद्यनुमानेन च जगतः सत्यत्वावधारणात् जगन्मिथ्या इति प्रतिज्ञा प्रबलप्रमाणविरुद्धा भवति।

tr.0.67 (Now) the author) states the example of the contradiction to a proposion etc.

tr.67 All these are (fit) to be observed (seen) in the inference (based on) perceptibility[1]

1.67 The syllogism (inference) "The thing[2] under dispute is not real becaus of it's perceptibility, whatever is seen is not real as shell and silver, This also is fit to be seen like that, And therefore (it) is false(not real)[3]" is to be understood as an example of the contradictio to the proposition etc.

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tr.0.68 How is it possible? (one might ask. And therefore the author) explains (at the beginning) the contradiction to the proposition through pramānas of more strength.

tr.68 Since the reality of the world (is proved) by perception, verbal testimony etc.[4]

1.68 The proposition that the world is not real is contradicted through the pramānas of more strength because the reality of the world is cognized through[5] i) the perception like 'the pot is existing' ii) the verbal testimony as- visvam satyam[6] etc, and iii) the inference as 'an object under dispute is real because of fruitful activity.'

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1. i.e. where perceptibility is a probans.

2. This refers to the world. Since the Brahman is real and shell-silver is false, and there is no dispute among the disputant in this respect. The only thing remaining under dispute from the reality or falsity points of view is the world.

3. This a syllogism in full.

4. etc. covers inference.

5. Among the three pramānas accepted by M the perception is more strong then comes verbal testimony and the inference is at last. Following this order, J shows the contradiction in the proposition through these pramānas respectively.

6. See विश्वं सत्यं मघवानो युवोरिदापश्चन प्रमिनन्ती व्रतं वां

Com. 0.69 (टी.) हेतोः स्वरूपासिद्धिमुपपादयति ।

T. 69 तत्पक्षे दृश्यत्वस्य च मिथ्यात्वात्

Com. 1.69 'यत् दृश्यं तत् मिथ्या' इति व्याप्तिमङ्गीकुर्वता दृश्यत्वस्यापि मिथ्यात्वमङ्गीकर्तव्यम् । अन्यथा दृश्यत्वस्य व्यभिचारापातात् । अतो दृश्यत्वहेतोर्मिथ्यात्वात् दृश्यत्वहेतुवादिनः स्वरूपासिद्ध एव ।

न मिथ्येत्यसदुच्यते । येन हेतोः स्वरूपासिद्धिः स्यात् । किं नाम ? अनिर्वचनीयमेव । अतः अनिर्वचनीयदृश्यत्वस्य भावान्न स्वरूपासिद्धिरित्यत आह

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T. 70

अनिर्वचनीयस्य प्रतिवादिनोऽसिद्धत्वात्

Com. 1.70

अनिर्वचनीयस्य दृश्यत्वस्य हेतुत्वाङ्गीकारेऽपि प्रतिवादिनः स्वरूपासिद्धिर्भवत्येव। प्रतिवादिना जगति अनिर्वाच्यदृश्यत्वस्यानङ्गीकृतत्वादिति।

यथा अग्निमत्वे साध्ये मलिनत्वामलिनत्वादिविशेषानपहाय धूममात्रं हेतुः तथा अनवधारितानिर्वचनीयत्वादिविशेषं दृश्यत्वमात्रं जगन्मिथ्यात्वे हेतुः किं न स्यात्? इत्यत आह ॥ अनिर्वचनीयस्येति ॥ शक्यते वक्तुं धूममात्रमग्निमत्वे हेतुरिति। मलिनधूमादौ वादिप्रतिवादिनोर्धूमत्वसंमतेः। न चैवं प्रकृते। अनिर्वचनीयदृश्यत्वस्य प्रतिवादिनोऽसिद्धत्वात्। न हि गगननलिनासिद्धौ नलिनत्वसामान्यं तत्राङ्गीकर्तुं शक्यत इति।

tr.0.69 Further the author explains svarūpāsiddhi 'unestablishment by it's very nature' in respect of this probans as-

tr.69 And (because) the perceptibility (also) is not real inhis doctrine.

1.69 One who accepts the concomitance as 'whatever is seen is not real' has to accept the non reality of perceptibility also. Otherwise the will be a contingency of 'perceptibility being toowide'..nd therefc since the probans'perceptibility' is not real the probans 'percepti bility' is unestablished by it's very nature even for the proponent (But one might answer to this objection, as) By (the word)mithyā 'false'we don't mean' non existing' by which there will be unestabli shment by it's very nature. What is then? We mean only inexpressible And since the inexpressible perceptibility does exist, there wil not be 'svarūpāsiddhi'.(M expecting this answer, further) says-

tr.70 Inexpressible (perceptibility) is not accepted (lit.not established (in the view) of the opponents (i.e. the other party).

1.70 Even if the probans is accepted as inexpressible perceptibility' the unestablishment by it's very nature (from the view point) of the opponent,still remains. Because 'inexpressible perceptibility' in respect of the world is not accepted by the opponents (i.e. thesecon

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As in the inference where the possession of fire is to be established, mere smoke, irrespective of it's peculiarity as dirtyness or cleanness, is a probans so also why mere perceptibility, not taking into consideration it's expressibility or inexpressibility cannot be the probans for the inference of non-reality of the world? (Expecting this counter argument, M says- inexpressibility etc.(He wants to state that) it is possible to say that mere smoke is the a probans for fire, because even in respect of dirty smoke , there is agreement between the proponent and the opponent regarding it's smokeness. But that is not the case at present, because the inexpressible perceptibility is not acceptable to the opponent. It is not the case, that mere lotusness is possible to accept (as a probans) where the skylotusness is unestablished.[1]

In short, if any additional quality of a probans is acceptable to both the parties to dispute then only, the statement of such probans in a syllogism, can be done without such quality. But if there is th difference of opinion regarding that particular qualitythen mere probans cannot be stated. This is being so, mere perceptibility can be a probans in this particular syllogism, because inexpressibility (not) respect of perceptibilityis acceptable to one party and not acceptable to the other party.

Com.0.70 दृश्यत्वहेतोरव्याप्तिमुपपादयति

T. 71 आत्मनोऽपि दृश्यत्वात्

Com.1.71 सत्यत्वेनाङ्गीकृतस्यात्मनो विपक्षत्वात् तत्र च दृश्यत्वहेतोर्वर्तमानत्वात् व्याप्तिहीनोऽप्यसौ भवति। एतेन व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तात् साधनाव्यावृत्तिश्चोपपादिता भवति।

Com.0.72 शुक्तिरजतादिदृष्टान्ते साध्याननुगममुपपादयति

T. 72 शुक्तिरजतादेरनिर्वचनीयत्वाभावात्

Com.1.72 मिथ्यापदेन अनिर्वचनीयत्वमभिमतं वादिनः। तच्च दृष्टान्ते शुक्तिरजतादौ न विद्यते। 'असदेव रजतं प्रत्यभात्' इति बाधकप्रत्ययेन असत्त्वावधारणात्। अतः शुक्तिरजतादिदृष्टान्तः

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tr.0.71 (Further the author) explains the absence of concomitance of the probans 'perceptibility' (as)—

tr.71 Since there is perceptibility (in respect) of the self also.

1.71 The 'self' accepted as real, is a counter subject[1] (for the present probans) and the probans 'perceptibility' exists there. Therefore the same (i.e. the probans perceptinility) becomes devoid of concomitance. With this (argument) the non exclusion of a probans from dissimilar illustration is explained[3].

0.72 Further he explains the absence of agreement of the probandum with the example shell and silver etc. as-

tr.72 On account of the inexpressibility in shell and silver etc.

1.72 By the word mithyā what is intended to convey by the proponent is 'inexpressibility' But that does not exist in the illustration 'shell. silver etc. (Because) (what is understood in that case is) the determination of non existence (of silver) through the preventive knowledge 'silver, which was non existent only, appeared to be." And therefore the illustration of shell-silver etc. is devoid of the probandum[4].

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1. A counter subject is one where a probandum does not exist. In respect of this inference the self is a counter subject because it is accepted as real one, (i.e. falsity does not exist in it).

2. A concomitance is shown in two ways— तत्सत्त्वे तत्सत्त्वम् and तदभावे तदभाव: Here it is to be shown that whereever there is the absence of probandum (i.e. unreality) there should be the absence of the proban (perceptibility) But in the self, though there is the absence of non reality (as it is real) there is no absence of perceptibility. (Since there are many pramāṇas like i) ब्रह्माऽहमस्मीति ब्रह्मज्ञानम् or ii) नमेन धीरा विज्ञाय etc. which prove it's perceptibility) And therefore this probans is devoid of concomitance.

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3. Absence of probans is a necessary condition for negative concomitance, and absence of that condition in respect of this probans is indicated by the text आत्मनोऽपि दृश्यत्वात्।

4. What one realizes in this illustration is absence of silver and not inexpressibility of silver, which is intended by the word mithyā.

Com.0.73 तत्र साधनाननुगमं चोपपादयति

T. 73 अनिर्वचनीयदृश्यत्वाभावात्

Com.1.73 अनिर्वचनीयं हि दृश्यत्वं साधनमभिमतम्। न तत् शुक्तिरजतादौ वर्तत इति दृष्टान्तः साधनविकलो भवति। अनिर्वचनीयतया अभिमतस्य शुक्तिरजतादेर्दृश्यत्वाभावादिति वा। शुक्त्यादेरेव दृग्विषयत्वेन [1]'रजतादिकं दृष्टम्' इति भ्रममात्रम्। तन्मतेऽपि अनिर्वचनीयस्य दृश्यत्वाभावादिति वा। [2]तैरपि शुक्तिरजतादेः न ऐन्द्रियकदृग्विषयत्वं अङ्गीकृतम्। प्रतीतिसमय एवोदयाभ्युपगमात्। इन्द्रियस्याधिष्ठानग्रहण एव व्यापारोररीकरणात्। शुक्त्याद्यवच्छिन्नाऽत्माविद्याकल्पितमारोपिततयैव अवभासत इति तत्प्रक्रिया।

tr.C.73 He explains the absence of agreement (presence) with the probans (also) in that (illustration).

tr.73 On account of the absence of inexpressible perceptibility.

tr.73 The perceptibility which is inexpressible (only) is accepted as the probans. Since that does not exist in shell and silver etc. the illustration is devoid of the probans.[1] Or alternatively, because of the absence of perceptibility of shell silver etc. which is intended to be 'inexpressible'[2]. Since the shell etc. alone is an object of visual contact (the cognition that) 'silver etc. is seen' is merely an illusion[3]. Or even according to their view also, because of the absence of perceptibility of (an object which is) inexpressible.[4] The nature of being an object of sensual perception'. of shell silver etc. is not accepted even by them (i.e. māyāvādins) owing (to the fac of the acceptance of it's appearance at the time of cognition only. The activity (or contact) of senses is (approved) accepted at the tir of perception of the substratum (i.e. shell). Their view regarding

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(the perception of shell silver is as)- (whatever appears) is mere super imposition imagined due to nescience existing in the self delimited by the shell etc.[5]

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1. In this first interpretition J has taken karmadhāraya compound.
2. If karmadhāraya is accepted there will be indication that some othe type of perceptibility also is there, like nirvacaniya drsyatva et. This is not accepted. Therefore he suggests another interpretition. In that case it is taken as षष्ठी तत्पुरुष.
3. One might agrue, 'How this can be illusion? because in this kn wle also, there is the knowledge of knowledge as 'I have seen silve etc.' In answer to this objection, J states-object of a knowledge i that, in contact with which an instrument (of knowledge) creates knowledge. In the present illustration also; the knowledge of silv is created through the contact of sense organ with the shell (and not with silver). Therefore the knowledge created thereby is of she only. Hence the knowledge that 'I have seen silver' is only illusion.
4. Further J interpretes the text in third way.
5. Even according to the advaitins the knowledge of silver in shell i not created through the contact of sense organ. And the process of generating this illusion is as- the caitanya which is delimited by shell gets contacted with defective sense organ and thereby creates the impression of silver.

Com.0-73 प्राक् दृष्टान्तविरोधाभिधानानन्तरं प्रतिज्ञायाः समबलप्रमाणविरोधस्य सप्रतिसाधनसञ्ज्ञा विहिता। अतस्तेनैव क्रमेण तमुपपादयति

T. 73 मानसिद्धत्वादिति सप्रतिसाधनत्वाच्च

Com.1-73 'जगत् सत्यं मानसिद्धत्वात् ब्रह्मवत्' इत्यपि वक्तुं शक्यत्वात् जगन्मिथ्येति प्रतिज्ञा सत्प्रतिपक्षा भवति। चशब्देन अमानसिद्धत्वमुपाधिं सूचयति। तद्धि मिथ्यात्वव्यापकं शुक्तिरजतादौ दृष्टम्। दृश्यत्वाव्यापकं च, जगति दृश्यत्वे विद्यमानेऽप्यभावात्। अतो जगतो व्यावर्तमानं अमानसिद्धत्वं मिथ्यात्वमपि व्यावर्तयतीति।

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tr.0.73 In the earlier text, the contradiction with the proposition through the pramāna of equal strength is named as saṗratisādhana, (only) after the statement of the contradiction with illustration[1]. Theref following the same order (the author) discusses it(i.e. saprati ādhanatva at this place) as-

tr.73 (Since it is possible to state as) ----- because it is proved by a pramāna[2] (this proposition is of the nature of) saṗratisādhana 'hav a counter probans'.

1.73 Since it is possible to state 'the world is real because it is prove by pramāṇas, like Brahman' the porposition that-the world is not re becomes satpratipaksa 'one having a counter probans (to prove otherwise). With the word ca the author indicates that not being establis by pramāṇas is an upādhi 'extraneous adjunct' (for this probans). That amāṇasiddhatva 'not being established by pramāṇas is all pervading (the probandum) mithyātva and (also) observed in shell silver etc. And also it is not pervading (the probans) 'perceptibility' because i does not exist in the world where perceptibility exists. And therefore 'not being proved by pramāṇas' which gets excluded itself from world, excludes falsity also from it[3].

---

1. In the usual order of syllogism, a proposition comes first and an illustration comes later on. But in the present text M has discussed the defects of an illustration, before the defects of a proposition stated. J gives explanation for this change of order as above. For prāk see PL 187-189.

2. This is a statement of 'probans' only. The complete syllogism is stated in the commentary.

3. Upādhi 'extraneous adjunct' is explained as which is all pervading the probandum, but not all pervading the probans. and by being so it makes t

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probandum excluded from the subject. J has shown here, how the extraneous adjunct 'not being proved by pramānas makes probandum 'mithyātva' absent in the subject-the world.

Com-0-74 यदुक्तं 'जगन्मिथ्या' इति प्रतिज्ञा प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धेति। तदयुक्तम्। अनुमानेन ह्येष्यत्कालीनबाध्यत्वं साध्यते। न च तदभावं गोचरयितुं प्रत्यक्षमीष्टे येन तद्विरोधोऽनुमानस्य स्यात्। वर्तमानमात्रग्राहित्वात् प्रत्यक्षस्य। न हि भिन्नविषययोर्बाध्यबाधकभावोऽस्ति। न हि भवति आमघटश्यामतांप्रत्यक्षेण पाकरक्ततांप्रमाणस्य बाध इत्याशङ्क्य परिहरति

T-74 जगत्सत्यत्वग्राहिप्रत्यक्षस्य वर्तमानमात्रग्राहित्वे अनुमानागमप्रामाण्यग्राहिणोऽपि प्रत्यक्षत्वाविशेषात् उत्तरक्षणे प्रामाण्यं न सेत्स्यतीति भेदादिवाक्यानामेव प्रामाण्यं स्यात्

Com-1-74 यो जगत्सत्यत्वग्राहिप्रत्यक्षस्य वर्तमानमात्रग्राहित्वं अङ्गीकुर्यात् स प्रष्टव्यः जगन्मिथ्यात्वग्राहिणः अनुमानस्य 'नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन' इत्याद्यागमस्य च प्रामाण्यं केन गृह्यत? इति। न तावत् स्वेन। स्वप्रामाण्यविषयत्वाननुभवात्। नाप्यनुमानाद्यन्तरेण। अनवस्थापातात्। प्रत्यक्षेण चेत् तर्हि तस्यानुमानागमप्रामाण्यग्राहिणः प्रत्यक्षस्यापि प्रत्यक्षत्वाविशेषात् वर्तमानमात्रग्राहित्वं स्यात्। तथा च न तेनोत्तरक्षणे अनुमानादिप्रामाण्यसिद्धिः। *जगन्मिथ्यात्वानुमानादेः उत्तरक्षणे प्रामाण्यासिद्धौ च 'द्वा सुपर्णा' इत्यादिभेदवाक्यानां 'विश्वं सत्यं' इत्यादिविश्वसत्यत्ववाक्यानां मानसिद्धत्वाद्यनुमानानां चोत्तरक्षणे प्रामाण्यं स्यात्। परस्परविरुद्धयोः अन्यतरनिषेधस्य अन्यतर*विधिनान्तरीयकत्वनियमादिति। न चोत्तरक्षणे अनुमानादिप्रामाण्यग्राहकं प्रत्यक्षान्तरं भविष्यतीति वाच्यम्। उक्तरीत्या तत्र प्रामाण्याभावस्य वक्तुं शक्यत्वात्।

tr.0.74 As to what is said, the proposition' the world is not real' is contrary to the perception'- is not correct. What is established through inference is(inpossibility,or non existence as real) in a future time (or later date);And perception is not capable of perceiving the absence of it (namely,existence) whereby there would result a contradiction of inference with that, since perception is cognizer of present only.There cannot be the relation as bādhya-

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bādhaka[2] between two which have different objects. Nor even perception of blackness of (unbaked) pot prevents (or contradicts) the proof of redness (of the same pot) due to it's baking.-Keeping in view this objection, the author refutes it as follows:-

tr.74: (If one holds that) the perception which cognizes reality of the world is one which perceives mere present (then other perceptions too) which proves validity of inference or verbal testimony, not being different from 'being perception' will not prove the validity (of inference or verbal testimony) in a later date, and therefore (as a result) there will be validity of the statements establishing the difference (between jīva and Brahman) etc.

1.74 One who accepts (holds) that perception cognizing the reality of the world is (of the nature of) cognizing present only, should be asked - 'how (through what) do you prove the validity of inference establishing the non reality of the world and of the statements (verbal testimony) like 'neha nānāsti Kiñcana' etc[3]' Not by itself, because of the absence of experience as one has it's (own) validity (as it's object). Nor also through any other inference since there would result infinite regress. If it is through perception, then (in respect of) the perception proving the validity of inference and verbal testimony which is not different from (being a) perception, there will be the nature of cognizing mere present. And so also there will not be establishment of validity of inference etc, in a later moment. (In this way, if) the validity of the inference (regarding the) non reality of the world is not established in a later moment, then there will be validity i) of the statements like dvā suparnā[4] which state difference, ii) of the statements like viśvam satyam[5] which prove the reality of the world and of the inferences like mānasiddhatva[6] etc. in a later moment. Because of the maxim'. In case of negation of one out of two which are opposed to each other,

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the other in necessarily asserted[7]. This also should not be said that in a later moment there will be another perception which will prove validity of inference etc. Since the absence of validity is possible to show in that case also, in the manner stated earlier[8].

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1. Bādhyatva is explained as 'sattāpratisedhah' by Sh. See PL 201.1
2. Perception cannot contradict (the result of) inference because both they have different objects.
3. See द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा ... Rv. 1.164.20.
4. See. नेह नानास्ति किंचन ... Sat Br. 14.7.2.21
5. See. विश्वं सत्यं मघवाना Rv. 2.24.12
6. The inference based on the probans 'mānasiddhatvāt'
7. ~~See~~.
8. In short, any perception even though it perceives whatever present before at that time, it can contradict what is being established by inference in a later moment. If this is not accepted, J says our view of reality is established following your technic only.

Com.0.75 (टी.) ननु न सर्वप्रत्यक्षं वर्तमानमात्रग्राहीत्युच्यते। किं तु? साक्षिव्यतिरिक्तमेव। साक्षी तु एष्यदपि गृह्णाति। अतस्तेन उत्तरक्षणेऽपि अनुमानागमप्रामाण्यं सेत्स्यति इत्याशङ्क्य परिहरति

T. 75 तस्य साक्षिसिद्धत्वं चेत् जगत्सत्यत्वमपि साक्षिसिद्धम्

Com.0.75 यदि अनुमानादिप्रामाण्यस्य साक्षिसिद्धत्वमुच्यते हन्त तर्हि जगत्सत्यत्वमपि साक्षिप्रत्यक्ष-सिद्धमिति ब्रूमः। [2]तथा च साक्षिणो वर्तमानमात्रग्राहित्वाभावात् तेन एष्यत्कालीनजगद्बाधाभाव-सिद्धिसम्भवात् प्रत्यक्षविरोधोऽनुमानस्य दुर्वार एवेति।

tr.0.75 (Now) having supposed the argument that, 'we do not state that all perception is not the cognizer of present only.(what then is it?) Only (perception) what is other than that of sākṣin . The sākṣin can perceive what is (going to be established) at a future moment. And therefore there will be establishment of validity even in a later moment[1], the

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tr.75 If that is proved by the perception of the witnessself, the reality of the world also (will be) established by (the perception of) the witness self.

com.75.1 If you talk of the establishment of the validity of inference etc. through the witnessself, well; then we will also state that the reality of the world is proved through the perception of the witness-self. And (this is being so) since the witness self is not the cogniz of mere present, there is the possibility of non contradiction with the presence of) the world in a future time, the contradiction of inference with perception is difficult to avoid.[2]

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1. To prove the validity of the statements like neha nānāsti etc. the advaitins will give this answer.

2. In other words, one has to accepts// that inference can be contradicted by perception.

Com.O 76 (टी.) अन्यस्त्वाह, न प्रत्यक्षेणानुमानस्य विरोधः। प्रत्यक्षस्य तत्र तत्र शुक्तिरजतादौ व्यभिचारो दृश्यते। ततश्च न तत्प्रामाण्ये विश्वासः सम्भवति। अविश्वस्तप्रामाण्येन च कथमनुमानस्य विरोधः स्यात्? इति।

तत्राह

T. 76 व्यभिचारश्चेदागमार्थानुमानिर्दोषत्वाध्यवसाये च समः

Com. 1.76 प्रत्यक्षस्य व्यभिचारदर्शनात् अविश्वसनीयत्वं वदन् वादी प्रष्टव्यः 'नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन' इत्यागमस्य अशेषभेदाभावोऽर्थः, दृश्यत्वानुमानं निर्दोषं, मानसिद्धत्वाऽध्यनुमानं सदोषं इत्यध्यवसायः केन प्रमाणेन? इति। न तावत् स्वेनैव। अननुभवात्। नाप्यागमाद्यन्तरेण। अनवस्थापातात्। प्रत्यक्षेण चेत्, तर्हि प्रत्यक्षस्य तत्र तत्र व्यभिचारदर्शनात् इदमपि प्रत्यक्षमविश्वसनीयं। तथा च न तेनागमार्थाध्यवसायः सिध्यतीति। अनुमाया अनिर्दोषत्वाध्यवसाय इति च योज्यम्। यद्यप्यत्र पूर्वोक्तमेवानिष्टं शक्यते वक्तुम् तथापि तत् शिष्यैरेव शक्यते ज्ञातुमिति दूषणान्तरमेवोक्तम्। अभेदागमस्याभेदार्थत्वाध्यवसायानुपपत्तिरेवानिष्टा।

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tr.C.76 Some one else says-'there can not be a contradiction of perception with inference, since we observe deviation of perception in the cases of pearl shell and silver etc. and therefore there does not arise (any) belief in its validity (or authoritativeness) a When it is so, how there can be the contradiction of inference to one validity or authoritativeness of which is unbelievable.' In that case (the author) states as-

tr.76 If(it is said that) deviation is there (in the case of perception) it is common to determination of the meaning of sacred texts and defectlessness of inference.

1.76 The proponent who speaks of unauthoritativeness of perception on account of the observation of it's deviation[1], should be asked' through which pramāṇa do you determine that i) the inference (bas on the probans)-'because it is proved by pramāṇa' is defective ii) the inference (based on)'perceptibility'is defectless and iii the meaning of the sacted text 'neha nanšti kiñcana' is 'the absence of total difference'? Not by itself. Since there is no experience like that. Nor by any other sacred text etc. because of the contingency of infinite regress.[2] If you say by perception' then such perception also will be unauthoritative because of observation of deviation of perception in certain cases[3]. And if it is so,there will not be the determination of the meaning of (respective) sacr texts.(The text in this respect) is to be understood (lit, applied)[4] as determination regarding the defectlessness of infere: Though the undesired contingency stated before, is possible to be point out in this argument also[5](it is not mentioned because), it is easy to understand the students (without explanation).And therefore the other defect[6] ~~od-j-~~ is shown.(And)the[7] undesired contingency (in this respect)is impossibility of conclusion that (so called) sacred text which sta

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the absence of difference, does not have that nature of being expressive of non difference.

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1. Compare ज्ञानस्य व्यभिचारित्वे विश्वासः [illegible]?
2. If there is need of another verbal authority to prove the authority of first, then there will be need of third to prove that of second an in this way assumption of more and more authorities is endless.
3. Since there is no any distinguishing factor to say that, a particular perception is not deviating and the particular is.
4. In earlier sentences J has asked the question' how do you decide that a particular inference is defectless?' Here he shows how that questio is based on or brought out from the text. The text व्यभिचारशोदा-ज्ञानाथनुमानादिदोषित्व etc. should be split as व्यभिचारशोदाज्ञानाथनुमा-नादिदोषित्वाध्यवसाय etc.
5. The regulation stated previously is- Validity of any pramana cannot b by itself. If it is through the perception of the witness self then f the same reason, validity of the reality of the world also has to be accpeted. But this is not necessary to state again because students will understand it easily.
6. Namely, there will be absence of determination --------- of etc.
7. If any defect is pointed out, the result of it also is to be shown. Oth wise the opposite party may say,'all right' let this defect be there'. Therefore Jshows what would be the result in the absence of determin

Com 0.77 अधिकं चाह

T. 77 अत उत्तरदिवसे अभेदवाक्यस्य भेदोऽर्थः स्यात्

Com 1.77 'नेहनाना' इति वाक्यस्याभेदोऽर्थ इत्यध्यवसायानुपपत्तौ भेदोऽर्थः स्यत्। परस्प-रविरुद्धयोः अन्यतरनिषेधस्य अन्यतरविधिनान्तरीयकत्वनियमादिति।

(टी.) प्रत्यक्षस्य वर्तमानमात्रग्राहित्वाभ्युपगमेऽप्ययं दोषः समान इति सूचयितुं उत्तरदिवस इत्युक्तम्। तथा हि,यदि प्रत्यक्षं वर्तमानमात्रग्राहि तर्हि 'नेह नाना' इति वाक्यस्य अभेदोऽर्थ इत्यध्यवसा-यहेतोः प्रत्यक्षस्यापि तथात्वापत्त्या उत्तरदिवसेऽपि तदर्थत्वाध्यवसायो न स्यात् इति सिद्धं कृत्वा आह ॥ अत इति ॥

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tr.C.77 (Further) in addition he states-

tr. 77 Therefore the meaning of the statement regarding 'non difference' will be 'difference' on the next day.

com.1.77 (And) in the case of the statements like nehanānā on account of i... possibility of determination of it's meaning as non difference; (it will have meaning) 'difference'. Since (there is) the rule there is t negation of one out of two which are always opposite to each other the assertion of the other alternative is necessarily presumed.[1] In this text, the word uttaradivase[2] is stated to indicate that (particular) defect is common even in the case of acceptance of per ception being the cognizer of mere present. In this way, having established that, in case (it is held that) perception cognizes the present only, there will be contingency of being so in respect c the perception which is a cause for the determination of the meanir of the text neha nānā as non difference and therefore on the next day also, the determination of the nature of having that meaning wi not be (possible) the author says- 'and therefore'.

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1. Two meanings namely, difference and non difference or duality and non duality are exactly opposite to each other. If one is unable to establish that the meaning of a particular statement is 'non diffe
2. Here (is) J explains the contention of M behind using the word "and therefore'.
3. That perception also will cognize only present and so it will help in determination of meaning of the text neha nana as non difference

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tr.0.78 Further he points out the difficulty(undesired contingency) in the absence of possibility of determination as 'defectless' in respect of the inference based on perceptibility.[1]

tr.78 (There will be) defectiveness in respect of an inference (accepted as defectless.

1.78 On account of the observation of deviation of perception in some place there (would arise) unauthoritativeness with respect to an inference accepted as defectless and thereby due to impossibility of the determination of defectlessness- there will be defectiveness (of the same inference). Since the rule that the absence of absence (something is) pressnt[2].

tr.0.79 (Further) the author points out the difficulty (defect) on impossibility of determination as 'defective' in respect of the inference "because it is proved by pramāṇas".[3]

tr.79 And there will be defectlessness in respect of an inference[4] (accepted as) defective.

1.79 Of defective inference 'means' of the inference accepted as defective

tr.0.80 And "on non acceptance of unauthoritativeness of perception in determinacy will occure not only in respect of the meaning of sacred texts. What is then? There would follow impossibility of all dealings since there would not exist any determinacy owing to (the fact that) all the determinacy (or system of fixing meaning) is rested in perception". With this intention he states-

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tr.80 (And) in this way (there will be) absence (of any) system

tr.1.80 The word iti 'in this way' (in this text) is for the purpose of indicating the above mentioned (result) situation.

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1. Here J shows that the syllogism विवादपदं मिथ्या दृश्यत्वात् which is accepted by the advaitins as defectless will come under 'defective'.

2. In the absence of any proof to state that same defect is not there (i.e. in the absence of absence) one has to accept that same defect is there.

3. i.e. the syllogism जगत्सत्यं मानसिदृश्यत्वात्

4. Namely →

5. J wants to make it clear that the inference regarding the reality by itself is not defective, but it is held as defective by the advaitins.

(The entire discussion establishes that the proposition the world is not real is contrary to the experience)

Com 0.81 यदुक्तं हेतुस्वरूपासिद्धिरव्याप्तिरिति हेतुर्विरोध इति तदयुक्तम् । आश्रयासिद्धि-साध्यासिद्धिव्यधिकरणासिद्धीनामपि 'हेतुविरोधित्वात् इत्यत आह

T 81 आश्रयसाध्यव्यधिकरणासिद्धयो न दूषणम्

Com 1.81 आश्रयासिद्धिव्यधिकरणासिद्धी दर्शिते । ततः प्राक् साध्यधर्मस्याप्रसिद्धिः साध्यासिद्धिः । यथा 'इयं भूः शशविषाणोल्लिखिता भूत्वात्' इति ।

Com 0.82 (टी.) कुतो न दूषणमित्याह

T. 82 अतिप्रसङ्गाभावात्

Com 1.82 आश्रयासिद्ध्यादीनामदूषणत्वाङ्गीकारे अनिष्टप्रसङ्गाभावात् न दूषणम् ।

Com 0.83 अतिप्रसङ्गाभावेऽपि कथमदूषणम् ? इत्याह

T. 83 अतिप्रसङ्गेन हि दोषत्वादोषत्वे कल्प्ये

Com 1.83 यस्य दोषत्वानङ्गीकारे अनिष्टप्रसङ्गः तस्य दोषत्वम् । यथा स्वरूपासिद्धेः अदोषत्वे ह्रदादेरग्नि-मत्वप्रसङ्गेन दोषत्वम् । यस्य च अदोषत्वानङ्गीकारे अनिष्टप्रसङ्गः तस्य अदोषत्वम् । यथा व्याप्तेः अदोषत्वानङ्गीकारे साध्यासिद्धिप्रसङ्गेन अदोषत्वम् । एवं दोषत्वादेरतिप्रसङ्गाधीनत्वात् अत्र च

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तदभावात् न दोषत्वम्। अत्र अदोषत्वोक्तिः दृष्टान्ततया उपयुज्यते। अतिप्रसङ्गशब्देन भावाभावावुपलक्ष्य अन्वयव्यतिरेकोक्तिर्वा।

tr.0.81 As to what is said ' unestablished nature of a probans by itself (in a particular place), and inadequate pervasion is a contradiction to a probans.' is not correct[1] because the nature of being contrary with a probans (is possible in respect of) unestablishment in the abode, unestablishment of the probandum and unestablishment in respect of the counter substratum also. (Having expect this objection) the author states-

tr.81 Unestablishment in the substratumand in the counter substratum are already explained[2]. And the unestablished nature of essential characteristic of a probandum even before that[3] is (called) unestablishment of a probandum.for example this ground is scratched by th horn of a hare, because it is a ground.

tr.0.82 (One might ask) why it is not a defect? And therefore he states

tr.82 Because of the absence of unwarranted contingency.

1.82 Since there is no any undesired contingency even on the acceptance of non defective nature in respect of unestablishment in the substratum etc; (they are not the) defects.

0.83 (It might be argued further) why it is not a defect in the absence of undesired contingency? (Therefore) he states-

tr.84 The nature of being a defect or not being a defect is to be decide (postulated) through the possibility of unwarranted contingency only[4].

1.84 (That only) is said to be a defect which, on non acceptance of it' defectness (leads to) unwarrented contingency. For example, if the unestablishment by it's very nature is not accepted as a defect there will be contingency of a lake having fire and thereby defect nature. (Similarly that only) is said not to be a defect which on non acceptance of it's not being a defect leads to undesired contingency. For example, If (the absence of) pervasion is accepted as 'not

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a defect' then there will be contingency of unestablishment of a probandum and thereby defectiveness. Thus the nature of being defect etc. is depended upon unwarrented contingency and since the same (i.e contingency)is not (taking place) in the present case, here there is no nature of being a defect[5]. The statement of not being a defect in this case is to be used as an example . Or it should be understood as, there is the statement of positive and negative (concomitance) by indication of existence and absence through the word atiprasaṅga 'unwarrented contingency.[6]

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1. See text हेतुस्वरूपासिद्धेरन्याश्रितेति हेत्वविरोधः PL.182.11
2. See the discussion on asiddha type of fallacy. The examples given for these two types are as i) प्रधानं नित्यं कार्यत्वात् ii) शब्दोऽनित्यः घटस्य कृतकत्वात् PL.110.9
3. That = is inferential knowledge- But śrī-'inference' See.PL 206-18
4. According to M the defect is a relative term. Whether something can be called a defect or not is dependant upon it's result. To convey this idea only, J has further defined dosatva and adosatva.
5. If the absence of probans is not held as defect then a lake also even though not possessing smoke willbe a real subject, and the contingency of inferential knowledge in lake will occure. But this is not expected and therefore it is a defect. Similarly if the absence of concomitance is not a defect, any subject without being probandum will be a real subject, which is undesired. Therefore it results in 'defect'.
6. In short the text is to be interpreted as- If on non acceptance of something as defect unwarrented contingency is there- it is a defect and if something is accepted as defect, but unwarrented contingency does not occur, it is not a defect.

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Com.0.85 इतोऽपि नाश्रयासिद्ध्यादेर्दोषत्वमित्याह

T.85 व्याप्तिरेव हि प्रयोजिका

Com.1.85 साध्यसिद्धौ हि साधनस्य व्याप्तिरेव प्रयोजिका । न तु सदाश्रयत्वं साध्यप्रसिद्धिः साध्यसाधनयोरेकाधिकरणत्वं वा । व्यतिरेकाभावात् । न हि सत्यां व्याप्तौ दोषान्तरासङ्कीर्णाश्रयासिद्ध्यादिना साध्यासिद्धिर्दृष्टेति । उपलक्षणमेतत् । विवक्षितस्थले सिद्धिश्चेति ज्ञातव्यम् । हेतुस्वरूपासिद्धिरिति ह्युक्तम् । एवकारस्तु सदाश्रयत्वादिव्यावर्तकः । व्याप्तिमत्साधनं हि विवक्षितस्थले विद्यमानं विवक्षितस्थले साध्यं प्रयोजयति ।

tr.0.85 Further(with the intention of conveying that) still (for the following reason) unestablishment of the substratum etc. are not of the nature of 'defect' he states-

tr.85 Because, only concomitance is the reason (which leads to inferential knowledge).

1.85 'The concomitance (with the probans' is the only reason for the establishment of a probandum. But not i) having an existing subject (substratum), ii) establishment of a probandum iii) or having one and the same substratum for probans and probandum.[1] Because of the absence of negation.[2] It is not the case that we notice the absence of establishment of probandum owing to the unestablishment of the substratum etc. not accompanied by any other defects[3] and when the concomitance is there. This is an indication.[4] And the establishment in intended particular place is to be understood (and therefore) It is said as 'unestablishment of a probans by its very nature.' The word eva 'only' is for warding off the nature of having an existing substrat etc. Because the probans possessing concomitance, existing in a (particular) intended place (alone), causes the existence of probandu in a particular place.

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1. M is of the opinion that concomitance alone is necessary for interential knowledge. And other things such as asadāshrayatva etc. are not necessary, And since the establishment of probandum is possible inspite of the existence of āsrayāsiddhi etc, they cannot be called 'defects'.

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2. The word negation is this respect, means absence of the establishment of probandum. As discussed above, we donot see the non establishment of probandum even when asadāśrayatva etc. exist.

3. By the word other defects, contradiction etc. are covered. what M wants to state is asadāśrayatva etc. alone do not prevent the establishment of probandum, but when they are mixed with other defects li contradiction etc. they become so.

4. This indicates that M wants to suggest that it is not necessary that a probans must be present in the subject only. But it should be in a respective place. And therefore he stated in the text as Hetusvarūpāsic otherwise he could have stated Hetusvarūpasya pakse siddhih.

5. The word eva in the text 'vyāptireva' excludes asadāśrayatva etc. from being the reason for inferential knowledge but not the establishment in a respective place etc. from being so.

(टी.) किमतो यदि व्याप्तिरेव प्रयोजिका ? इत्यत आह

असत्यपि व्याप्तिरस्त्येव

प्रयोजिका च व्याप्तिः असत्यप्याश्रये साध्यसाधनयोरस्त्येव । 'वन्ध्यासुतो न वक्ता अचेतनत्वात्' इत्यादौ दर्शनात् । अतो नाश्रयासिद्धिर्दूषणमिति ।

(टी.) एवं असत्यपि साध्यस्य प्रसिद्धत्वे प्रयोजिका व्याप्तिरस्त्येव "जीवच्छरीरजातं सात्मकं प्राणादिमत्वात्' इत्यादौ दर्शनात् । अतो न साध्यासिद्धिर्दूषणमिति ।

(टी.) तथा असत्यपि साध्यसाधनयोरेकाधिकरणत्वे प्रयोजिका व्याप्तिरस्त्येव । चन्द्रोदयादिना समुद्रवृद्धियाद्यनुमानदर्शनात् । अतो न व्यधिकरणासिद्धिरपि दूषणमिति ।

tr.0.86 (One might say) all right, what is then, if concomitance only is a cause? Therefore he states-

tr.86 (Because) even in the absence of that (substratum), concomitance is there.

1.86 (We can say that the) concomitance between probandum and a probans which is the cause (for inferential knowledge) exists even when the

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substratum does not exist. (Because) it is observed in the syllogism like 'This son of the barren woman cannot speak because of being an inanimate. And therefore unestablishment of substration is not a defect. Similarly (we can see that) even in the absence of established nature of probandum, the concomitance which is the cause (for inferential knowledge) exists because of the observation of it, in the syllogism as - 'All the living bodies possess soul because they possess life.[2] And therefore unestablished nature of a probandum (also) is not a defect.

In the same way (we can see that) even when there is the absence of having one and the same substratum for a probandum and a probans the concomitance which is the cause (for the establishment of a probandum) exists, Because of our experience of inference of 'rising of the sea etc. through the rise of the moon etc.[3] And therefore non establishment through counter substratum also is not a defect.

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1. Here 'this son of a barren woman' is the subject or substratum which does not exist., for, barren woman cannot have child. But we can get the establishment of probandum 'absence of capacity to speak' in what is inanimate.
2. All the living bodies are made subject for this inference and hence nothing else can be shown as an example where the establishment of probandum could be observed.
3. In this example, rise of the sea (i.e. the probandum) is on the earth but rise of the moon (i.e. the probans) is in the sky. Thus both these do not have one and the same substratum.

Com·0·87. असदाश्रयस्य हेतोर्व्याप्त्यनङ्गीकारे बाधकं चाह

T·87 'असदाश्रयस्य साधकत्वं न' इत्यपि 'व्याप्तिं विना कथं निवार्यते ?

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Com 1.87 'असदाश्रयस्य साधकत्वं न' इति ब्रुवंस्तत्र किञ्चित् प्रमाणमाचष्टे न वा। न द्वितीयः। प्रमाणं विना अर्थसिद्धेरभावात्। आद्ये न तावत् प्रत्यक्षमागमो वा तत्रास्ति। अतोऽनुमानमेव वाच्यम्। तत् 'किमसत् तदाश्रयं हेतुं वा पक्षीकृत्य प्रवर्तते? उभयमप्यसदाश्रयं स्यात्। सतः असद्धर्मत्वानङ्गीकारात्। तत्र प्रष्टव्यं, तस्य व्याप्तिरस्ति न वा? इति। नाद्यः सर्वत्रापि तत्प्रसङ्गात्। द्वितीये 'असदाश्रयस्य साधकत्वं न' इति निवारणं न स्यात्। अव्याप्तस्य साधनबाधनानङ्गत्वादिति।

नन्वसतो निर्धर्मकत्वेन साध्यसाधनाश्रयत्वानुपपत्तेः कथमसदाश्रयो हेतुः साधकः स्यात्? इत्यत आह ॥ असदाश्रयस्येति ॥ अत्र व्याप्तिरिति तद्वतोः साध्यसाधनयोराश्रयत्वमुपलक्ष्यते। प्रागपिहेतुसमुच्चये। अत्रासद्विषयव्यवहारान्तरानुपपत्तिं समुच्चिनोति। अन्यत्समानम्।

tr. .87 Further he shows the difficulty in non accepting the concomitance in respect of a probans the substratum of which is non existant.

tr.87 How this also can be stated (lit refused)' (the probans) having non existent substradum is not (of the nature of) establishing (a probadum)"without the concomitance.

1.87 One who is saying that the probans having non existent substratum is not of the nature of establisher of (probandum) does state any pramāna for that or not? The second alternative (i.e. does not give any pramāna) is not possible, because no . ende (of any statement) is established without (the support) of pramāṇas. In the case of fir alternative (i.e. giving pramāna for that one has to give atleast on of the three pramāṇas) but neither perception not verbal testimony i (possible to state) there. And therefore he has to state inferenc only. But, whether that inference (also) will proceed by making some-thing non existant as a subject or making a probans having non existent substratum as a subject?[1] Both these will be asadāśraya. Becaus it is not accepted that existent one cannot be a property of non existent[2]. In that case it is to be asked, whether it[3] has concomitar or not? The first alternative is not possible, because the contingency of it will occure everywhere[4]. In the case of second alternati the refutation as 'one having non existent substratum is not of the nature of establishing"is not possible. Because one which is not

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concomitant is not a part of contradiction with a probans.[5]

(One might argue, further) anything which is non existent is devc of attribute and therefore, being the substratum of probandum and probans is not possible (in it's respect). And how (then) the probans having non existent substratum will be of establishing nature? Therefore the author states 'asadāśrayasya'. Here (by the word) Vyāpti the nature of being substratum for a probandum and the probans which poss it (i.e. vyāpti) is indicated.[6] In the (first)previous interpretation, the word api is for the inclusion of (the word) hetu 'probans' And here (i.e. in this interpretation) covers (indicates of lit. collects) impossibility of other usage (practices) regarding non existent one. the rest is common.[7]

1- Interpretation of the word asadāśraya is possible in two ways. And therefore meaning will be as- i) the substratum which is non existent is not establisher of probandum (i.e. non existing substratum cannot be a part of probans) or ii) The probans having non existent substratum is not establisher of probandum. In the first of these two syllogistic statements, the subject is non existant substratum while in the second, the subject is the probans qualified as having non existent substratum.

2. One should not say let the substratum be non existent but the probans existing there will be existent one. Because if a property is non existent the possesser of that property also is (held as) non existent.

3. It = the inference or syllogistic statement which is going to prove that (the probans having) non existent substratum is not establisher of a probandum.

4. If it is accepted that there is concomitance for this inference, then,

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any inference like 'the son of barren woman etc' will lead to inferentia knowledge because that also comes under asadāśraya.

5. Because any syllogistic statement would not lead to inference without showing the concomitance.

6. J gives one more interpretition for this sentence by using api in dif erent way. And to bring out this meaning he says 'vyāpti means 'abode of both (i.e.) subject'. In the first way the meaning will be i) How can one present the syllogism 'one having non existent substratum is not esta lisher' without the concomitance and the probans. ii) And if you say that any non existent cannot be the substratum of probans etc. becaus it is attributeless, then you cannot use the phrase 'the non existant not----' because one cannot refute or prohibit what does not exist at All In this case the word api is taken to convey 'this type of statement also is not possible' etc.

7. rest = inferpretition of other words of the text (except the word api is common to both ways.

Com.88 ; इतोऽपि न निर्धर्मकत्वेन असतः साध्यसाधनाश्रयत्वाभावो वाच्य इत्याह

T. 88 असदाश्रयमित्यादिविशेषणत्वसम्भवे कथमव्याप्तिः

Com. 1.88 'असदाश्रयं साधनं न साधकं' इति वदता असतः साधनव्यावर्तकतया तद्विशेषणत्वं अङ्गीकृतमेव । अन्यथा तथा वक्तुमेवाशक्यत्वात् । एवञ्च असतो विशेषणत्वलक्षणधर्मसम्भवे कथं साध्यसाधनधर्माश्रयत्वासम्भवः ? विशेषहेत्वभावादिति । एवं असदाश्रयत्वं आश्रयासिद्धिरिति मतं निराकृतम् ।

tr.88. Further with the intention of conveying that 'still for one more reason one should not state the absence of the nature of being substratum for a probandum and probans in respect of non existing owing to it's attributelessness' the author states-

tr.88 How can there be the absence of concomitance when there is the possibility of being an adjective (in the case of) asadāśraya etc.

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1.88 By one who is stating that the probans having non existant substratum cannot be the establisher of a probandum, 'the nature of being an adjective in respect of non existant one' is already accepted through the acceptance of it's being excluder of probans[1]. Otherwise it is not possible to state like that. And in this way when there is the possibility of having the attribute in the form of adjectiveness in the case of non - existent one, how can there be impossibility of being the substratum of the attribute like probandum or probans? Since there is no any special reason(for that[3]). In this way the view that, having non existent substratum is (equal to) unestablishment in respect of it's substratum'is refuted.

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1. In short, the objection is, anything which is attributeless how can have the attribute as 'being substratum?

2. In the statement 'having non existent substratum cannot be.... the phrase having non existent substratum itself is for the exclusion of other probans which has existent substratum from coming under this nature (namely, not establisher of probandum) And this way, th word asadāśrayatva is an adjective of a speacial attribute which differentiate this probans from the others. And because of this adjective one can not say that the non existent is attributeless.

3. namely, why 'adjective' is an attribute and probandum etc. are not so.

Com.0.89 ये पुनरभावस्य निर्धर्मकत्वात् तदाश्रयत्वं आश्रयासिद्धिदूषणं ब्रुवते तन्निरासायाह

T. 89 न चात्यन्ताभावोऽपि सर्वधर्मरहितः

Com.1.89 किमुत प्रागभावादिः प्रामाणिकप्रतियोगिक इति शेषः ।

Com.0.90 कुतो न ? इत्यत आह

T. 90 प्रमेयत्वाद्यनुभवात्

Com.1.90 अनुभूयन्ते हि प्रमेयत्वाभिधेयत्वादयः अत्यन्ताभावेऽपि धर्माः । कथमन्यथा तस्य सर्वधर्मराहित्यादि जानीयात् ? कथं च शिष्यं प्रत्युपदिशेत् ? अनुपदिष्टश्च कथमसौ जानीयात् ? इति ।

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tr.0.89 (Further) in order to refute (the view of those) who say that an absence is attributeless and being substratum of it is a defect (called) āśrayasiddhi 'unestablishment in it's substratum' the author states-

tr.89 Not even the absolute absence also is devoid of all attributes.

tr.1.89 "What then, to say about anticedent negation counter correlate of which is proved by pramānas" is the remaining part (of the above text).

tr.0.90 Why not? (one might ask and) therefore he states-

tr.90 Because of the experience of 'knowability'

tr.1.90 Indeed we experience the attributes like 'fit to be known' or 'fit to be named' etc. even in the absolute absence. Otherwise how could one known its nature of being devoid of all properties etc And how can one instruct the same to his pupils? And how the pupil would understand it, if he is not taught?

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1. If it is not accepted that absolute absence does not possess even knowability then it is not possible to teach it, because an unknowable thing cannot be taught.

Com.0.91 हेत्वन्तरेण अप्रसिद्धसाध्यस्य हेतोः साधकत्वं साधयति

T. 91 परिशेषार्थापत्तिप्रामाण्याभ्युपगमाच्च

Com.1.91 परिशेषस्य अर्थापत्तेश्च प्रामाण्यं तावत् सर्वैरङ्गीकृतम्। तत्साध्यं अप्रसिद्धमपि दृश्यते। अतो न कुत्रापि साध्याप्रसिद्धेर्दूषणत्वम्।

Com.0.92 इतोऽपि नाप्रसिद्धसाध्यस्य असाधकत्वमित्याह

T. 92 'विमतं सकर्तृकं' इत्यत्र सर्वज्ञत्वस्य पक्षधर्मताबलेन सिद्ध्यङ्गीकारात्

Com.1.92 'भूभूधरादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वात् घटवत्' इत्यनुमानेन परैः ईश्वरे सर्वज्ञत्वसिद्धिरङ्गीक्रियते। यद्यपि कार्यत्वं सकर्तृकत्वमात्रेण व्याप्तं तथापि भूभूधरादिपक्षधर्मताबलेन सर्वज्ञमेव कर्तारं गमयति। उपादानाऽदिविषयज्ञानवत एव कर्तृत्वात्। न च सर्वज्ञत्वं प्रसिद्धम्। अतस्तद्वत् न कुत्रापि अप्रसिद्धसाध्यस्य दूषणत्वमिति।

अनेनैव व्यधिकरणत्वेऽपि साधकत्वं चोपपादितं भवति। भूभूधराऽदिनिष्ठेन कार्यत्वेन हेतुना ईश्वरे सर्वज्ञत्वसिद्ध्यङ्गीकारात् न कुत्रापि साध्यसाधनयोर्व्यधिकरणत्वं दूषणमिति।

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एतेनैव अवयवनियमश्च परास्तः । न हि पक्षधर्मतावलेन सर्वज्ञत्वसिद्धाववयवनिय-
मोऽस्ति ।

tr.0.91 Further inducing yet another reason[1], the author explains (establishes) the nature of proving (something) of a probans the probandum of which is unknown as -

tr.91 And also on account of the acceptance of authoritativeness (validity) of 'residue' and 'presumption (as pramāna)[2]

tr.1.91 The validity (as a pramāna) of 'residue' and of 'presumption' is accepted by all. And the probandum of it is seen to be what has been unknown. Therefore, nowhere the unestablishment of a probandum (is seen) as being a defect.

tr.0.92 Further (with the intention of conveying that for this one more reason)[3] also (the probans) having unknown probandum is not of the nature of non establisher (i.e. is establisher) he states-

tr.92 (Because in respect of the syllogism) 'the thing under dispute has a creater----- the establishment of all knowingness is accepte through the strength of subject adjunctness.

tr.1.92 The (establishment of) omniscient character of Īśvara is accepted by the others through the syllogism "the earth and the mountain etc (are having) have a creator because (they are) being an effect lik a pot". Though 'the effectness' is being pervaded by mere 'nature of having a creator'[4], it makes known the only creator who is all knowing, owing to the strength of adjunctness with the subject 'the earth and the mountain etc.' Since that alone who possesses the knowledge relating to things which are material cause etc. can hav (capacity to create and thereby) the nature of a creator. And omniscience (all knowingness) is not at all known (observed any where). And as in that case, however (else also) unknown probandum is not held as a defect.

By this very statement the capacity to establish (the probandum) even in the case where there is difference of substrata, is reason out.

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Since the establishment of omnyscient nature in respect of the Lord is accepted because of the probans Kāryatve 'being an effect' existin in 'the earth and the mountain etc' no where the (nature of having) different substrate of a probandum and a probans is held as a defec: By this very argument, the restriction regarding the number of part: (of syllogistic statement) also is rifuted. For, there is no any restriction of the number of the parts (of the syllogistic stateme: in the attempt to prove omnyscient nature on the strength of the subject adjunctness.[5]

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1. Because in the previous passage he has shown 'undesired contingency as a reason for accepting the proving nature now he gives another o:
2. In the case of both these pramāṇas the conclusions namely 'caitra is not at (his) home, or one is having fifty' are not known previously. but they are drawn just from the facts observed.
3. Namely, the establishment of omnyscient nature in respect of the Lo
4. Because the concomitance is observed as 'whatever is an effect has creator', but not as has a creator who is omnyscient.
5. In this syllogism no illustration is possible because any other omnyscient is not possible to be shown. Therefore the illustration part of this syllogistic statement cannot be stated and hence restriction of particular number of parts cannot be observed.

Gan.O.93 नन्वप्रसिद्धसाध्ययोः परिशेषार्थापत्त्योः प्रामाण्याभ्युपगमेऽपि किमायातमप्रसिद्धसाध्य-सानुमानस्य साधकत्वे ? इत्यत आह

T. 93 परिशेषोऽर्थापत्तिरनुमानमित्यविशेषः

Gan.1.93 अप्रसिद्धसाध्यस्य परिशेषादेः साधकत्वे अनुमानस्यैव तदुक्तं स्यात् । परिशेषादिरनुमान-मित्यनतिभिन्नार्थत्वात् ।

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Com.0.94 तत्कुतः? इत्यत आह

T. 94 उपपत्तिमात्रत्वात्

Com. 94 इहोपपत्तिरन्यथानुपपत्तिर्ज्ञातव्या ।

Com.0.95 परिशेषार्थापत्त्योः अन्यथानुपपत्तित्वेऽपि कुतोऽनुमानत्वं ? इत्यत आह

T. 95 उपपत्तेश्च व्याप्त्यपेक्षा सर्वथा अङ्गीकार्येत्याग्रहमात्रेण भेदः

Com. 1.95 अन्यथानुपपत्तिर्हि केनचित् विना कस्यचिदसम्भवः । असम्भवश्च न तावदनुत्पत्तिः । बहिर्भावादिनाऽपि गृहाभावादेरजन्यत्वात् । अतोऽनवस्थानमेवासम्भव इति वाच्यम् । तस्य च व्याप्त्यपेक्षा सर्वथा अङ्गीकार्या । केनचिद्विना कस्यचिदनवस्थानं हि तयोर्व्याप्तिं विना नोपपद्यते । व्याप्त्यपेक्षया अर्थावगमकमनुमानमिति चोक्तम् । एवमपि परिशेषादेरनुमानत्वानङ्गीकारे धूमोऽप्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या अग्निं गमयन् नानुमानं स्यात् । अतो दुर्दर्शनाभ्यासविशेषविजृम्भिताऽग्रहमात्रेण अनुमानात् अर्थापत्त्यादेर्भेदो वादिभिरङ्गीक्रियत इति ।

tr.0.93 (Expecting further argument that) Even if the authority of 'Residue and Presumption-the probandum of which is unknown as pramāṇa is accepted, how does it help in (what is the out come which leads to) accepting the proving nature in respect of an inference having unknown probandum? the author states-

tr.93 Residue, Presumption and inference do not have a difference (between one another).

1.93 If one speaks of proving nature in respect of Residue etc, the probandum of which is unknown, then that would be spoken of, in the case of inference itself. Since (the words) residue etc.(and inference are not having much different meaning.[1]

tr.0.94 (Then the question will come) why is that so? And therefore) the author states-

tr.94 (Because they also are) of the nature of reasoning only.

1.94 In this respect the word upapatti reasoning is to be understood in the sence of anyathānupapatti 'existence of one being disproved without the other'.

tr.0.95 (Again one might ask) even though residue and presumptions are accepted as being of the nature of anyathānupapatti, why they are

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(said) to be of the nature of inference? (And therefore) the author states-

tr.95 And the distinction is only on account of insistance that one has always to accept the expectancy of concomitance for reasoning.

1.95 anyathānupapatti 'absence of being proved otherwise' is an impassibility of some conclusion in the absence of something else. But the word impossibility does not mean non production. Since the absence of some one at his home etc. is not produced by his presence outside. Ar hence the word asambhava 'impossibility' in this respect is to be unde stood as 'non existence' only.[1] And for that (purpose), the expectancy of concomitance is always to be accepted (as necessary one). 'Absence of being proved of something without something else' does not stand to reason without concomitance of those two. And this also is alread said that 'inference is that which makes known something through it's dependance on a concomitance'. In this way also, (being aware of this fact) if one does not accept the nature of inference in respect of residue and presumption; smoke, causing cognition of fire by way of anyathānupapatti 'absence of being proved without the other' will not be (called) inference. And for this reason (only, we say that) distinction of presumption etc. from inference, (as) accepted by the proponents (other party), is only because of their insistance (for holding so) arising out of (or caused by) a particular study of wrong doctrine.[3]

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1. The basic idea behind this argument is - M does not accept residue and presumption as distinct pramāṇas but include them under inference And their dinctinct mention from inference is justified only for one reason namely, inference necessarily needs concomitance whereas

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residue etc. do not need it in that way. But anyathānupapatti is common to all these three.

2. J has explained here what slight difference is between the absence of smoke (in the absence of fire), and the absence of some one at his home. In the first, absence of smoke is produced in the absence of fire, while in the second, the absence is not produced but it is understood.

3. In short, their view regarding residue and presumption is based on the study of wrong concepts and insistance arising out of it.

Com.0.96 प्रसङ्गात् उपमानस्याप्यनुमानत्वं प्रागुक्तं साधयितुमाह

T. 96 उपमानस्यापि

Com. 1.96 अपिपदेन 'आग्रहमात्रेण भेदः' इत्यनुकृष्यते ।

Com. 0.97 कुतः? इत्यत आह

T. 97 व्याप्तिरूपत्वात्

Com. 1.97 व्याप्तिसापेक्षमर्थगमकं ह्यनुमानम् । उपमानस्यापि व्याप्तिसापेक्षत्वात् नानुमानात् भेदः ।

Com. 0.98 कथमुपमाने व्याप्तिः? इत्यतस्तामुपपादयति

T. 98 न हि स्वसदृशेनासदृशं क्वचित् दृष्टम्

Com. 1.98 'यो यद्गतसादृश्यप्रतियोगी स तेन सदृशः' इति हि व्याप्तिरुपमाने विवक्षिता । 'न हि यत् येन सदृशं तत् तेन असदृशं क्वापि दृष्टम्' येनेयं व्याप्तिरनुपपन्ना स्यादिति मीमांसकोपमानस्य व्याप्तिरुपपादिता भवति । नैयायिकोपमानेऽपि न हि योऽगोत्वे सति गोसदृशः असौ गवयशब्द-वाच्यात् अन्यो दृष्ट' इत्यादिरूपेण व्याप्तिरूपपादनीया ।

tr.0.96 (Now) as occasion demands, in order to establish the nature of inference in respect of analogy, which is already stated before, the author says-

tr.96 Also of analogy-

tr. 1.96 With the word 'also' the phrase' the distinction is on account of instince only' is[1] (carried out) continued (from previous passage).

tr.0.97 (To answer) why this is so? (the author states)-

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tr.97 Because of it's[2] nature of being concomitance.

1.97 Inference is one which is making known . something (and is) dependant on concomitance. And anology also owing to it's dependantee on concomitance is not different from inference.

tr.0.98 (One might ask) how is there (scope for) concomitance in anology (In order to answer the same) he explains it[3] as follows-

tr.98 For indeed, nowhere a thing is seen dissimilar to what is similar to it[4]

1.98 In an anology, there is intended the concomitance, namely, 'One who is counter correlate of the similarity existingin that other, is similar to that other.' And this also is not the case that such concomitance will not be observed[5] since we do no see something dissimilar anywhere to that, (of which is it similar and thereby with this observation) the concomitance required fo anology stated by the mīmāṃsaka will be explained. And even in the case of anology as stated by the naiyāyikas the concomitance is to be explained in the following form-one who is not a cow bu similar to a cow; is not seen (found) different from what is expressed by the word 'cow'.[6]

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1. See tr.95. The same is to be repeated here in respect of anology also.
2. It's = of anology
3. It = concomitance.
4. If we see A is similar to B, then this experience is permanent we do not see otherwise, because similarity cannot be occasional
5. i.e. necessarily observed.

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6. J has already explained the difference between the mimāṃsakas and the naiyāyikas regarding the concept of analogy and included them under inference inclusion of other pramāṇas under three

Com 0·99 अभावप्रमाणस्यापि अनुमानेऽन्तर्भावमुपपादयति

T. 99 योग्यानुपलब्धेश्च लिङ्गत्वम्

Com 1·99 भावानुपलब्धिरभावप्रमाणमङ्गीक्रियते । सापि अर्थे लिङ्गमेव । न तु पृथक्प्रमाणम् । कुतः? न ह्यनुपलब्धिमात्रमभावगमकमङ्गीक्रियते । किं तु? उपलब्धियोग्यस्यानुपलब्धिः ।

tr.0.99 (Further) he also explains the inclusion of absence as a means of knowledge under inference as-

tr.99 And the nature of being an inferential mark (inference in the case of non perception of what is fit to be perceived (also).

1.99 Non perception of existence is accepted as 'means of knowledge' for absence. But that also is only an inferential mark for absence (lit. for the object) and not a distinct pramāṇa. why is this? Because the non perception alone is not accepted as the cognizer of absence. What is then? The non perception of what is fit for per-

Com·0·100 तथापि कुतोऽनुमानत्वं इत्यत आह

T· 100· अविशेषात्

Com 1·100 अनुपलब्धिमभावप्रमाणमङ्गीकुर्वता योग्यस्यानुपलब्धिरिति कस्मादुच्यते? अनुपलब्धिमात्रस्य अभावव्यभिचारादिति चेत् । तत् किं योग्यानुपलब्धिरभावाव्यभिचारिणी? बाढमिति चेत् हन्त तर्हि व्याप्तिसापेक्षा अर्थं, गमयतीत्यङ्गीकृतं स्यात् । तथा च प्रसिद्धानुमानादविशेषादनुमानमेवेति ।

Com·0·101· किं चानुपलब्धेरभावगमकत्वे अभावत्वाविशेषात् अनुपलब्ध्यन्तरापेक्षेत्यनवस्था स्यादित्याह

T. 101 अविशेषात्

Com 0·101 असत्पक्षे स्वप्रकाशसाक्षिसिद्धत्वाददोषः ।

Com·0·102 न च वाच्यमनुपलब्धिरज्ञातैवार्थं बोधयतीति । तथा सत्यनुपलब्धित्वाविशेषात् सुषुप्त्यादावपि बोधयेदित्याह

T. 102 अविशेषात्

Com 1·102 न च चक्षुरादिवदुपपत्तिः । तस्य सम्प्रयोगादिविशेषापेक्षत्वात् । अनुपलब्धेस्तदभावादित्याह

T 103. अविशेषात्

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tr.0.100 (There will be further objection) All right, even then, how can (it be of the nature of) inference? And therefore he states-

100. Because of the absence of (any) difference.

1.100 Why does one, who accepts non perception as a _pramana_ (called 'absence) say that there is non perception of what is fit for perception)? (If one were to say) it is because non perception in general is over pervasive of absence.[1] Then (we will ask) all right, then the non perception (at least) of what is fit for perception has not a deviation from absence? If the answer is 'yes let this be so'. Then indeed it will be accepted that (the non perception of what could be perceived) makes known 'absence' only with the dependance on concomitance. And in that case, since it is not different from (that commonly accepted) inference, woul also be inference only.

Q.101 Moreover (with the intention of conveying that) if the non perception is accepted as the cognizer of absence, then it would not be distinct from absense, and therefore there would arise expectancy of another non perception[2] and thereby (there would arise) en less assumption. he states-

tr.101 Because of the absence of (any) difference.

1.101 According to our doctrine it is established by the self luminous witness[3] (and hence this) defect would not be there.

0.102 (Further to convey that)' This also should not be said that "non perception being unknown only, makes known absence;" If it were so it would make it known even in deep sleep because of the absence of any distinction from non perception[4], he states-

tr.102 Because of the absence of (any) difference.

1.102 (This also cannot be argued)' it is justified as in the case of visual faculty etc[5]

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Because it needs (dependant on) a speacial type of application (or contact), which is not the case of perception. Therefore he states-

tr.103 Because of the absenceof any difference-

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1. i.e. non perception exists in some more places where 'absence' does not exist.
2. Non perception and absence are not different from each other. If non perception is necessary for cognizing absence it means one absence is necessary to cognize another absence. Thus endless assumption of absence is unavoidable.
3. M has accepted the witness self, which does not need any other pramāna for deciding validity of knowledge obtained by it. Whatever is perceived or cognized by the witness self is valid only. M holds that the witness self can cognizes absence and there is no need to test it's validity.
4. Non perception in ordinary life and in deep sleep is not different. And if it is accepted that non perception which is unknown cognizes the absence then it should cognize absence at any time, even in dee sleep. But, experience is not like that.
5. In the case of visual faculty (i.e. eye) we can say that though thi faculty is ~~abe~~ alert and working all the time, we do not perceive each & every object coming in it's range because we do not bring all such objects into connection. The same can be the answer in respect of non perception also.

Com 0.104 त्रिविधो विरोध इत्यादिनोक्तस्योपयोगमाह

T. 104 उक्तदोषेष्वेवाशेषानुमानदोषाणामन्तर्भावः

Com 1.104 ये प्रतिज्ञाविरोधादयो दोषा उक्ताः तेष्वेव अशेषानुमानदोषाणां हेत्वाभासादीनामन्तर्भावः। अतो नोक्तदोषातिरेक इति। तत्र प्रबलप्रमाणविरोधः कालातीतः। समबलेन हेत्वन्तरेण विरोधः सन्देहतो व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिः सत्प्रतिपक्षश्चेत्युक्तम्। तेनैव हेतुना चेत् प्रकरणसमः। असिद्धिः स्वरूपासिद्धिः। व्यर्थविशेषणासिद्ध्यादेराधिक्ये अन्तर्भावः।

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0.104 Now the author explains the application of what is stated by the statement" the contradiction is threefold----[1]

T.104 The inclusion of all the defects of inference[2] is only under the defects stated (before)

1.104 The inclusion of all the defects of inference (without any exception including (beginning with) fallacies, is only under the defects (namely) contradiction to the proposition etc. which are stated earlier. And therefore there is no any addition to the defects already stated.[3] Of them, the contradiction through stronger pramāṇa is (known as) kālātīta.

It is already stated that the contradiction through another probans of equal strength is vyāpyatvāsiddhi because of doubt' and satpratipakṣa. If it is through the same probans, it is prakaraṇasama. Unestablishment is svarūpāsiddhih and vyarthaviśeṣaṇāsiddhi etc. are included under 'more'(or excess).

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1. See - P.L. 124.24

2. i.e. stated by others.

3. i.e. the defects are three only.

Com.2.104 व्याप्यत्वासिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकानध्यवसितानामव्याप्तौ। आद्यस्य साध्यसम्बन्धाभावात्। उत्तरयोस्तु विपक्षवृत्तित्वेन साध्यव्यभिचारात्। अनध्यवसितस्यापि पक्ष एव वर्तमानत्वेन व्याप्तेरग्रहणात्। व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिस्तत्र गृह्यतामिति चेन्न। सपक्षविपक्षाभावे सपक्षमात्रभावे वा तदयोगात्। सपक्षविपक्षभावे च अन्वयस्यैव प्रथमप्राप्तत्वेन सत्यपि सपक्षे तदनुपलब्धौ व्याप्त्यनिश्चयात्। सपक्षैकदेशवृत्त्यन्वयव्यतिरेकिवत् अस्य व्याप्तिः किं न गृह्यते? इति चेन्न। सपक्षैकदेशेऽपि अवृत्त्या किमत्र व्याप्तिरेव नास्ति? उत सपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिवत् अस्ति व्याप्तिः? इति सन्देहावस्कन्दनात्।

tr.2.104 The inclusion of vyāpyatvāsiddha, viruddha, Anaikāntika and Anadhyavasita is under 'absence of concomitance'. Because in the case of first[1] there is the absence of connection with probandum. In the case of other two[2], because of it's existence in a counter subject there is the deviation from a probandum. Even Anadhyavasita

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exists in the subject alone nd therefore no concomitance is found there.If some one says, negative concomitance should be taken there.

because in the absence of similar and counter subjects or in the possibility of only similar subject, that[3] is not possible. Even in case the similar and counter subjects are possibl there would not be the determination of concomitance because of non availability of it[4], as positive only comes first even when similar and counter(subjects) exist. (If one says that why the concomitance in this case also is n observed in the way as it is observed in the case of one having possitive and negative (examples) existing in a part of a counter subject? The answer is 'no'. Because the doubt whether on account of it's absence in a part of a similar subject there is no concomitanc at all, or the concomitance is there as it is in the case of one existing in a part of similar subject?

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1. i.e. Vyāpyatvāsiddha.
2. i.e. Viruddha and Anaikāntika. Existence in the counter subject itself shows the absence of concomitance.
3. That = absence of negative concomitance.
4. Non availability of positive concomitance in the similar subject.

Com. 3.104 ( ) व्यतिरेकतोऽनैकान्तिक एवानध्यवसित इत्येके । तदसत् । सपक्षविपक्षरहिते तदयोगात् । असिद्धविरुद्धयोरपि तत्त्वप्रसङ्गाच्चेति ।

3.104 Some others (say) that unsteady by negation is (called) non determinate[1] only. But it is not correct because it is not possible (to show it in the example) devoid of similar and counter subjects. And also because of the contingency of being that (i.e. non determinate) in respect of unestablished and contradicted.[3]

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Because it needs (dependant on) a speacial type of application (or contact), which is not the case of perception. Therefore he states-

tr.103 Because of the absenceof any difference-

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1. i.e. non perception exists in some more places where 'absence' does not exist.
2. Non perception and absence are not different from each other If non perception is necessary for cognizing absence it means one absence is necessary to cognize another absence. Thus endless assumption of absence is unavoidable.
3. M has accepted the witness self, which does not need any other pramāna for deciding validity of knowledge obtained by it. Whatever is perceived or cognized by the witne ssclf is valid only. M holds that the witness self can cognizes absence and there is no need to test it s validity.
4. Non perception in ordinary life and in deep sleep is not different. And if it is accepted that non perception which is unknown cognizes the absence then it should cognize absence at any time, even in deep sleep. But, experience is not like that.
5. In the case of visual faculty (i.e. eye) we can say that though this faculty is ~~abe~~ alert and working all the time, we do not perceive each an every object coming in it s range because we do not bring all such objects into connection. The same can be the answer in respect of non perception also.

Com 0.104 त्रिविधो विरोध इत्यादिनोक्तस्योपयोगमाह

T. 104 उक्तदोषेष्वेवाशेषानुमानदोषाणामन्तर्भावः

Com 1.104 ये प्रतिज्ञाविरोधादयो दोषा उक्ताः तेष्वेव अशेषानुमानदोषाणां हेत्वाभासादीनामन्तर्भावः । अतो नोक्तदोषातिरेक इति । तत्र प्रबलप्रमाणविरोधः कालातीतः । समबलेन हेत्वन्तरेण विरोधः सन्देहतो व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिः सत्प्रतिपक्षश्चेत्युक्तम् । तेनैव हेतुना चेत् प्रकरणसमः । असिद्धिः स्वरूपासिद्धिः । व्यर्थविशेषणासिद्धयादेराधिक्ये अन्तर्भावः ।

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1. The unsteady, according to the division stated by other is of two types i) sādhāran-anaikāntika and ii) asādhārna-anaikānitika The probans existing in the whole ofsimilar subject is called asadharna anaikantika. (i.e. vyatirekato anaikāntika) See -

तत्र सर्वाभिचारः स्यादनेकान्तः स च द्विधा
साधारणस्तथा हेतुरसाधारण एव च ।
आद्योऽन्वयादनेकान्तः पक्षसपक्षकृतान्वयः
व्यतिरेकादनेकान्तः पक्षमात्रान्वयः परः ॥ TaRa. 2. 80-81.

2. The example of such type is-'every thing is non eternal because it is the object of knowledge' As the subject of this probans covers everything and there is nothing to show as similar subject, the nature of being absent in similar subject is not possible in this case.

3. The respective stock examples of 'unestablished and contradicted are' sound is not eternal because it is seen and sound is eternal because it is made,' As both these probans exist in their counter subjects, these also can be called 'unsteady' which is undesired.

Com. 4. 104 -

दृष्टान्तविरोध एव उदाहरणाभासानामन्तर्भावः । आश्रयहीनत्वं पूर्ववत् अदूषणम् ।
अव्याप्त्यभिधानं न्यूने । विपरीतव्याप्त्यभिधानं असङ्गतौ । तर्कपराहतेरसिद्ध्यादाविति ।

tr.4.104 The inclusion of 'pseudo illustrations' is under the contradiction to illustration. (And) as stated before, 'being devoid of substratum' is not a defect. Non statement of concomitance is included under 'less' while statement of concomitance in other way is included under inconsistency. And 'removal of hypothetical argument' in unestablishment'[2] etc.[3]

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1. As already discussed, 'pseudo illustrations' are of two types- i) based on similarity and ii) based on dissimilarity. The following come under the first division - A) being devoid of i) probandum

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ii) probans and iii) both B) being devoid of substratum C) non statement of concomitance and D) statement of concomitance otherwise. Of these, the first three come under contradiction to illustration.'

2. Because, whatever is imposed as unwarrented on the opponent is not established. For example." .....such water will burn me too' is not an established fact.

3. etc.- covers contradicted through pramānas

Com.0.105 तथापि साध्याविशिष्टत्वं हेतोर्दूषणान्तरमस्तीत्यत आह

T 105 साध्याविशिष्टोऽसिद्धः

Com 105 पर्वतोऽग्निमान् अग्निमत्वादिति साध्याविशिष्टो हेतुरसिद्ध एवान्तर्भवति। साध्यमेव ह्यत्र हेतुः। न हि साध्यं सिद्धम्। व्याहतेरेव। न च वाच्यं साध्याविशिष्टो हेतुरव्याप्तौ किं नान्तर्भवति? व्याप्तेरुभयधर्मत्वेन स्वेनैव स्वस्य व्याप्त्ययोगादिति। विवक्षितस्थले लिङ्गदर्शनानन्तरं हि व्याप्ति-स्मृतिः स्यात्। तत्र साध्यभूतलिङ्गस्य अदर्शनेनैव अनुमानदोषसिद्धौ व्याप्तिचिन्तायां एवानुदयात्। आश्रयासिद्धिरदूषणमित्युक्तम्। तत् किं सर्वापि? न। 'धर्म्यभावादिनिमित्तैव। यदभाषत असत्यपि व्याप्तिरस्तीत्यादि।

tr.0.105 And yet one would say that there still remains one more defect of probans namely, 'not being distinct from probandum.' And therefore, in order to answer it, he states-

tr.105 Nature of being non different from probandum is inconsistent only.

1.105 The probans non different from the probandum as, 'the mountain has fire because of the possession of fire' becomes included only under 'unestablished'. Because the probandum only is a probans in this (inference). And since it is a probandum (one which is to be proved) it is not (yet) established on account of the contradicting statement. This also should not be asked 'why the probans non-different from a probandum is not included under avyāpti 'absence of concomitance' because concomitance is an attribute of both (i.e. of two different things) and this being so, concomitance of one with one self is impossible. The rememberance of concomitance would be (possible) only after the observation of an inferential

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mark in a particular (intended) place. And in this particular case, on account of non observation of inferential mark which is in the form of probandum, the defect of inference[1] only is established and therefore the question of (or thought of) concomitance does not arise at all.

It is already stated that 'unestablishment of its abode' is not a defect[2].(But) whether it is meant by that (statement) total[3] (or absolute unestablishment)?(The answer is) 'no'. But only what (arises) due to the absence of <u>dharmin</u>[4].Since it is stated 'in the absence of (that also) concomitance is there[5]' etc.

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1. namely, unestablishment

2. आश्रयसाध्यव्यधिकरणास्त्रिरूपे न दूषणम् PL.205.19

3. 'Total' refers to two types of <u>āśrayāsiddhi</u> i.e. i) on account of the absence of subject itself and on account of doubt regarding the existance of probans in it. First is '<u>sasthī tatpurusa</u>' and the second is '<u>saptamītatpurusa</u>'. This is according to the Tārkikas See.

आश्रयासिद्धता हेतोः पक्षधर्मस्य साधने ।
पक्षो हि संश्रयस्तस्य स च साध्यान्वितो यतः ॥ TaRa.2.85

4. <u>Āśrayāsiddhi</u> arising out of first type mentioned above only, is said to be 'not a defect', but not of the second type.

5. J gives proof for the above answer, in the words of M. M has said that even in the absence of that (i.e. subject) the concomitance is there, which means the absence of a subject does not amount to defect. See. असत्यपि व्याप्तिरस्त्येव PL.208.20.

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

Com 0.106 तर्हि सिद्धसाधकत्वं दोषान्तरमस्तीत्यत आह

T 106 सिद्धसाधकोऽसङ्गतः

Com. 1.106 बुभुत्सितसाधनस्यैव सङ्गतत्वात् सिद्धसाधकोऽसङ्गतो भवति ।

0.106 (Further ,one might argue) There is one more defect (called)' the nature of being establisher of what is already established'. (which is not included under any other).To this, the author states-

tr.106 Establisher of what is already established is 'inconsistent'[1]

1.106 Since ,the probans which is going to prove something which is desired to be known only is (experienced as) consistent (or proper one), the probans which establishes (makes known) what is already established (known) is inconsistent (improper).[2]

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1. i.e. It is included under 'inconsistency.'
2. If any thing already proved is being established , it has no meaning and therefore it is inconsistency only.

Com.0.107 एवं प्रमाणतदाभासस्वरूपं निरूप्य स्वोक्तलक्षणदृढीकरणाय वाघन्तरोक्तलक्षणानि निराकुर्वन् भाट्टानां लक्षणं तावन्निराचष्टे

T.107 न प्रमासाधनं प्रमाणम्

Com.1.107 प्रमेयगतं ज्ञाततापरपर्यायं प्राकट्यं प्रमेत्युच्यते । तत्साधनं प्रमाणम् । अत्र प्रमाग्रहणं कुठारादिव्यावृत्त्यर्थम् । साधनग्रहणं प्रमायामतिव्याप्तिं प्रत्यक्षादावसम्भवं च व्यवच्छिनत्ति । न चेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादावव्याप्तिः । ज्ञानस्यैव मुख्यतः प्रामाण्यात् । न च भ्रमादावतिव्याप्तिः । अर्थानुसारिणो ज्ञाततविशेषस्यैव प्रमात्वात् । भ्रमादिना च तदजननात् । इदमित्याद्याकारेण जननेऽपि तत्र प्रामाण्याभ्युपगमात् । ज्ञाते पुनर्ज्ञाततानुदयेन न स्मृतावतिव्याप्तिः । साधनग्रहणेनैव प्रमात्रादिव्युदास इति ।

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Com 0.108 तदेतल्लक्षणं नोपपद्यते । कुतः? इत्यत्र आह

T. 108 ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तप्रमायां प्रमाणाभावात्

Com. 1.108 प्रमेयाश्रयायाः प्रमाया एवाभावेन असम्भवित्वादयुक्तमिदं लक्षणम् । न हि प्रमेयनिष्ठप्रमायां प्रमाणमस्ति । ज्ञातो घटः, प्रकटो घटः इति प्रमेयधर्मतया प्रमा प्रत्यक्षत एवानुभूयत इत्यत उक्तम्

॥ ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तेति ॥ ज्ञातो घटः इत्यादौ हि ज्ञानमेव प्रमेयविशेषणतया दृश्यते । न तु ततोऽन्या प्रमेति । न च आत्मधर्मस्य ज्ञानस्य प्रमेयविशेषणताऽनुपपत्तिः । इष्टो घटः इत्यादावपि तदभावापातात् । विषयविषयिभावात् तत्रोपपत्तिरिति चेत् समं प्रकृतेऽति । न च वाच्यं ज्ञाततासभावे ज्ञानस्य विषयनियम एवायुक्तः । यदाकारं यत् विज्ञानं तत् तद्विषयमिति हि बौद्धानामेव शोभत इति । तथा सति इच्छादीनामपि विषयनियमाभावप्रसङ्गादिति । [1]करणविषयतया तत्रोपपत्तिरिति चेत् तुल्यम् । अन्यथा तेनैव ज्ञानेन अत्रैव ज्ञातता जायत इति नियमो न स्यादिति ।

tr.0.107 Thus having explained the nature of (real) pramānas and pseudo pramānas now the author, with the purpose of confirming the definition stated himself by way of refutation of the definitions stated by opponents; refutes the definition stated by Bhatta[1] at first , as-

tr.107 a (The difinition of) pramāns is not (as) 'an instrumental caus of pramā'

1.107 (And) pramā is manifestation of what is present in the object to be known, having another name jñātatā 'knowness' (And) the instrument for (obtaining) it, is called pramāna. Addition of the word pramā in this definition is for the purpose of exclusion of an exe etc.[2](from coming under this definition). (Similarily) inclusion of the word sādhana 'instrument' avoids (cuts the possibility of) over applicability of this definition in pramā[3] and also impossibility in perception etc.[4](This definition) will not have over applicability in the contact of sense organs etc.[5] (with the object) because knowledge alone is especially (held) as (being a) pramāna.[6]Nor (even) there would be overapplicability in illusion etc.[7] Because a particu

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lar type of knownness which is in accordance with the object, is said to be pramā. And the same is not produced through illusion etc.[8] Though there is the production (of knowledge) in the form 'this is' etc. the nature of being a pramāna is not accepted (in such knowledge) Since knownness is not manifested is what is already known, this definition does not have overapplicability in memory. And with the addition of the word sādhana there is the exclusion of a cognizer etc.[9]

0.108 But[10] this definition does not fit.(is not correct) why? (one might ask) and therefore he states-

tr.108 Since there is no (any) proof in accepting pramā 'knownness'as distinct from knowledge.

1.108 Due to the absence of pramā as such, abiding in the object to be known, there will be'impossibility' and therefore this definition is not perfect.(suitable)(It is our experience) that there is no (any) pramāna in (establishing) pramā (which) is abiding the object to be known. (on the other hand in respect of the experience is- 'the pot is known'; 'the pot is manitested' (etc.) pramā is experienced as a property of the object to be known through the perception itself; and with this intention only it is said'jñānavyatiriktā eti'[11]. different from knowledge' etc. In the case of the experience 'the pot is known' etc. the knowledge only is observed as an attribute of the object to be known. But nothing other than that[12] (known as) pramā. Thisalso should not be said that in the case of knowledge which is an attribute of the self, nature of being a quality of an object to be known, is not possible, because the contingency of the absence of the same(i.e. possibility of Viśesanatā) will occur in 'the pot is desired.'(If the answer is -'it's possibility in that case is due to the relation as an object and subject; then the similar

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(answer will be given) in the present case also. This also should not be said that in the absence of knownness as such, the restriction that, 'knowledge must have any object' is not proper. The concep that 'that particular thing only is an object of that particular knowledge, in respect of which that particular knowledge (took place suits to the buddhas only. If it is so, there will be contingency of no restriction for the object in respect of desire etc. (If your answer in that case is as) It is possible in that case by being an object of an instrumn t. It is equally same (in the case of other knowledge also). Otherwise the restriction as ' the knownness is produced in this particular knowledge, through th 'particular knowledge would not be possible.

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1. See. अनुभूतिः प्रमाणम् TaRa 1.4
2. Though it is an instrument it does not produce knowledge.
3. Since it is pramā by itself can not be a cause of it.
4. Perception and inference are the instruments of knowledge. But they are not pramā by their very nature. So the definition as 'pramā is pramāṇa, will not be applicable to all such pramāṇas. And hence there will be defect called 'impossibility'.
5. Thinking that, the contact of sense organ also is an instrument of knowledge.
6. And not any instrument of it. This explanation excludes contact of the sence organs with the object from coming under this definition.
7. etc, covers erroneous knowledge.
8. Because the knowledge produced through illusion and error is not in accoddance with the object.
9. Since the cognizer is not an instrument for cognition.

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10. In the above passage J has explained and discussed the definition given Bhatta With it s padekrtva.And thereafter refutes it as follows.

11. See the text No. 108

12. That = knowledge . M is of the opinion that, at the time perception only the knowledge is created, which is not different from what is known as 'jñātatā' and thereafter the knowledge is not acceptable.

13. Because the Bauddhas only believe that the knowledge of a particular object is restricted for that particular object only and it does nc creat any other knowledge. But this is not acceptable to M.

Com.0.109 अन्यस्त्वाह, प्रमासाधनत्वमेव लक्षणम् । प्रमा च नार्थप्राकट्यम् । किं तु ? अज्ञातार्थस्य यथार्थज्ञानम् । अतो नोक्तदूषणमित्यत आह

T. 109 न चाज्ञातपरिच्छित्तिरेव प्रमेत्यत्र किञ्चिन्मानम्

Com.1.109 परिच्छित्तिरिति यथार्थज्ञानमुच्यते । अज्ञातेति स्मृतिसाधनव्युदासार्थम् । यथार्थग्रहणं भ्रमादिसाधनव्युदासार्थम् ।

अस्तु नाम अज्ञातपरिच्छित्तिः प्रमा तत्साधनं च प्रमाणम् । तथापि न लक्षणमेतत् युक्तम् ज्ञातपरिच्छित्तेरपि प्रमात्वेन तत्साधनस्य च प्रमाणत्वेन तत्राव्याप्तेः । न हि ज्ञातपरिच्छित्त्यादेः अप्रमात्वादौ प्रमाणमस्ति ।

Com.0.110 ज्ञातपरिच्छित्त्यादेः प्रमात्वादौ स्मृत्यादेरपि तत् स्यादित्यत आह

T 110 याथार्थ्यमेव प्रामाण्यमित्यङ्गीकारात्

Com.1.110 स्मृत्यादेः प्रमात्वादिप्रसङ्गो नानिष्टः । याथार्थ्यमेव प्रामाण्यमित्यङ्गीकुर्वद्भिः स्मृत्यादिकस्य प्रमात्वादेरङ्गीकृतत्वादिति ।

0.109 The other one[1] states that the definition (of pramāṇa is as' the nature of being instrument of pramā' only, but the word pramā does not mean (only) manifestation of the object. What then is it?[2] It is only as it is knowledge of an object which is unknown. And

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therefore the defect stated (previously) would not be there. (Expecting this argument) the author states-

tr.109 There is no any pramāṇa (proof) to hold that the word pramā means 'as it is knowledge of an unknown object.' only.

tr. 1.109 The word parichhitti means as it is (real) knowledge of an object. And the word ajñāta 'unknown' is for the purpose of excluding the instrument of memory[3] (from coming under the definition) The word Yathārtha 'according to the object' is included (in the definition) for the purpose of excluding the instrument of illusion etc.[4]

[5]All right, let the word pramā mean the valid knowledge of unknown (object) and 'instrument of it' is (a definition of) pramāṇa. But this definition also is not perfect. Because as it is knowledge of a known object also is valid one (of the nature of pramā and instrument of it is of the nature of) pramāṇa, but this definition is inapplicable there.[6] Since there is no any pramāṇa to establish the nature of not being pramā etc. in respect of valid knowledge of an object already known.

tr. 0.110 (One might argue) 'If the nature of pramā is accepted in respect of valid knowledge of a known object, the same (nature) would be (unavoidable) in the case of memory etc. (In order to answer this objection) the author states-

tr.110 Because it is accepted 'Being in accordance with the object only' is a pramāṇa.[7]

tr. 1.110 The contingency of 'memory etc. being pramā 'valid knowledge' is not undesired; Because by those, who hold that pramāṇa is only what is in accordance with an object the nature of being pramā in respect of memory etc. is accepted.

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1. This refers to some of the mīmāmsakas.

2. To avoid the objection 'there is no any proof to accept that there is something as 'knownness' understood by the word pramā' the other party gives different explanation for the word pramā.

3. Samskāra 'impressions' is the instrument of memory. Though it is according to the object it cannot be a pramāna. Since it is not instru of what is ajñāta 'unknown' (Because memory is always of known objects only).

4. Illusion and error are not according to the object.

5. Having explained the definition with it s padakṛtya the commentator now refutes it as above.

6. Even in the case of inference of fire, fire is already known object Inference is an accepted pramāna and it is the instrument of valid knowledge But since inference does not produce the knowledge of an object which is unknown, this definition is not applicable to it an therefore the defect asambhava 'impossibility' occurs.

7. Memory is not accepted by some others as pramāna but M accepts it so, only on the ground that it cognizes the object as it is.

Com.O.111 प्राभाकराणां लक्षणं दूषयति।

T 111 न चानुभूतिरेव प्रमाणम्

Com.1.111 स्मृतिव्यतिरिक्तं ज्ञानमनुभूतिः। स्मृतिश्च संस्कारमात्रजं ज्ञानम्। न च अयथार्थानुभवे अतिव्याप्तिः। "प्रमाणं स्मृतिश्च नः प्रत्ययः" इत्यङ्गीकृतत्वेन तत्स्वरूपस्यैवानभ्युपगमात्। व्यवहारस्तु ग्रहणस्मरणयोरेव ग्रहणयोरेव वा स्वरूपतो विषयतश्च विवेकाग्रहमात्रेण भवतीति।

tr. 0.111. (Further) the author refutes the definition stated by the prābhākaras[1] (as)-

tr. 111. Not even 'the experience alone ' is pramāna.

tr. 1.111. The knowledge other than memory is (called) experience'. And memory is the knowledge produced through impressions only. There is

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no overapplicability of this definition in erroneous experience. Since (the statement) "We experience only what is according to the object and memory" (shows that these two) only are accepted as experience and therefore (illusion as such) by it's very nature is not accepted. But the usage (or general practice of saying that 'this is illusion' etc) is only on account of non understanding (absence of noticing) of the difference between what is perceived and what is remembered or in (two) perceptions in respect of their very nature and object.[3]

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1. See. TāRa 1.4
2. In this respect the word viveka stands for knowledge of difference.
3. According to this view, there is nothing what is called as illusion or erroneous knowledge. But our usage of saying 'this is illusion' etc. is the result of following facts only. i) when one sees pearl-shell and remembers silver, he has two different expressions, one is perception and the other is remembrance. In perception he cognizes only as 'this is' and not as 'this is shell or silver'. And in remembrance he cognizes only silver. Thus, there are two different experiences; but the cognizer, due to the presence of the knowledge of silver in touch, does not take into consideration the difference between silver and shell from their essential nature point of view and hence mixes two, memory and perception together and says that this is silver. This process clearly shows that illusion etc. are not separate experiences.

In the same way when some one says that this śaṅkha is yellow he has two experiences. In the first he perceives a yellow thing, only as yellow colour but does not take into consideration that object. In the second perception he perceives śaṅkha only as śaṅkha without it'

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any other quality or colour etc. And on account of proximity of these two experiences he mixes two perceptions together and says 'this śaṅkha is yellow.' Therefore the practice as illusion, takes place only when there is the absence or understanding the difference as stated above.

Com.0.112 एतदपि लक्षणमयुक्तम् । कुतः? इत्यत आह

T. 112 स्मृत्यादावव्याप्तेः

Com.1.112 आदिपदेन वेदाद्यनुप्रमाणसंग्रहः ।

0.112 This definition also is not correct. Why? (One might ask and) therefore he states-

tr.112 Because of inapplicability in memory etc.

1.112 By the word etc. anupramānas like veda are covered.

Com.0.113 स्मृत्यादेः सति प्रामाण्ये भवेदव्याप्तिदोषः । तदेव कुतः ? इत्यत आह

T. 113 वेदादिप्रामाण्यप्रसिद्धेश्च

Com.1.113 अत्र आदिपदेन स्मृत्यादिग्रहणम् । प्रसिद्धिर्लौकिकी । न हि सा निर्मूला याथार्थ्यहेतु-सिद्धा । श्रौती चास्तीत्याह

T. 114 स्मृतिः प्रत्यक्षमैतिह्यमनुमानश्चतुष्टयम् ।
प्रमाणमिति विज्ञेयं धर्माद्यर्थे बुभूषुभिः ॥ इति श्रुतेश्च ।

0.113 But this defect in the form of inapplicability would be (there) only when the nature of being pramāna is accepted in respect of memory etc.[1] How is that (validity is explained?) Therefore he states-

tr.113 The authority (as pramāṇa) of veda etc. is well known.

1.113 In this text, the word etc. includes smṛti and (other texts) (And the word) prasiddhi (stands for ' well known) in the people in general. It cannot be said to be baseless because it is established through the reason 'it is being in accordance with the object'. And

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it,is in the vedas also-

tr.114 Since there is the vedic statement as-

Those who are desirous of understanding the four arthas beginning with dharma,should understand that the group of four namely, memory,perception aithihya 'tradition' and 'inference' (only) is pramāna.

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1. Because some do not accpet memory as pramāna See . P.L.131.10

Com-O-115 नन्विदं शान्तिके कर्मणि वेतालोत्थानमिव। यावता स्मृत्यादिप्रामाण्यसिद्धयर्थं उदाहृतश्रुतौ एतिह्यं चतुर्थं प्रमाणमापतितमित्यत आह

T 115 ऐतिह्यमागमभेदः

Com 1-115 पुरावृत्तोक्तिरैतिह्यम् । तत् यथार्थमागम एवान्तर्भवति । ऐतिह्यमित्यशेषागमोपलक्षणम् । स्मृतिपदञ्च अशेषकेवलप्रमाणस्य । तथा च केवलमेकं अनुप्रमाणं प्रत्यक्षादिभेदेन त्रिविधमिति चतुष्टयमित्युक्तं भवति ।

tr.O.115 But this(again appears like) the raising up of a ghost (instead of destroying evil) in the performance of 'pacification appeasement'. Because from the vedic text quoted for the establishment of memory as a pramāna, (contingency of) Aithiya 'tradition' as fourth pramāna occurred In answer the author states-

tr.115 Tradition is a type of verbal testimony.[2]

O.115 Tradition is the statement of past events. If it is real or in accordance with the (object) facts, then it is included under verbal testimony.(The word) aitihya 'tradition' is indicative of total sacred texts. And the word memory is indicative of total kevala-pramāna. And thus, the kevalapramāna is(of) only one type and anu-pramānas are three on the basis of difference as perception etc.

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(having this idea in mind) it is stated as of four types.[3]

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1. Because this text reads as - चतुष्टयं प्रमाणमिति वक्तव्यम् etc. This shows that pramāṇas are four. But M accepts only three, therefore this objection is raised.
2. M does not accept it as separate one, so no question of excess in number comes.
3. J has shown how this particular text supports only threefoldness of pramāṇa. In this stanza there is no other word for verbal testimony therefore, as J interpretes the word aitihya stands for verbal testimony. And smṛti for Kevalapramāṇa.

Com. 0.116 नैयायिकलक्षणं निराकरोति.

T. 116 न च सम्यगनुभवसाधनं प्रमाणम्

Com. 1.116 सम्यग्ग्रहणं संशयविपर्ययापोहनम्। अनुभव इति कुठारादेर्निरासः। ज्ञानग्रहणे स्मृतौ प्रसङ्गादनुभवग्रहणम्। साधनग्रहणं फलात् भेदज्ञापनार्थं प्रमातृप्रमेयव्यवच्छेदार्थं चेति।

Com. 0.117 एतदपि लक्षणं नोपपद्यते। कस्मात्? इत्यत आह

T. 117 ईश्वरज्ञानादावव्याप्तेः

Com. 1.117 नैयायिकैः खल्वीश्वरस्यापि प्रामाण्यमङ्गीकृतम्। अतः तस्मिन्नीश्वरे तज्ज्ञाने अस्मदादिज्ञाने चाव्याप्तत्वादिदमलक्षणम्। न हीश्वरादेः सम्यगनुभवसाधनत्वमस्ति। ईश्वरातिरिक्तप्रमाणलक्षणं तत् इत्यङ्गीकारेऽपि तज्ज्ञानादावव्याप्तिरपरिहार्यैवेति ज्ञापनाय स्वरूपेण तज्ज्ञानग्रहणम्।

Com. 0.118 ज्ञानं प्रमाणमेव न भवति। किं तु? तत्फलमेव। अतः कथं तत्राव्याप्तिर्दूषणम् इत्यत आह

T. 118 अप्रामाण्ये प्रमाणाभावाच्च

Com. 1.118 ज्ञानस्येति शेषः। चशब्देन "स्मृतिः प्रत्यक्षमैतिह्यं" इत्यादि प्रमाणविरोधं समुच्चिनोति।

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tr.0.116 (Further) he refutes the definition stated by the Naiyāyikas[1] as follows -

tr.116 Not even 'the instrument of true experience' is (the definition of) pramāna.

1.116 Here in this definition the addition of the word sammyak 'real' is for the purpose of removing doubt and error[2] (from coming under the definition) And the word experience is for the purpose of avoiding axe etc.[3] If, (instead of the word experience) the word 'knowledge' would have been stated, there would be contingency of application of this definition in memory and therefore the word experience is stated. Inclusion of the word sādhana 'instrument' is for the purpose of conveying the difference from result and also for the exclusion of cognizer and the object to be known[4] (from coming under the definition).

0.117 But this definition also is not correct, why? (One might ask) And therefore he states-

tr.117 Because of inapplicability in the knowledge of God.

1.117 Indeed the validity of God (as a pramāna) is accepted by the naiyāyikas. And since this (definition) is not pervaded in God, His knowledge and the knowledge of ordinary people like us, this is not a (perfect) definition. Being the instrument[5] of real experience is not (at all) possible in respect of God etc. In this text the knowledge of God is mentioned by it's very nature because the author wants to convey that even if it is accepted that this definition is for the pramānas other than God, the inapplicability is unavoidable.

0.118 (Expecting further argument that) the knowledge cannot be a pramāna (in any case) what is it then? It is only result of it, (i.e. of pramāna) This is being so, how do you point out the defect

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inapplicability[6]? In order to answer he states-

tr.118 Since there is no pramāna proof (upholding) the nature of not being a pramāna.

1.118 "(In respect) of knowledge[7] is the remaining portion (of the text). The word ca 'and' removes the contradiction (with acceptance of) smriti..... etc as pramāna[8].

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1. See. TaRa 1.4
2. Because they are not true experiences.
3. Because axe is not an instrument for experience.
4. If the word sādhana is not inserted the definition would be 'samyaganubhavah' And in that case the question 'what is the result obtained through pramāna will remain as not answered. The word sādhana makes it clear that the experience (i.e. true knowledge is the result obtained through pramāna) Hence pramāna and knowledge are different. Secondly the word sādhana is explained as one in the absence of which the effect does not take place and in the presence of which it necessarily happens. Pramāna is of that nature, but one who cognizes or what is cognized, do not come under this nature of sādhana.
5. The knowledge of God cannot be instrument of knowledge, because itself is knowledge.
6. The defect inapplicability arises only when the definition does not apply to what is defined. But the knowledge is not what is to be defined.
7. M holds that an instrument of knowledge as well as the knowledge also is pramāna See. Intor.
8. Ca 'and' indicates that in respect of all four pramānas stated

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in the verse 'smrti etc' there is no proof to say that they are not Pramāṇas

Com 0.119 साक्षिज्ञानेऽपि अव्याप्तिं वक्तुं तस्य प्रामाण्यानङ्गीकारे बाधकं तावदाह

T 119 **प्रामाण्यज्ञाने च**

Com 1.119 प्रमाणाभावादिति चशब्देन अनुकृष्यते । तादर्थ्ये सप्तमी । साक्षिणोऽप्रामाण्ये सर्व-प्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यमप्रामाणिकं स्यात् । प्रामाण्यज्ञानार्थं प्रमाणान्तराभावात् ।

Com 0.120 प्रामाण्यज्ञानार्थमपि सम्यगनुभवसाधनमेव किञ्चित् अङ्गीक्रियते । अतो न तस्याप्रमाणिकत्वापात इत्यत आह

T 120 **तत्राप्यङ्गीकारेऽनवस्थितेः**

Com 1.120 यदि प्रामाण्यज्ञानार्थं सम्यगनुभवसाधनं प्रमाणमङ्गीक्रियते तर्हि तत्प्रामाण्यं प्रामाणिकं न वा ? नेति पक्षे न स्यात् । आद्ये किं स्वेनैव सिद्धं ? प्रमाणान्तरेण वा ? नाद्यः अन्यत्रापि तत्प्रसङ्गात् । द्वितीये तस्यापि प्रामाण्यं प्रमाणान्तरवेद्यमित्यनवस्थितिः स्यात् । तस्मात् साक्षिज्ञानेनैव सर्वप्रमाण-प्रामाण्यं ज्ञायत इत्यङ्गीकार्यम् । तस्य च स्वप्रकाशत्वेन स्वप्रामाण्यविषयत्वात् नानवस्था । 'मामहं जानामि' इति आत्मनः स्वप्रकाशत्वदर्शनात् । साक्षिणश्चात्मत्वादिति ।

तार्किकोक्तप्रमाणलक्षणस्य साक्षिण्यव्याप्तिः

Com 0.121 एवं स्वप्रकाशात्मरूपसाक्षिज्ञानस्य प्रमाणप्रामाण्यज्ञानार्थमङ्गीकारे किं स्यात् ? इत्यत आह

T 121 [1]**स्वप्रकाशात्माङ्गीकारे तत्राव्याप्तेः**

Com 1.121 [2]स्वप्रकाशात्मभूतसाक्षिज्ञाने प्रमाणे अङ्गीकृते तस्य सम्यगनुभवत्वेन तत्साधनत्वाभावात् तत्राव्याप्तेरयुक्तमेतल्लक्षणमिति ।

0.119 In order to state avyāpti 'non applicability' of this definition in the knowledge of the witness self also (it is necessary to show that it is pramāna and) therefore the author states the difficulty in non acceptance of it's validity (as a pramāna)-

tr.119 And in (respect of) the knowledge of validity (of any pramāṇa)

1.119 The phrase 'because of the absence of any pramāṇa' is carried out (from previous text) by the word Ca. The locative case (of the word jñāna in the text) is in the sense 'for the sake of'.

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In case, the authority of the witness self is invalid then the authority of all pramāna will be invalid. Because there would not be any other pramāna to understand the validity of (a pramāna)

tr.0.120 (Further expecting the answer that) "for the knowledge of validity also, some (type of) instrument of real experience only is accepted and therefore there is no contingency of unauthoritativeness of it" he states-

tr.120 Because of infinite regress of assumption (lit. acceptance) in that case also.

1.120 If for the purpose of the knowledge of validity some (type of) instrument of real experience is accepted as authority, then the question would arise, whether that authority also is valid or not? (lit. proved by any pramāna or not?) If the (opinion) answer is 'not' then the validity is not there. In the first alternative (i.e. yes) the question will be, how is it established? By itself or through any other pramāna? The first (alternative) is not possible because the contingency of the same (i.e. self validity) will occure elsewhere also. In the case of second alternative the validity of that also will be one, to be understood through another pramāna and thereby there will be endless assumption (of pramānas). And therefore, it has to be accepted that the validity of all pramānas is understood through the witness self. And since it is self luminous one, it has it's own validity as its object and thereby there would not be infinite regress. The self-luminous nature of the self is observed through experience as 'I understand (cognize) myself' And the witness self is in the form of Ātman.

0.121 (One might ask) All right, what would be (the result) of acceptance of the knowledge of the witness self which is in the form of self

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luminous soul for the purpose of understanding validity of pramānas? Therefore (in order to answer) he states-

tr.121 On acceptance of soul as self-luminous, there would be inapplicability (of this definition).

1.121 If the knowledge of the witness self, which is in the form of self luminous soul is accepted as pramāna and since it is experience but not an instrument of it, this definition would have inapplicability in that, and therefore this definition is not proper (or fit)[1].

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1. The basic question raised by M in order to refute the definition of the Naiyāyikas is validity of knowledge. If it is not by itself but dependent on any other pramāna then assumption of a chain of pramānas is endless. And if it is by itself then it would be difficult to differentiate two, true and illusion. To avoid this difficulty M has accepted the witness self which cognizes only yathārtha without the need of any pramana. This is a valuable contribution of M to Indian philosophy. (see int) And one can not say that there is nothing as the witness self's knowledge. Because we experience it's existence when we say 'I understand myself'.

Com.O.123 यथार्थस्मृतावव्याप्तिश्च प्राक् आदिशब्देन संगृहीता। तत्र स्मृतिर्न ॥ प्रमाणमिति न वाच्यम्। साधितत्वात्। तदनङ्गीकारे बाधकं चाह

T.123 स्मृतेश्च प्रामाण्यानङ्गीकारे अनुभूतं मया इत्यत्र प्रमाणाभावात्

Com.1.123. यदि स्मृतिर्न प्रमाणं तर्ह्यनुभूतमप्रामाणिकं स्यात्। 'अनुभूतं मयेदं' इत्यत्र स्मृतिं विना प्रमाणाभावात्।

स्मृतेरनुमानत्वेन प्रामाण्यमिति पक्षनिरासः

सत्यम्, स्मृतिरेवानुभूते प्रमाणम्। किं नाम? लिङ्गत्वेनैव। पटुतरो ह्यनुभवः संस्कारं जनयति। स च सदृशदर्शनादिना समुद्बुद्धः स्मृतिमिति। संस्कारजन्या स्मृतिः संस्कारे लिङ्गम्। स च पूर्वानुभवे भविष्यति। अतो नानुभूतस्याप्रामाणिकत्वं नापि लक्षणस्याव्याप्तिः स्मृतेरपि

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T 124

लिङ्गत्वेन प्रामाण्ये कल्पनागौरवम्

Com. 1-124 यदि स्मृतेर्लिङ्गत्वेन प्रामाण्यं कल्प्यते तर्हि कल्पनागौरवं स्यात्। साक्षात् अर्थ एव प्रामाण्यसम्भवेऽपि स्मृतेः संस्कारे लिङ्गत्वं, तस्यानुभव इत्यप्रामाणिकस्यानेकस्य कल्प्यमानत्वादिति।

Com. 0.125 दोषान्तरं चाह

T. 125

दृष्टहानिश्च

Com. 1-125 यदि स्मृतेर्लिङ्गत्वेन प्रामाण्यं तर्हि पृथक्प्रमाणतया दृष्टस्यापि प्रत्यक्षादेः लिङ्गत्वमेव स्यात् तत्रापि प्रत्यक्षादिना कर्मकारकस्यार्थस्यानुमानसम्भवात्।

(टी.)अतः प्रत्यक्षादिवत् स्मृतेरपि साक्षात्प्रामाण्यात् तत्राव्याप्तं परोक्तप्रमाणलक्षणमयुक्तमेवेति यथावस्थितार्थविषयत्वमेव लक्षणमुपपन्नमिति।

tr.0.123 And by the word ādi 'etc' stated in earlier text, inapplicability (of this definition) in the memory which is in accordance with the object is included.[2] In that case one should not say that memory is not a pramāṇa'. Because it is proved. (On the other hand) he also shows the difficulty in not accepting it (as a pramāṇa) as -

tr.123 On non acceptance of memory as a pramāṇa there would not be any (pramāṇa for the validity of the statement' 'I experienced.)'[4]

1.123 If memory is not a pramāṇa then whatever is experienced would not be supported by any pramāṇa. Because in the (statement) 'It is experienced by me' there is no any other pramāṇa but memory.

tr.124 (Further, expecting the answer) All right, indeed memory only is a pramāṇa for experience. But how? Being an inferential mark only. (Because) true (or as it is) experience alone produces impressions. And the same coming out from the observation of similarity is called memory. (Thus) the memory produced through impressions is on inferential mark in respect of impressions[5]. And the same impressions becomes (inferential mark) in respect of

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previous experience. And therefore since memory also is an instrument of true experience there is no natureof not being proved by any pramāṇa in respect of what is experienced, nor even (there is) inapplicability of the definition (of pramāṇa in memory)' the author states-

tr.124 In the case of validity through 'being an inferential mark' (there would be) 'burdon of assumption'.

1.124 If the validity of memory is considered through it's being an inferential mark then there would be 'burdon of assumption, because of the assumption of many (stages) as memory as an inferential mark for impressions, and experience of it (etc), when it is possible that memory can be a pramāṇa direclly for an object.[6]

tr.0.125 (Further) he states another defect as-

tr.125 And also the loss of what is proved by perception.

1.125 If memory is accepted as a pramāṇa by being an inferential mark then (same) nature of being an inferential mark would arise in the case of perception which is experienced as a distinct pramāṇa, because in that case also there is thepossibility of inference of an object which causes effect, through perception.[7]

(And hence) since memory is also a direct pramāṇa like perception etc, and since the definition of pramāṇa stated by others, is not pervaded there[8], the same is not proper and the definition as 'one having for it's object, an object as it is' only is found fit (and justified)[9]

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1. See the text ईश्वरज्ञानयोरव्याप्ते: PL 234.19

2. Hence the text should be understood as – ईश्वरज्ञाने यथार्थस्मृतौ च अव्याप्ते:।

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3. In order to answer this avyāpti

4. Because no one of any four pramāṇas proves validity of experience.

5. This process is further explained as कर्मकरकस्यार्थस्यानुभानम्। The 'impressions' is a Karma 'effect'. This effect is out comeof experience Because effect cannot take place without a cause. ∴ when one remembers something it is understaod that this is produced through impression And impressions are produced through experience. Thus through memory one can infere impression and through impression he can further infere experience. This way memory can be inferential mark for (true) experience.(And therefore it will come under inference) Hence there is no need of holding memory as separate pramana.

6. i.e. experience.

7. For example, even after perceiving fire, one can say, yes it is fire because it is with smoke etc.

8. Does not become applicable.

9. Up to this M has discussed the definitions of pramāṇa stated by others and has shown how they have defects of definition.

Com.O.126 इदमपि लक्षणं न युक्तम्। द्विविध एव हि प्रत्ययः स्मृतिरनुभवश्चेति। तत्रानुभवः सर्वोऽपि प्रमाणमेव। स्मृतिरपि यदि प्रमाणं तदा यथावस्थितविशेषणस्य कृत्याभावादित्यत आह

T.126 स्मृतिप्रमाणद्वैविध्यमात्रकल्पने मिथ्याज्ञानादेर्निरासादनुभवविरोधः

Com. J.126 स्मृतिश्च प्रमाणं चेति प्रत्ययद्वैविध्यमात्रकल्पनं न युज्यते। तथा सति विपर्ययसंशययोः अपाकरणप्रसङ्गात्। न च तथास्त्विति वाच्यम्। विपर्ययादेरनुभवसिद्धत्वेन तद्विरोधादिति।

Com.O.127 (टी.) विपर्ययादिविषयोऽनुभव एव नास्ति। किं तु? व्यवहारमात्रमित्यत आह

T.127 तदनुभवाभाव इत्युक्ते अनुभवः स्मृतिश्च नास्तीत्युक्ते किमुत्तरम्?

Com. J.127 यदि विपर्ययादिविषयोऽनुभवः स्वयं प्रकाशमानोऽपि नास्तीत्युच्यते तर्हि पराभ्युपगतं अनुभवमात्रं स्मृतिमात्रं च न स्यात्। अविशेषात्। तथा च जगदान्ध्यं स्यात्।

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EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION STATED BY HIMSELF

tr.0.126 (One might argue) 'this definition also is not correct. Because the cognition is of two types i) memory and ii) experience[1]. Of them the experience in total, is pramana only.[2] But If memory also is held as pramana then the adjective yathāvasthita 'in accordance with the object' would be without any purpose.'[3] In order to answer this (objection) he states-

tr.126 On the assumption of only twofold nature of experience namely, in the form of memory and pramāna (true knowledge) (then there would be) exclusion of erroneous knowledge, and thereby there will be contradiction to normal practice.[4] (usual experience)

1.126 This is not proper to hold that experience is twofold only, (namely) memory and pramāna (valid knowledge). Because in that case the contingency of exclusion (non recognition) of erroneous knowledge and doubt will arise. And one should not say 'all right let it be so'. because it will be contradicted, on account of the establishment of erroneous knowledge etc.[5] through experience

tr.0.127 (Expecting further answer as) 'But there is no experience which has erroneous knowledge as it's object, what is it then? It is just usage," the author states-

tr.127 If it is said that (there is the only) absence of the experience of that (i.e. erroneous knowledge etc) then we will also say that true experience and memory also (do not exist). (and in that case) what will be your answer?[6]

1.127 'If the self luminious[7] experience which has error etc as it's object 'also is said to be non existent one, then mere experience (of true) and mere memory which is accepted by others would not be at all (existent in our opinion), because of the absence of

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any difference. And if it so, worldly blindness would take place.

--

1. Here it refers to यथार्थानुभव only.

2. Since the concept of error and doubt is not accepted, every experience, and all the cognitions are to be true and in accordance with the object only.

3. If every experience including memory is pramāna (there is nothing like error or doubt), and therefore everything being in accordance with the object, then why to state the phrase one which reveals or makes an object as it's object, as it ready is -in the definition, becaus there is no any experience other than that.

4. Because it is our common experience that we have the knowledge of erroneous knowledge as' I have knowledge that this is silver'(i.e. अनुव्यवसाय)

5. etc = doubt. This also is common that we experience doubt such as 'whether this one is a man or pillar?

6. There is no any rule which will restrict as, true knowledge alone is real experience and error etc are only 'imagination'. And therefore one can state otherwise also

7. If there would be nothing like true knowledge, memory and error or doubt, no one will move for real knowledge and the worldly activities will come to an end.

2.127 अथ वा विपर्ययाद्यनङ्गीकारे दूषणान्तरमेतत् । यदि शुक्तिकायां 'इदं रजतं' इत्यादिरूपो विपर्ययाद्यनुभवो नास्ति किं तु? पुरोवृत्त्यनुभवे सति रजतस्मृतौ तयोः स्वरूपतो विषयतश्च विवेकाग्रहादेव 'इदं रजतं' इत्यादिव्यवहार इत्युच्यते तर्हि पुरोवृत्त्यनुभवो रजतस्मृतिश्च नास्तीति वदामः । ज्ञानपूर्वकत्वात् व्यवहारस्य कथं तदभावेऽसौ स्यात्? इति चेत् हन्त तर्हि विशिष्टज्ञानपूर्वकत्वात् विशिष्टव्यवहारस्य कथमसावपि तद्विना स्यात् ।

( )स्मृत्यनुभवयोरगृहीतविवेकत्वेन विशिष्टज्ञानसादृश्यात् व्यवहार इति चेत् तर्हि अविवेकाग्रहेण अविशिष्टज्ञानसादृश्यात् तदभावस्याप्यापातः स्यात् । तस्मात् विपर्ययादेर्व्यावर्तनीयस्य सद्भावात् याथार्थ्यमेवोपपन्नं लक्षणमिति ।

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tr.2.127 Or on non acceptance (of the concept of) erroneous knowledge the Othdr defect will be as follows-[1] If you say that there is no any experience of erroneous knowledge etc. like 'this is silver' in shell, but at the time of the experience of an object present before, remembrance of silver takes place and thereafter the usage as' this is silver' is only because of the absence of noticing the difference between them from their nature and object points of view. Then we will also say that, there is nothing (which can be called as) experience of an object present before, and memory of silver. If (again) you say, 'usage or any verbal statement is always preceeded by knowledge, and if nothing is there (lit in the absence of that knowledge) how the (verbal) statement (as this is silver) would take place? Then our answer would be, 'any specific type of usage is always preceeded by that particular type of knowledge. And then how this (usage or verbal statement as 'this is silver) will also take place without that (type of particular knowledge)?

(On this argument) if you say that the practice of saying (that this is silver) is on account of similarity of two specific knowledges arising out of non understanding of the difference between memory and experience; then there would be contingency of absence of the same (i.e. usage or verbal statement) on account of similarity between two knowledges not of any specific type, due to non understanding of non difference. And thus, since there is erroneous knowledge etc. which is fit to be excluded (from the definition) the definition as 'being in accordance with the object' is justified.[2]

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1. This is for the mīmāmsaka who do not hold error etc. as real

2. In this passage J has given another explanation for the use of phrase 'Yathāvasthita' in the definition of pramāna stated by M. by way of refuting the view of the mīmamsaka regarding error. In short he says -

Error and doubts are real. We experience them, and therefore we state 'I doubt whether this is manor pillar'. or we state' this is silver' when we see shell. But having ignored this fact, if the opponents give any other explanation for the statements of above type, the same answer can be given to establish error and doubt also

Com-0-128 ननु विपर्ययाद्यनुभवाभावे अनुभवस्मृत्योरभावः स्यादित्ययुक्तम् । अपसिद्धान्तप्रमाणबाधा सिद्धिदोषादिति चेन्न । तर्कस्य दूषणानुमानत्वात् । तथापि कुतो नापसिद्धान्तादि ? इत्यत आह

T. 128 स्वसिद्धैः साधनं परसिद्धैर्दूषणम्

Com. 1-128 साधनमेव स्वसिद्धान्तसिद्धन्यायैः कर्तव्यम् । न तु दूषणमपि । तत् परसिद्धन्यायैरपि भवति । किमतो यद्येवम् ? इत्यत आह

T. 129 अतो न दूषणे अपसिद्धान्तादि

Com. 1-129 अतः परसिद्धन्यायेन परोक्तस्य दूषणीयत्वात् दूषणानुमाने नापसिद्धान्ताद्युद्भावनीयमिति ।

tr.0.128 (One might argue that) as to what is said 'in the absence of experience of error etc, there will be absence of (true) experience and memory also."[1] is not correct, because in that case there would be defects→deviation from tenet, contradiction with what is proved by pramana and unestablishment. The answer will be 'no, in our opinion hypothetical argument is considered as 'inference for refutation'.[2] All right, but why not the other defects (like) deviation from tenet! (will be a further argument by the opponents) And therefore in order to answer the same, the author states-

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tr.128 Establishment (of a view is to be done) through the doctrins accepted in one's own system and refutation (of the views of others is to be done) through (the doctrines) accepted in that of others

tr.1.128 Establishment of one's own view only is to be done through the doctrine established (accepted) in one's own system, but not refutation also. That can be done through the doctrines established in others systems. (one might say) 'all right what is then?' 'If this is so?' Therefore the author states-

tr.129 And therefore deviation from tenet etc are not the defects in refutation.

1.129 (And therefore) Since the refutation of what is stated by others is to be done through the maxim established in the system of others only, the deviation from tenet etc. are not to be pointed out (as defects) in the inference stated for refuting others.

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1. This statement is made in order to refute others only, but it is done by one who accepts error etc. as real. And hence there will be deviation from tenet, (i.e. acceptance of what is not accepted in one's own system)

Com0.130 स्वपक्षदोषमनुद्धृत्य प्रतिबन्दीग्रहणं मतानुज्ञेत्येके । तदनुपपन्नम् । प्रतिबन्दीग्रहणस्य परोक्तव्यभिचारोद्भावनरूपत्वेन बाधकतर्कोद्भावनरूपेण वा परोक्तदूषणत्वात् । स्वपक्षास्थापनेन प्रवृत्तेर्दोषत्व मिति चेत् तर्हि अप्राप्तकालसाङ्कर्यापातात् ।

स्वपक्षे दोषमनुद्धृत्य परस्येष्टापादनमित्यन्ये । तदप्यसत् । विशेषणासामर्थ्यात् ।

तस्मात् इष्टापादनमेव मतानुज्ञेति भावेन तत्स्वरूपानुवादेन सिंहावलोकनन्यायेन प्रकृतदूषणानुमानदोषस्य मतानुज्ञाया उक्तान्तर्भावमाह

इष्टापत्तिः सिद्धसाधनत्वात् असङ्गतमेव

इष्टापादनरूपा मतानुज्ञा [1]असङ्गतावन्तर्भूता । परसिद्धार्थसाधनस्वरूपत्वात् । सिद्धसाधनस्य च असङ्गतत्वमुक्तम् । अनिष्टापादनस्यैव सङ्गतत्वादिति न विरोधादिभ्यो दूषणान्तरमस्तीति । व्याप्त्यभावादीनामन्तर्भावस्तु स्फुटत्वान्नोक्तः ।

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tr.0.130 According to some Matānujñā 'admission of a fault in one's own statement' is putting on a similar defect on the opponent Without having removed the defect pointed out in one's own statement. That is not justified because putting a similar defect on the ppponent comes under 'being a defect in what is stated by others' since it is in the form of pointing out a deviation in what is stated by opponents or in the form of raising a hypothetical argument contrary to his view. (If you say that) it is of thenature ofdefect since it proceeds without establishing one's own view, then there will contingenc of mixing it with aprāptakāla[1].

According to some others[2], (mātānujñā is contingency of) resulting in what is desired by others not having removed the defect in one's own view. But this also is not correct becaus the adjective (Phrase,'not having removed the defects in one's view) will be purposeless.[3]

And therefore, with the intention of conveying that matānujñā is only'resulting in what is desired' he explains it's nature and thereby following the maxim[4] 'lion's looking back'[5] states the inclusion of matānujñā (which is pointed out by the opponents as) the defect in the present inference stated to refute other under what is stated as-

tr.130 The contingency of what is desired is of thenature of establishment of what is already established (and therefore) is (comes under) inconsistent only.

tr.1.130 Matānujñā which is in the form of desired contingency is included under inconsistency, since it's nature is as establishing the view already established in the system of opponent.

And

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And it is already stated that establishment of what is already established is 'being inconsistent'.(only) what is consistent is 'resulting in the contingency of undesired' only(therefore this is not a defect different from contradiction etc.The inclusion of 'absence of concomitance' etc.is very clear and hence,not mentioned.

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1. Aprāptakālam is explained as'changing the proper order of arguments If any party does not remove the defects stated in its statement by the other party, but proceeds to point out a defect in second party's statement, it is nothing but change of order because it was necessary for the first party to remove first the the defects stated in his arguments. Therefore matānujñā according to this first definition is not different from aprāptakālam because it is being the same.

2. This has reference to TārkikaRakṣā. See
अनिष्टप्रसक्तोऽन्येनानिष्टमापादयेद्यदि ।
मतानुज्ञेति तस्य स्यान्निग्रहस्थानता स्फुटम्॥

TāR.3.17 The stock example of matānujñā is - If one says to other- you are a thief because you are a man. Then the other one says'on the same ground you also are a theif.

3. We cannot see any difficulty if this phrase is not added in the definition. On the other hand if this definition is stated as 'contingency of undesired' there will be nothing as not being matānujñā but every example will come under this. Hence, this adjective is meaningless.

4. The inclusion of other clinchers is already stated in previous text, But matānujñā was not discussed. This lion's looking back refers to inclusion of other clinchers.

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एवं प्रमाणादिस्वरूपं निरूप्य तन्निरूपणस्य प्रयोजनादिकं दर्शयति

आनन्दतीर्थमुनिना ब्रह्मतर्कोक्तिमार्गतः ।
मानलक्षणमित्युक्तं संक्षेपाद्ब्रह्मसिद्धये ॥

लक्षणादिनिरूपणेन संशोधितैरेव खलु वेदादिभिर्ब्रह्मज्ञानं भवति । तदिदं न वाद्यन्तरोक्तवदेवेति मन्तव्यम् । परमाप्ततमेन सुखरावतारेणोक्तत्वादिति भावेनोक्तम् ॥ आनन्दतीर्थमुनिनेति ॥ यस्तु स्वप्रभावानभिज्ञः तं प्रत्याह ॥ ब्रह्मतर्कोक्तिमार्गत इति ॥ यस्तु अनधिगतब्रह्मतर्कोक्तिमार्गोऽपि तदनुजिघृक्षया आह ॥ इत्युक्तमिति ॥ युक्त्यादियुक्तता प्राक् प्रदर्शितेति इतिशब्देन स्मर्यते । यद्येवं कथं तर्हि स्वल्पेनैव ग्रन्थेन समाप्तः इत्यत उक्तम् ॥ संक्षेपादिति ॥ श्रोतृबुद्धिमनुसृत्य शब्दसंक्षेपेणोक्तमिति ।

tr.0.131 Thus, having explained the essential nature of pramāna etc. the author now explains the purpose etc. of that explanation as-

T.131. In this way, the definition of pramāna (i.e. the text mānalaksana is stated in short, by the sage Ānanda tīrtha follwoing the path of statements made in Brahmatarka, for the purpose of establishment of Brahman.

tr.1.131 Indeed the knowledge of Brahman is obtained through Vedas etc. which are examined by way of stating (explaining) the definition etc. But this (text) also should not be considered as equal to what is stated by other opponents;[2] because it is stated by one who is the great and most reliable (because of) being an incornation[3] of higher God (i.e. vāyu) with this intention it is stated as- Ānandatīrtha muninā. The author states as Brahmantarkoktimārgatah for one who is ignorent of his (i.e. of M) Power.[4] And he states as 'Ityuktam' with (the purpose of) doing favour to him who has not studied the path of statements of Brahmatarka. With the word Iti 'in this way' it is reminded that fitness (of the statement) through arguments (and pramāna etc) is (already) explained. (one

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might ask further) it is so, how this is com leted by (this much) short text? Therefore it is said Samksapāt 'in short'. (It means) it is stated in abridged (form of) word[6].

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1. See.Intro, (the sources for the thoughts).
2. J explains difference between the definitions of pramāna stated by others and by M.
3. M is believed to be third incornation of Vāyu. Vayu is the deity of speeah and therefore what is stated by M is true only. for his incornation belief- See ṛṇa.V. 128, 2.2,3.
   अस्य श्रीणुहिमाजी . . . Rgveda 1.21.141
4. One who does not believe that M. is third incornation etc. for him, M himself quotes authority for his own thoughts
5. Reason for writting a new work on the base of Brahmatarka.
6. This way J has given explanation for almost all the words in the stanza.

com.0.132 अथ समापितप्रकरणोऽपि भगवनाचार्यः स्वेष्टदेवतां प्रणमति

T.132

अशेषमानमेयैकसाक्षिणेऽक्षयमूर्तये ।
अजेशपुरुहूतेड्य नमो नारायणाय ते ॥

Last mañgalācarana

tr.0.132 Further the great teacher(even), who has finished the work pays homage to his favourite diety as-

tr.132 O Nārāyana (I) salute you, who is theonly witness for all pramāṇas and objects to be known (by pramāṇas) whose form (body) is indestructible, who is without birth, is the lord and who is invoked always.

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1-132 (1) नारायणस्यैव प्रणामे को हेतुः? इत्यतो यत् उक्तं प्रमाणादि तत् प्रेरकत्वेन नारायणस्यैव मुख्यतः तदभिज्ञत्वात् इति भावेनोक्तम् ॥ अशेषेति ॥ ननु नारायणस्य शरीरमस्ति न वा, आद्ये मरणादिप्रसङ्गः । द्वितीये कथं तस्येन्द्रियशून्यस्याशेषमानादिसाक्षित्वम्? इत्यत उक्तम् ॥ अक्षयमूर्तय इति ॥ अस्त्येवेश्वरस्य शरीरम् । तच्च सच्चिदानन्दादिरूपत्वेनाक्षयमेवेति न कश्चिद्दोष इति । अजादिवन्द्यत्वाच्च नारायण एव नमस्कार्य इति भावेनोक्तम् ॥ अजेशेति ॥

tr.1.132 (here in this verse) the phrase 'aśeśa' etc. is stated with the intention of conveying that, whatever pramāna etc. is stated (up to this) is in order to answer the question 'what is the reason for saluting Nārāyana alone? (raised in the beginning) knows in detail Nārāyana only because He alone sets in motion (all this. The phrase akṣayamūrti is stated (to answer the question) whether Nārāyana has got body or not? In the first alternative[1] there will be contingency of (His) death etc. And in the second (alternative there would be the question) how the nature of being only witness for all pramanas etc. who is without having sense organs (is possible)?

(The answer is) indeed he has the body. And it is in the form of sat cit and ānanda, therefore it is without distruction, and so there is no any defect. And the word ajeśa etc. is stated with the intention that Nārāyana alone is fit to be saluted because He is fit to be praised by aja Brahmadeva etc.

Com 2.132 (1) अमरा भ्रमरायन्ते कमला 'वरटायते ।
यत्पादाम्भोरुहद्वन्द्वे वन्दे तं पुरुषोत्तमम् ॥

Rarest Archiver

tr.2.132 (Now having commented upon the work J does mangalācarana at the end of work as)-

I bow down to Purusottama 'the great person' at whose pair of lotus-like feet, the immortals (all the gods) behave like bees, and the Goddess Laksmi behaves like 'she swam'.

———X———

Rarest Archiver

GLOSSARY

अतिदेशवाक्य- Statement containing the rule of tranfer, assimilative proposition.

अतिप्रसङ्ग - Undesired application, contingency of accepting the undesired.

अतिव्याप्त - Over pervaded - too wide.

अतिव्याप्ति - Over applicability (of a definition).

अतीन्द्रिय - Beyond sense (perseption)

आधिकरण - Substratum, support

अध्यवसाय - Determinative cognition

अनन्त - Endless, having no end.

अनवधारण - Indeterminate cognition.

अनवस्था Infinite regress, endlessness.

अनादि - Beginningless, having no beginning

अनित्य - Non - eternal.

अनिर्वचनीय - Inexpressible.

अनिर्वचनीयत्व - Inexpressibility

अनिर्वाच्य - Inexpressible

अनिष्ट - Undesired (unwanted, unwarrented)

अनुकूल - Favourable.

अनुत्पत्ति - Non-origination

अनुपपत्ति - Not proved, not reasoned out.

अनुपलब्धि - Non-perception, absence (a pramāṇa), non availability.

अनुपलम्भ - Non-acceptance.

अनुपसंहारिन् - Non conclusive (probans)

अनुभव - Experience, cognition.

अनुभूति - Experience, cognition

अनुमा - Inference, syllogism (probans)

Rarest Archiver

अनुमान - (Probans, inferential mark, inference, Syllogism.

अनुमिति - Inferential knowledge, (correct) cognition.

अनुमेय - cognisable through inference.

अनुवाद - Repititative statement.

अनैकान्तिक - Unsteady (Existent in counter subjects also)

अन्योन्याश्रय - Mutual dependence.

अन्वय-व्यतिरेक-व्याप्ति - Concomitance through positive and negative (examples)

अपूर्वता - Novelty

अप्रमाण - Unauthoritative.

अभाव - Absence, Negation (as a pramāṇa)

अभ्यास - Repitition

अभ्युपगम - Acceptance.

अयथार्थ - Not being in accordance with the object, erroneous.

अर्थ - Object (of cognition), meaning, purpose.

अर्थवाद - Explanatory passage.

अवच्छिन्न - Delimited.

अवच्छेदक - What delimits.

अवधारण - Determinate knowledge

अवयव - Members of syllogistic statement.

अवस्था - Condition, state.

अविगीत - Unblamed

अविनाभाव - Existence not without (the other); invariable co-existence

अव्याप्ति - (Partial) inapplicability.

असङ्गति - Inconsistency.

असम्भव - Impossibility (of application of definition).

असाधारणधर्म - Defining characteristic.

Rarest Archive

असिद्ध - Unestablished probans

असिद्धि - Unestablishment.

आकाङ्क्षा - Expectancy.

आत्माश्रय - Self dependence.

आश्रय - Support, substratum.

आश्रयासिद्ध(हेतु) - (Probans) unestablished in the 'subject'

इन्द्रियसन्निकर्ष - Contact of a sense organ (with an object).

इष्टापत्ति - Desired, favourable contingency, desired consequence.

ईश - The Lord

उत्पत्ति - Origination, production.

उदाहरण - Illustration (example).

उपक्रम - Commencement

उपचार-छल - Figurative casuistry.

उपदेश - Instruction, teaching.

उपपत्ति - Reasoning, intelligibility, inferential mark, probans

उपमान - Analogy

उपलक्षण - Indication

उपलब्धि - Perception, availability.

उपसंहार - Conclusion.

उपाधि - Extraneous condition (attribute)

ऊह - Guess

एकवाक्य - Statement (group of sentences) containing one thought

ऐतिह्य - Tradition

कर्तृ - Agent

कारण - Cause.

कार्य - Effect.

Rarest Archiver

केवलव्यतिरेकिन्- (Probans having only) negative concomitance.

केवलान्वयिन् - (probans having only) positive concomitance.

चक्रक - Circlur dependence

छल - Trick, casuistry

जाति - Futility, casuistry

ज्ञप्ति - Knowledge.

ज्ञातता - Knownness.

ज्ञान - Cognition.

ज्ञेय - Object of cognition.

तटस्थलक्षण - Incidental definition.

तात्पर्य - Purport.

तारतम्य - Gradation.

तूष्णीभाव - Silence, keeping mum.

दूषणानुमा(न) - Refuting inference.

दृष्टान्त - } Example (a particular place where concomitance is observed).

धर्म - Property, attribute.

धर्मिन् - Possessor of Property,

निगमन - Final conclusion.

निग्रहस्थान - Clincher.

नित्य - Eternal.

निरुक्ति - Etymological explanation.

निर्विकल्पक(प्रत्यक्ष) - Non-conceptual (formless) perception.

न्यून - Less, want/ie deficient,

पक्ष - Subject

पक्षधर्मता - Subject adjunctness.

परतः प्रामाण्य - Extrinsic validity.

परार्थानुमान - -Syllogism for inferential knowledge of others

परिशेष - Residue

Rarest Archiver

परीक्षा - Examination

प्रतियोगिन् - Counter correlative, (positive) counter part, of negation or similarity.

प्रतिवादिन् - Opponent.

प्रतिसन्धान - Recollection of past experience.

प्रत्यक्ष - Direct Perception.

प्रत्यभिज्ञा - Recollection, Recognition

प्रमिति - Correct cognition

प्रमेय - Object to be known through a pramāna.

प्रसङ्ग - Occurrence.

प्रसञ्जन - Contingency (occurrence).

प्रामाण्य - Validity, authoritativeness.

फल - Result.

बाध - Contradiction, stultification.

भोग - Enjoyment.

भौतिक - Material elements etc.

भ्रम } - illusion
भ्रान्ति } Delusion

मान - Pramāna

मानसप्रत्यक्ष - Mental perception

मुक्ति - final liberation

यथार्थ - In accordance with the object.

युक्ति - Reasoning (inference), argument

योग - Meditation.

योगिन् - Yogin

योग्यता - Compitability

योग्यानुपलब्धि - Non perception of what is fit to be perceived

यौगिक - Derivative meaning.

रूप - form, colour.

Rarest Archiver

लक्षण- Definition, defining characteristic.

लक्ष्य- Object to be defined.

लिङ्ग- Probans, inferential mark.

लिङ्गिन्- Subject (of proposition).

वाद - Debate.

वादिन् - Proponent, disputant.

विपक्ष- Counter subject.

विपर्यय- Erroneous knowledge.

विरुद्ध - Contradictory (probans).

विरोध- Contradiction.

विषयिता- Subjectness.

वृद्धि- Increase, growth.

व्यधिकरण- (Being) different substrata.

व्यतिरेक- Negation (negative concomitance).

व्यधिकरण- Having different substrata.

व्यभिचार- Being too wide, wrong deviation.

व्याघात- Self contradiction.

व्यापक- All pervading, pervasive.

व्यापार- Function.

व्याप्य- Pervaded.

व्याप्ति - Concomitance, pervasion.

अव्याप्यत्वासिद्ध- Not established through want of concomitance

व्यावृत्ति - Exclusion.

व्युत्पत्ति - The knowledge of relation between a word and a sense expressed by it.

शब्द - verbal testimony.

संसर्ग- Contact.

संस्कार - Impression.

संकेत - Convention.

Rarest Archiver

सङ्गति - Consistency, relevancy.

समवाय - Inherent existence.

सद्धेतु - (Valid) probans.

संदिग्ध - Doubtful (probans).

सान्निकर्ष - Contact.

सान्निधि - Proximity.

सपक्ष - Similar subject.

समय - Restriction, Condition

समवाय - Inherence

सम्भव - Possibility (as a pramāna)

सविकल्पक - Conceptual.

सव्यभिचार - Straying reason, deviation

साधन - Probans, reason

साधारण - Common

साधर्म्य - Similarity in respect of property.

साध्य - Probandum.

सामानाधिकरण्य - Having one and the same substratum.

सामान्यतो दृष्ट - Seen in general (based on general observation).

सिद्ध - Established.

स्मरण - Recollection

स्मृति - Memory

हानि - Giving up; loss.

हीन - Devoid of.

हेतु - Probans

हेत्वाभास - Fallacy of reason

ह्रास - decrease.

—×—

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